1 Karol Czuba, University of Toronto1 Ethnic Politics in Marsabit Last ...

Karol Czuba, University of Toronto1 Ethnic Politics in Marsabit Last updated on the 15th August 2017 Early draft: Comments, corrections, and suggestions for improvement will be greatly appreciated, but please do not cite. 1. Introduction The transformation of Kenya’s political system initiated by the 2010 constitution—which devolved power to newly created autonomous county governments—has resulted in the emergence of vibrant political life in Marsabit County, an ethnically heterogeneous area in the country’s historically marginalized and neglected northern periphery. This vibrancy reflects the high stakes of contestation between local political agents who seek control over the Marsabit County Government, which came into being following the 2013 elections and commands considerable powers and resources. Due to Marsabit’s population composition, these political agents’ efforts to mobilize popular support have given rise to a form of politics in which the salience of ethnic divisions is particularly marked. As no ethnic group commands absolute majority in the county, local leaders’ pursuit of power has forced them to form interethnic alliances, which—given the competing interests of different ethnic groups and the political agents who represent them—easily fragment, necessitating frequent realignments and, at times, leading to interethnic conflict. In addition, the largest ethnic communities in Marsabit are further divided into sub-ethnic groupings that often play a major role in the interactions between political agents. In this highly dynamic political environment, the role of ethnic and sub-ethnic collective identities is unusually conspicuous. Relatedly, many local political agents display unusual readiness to openly discuss the nature of Marsabit’s political life and explicitly acknowledge the political salience of ethnicity. For this reason, the county offers a particularly suitable location for examination of the phenomenon of ethnic politics, as well as valuable

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[email protected]. I would like to express my gratitude to Dalle Abraham and Woche Guyo Woche, without whose help field research on which this working paper is based would not have been possible.

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insights into the related phenomena of ethnicization and territorialization of collective identities, interethnic conflict and cooperation, and the leadership dynamics within ethnic groups. Relatedly, examination of Marsabit’s political system can make a valuable contribution to the study of ethnic politics. Scholarly interest in the phenomenon—spurred in large part by the identification of strong associations between ethnic fragmentation and economic growth,2 public goods provision,3 and conflict4—has generated a large literature that has paid particular attention to the origins of ethnic identities,5 the conditions under which these collective identities become politically salient,6 the role of ethnicity in conflict,7 and the design of political systems most conducive to successful accommodation of ethnic diversity (and, therefore, to prevention of conflict).8 While this literature has greatly enhanced our understanding of ethnic politics, it suffers from several shortcomings that examination of the political life in Marsabit can help to address. First, because much of the research in the field has prioritized estimation of relationships between variables of interest through statistical analysis of large datasets, the causal connections between those variables have not been adequately explored. In contrast, investigation of political processes in a small-scale setting such as Marsabit allows specification of the causal mechanisms that explain the inter-variable relationship.9 Second, ethnic politics scholars have often incorrectly assumed that ethnic groups act as united, cohesive political organizations and glossed over the issue of agency.10 For this reason, the role of the political agents who mobilize collective identities and construct ethnic organizations, the strategic interactions between such ethnic entrepreneurs, and the ways in which the parameters of political contestation between agents shape those interactions have been largely neglected. Marsabit provides a suitable setting for the analysis of all of these crucial—but under-studied—aspects of ethnic politics. Third, although, as Fearon and Laitin point out, interethnic cooperation is far more common than interethnic conflict, much more attention has been devoted to the latter 2

E.g. Alesina et al. 2003 and 2016; Alesina and La Ferrara 2005; Collier 2000 and 2001; Easterly 2001; Easterly and Levine 1997; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005. 3 E.g. Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999; Alesina and La Ferrara 2005; Habyarimana et al. 2007; McCauley 2014. 4 E.g. Blattman and Miguel 2010; Forsberg, Birnir, and Davenport 2016; Horowitz 1985. 5 E.g. Bates 1974; Young 1976 6 E.g. Posner 2005. 7 E.g. Cederman, Weidmann, Gleditsch; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2009. 8 The Horowitz-Lijphart debate that centres on this last question has been particularly prominent in the study of ethnic politics (e.g. Lijphart 1977; Horowitz 1986 and 1990). 9 Hedström 2005: 40-41; Schelling 1978: 135-167. 10 Salehyan 2017: 64.

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phenomenon.11 The nature of politics in Marsabit allows thorough exploration of the ways in which ethnic groups—and the political agents who seek to lead them—cooperate and of the conditions under which cooperation gives way to interethnic conflict. Fourth, as Birnir, Forsberg, and Davenport argue, the nature of ethnic identity has not been sufficiently investigated by scholarship in the field.12 Examination of ethnic politics in Marsabit offers some valuable insights into the formation and politicization of multiple and often overlapping ethnic (and sub-ethnic) identities. In recent decades the historically highly fluid and malleable collective identities in Marsabit have become increasingly bounded and expressed through demands for exclusive territorial control.13 This process has attracted considerable attention from scholars who study the pastoralist communities of the drylands of East Africa and the Horn.14 They recognize that both phenomena can be attributed largely to the actions of the Kenyan (colonial and postcolonial) authorities. The causal mechanisms that link incorporation of Marsabit into the Kenyan state and the transformation of the area’s collective identities have not, however, been adequately investigated. In this working paper I employ the analytic narrative approach15 to trace the development of Marsabit politics and argue that its highly ethnicized character is the result of the patterns of extension of state power in the area. In particular, I consider the ways in which the process of extension of state power has led to the emergence of new leaders and their efforts to mobilize (and promote) the new conceptualizations of collective identities to gain their coethnics’ support, which they have required to improve their bargaining position in the course of interactions with other political agents: the politicians in charge of the Kenyan central government—to whom I refer as ‘state managers’—customary leaders (who, because of the nature of Marsabit politics, have retained and, at times, increased, their political power), and other new leaders; on different occasions, these interactions have led to interethnic alliance-making or conflict. Since devolution has resulted in effective incorporation of local leaders into the Kenyan state-managing elite, I examine both the interactions between the political agents who operate primarily at the level of the new county government and those within the central government structures and interactions 11

Fearon and Laitin 1996. Birnir, Forsberg, and Davenport 2016: 4. 13 Sobania 1979, 1980, 1988b; Schlee 1989 and 1994a; Spear and Wailer 1993; Witsenburg and Zaal 2012. 14 Galaty 2005 and 2016a; Schlee 2013; Witsenburg and Adano 2007. 15 Bates et al. 1998. 12

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among different local leaders. The paper is based on field research conducted in Marsabit and Nairobi from January to April and in September 2016. 2. Overview At 70,961.2 square kilometres, Marsabit is—in terms of land area—Kenya’s largest county. Because it is also the country’s least densely populated county (with 4 people per square kilometre), however, it is only inhabited by 291,166 people (as of the 2009 census), fewer than all but five of Kenya’s counties.16 Low population density is the result of the county’s physical environment: with the exception of Mount Kulal (close to Loiyangalani), Mount Marsabit (where Marsabit Town is located), and Hurri Hills (in North Horr), nearly all of Marsabit’s territory is desert or semi-desert. For this reason, the livelihood systems of the area’s inhabitants have historically depended on pastoral production; farming in the region, which remains limited, only commenced after the advent of the colonial era. Despite gradual livelihood diversification and sedentarization, pastoralism remains the dominant livelihood strategy in the county, although local ethnic groups display significant variation. The Burji (who were never pastoralists, having migrated to Mount Marsabit only in the early colonial period) primarily engage in agriculture and commerce. Livestock continue to serve as the primary livelihood source for many Ariaal (who keep both camels and cattle) and Borana (who are cattle herders), but some of them have settled on the slopes of Mount Marsabit, where they have diversified into farming and commercial activities in Marsabit Town and, among the Borana, Moyale. Most Gabbra and Rendile keep camels, but settled, non-pastoralist populations have emerged within both groups as well.17 This diversity of livelihood systems corresponds to the county’s ethnic heterogeneity. Because the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) has not released county-level ethnic affiliation data from the 2009 census, estimation of the ethnic composition of Marsabit’s population is necessarily imprecise. However, according to the KNBS, there are 161,399 Borana across Kenya; most of them, probably around 100,000, live in Marsabit.18 The country-level data on ethnic groups that predominantly live in Marsabit closely approximate their numbers within 16

KNBS 2009. Fratkin 2001; Fratkin and Roth 2005; Witsenburg and Adano 2004. 18 Large numbers of the Kenyan Borana also live in Isiolo County. 17

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the county: 23,735 Burji; 12,530 Dassenech; 89,515 Gabbra; 60,437 Rendille; 2,844 El Molo.19 In addition, smaller—but significant—numbers of members of communities that primarily inhabit neighbouring counties are also present in Marsabit; the list includes the Garre, Samburu, Sakuye, Turkana, and Waata.20 The census did not collect data on the Ariaal, an interstitial bicultural and bilingual community which is largely descended from the Rendille but has adopted some Samburu cultural traits.21 The ethnic groups’ political importance is largely the function of their size, although the Burji—a relatively wealthy community concentrated on the central Mount Marsabit—arguably punch above their weight and have joined the powerful Borana, Gabbra, and Rendille as the fourth most influential force in the county’s ethnic politics. The other communities play limited roles in political life in Marsabit, although—as I detail later in the paper—they are sometimes coopted into alliances led by politicians representing the larger groups. Interethnic alliancemaking has been significantly affected by the customary governance systems of the main communities, which I briefly outline below. The customary governance system of the Borana comprises four parallel structures: the hereditary qaluu, the gadaa grade officials (as well as the influential retired gadaa office holders) of the Borana generation-class system, the leaders of the descent segments (moieties, clans, sub-clans, and lineages), and the system of assemblies and councils. Because of the considerable physical distance between Marsabit (and Isiolo) and the centre of Borana society in the highlands of (what is today) Borena Zone in southern Ethiopia, the political influence of the qaluu,22 gadaa system, and Gumii Gaayo has been relatively limited (but not nonexistent, as discussion of the abba gadaa’s involvement in the 2013 elections will demonstrate). Instead, most governance functions among the Kenyan Borana have been historically performed by descent segment leaders and local assemblies.23 The Borana-led Worr Libin alliance, which existed from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century, incorporated most other communities 19

KNBS n.d. The Waata are often categorized as a sub-group of the Borana. Their name is today considered pejorative by some of their leaders, who prefer that the community be referred to as the Wayyu. In addition, a small number of Konso, who primarily reside in Ethiopia, live in Marsabit (Salvadori 2000: 37-44). 21 Fratkin 2001 and 2004; Witsenburg and Adano 2004; Witsenburg 2012; Mugo, Josiah. “Marsabit leaders to unveil new political alliance.” Citizen TV (Kenya), July 24, 2016. https://citizentv.co.ke/news/marsabit-leaders-to-unveilnew-political-alliance-134713/. 22 The political role of the qaluu has in any case been restricted to their appointment as balabbats by the Ethiopian imperial government prior to the 1974 revolution and never extended into Kenya. 23 Bassi 2005; Baxter 1978. 20

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inhabiting the territory of the contemporary Marsabit County, including the Gabbra and Rendille.24 The Gabbra, who speak Afaan Borana but are mostly descended from ancestors who belonged to the proto-Rendille-Somali (PRS) complex,25 consist of five largely independent and self-sufficient phratries (known as ‘drums’) that constitute the political and ritual foci of Gabbra social organization. The authority of the Gabbra customary leaders—the hayyuu (the most important office holders, of whom every phratry has two, one per intra-phratry moiety) and jallaba (who are the representatives of sub-phratry clans)—was historically limited to arbitration and ritual.26 The relative weakness of both the internal cohesion of the Gabbra as a single society and of their customary leaders has significantly constrained inter-phratry coordination of governance functions.27 The Rendille, speakers of a Somaloid language whose origins also lay in the PRS complex, have an even more diffuse governance system. Rendille society consists of nine clans—divided by idiosyncratic cultural practices—that belong to two moieties (and one unaffiliated clan); this structure is further complicated by the unusual position of the Ariaal, who—although a distinct community—are not fully separate from the Rendille (or the White Rendille, as the ‘proper’ Rendille are sometimes called to distinguish them from the Ariaal). This complex social organization imposes significant constraints on elders, in whom the Rendille ageset-based gerontocratic governance system vests political authority; their ability to coordinate decision-making across clans is limited.28 The Kenyan Burji are an offshoot of the larger ethnic group that primarily resides around Lake Chamo in Ethiopia’s southern highlands. Despite the distance between their Ethiopian homeland and Mount Marsabit, where most Kenyan Burji reside,29 a common Burji ethnic

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Schlee 2013; Witsenburg 2012. With the exception of the Algana phratry, which is largely of Borana origin. 26 Most Gabbra phratries—but not the Algana—also have qalluu, or hereditary high priests. 27 Schlee 1989:14-15; Schlee 2008; Soga 2001. 28 Sato 1984; Schlee 1989:9-10; Smith 1998; KO7, member of parliament from Marsabit County, interviewed in Nairobi on the 3rd March 2016. 29 In addition, having played a major role in the development of Marsabit Town, the business-oriented community subsequently established presence in other urban areas, such as Moyale and Nairobi. 25

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identity continues to exist and enhances elders’ considerable ability to coordinate the governance functions that they perform within the community.30 3. Marsabit before devolution 3.1. Precolonial and colonial Marsabit Prior to its incorporation into British East Africa (which in 1920 became the Colony of Kenya) in the late nineteenth century, the area that is now Marsabit County formed a section of the territory controlled by the Worr Libin alliance, which had emerged in the wake of the southward expansion of the Borana in the sixteenth century. The Borana occupied a hegemonic position in Worr Libin, but its other members—the Ajuran, Gabbra, Garre, Rendille, Sakuye, and Waata (Wayyu)—had a degree of influence within the alliance, although they were required to recognize the ritual seniority of the Borana and defer to decisions made within the Borana governance system. In addition to its ritual role, the alliance performed military and resource management functions. Thus, in the late nineteenth century, the member communities jointly repelled the Laikipiak Maasai who had invaded the Rendille; their efforts to stop the westward expansion of the Somali proved, however, less effective. Worr Libin also managed access to the natural resources—primarily water and pasture—necessary for survival in the arid territory, forestalling conflict between the member communities, most of which occupied very similar ecological niches: the Ajuran, Gabbra, Garre, Rendille, and Sakuye were camel-herders, while the Borana kept cattle and the Waata were hunter-gatherers; all groups were nomadic or seminomadic, frequently migrating in search of water and (with the exception of the Waata) pasture. The coordination mechanisms enforced by the alliance effectively prevented conflict over resources and helped to ensure a mostly harmonious coexistence (sometimes referred to as Pax Borana) of the ethnic groups participating in Worr Libin.31 Although these ethnic groups had distinct (but—as the Gabbra and Garre ancestors’ shift from their original PRS languages to Afaan Borana and the later emergence of the Ariaal suggest—often fluid) identities, their highly mobile members commonly established close interethnic ties, intermarried, and—not infrequently—adopted alternative identities. Such was

Mahmoud 2009; KO7, member of parliament from Marsabit County, interviewed in Nairobi on the 3rd March 2016; KO38, civil servant, Marsabit County Government, interviewed in Marsabit on the 13th April and 14th September 2016. 31 Carrier and Kochore 2014; Schlee 1989, 2008, and 2013; Witsenburg 2012. 30

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the flexibility of ethnic affiliation that many clans (units of social organization which often proved more durable and invariable than ethnic groups) are today present in multiple ethnic groups. For example, the originally Borana Karrayyu clan is also represented among the Burji, Konso, and Waata, while members of the Odola clan are dispersed among the Gabbra, Rendille, and Sakuye.32 For this reason, many individuals could easily deploy a range of identities, opting for affiliations most appropriate for particular occasions and settings. According to Schlee, “[a] Rendille who meets a Gabbra can either underline his different ethnicity, especially in a hostile context, or he can point to a clan affiliation which he or one of his relatives shares with the Gabbra in question to establish an in-group relationship.”33 As Schlee’s use of the ethnographic present indicates, this fluidity of ethnic relationships persisted long after the Worr Libin alliance that had facilitated its emergence ceased to exist. When the British and Ethiopian empires expanded into the dryland region in the last years of the nineteenth century, they established government structures that quickly supplanted Worr Libin and took over its previous functions as the guarantor of stability and enforcement mechanism for the resource management system in the area. Following the large-scale migrations of the early colonial period—when most Gabbra and many Borana migrated south to avoid involuntary service on the Ethiopian side of the border, while the Burji took advantage of the new opportunity (made available by British colonization) to access fertile land on the previously uninhabited slopes of Mount Marsabit—both imperial governments sought to curtail mobility, mostly to strengthen their control over the new dryland periphery, but also in part in order to manage resource access and prevent ethnic conflict that might erupt following the dissolution of Worr Libin. To this end, they delineated ethnic territories to which the area’s communities— which had previously been able to roam widely in search of water and pasture—were now restricted. Although the original ‘Galla-Somali Line’ that the British drew to divide the Borana and Somali territories failed to stop Somali expansion and had to be moved westward in 1934, these measures were largely successful (insofar that the colonial authorities’ objectives were realized): despite the minimal administrative presence and expense, the (then) Northern Frontier District (or NFD, which—in addition to Marsabit—included the contemporary Garissa, Isiolo, Mandera, and Wajir counties, and parts of Tana River County) remained mostly stable in the 32 33

Carrier and Kochore 2014; Schlee 1989; Witsenburg and Adano 2004. Schlee 1989: 234.

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colonial period. Preservation of these conditions served the interests of Kenya Colony’s government, which considered the area to be of little value except as a convenient buffer between Ethiopia and the more important areas of white settlement in the southern highlands. Given the absence of government administrators outside Marsabit Town and a few scattered military outposts, the direct impact that formal incorporation of the area into the Kenyan state had on the local communities—which continued to rely on their indigenous governance and livelihood systems—was very limited. The indirect consequences of the colonial period have, however, been significant and far-reaching. First, colonial policies led to ossification of ethnicity in the area; despite the historical fluidity of collective identities in the future Marsabit County, its ethnic map (and the list of communities it contains) has undergone very little change in the course of the last century (see the map below). Second, and relatedly, the link between collective identity and land introduced by the colonial authorities prompted local communities to gradually redefine their understandings of ethnicity. The shift in the nature of interethnic relationships in Marsabit started to become apparent even before the British withdrawal from East Africa.34

Map. Ethnic groups in Marsabit County.35 34 35

Branch 2011: 29; Galaty 2016; Kochore 2016; Salvadori 2000; Schlee 2013; Witsenburg and Adano 2004. From Ember et al. 2014.

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3.2. Postcolonial Marsabit As they prepared to relinquish their control over Kenya Colony, the British authorities decided to transfer the NFD to the Somali Republic, which was formed from the British Somaliland and the Trust Territory of Somaliland (the former Italian Somaliland) and granted independence in 1960. Among Kenyan Somalis, these plans inspired hope of reunification with their ethnic brethren; in the same year, supported by the Isiolo Borana and Rendille, Somali nationalists formed the Northern Province Progressive People’s Party (NPPPP) to campaign for secession; in a referendum which the colonial government organized in 1962, an overwhelming majority of the inhabitants of the NFD voted for secession. This outcome pitted the Somali and their Isiolo Borana and Rendille allies against the Burji, Gabbra, and Marsabit Borana. While the Rendille, who speak a Somaloid language, and Isiolo Borana, who are predominantly Muslim, found a common cause with the Somali, the other former Worr Libin communities in Northern Kenya— only very distantly related to the Somali (who also belong to the Cushitic language family), at that time mostly non-Muslim, and (in the case of the Borana) long threatened by Somali expansionism—did not consider a minority status within a Somali-dominated nation-state to be in their interest.36 For this reason, their interests were aligned with those of the Kenyan elites that took over the country’s administration when it became independent in 1963. The new Kenyan rulers were staunchly opposed to secession, both because they did not wish to lose a fifth of the new country’s territory and because they feared that it would stoke dangerous centrifugal forces (either in the form of demands for self-rule or new secessionist movements) that could threaten Kenya’s stability. The Kenyan government’s rejection of the results of the 1962 referendum led the dissatisfied NPPPP to launch a guerilla war under the umbrella of the Northern Frontier District Liberation Front (NFDLF). The guerillas—or, in government parlance, shifta (or bandits)—attacked government outposts and used weapons which they had acquired from Somalia to gain advantage in the previously largely dormant interethnic conflicts over access to resources; thus, for example, the Rendille successfully displaced the Borana from the Karare area on the southern slopes of Mount Marsabit. The Kenyan government, which in Marsabit was supported by most local ethnic groups, responded to the NFDLF campaign with overwhelming force (as well as great brutality) and, in the period through 1967, successfully contained the rebellion. Although the ‘shifta war,’ as the conflict is 36

Branch 2011: 28-35; Whittaker 2012.

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usually known, ground to a halt, the stability and relative security of the colonial (and precolonial) period did not return. Once the threat of secession was eliminated, the government had few incentives to devote further resources to a territory which—much like its colonial predecessor—it considered to be of low potential. The former guerillas took advantage of the subsequent neglect of the area and transformed themselves into actual bandits; for the next few decades, the murders, robberies, and other criminal acts that they perpetrated made the former NFD a highly dangerous and volatile place.37 Although government presence—and the public services provided to the local population—remained very limited after the conclusion of the shifta war, nominal integration into the postcolonial Kenyan state had significant impacts on the area which, following the dissolution of the NFD (most of which became the Somali-dominated North Eastern Province, while Isiolo and Marsabit were transferred to the new Eastern Province), became Marsabit District (which in the early postcolonial years was coterminous with the contemporary Marsabit County) within the Eastern Province. The interactions between the Kenyan government and the majority of the new district’s population remained largely nonexistent, but a small number of individuals who had received formal education and resided in urban centres was well positioned to take advantage of the limited and slow process of extension of state power that the Kenyan government undertook in the decades following independence. These individuals could access the employment opportunities created by the Kenyan state managers, who needed local administrative officials, police officers and soldiers, members of parliament, and teachers to help to govern the country. Officials who obtained posts in the local administration—either at the district headquarters in Marsabit Town or as chiefs and assistant chiefs in locations and sublocations across the district—served as useful conduits for state managers’ interests in the area, but had no independent power and little influence; in the highly centralized pre-devolution Kenyan state, the Marsabit District Commissioner was centrally appointed, and the most important decisions were made at the Eastern Province headquarters in Embu or in Nairobi. Similarly, although they personally benefitted from their connections with the state, the coercive apparatus personnel—often stationed outside their home areas—had little ability to affect their

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Branch 2011: 28-35; Government of Kenya 1965; Kochore 2016; Salvadori 2000: 7-9; Whittaker 2012.

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coethnics.38 In contrast, members of parliament and teachers had far more ability to influence their coethnics and affect power dynamics in Marsabit District; to do so, they frequently took advantage of—and further encouraged—the shift in the nature of interethnic relations in the area induced by colonial policies.39 For most of Kenya’s postcolonial history members of parliament had little independent power; their status derived from their relationship with the incumbent president. Their ability to control state resources—which were instead channelled through the centralized system of administration—was similarly limited.40 However, even though the structure of the Kenyan state placed significant constraints on members of this subordinate political class, for political agents from marginal communities in Kenya’s periphery, including in Marsabit District, a parliamentary seat offered the best available opportunity to attain a degree of political influence and to access otherwise unreachable resources. For this reason, these positions were highly coveted by members of the small political elite that gradually emerged in Marsabit. Elections in Kenya— although dominated by patronage links with the top echelons of the state-managing elite—were always somewhat competitive, even during the period of one-party rule of the Kenya African National Union (KANU; officially from 1982 to 1992, but de facto from 1963 to 2002). For example, the parliamentary seats in Marsabit North Constituency in 1974 and in Saku Constituency in 1992 were each contested by six candidates.41 To increase their odds of winning, candidates unsurprisingly emphasized their connections to potential voters. In Marsabit, these connections were largely based on ethnic and clan ties. The table on p. 17 contains the list of members of parliament from Marsabit, the constituencies that they have represented, and their ethnic affiliations. In the early postcolonial period, especially, electoral competitiveness reinforced interethnic divisions. In the first parliamentary elections, held in 1963 (shortly before independence), Elisha Daniel Godana—a Burji tax clerk in the British commissioner’s office in Marsabit Town—took advantage of the Rendille boycott of the elections and was elected the 38

Although, as I discuss later in the paper, the prestige associated with successful military career has proved highly valuable for one of post-devolution Marsabit County’s most influential political agents, the retired colonel and MP for Saku Constituency Ali Rasso Dido. 39 Kochore 2016; KO3, member of parliament from Marsabit County, interviewed in Nairobi on the 23rd February 2016. 40 At least prior to the establishment of Constituency Development Funds in 2003. 41 Soga 2001.

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member of parliament for the Rendille-majority Marsabit South Constituency, even though no Burji lived there. His election stoked tensions with the Rendille, who—as the failure of the secessionist movement became apparent—chose to join Kenyan political life and won the seat in the ‘little general election’ of 1966. Elisha regained a seat in parliament in 1974, this time in Marsabit North Constituency, which was split between the Borana, Burji, and Gabbra. Following the creation of a separate Moyale Constituency in 1966, the Gabbra were the largest community and usually won elections in Marsabit North; with the exception of Elisha’s 1974-1979 tenure, a Gabbra represented Marsabit North in parliament in every year the constituency existed (19631988). The Gabbra dominance of the constituency contributed to growing hostility between the three ethnic groups. Elisha’s victory in 1974 was, however, the result not of interethnic tensions, but of an intra-Gabbra split: the incumbent (and future) MP Alex Isako Umuro, a Gabbra from Galbo phratry, was challenged by his predecessor, the former Marsabit-Moyale Constituency MP Galgallo Godana, a Gar Gabbra, and Haro Tulu Godana, an Algana Gabbra.42 The dynamics of the 1974 elections in Marsabit North point to the other force in Marsabit politics: intra-ethnic divisions. As existing constituencies were split into smaller, mostly ethnically homogenous electoral districts, such internal discord became increasingly prominent over time. Thus, after 1966, when the Rendille leader Mohamed Kholkholle Adichareh—at the time imprisoned for his participation in the shifta war43—urged his coethnics to vote for his surrogate Philip Kurungu (whom Kholkholle replaced as the MP in 1969), all elections in Marsabit South Constituency (in 1988 renamed Laisamis Constituency) were won by the Rendille (or Ariaal). Similarly, with the exception of the 1974 elections won by the wealthy Barawani44 businessman Mohamed Osman Said, the parliamentary seat in the Borana-majority Moyale Constituency was held exclusively by Borana politicians. Interethnic competition continued in Marsabit North Constituency until 1988, when it was split into North Horr and Saku constituencies. The Gabbra had no challengers in North Horr; Saku Constituency, which comprises Marsabit Town and surrounding communities on Mount Marsabit, is more ethnically heterogeneous, but the Borana are the largest community and won all parliamentary contests in the constituency. In this situation, intra-ethnic identities usually overshadowed ethnicity as the

Soga 2001; KO38, civil servant, Marsabit County Government, interviewed in Marsabit on the 13th April and 14th September 2016; KO81, retired teacher, Marsabit County, interviewed in Marsabit on the 15th September 2016. 43 Kholkholle was the deputy leader of the NPPPP. 44 The Barawani are a community of mixed ancestry that originated in Barawa in Somalia. 42

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most salient markers of political division. Given the high degree of phratry autonomy and weak coherence of the common ethnic identity, intra-ethnic discord was often particularly pronounced among the Gabbra. Thus, Galgallo Godana (MP from 1963 to 1969), a Gar, competed with his successor Alex Isako Umuro (MP from 1969 to 1982), a Galbo, in the 1969 and 1974 elections, although after the defeat they both suffered at the hands of Elisha Daniel Godana in 1974 Gabbra leaders agreed to unite behind a single candidate, Alex Isako, in the 1979 elections. After Alex Isako was killed by the shifta in 1982, Galgallo Godana returned to politics, but was defeated by Abdikadir Yatani, an Algana, in the elections held in the following year. Abdikadir lost his seat in the subsequent elections, in 1988 (in the newly created Gabbra-majority North Horr Constituency), to another Gar, Bonaya Adhi Godana, who—despite challenges from candidates from other phratries (including Abdikadir in 1992)—held on to it until (together with all other incumbent members of parliament from Marsabit) he died in an aviation accident in 2006. The dominant position that Bonaya—and, therefore, the Gar—occupied in Gabbra political life inspired such intra-ethnic discord that, according to Soga, in the wake of the 1997 elections the Algana effectively seceded from the Gabbra society;45 the Algana ultimately regained the seat in 2007, when Francis Chachu Ganya defeated Bonaya’s Gar successor Ukur Yatani (later the first governor of Marsabit County).46 Although the population composition of parliamentary constituencies limited political agents’ need to tap into—and incite—interethnic tensions to build their popular support, interethnic divisions played a major role in other arenas in which the fledgling political life in Marsabit took place. The smaller communities especially detested the perceived continuing supremacy of the Borana, the former hegemons of Worr Libin. Their ability to dominate Marsabit politics was constrained by the central control of the district administrative apparatus and the distribution of the Borana population, which is split between Mount Marsabit and the southernmost reaches of the Ethiopian highlands around Moyale and Sololo; for this reason, until 1988, the Borana could realistically only elect one of their coethnics as an MP (in Moyale Constituency). The Borana did, however, use their numerical strength across the district to gain control over some political bodies; most notable among them was the district branch of the 45

Soga 2001. Guyo 2013; Soga 2001; KO38, civil servant, Marsabit County Government, interviewed in Marsabit on the 13th April and 14th September 2016; KO81, retired teacher, Marsabit County, interviewed in Marsabit on the 15th September 2016. 46

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influential Kenya National Union of Teachers (KNUT). Teachers—relatively numerous, well educated, and often posted to schools in areas inhabited by their coethnics—had the ability to significantly influence political life in Marsabit (and, as I detail later in the paper, some of them subsequently joined formal politics). When in 1988 the new Moyale District was carved out of the larger Marsabit District, the Burji, Gabbra, and Rendille leaders—dissatisfied with the decision made in the same year to create the Borana-majority Saku Constituency—took advantage of the decrease in the number of Borana teachers in the now smaller Marsabit District, which gave the three smaller groups a majority in the local structures of KNUT. A member of parliament recalls that “when Marsabit was a district, the Borana were the largest group. Every time we go for election, the Borana would win, because all communities would go as individuals. So, at one point they made the decision to form a coalition against the Borana.”47 In a momentous move for Marsabit politics, Rendille, Gabbra, and Burji teachers formed an interethnic alliance that was dubbed ReGaBu, which dominated KNUT structures in the district for the next few decades, periodically rotating its leadership between members from the three communities.48 In these conditions, interethnic hostility gradually increased, frequently fanned by political agents who sought to use it to reinforce their hold over their coethnics. For example, facing regular electoral challenges from representatives of other phratries, Bonaya Godana sought to strengthen a sense of pan-Gabbra cultural and political identity. These efforts were necessarily oriented against the former Borana hegemony and triggered antagonistic responses from the Borana.49 It is in this context that—following a series of violent interethnic clashes that took place earlier in the decade—in 2005 a group of Borana attacked the Gabbra settlement of Turbi, located close to the boundary between North Horr and Moyale constituencies along the main road from Marsabit to Moyale. The victims were indiscriminately sprayed with gunfire and hacked to death with pangas and spears; an infant had his head smashed on a rock. Between



KO7, member of parliament from Marsabit County, interviewed in Nairobi on the 3rd March 2016. KO5, national government civil servant from Marsabit, interviewed in Nairobi on the 25th February 2016; KO7, member of parliament from Marsabit County, interviewed in Nairobi on the 3rd March 2016; KO38, civil servant, Marsabit County Government, interviewed in Marsabit on the 13th April and 14th September 2016; KO74, Borana member of the Marsabit County Assembly, interviewed in Marsabit on the 24th April 2016; KO81, retired teacher, Marsabit County, interviewed in Marsabit on the 15th September 2016. 49 Salvadori offers a detailed list of interethnic clashes in Marsabit during the 1990s (Salvadori 2000: 45-73 and 123128). 47 48

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seventy and ninety-five people, including twenty-one to twenty-three children,50 were killed that day.51 The massacre inspired revenge attacks, including an incident in which ten Borana churchgoers in Bubisa (in North Horr) were hacked and speared to death. The Borana and Gabbra MPs—Abdi Tari Sasura (Saku), Guracha Galgallo (Moyale), and Bonaya Godana (North Horr)—subsequently traded accusations over the attack, further increasing interethnic tensions. Political agents capitalized on the sense of threat that these tensions inspired to bring their coethnics under ever closer political control. Their ability to do so was further enhanced by the creation of the Constituency Development Funds (CDF) in 2003, which MPs used to channel resources to their coethnics. Both before and after Kenya’s democratization, as long as local leaders remained loyal to their political patrons within the state-managing elite, the central government did not interfere with the methods that they used to build popular support. Although all sitting members of parliament from Marsabit and Moyale districts died in a plane crash in 2006, their successors—who continued to benefit from interethnic divisions—had no reason to change the ethnicity-centric structure of Marsabit politics, which became increasingly entrenched.52 Ethnic and sub-ethnic identities gradually emerged as the parameters that structured political interactions in Marsabit. Political agents’ success in this setting depended—in addition to their loyalty to the state-managing elite—on their ability to mobilize ethnic and sub-ethnic voting blocks. The choice of the most appropriate collective identity was shaped by electoral systems in place at the level of constituencies and the district. The population distribution of parliamentary constituencies generally structured political agents’ payoffs in such a way that they were better off relying on sub-ethnic allegiances, which limited the size of the winning coalition. In district-level elections, clans and phratries were, however, too small to constitute viable alternatives to ethnic group allegiances. Given political agents’ incentives, erosion of the primacy of these collective identities was improbable. As devolution approached, the parameters 50

Different reports offer conflicting numbers. The assailants also raided approximately 4,000 camels, 3,000 heads of cattle, and 5,000 sheep before fleeing across the border to Ethiopia. 52 Carrier and Kochore 2014; Galaty 2016; Kochore 2016; Mwangi 2006; Witsenburg 2012; “Peace calls dominate Marsabit plane crash 10th anniversary.” Star (Nairobi), April 11, 2016 . http://www.thestar.co.ke/news/2016/04/11/peace-calls-dominate-marsabit-plane-crash-10th-anniversary_c1329360/.; KA14, Anglican priest, interviewed in Marsabit on the 24th April 2016; KO3, member of parliament from Marsabit County, interviewed in Nairobi on the 23rd February 2016; KO76, Borana member of the Marsabit County Assembly, interviewed in Marsabit on the 27th April 2016. 51

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of contestation for its many rewards were, therefore, already set. For this reason, the transformation of Kenya’s political system after 2010 did not significantly alter the nature of Marsabit politics. However, because of the scale of resources that were now made available to the victors of the struggle for power in Marsabit, the stakes of political contestation increased dramatically. Table. Members of parliament from Marsabit. Year

1963

1966 1969 1974 1979 1983

Marsabit South Constituency (since 1988, Laisamis Constituency) Elisha Daniel Godana (Burji) Philip Kurungu (Rendille) Mohamed Kholkholle Adichareh (Rendille) Mohamed Kholkholle Adichareh (Rendille) Mohamed Kholkholle Adichareh (Rendille) Mohamed Kholkholle Adichareh (Rendille)

1988

Samuel Ntontoi Bulyaar (Rendille)

1992

Robert Iltaramatwa Kochalle (Rendille)

1997

Robert Iltaramatwa Kochalle (Rendille)

2002

Titus Ngoyoni (Rendille)

2006 (by-elections)

Joseph Lamasolai Lekuton (Ariaal)

2007

Joseph Lamasolai Lekuton (Ariaal)

2013

Joseph Lamasolai Lekuton (Ariaal)

Marsabit-Moyale Constituency

Galgallo Godana (Gar Gabbra) Marsabit North Constituency Galgallo Godana (Gar Gabbra) Alex Isako Umuro (Galbo Gabbra) Elisha Daniel Godana (Burji) Alex Isako Umuro (Galbo Gabbra) (killed in 1982) Abdikadir Yatani (Algana Gabbra) North Horr Saku Constituency Constituency Bonaya Adhi Jillo Jarso (J. Godana (Gar J.) Falana Gabbra) (Borana) Bonaya Adhi Jillo Jarso (J. Godana (Gar J.) Falana Gabbra) (Borana) Bonaya Adhi Abdi Tari Godana (Gar Sasura Gabbra) (Borana) Bonaya Adhi Abdi Tari Godana (Gar Sasura Gabbra) (Borana) Ukur Yatani Hussein Kanacho (Gar Sasura Gabbra) (Borana) Francis Chachu Hussein Ganya (Algana Sasura Gabbra) (Borana) Francis Chachu Ali Rasso Ganya (Algana Dido Gabbra) (Borana)

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Moyale Constituency Sora Ali Galgallo (Borana) Abajillo Osman Araru (Borana) Mohamed Osman Said (Barawani) Guyo Halake Liban (Borana) Mohamed Malicha Galgallo (Borana)

Philip Galma Godana (Borana) Mohamed Malicha Galgallo (Borana) Guracha Boru Galgallo (Borana) Guracha Boru Galgallo (Borana) Malla Wario Galgallo (Borana) Mohammed Mahmud Ali (known as Abshiro) (Borana) Roba Sharu Duba (Borana)

4. Marsabit since devolution 4.1. The 2013 elections Marsabit County came into existence with the promulgation of Kenya’s new constitution in 2010. Following a period of extensive preparation—which was necessary to implement the radical reorganization of the Kenyan state envisioned by the constitution—the devolved government of the new county was established in 2013.53 Devolution radically transformed the relationship between the inhabitants of Marsabit and the Kenyan state. The following comment by a member of parliament from Marsabit illustrates the nature and scope of the changes that the area has experienced: Devolution has been a major move forward for the region, where in terms of resources what used to be at the centre has been moved to the periphery… and also in terms of empowering the leadership of a marginalized region. We are able to see for the first time the sort of dependence we had. […] We feel that devolution has been like a new dawn of independence, particularly for Northern Kenya, and for the region I come from: Marsabit. […] What used to happen was that Nairobi was the hub of everything. If you wanted anything, you had to drive all the way to Nairobi, to access not only resources, but also the most basic government services. But I think there is that attempt to tell you that you’re responsible for your water, you’re responsible for your health services, you’re responsible for your basic infrastructure, like roads, like having functional [unclear], and employing your manpower. Before, most of employment used to be out of Nairobi. If you didn’t come to Nairobi, you wouldn’t get a reasonable employment, no matter how qualified you were. But I think with the devolution there has been a push to the periphery. But there are still issues and matters you must consult and coordinate with the centre. The other thing in the olden days… you had what you almost considered to be a government outpost of administrators, a police station, maybe a military camp. For the purposes of law and order, and for the sort of government outreach. But in terms of distribution of resources, in terms of development, they were inadequate to a big extent. Because if you wanted a road or a dam built, you had to go to an office in Nairobi.54 This statement identifies the key components of the new political reality in Marsabit. After decades of marginalization as a peripheral and—from the state managers’ point of view— unimportant part of Kenya, Marsabit (as well as the other counties in Northern Kenya) has, for the first time since its incorporation into British East Africa, been granted a degree of formal autonomy from the central government. The new county government—which the constitution makes responsible for such important functions as pre-primary school (early childhood 53 54

CIC 2014. KO3, member of parliament from Marsabit County, interviewed in Nairobi on the 23rd February 2016.

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development) education, health, livestock production, and local transport infrastructure—can provide Marsabit’s inhabitants with public services that in many cases had previously always been out of reach. To do so, it requires administrators, animal husbandry specialists, educators, engineers, medical staff, and other personnel. This demand creates employment opportunities that also had never before existed in Marsabit. The ability to offer employment and public services greatly increases the power of the political agents who control the county government; no longer tools of the powerful central government, because of devolution they have acquired an independent source of power that grants them status comparable to that of the state managers in charge of the central government (whose power has, in contrast, diminished considerably). This transformation has been possible because of the decentralization of budget allocation, of which Marsabit County has been a major beneficiary. Although data are scarce, the pre-devolution centrally administered funds that reached Marsabit’s inhabitants—and provided them with indisputably inadequate public services—appear to have been negligible. In contrast, between 2013 and 2017 the county government was allocated over KES 20 billion (approximately USD 195 million; KES 250 million in the 2012/2013 financial year, KES 4 billion in 2013/2014, KES 4.6 billion in 2014/2015, KES 5.4 billion in 2015/2016, and KES 5.8 billion in 2016/2017), a staggering sum of money in what remains one of the poorest places in the world.55 The resources that it would manage—and the power they granted—made the office of the governor, who controls the county government, very attractive to political agents in Marsabit. Given the nature of Marsabit politics, ambitious political agents who wished to secure this position in the 2013 elections had little choice but to tap into their ethnic networks. In the gubernatorial and senatorial contests, the population composition of Marsabit County entailed, however, a more complex ethnic arithmetic compared to elections in the largely ethnically homogenous parliamentary constituencies. As a member of parliament from the county recalls, “when planning for the election we knew that nobody could win in Marsabit alone.”56 Similarly to the pre-1988 Marsabit District, the Borana were the largest group, but fell considerably short of majority. Furthermore, because of the perception of hegemonic tendencies of the Borana the 55

CRA n.d.; Salvadori 2000: 13-25; KO66, member of the Marsabit County Executive Committee, interviewed in Marsabit on the 26th April 2016; KO75, Borana member of the Marsabit County Assembly, interviewed in Marsabit on the 27th April 2016; KO79, Rendille member of the Marsabit County Assembly, interviewed in Nairobi on the 29th April 2016). (In 2005/2006, Marsabit’s poverty gap was 42.2, compared to 19 across Kenya; CRA 2013. 56 KO7, member of parliament from Marsabit County, interviewed in Nairobi on the 3rd March 2016.

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smaller communities continued to be negatively predisposed to the prospect of Borana domination of the new county government. Conveniently, these non-Borana ethnic groups had a well-established and successful model that they could emulate to construct a political bulwark that could prevent a Borana victory in the forthcoming elections: the ReGaBu alliance originally established in the KNUT.57 Leaders of the Gabbra, the largest ReGaBu community, “wanted to go for the governors, had the foresight to be governors. They talked to the Burji and the Garre [as well as the Rendille and Sakuye—KC].”58 First, however, they had to address internal disunity within the ethnic group. To do so, the leading candidate, the Gar former North Horr MP and, at the time, Kenyan ambassador to Austria Ukur Yatani, mobilized the Gabbra customary leaders. Although the divisions—and, at times, outright discord—between Gabbra phratries remain pronounced, in the preceding decades their historically relatively weak customary leaders, the hayyuu and jallaba, had gradually strengthened their control over fellow phratry members. In 2012, following discussions between phratry leaders at Kalacha, an oasis hamlet in Chalbi Desert, they chose to offer Ukur their support in his quest to become Marsabit’s first governor. The power that the customary leaders jointly commanded over Gabbra voters guaranteed Ukur’s position as the sole gubernatorial challenger from the Gabbra community. This display of pan-Gabbra unity—only the second such occurrence since 196359—demonstrates the importance that Gabbra leaders (both customary and those directly engaged in state-based politics) attached to the forthcoming gubernatorial contest.60 With his position within the Gabbra community secure, Ukur set out to construct an alliance on the basis of the ReGaBu coalition, which provided a successful model of interethnic cooperation in Marsabit’s divisive politics. According to a well-informed respondent, “Ukur

KO38, civil servant, Marsabit County Government, interviewed in Marsabit on the 13th April and 14th September 2016; KO74, Borana member of the Marsabit County Assembly, interviewed in Marsabit on the 24th April 2016; KO81, retired teacher, Marsabit County, interviewed in Marsabit on the 15th September 2016. 58 KO7, member of parliament from Marsabit County, interviewed in Nairobi on the 3rd March 2016; also KO81, retired teacher, Marsabit County, interviewed in Marsabit on the 15th September 2016. 59 The first one was in 1979. 60 Meanwhile, as in the earlier parliamentary elections, the seat of the North Horr MP saw an inter-phratry contest between the incumbent Francis Chachu Ganya and Bonaya Huri (Carrier and Kochore 2014.; “Gabbra Youth and Proffesionals [sic] Refute Amb[.] Ukur’s Endorsement.” Marsabit Times, June 19, 2016. http://marsabitimes.com/gabbra-youth-and-proffesionals-refute-amb-ukurs-endorsement/.; KO5, national government civil servant from Marsabit, interviewed in Nairobi on the 25th February 2016; KO7, member of parliament from Marsabit County, interviewed in Nairobi on the 3rd March 2016; KO38, civil servant, Marsabit County Government, interviewed in Marsabit on the 13th April and 14th September 2016). 57

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used an existing body, made it more political, and galvanized the three tribes as the ladder to power.”61 To obtain Burji and Rendille support, he offered them the positions of the deputy governor and senator, respectively. He also sought to expand the alliance to include smaller communities that might give it an electoral edge over the Borana; to this end, the position of the woman member of parliament was offered to the Garre. The new coalition was not as cohesive as Ukur might have wished. For example, the Gabbra broke the coalition agreement and fielded their own candidate for the position of a member of the county assembly in the multiethnic Central Ward in Marsabit Town, preventing the Burji candidate from winning and effectively handing the seat to the Borana. On the other hand, the Burji decided against fully throwing their weight behind the ReGaBu alliance and provided not only Ukur, but also his primary Borana challenger Mohammed Mahmud Ali (known as Abshiro) with candidates for the position of the deputy governor. Similarly, the weak internal cohesion of the Rendille resulted in a split vote in which only a small majority of the community’s members supported Ukur.62 The pressure that these divisions placed on Ukur and his alliance was, however, alleviated by internal Borana discord. Political agents from two Borana clans, the then Moyale MP Mohammed Ali (or Abshiro) from the Karrayyu (Sabo moiety) and NGO worker Chachu Tadicha from the Warra Jidda (or Jilitu; Gona moiety), hoped to contest the position of the governor. Although, compared to the Gabbra phratries, Borana inter-clan (and inter-moiety) relations are generally relatively harmonious, leaders of both clans recognized the great power that leadership of the new county government offered. Unable to resolve their differences, supporters of both candidates chose to appeal to customary authorities or, more specifically, the gadaa official who formally occupies the apex of the Borana governance system: the then abba gadaa Guyyo Goba Bule. Possibly acting on the orders of Ethiopian state managers, who might have hoped that—as an inexperienced representative of a relatively small clan—Chachu would be more amendable to their influence than the powerful Abshiro, Guyyo Goba chose Chachu as the Borana candidate in the Marsabit gubernatorial contest. Having received advance notice of



KO81, retired teacher, Marsabit County, interviewed in Marsabit on the 15th September 2016. KO7, member of parliament from Marsabit County, interviewed in Nairobi on the 3rd March 2016; KO81, retired teacher, Marsabit County, interviewed in Marsabit on the 15th September 2016. 61 62

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the decision, however, Abshiro boycotted the planned meeting with the abba gadaa and determined to run in the elections regardless of Guyyo Goba’s verdict.63 This turn of events demonstrates not only the relative political weakness of the office of the abba gadaa (whose edict could be safely ignored by an influential politician), but also, more broadly, the constraints on the power of customary leaders in Marsabit—Burji, Gabbra, and Rendille as much as Borana—who, despite their continuing influence, cannot impose their decisions on powerful new leaders. On the other hand, although a powerful political agent with a well-established support base (such as Abshiro) does not necessarily have to heed customary leaders’ pronouncements, newer entrants to politics cannot afford to disregard the will of leaders who continue to be widely respected by their constituents. Thus, when—in a situation somewhat analogous to the intra-Borana contestation in the gubernatorial elections—two popular, but politically inexperienced, Borana candidates sought to replace the poorly-regarded incumbent Saku MP Hussein Sasura64 and local customary leaders failed to agree on a single contender (threatening the Borana hold on the ethnically heterogeneous Saku Constituency), the matter was forwarded to Guyyo Goba, who chose the retired army colonel Ali Rasso Dido as the Borana parliamentary candidate in Saku. Abba gadaa’s decision was not questioned and Ali Rasso subsequently won the election. Abshiro’s challenge to Guyyo Goba’s authority proved less successful: although, thanks to his personal popularity and the support base (and wealth) that he had built as the Moyale MP, he received a much larger number of votes (thirty-five thousand) than Chachu (six thousand), the intra-Borana split gave Ukur—supported by his interethnic alliance—a significant majority of the vote (forty-eight thousand) in the gubernatorial election. Simultaneously, political agents representing the other ethnic groups that made up ReGaBu obtained the district-level positions that they contested: Omar Abdi Ali, a Burji, was elected the deputy governor; Abubakar Godana Hargura, a Rendille, became the Marsabit senator; and Nasra Ibrahim Ibren, a Garre, was the county’s first woman representative in parliament. This result illustrates the complex relationship between customary and new leaders in Marsabit: neither category of agents has sufficient power to ignore the wishes of the other. Ukur’s decision to coordinate his actions with Gabbra phratry leaders—as well as representatives of other ethnic 63

Carrier and Kochore 2014; KO76, Borana member of the Marsabit County Assembly, interviewed in Marsabit on the 27th April 2016. 64 Hussein Sasura had been elected to the seat following the death of his brother Abdi Tari Sasura in the 2006 aviation accident.

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groups—allowed him to gain control of the most powerful office that any political agent from Marsabit had every occupied, while Abshiro lost both the gubernatorial contest and his seat in parliament (which he had given up to contest the position of the governor).65 The 2013 elections marked a radical break in the nature of the relationship between state managers in charge of the central government of Kenya and those political agents in Marsabit— Ukur and his ReGaBu associates—who gained control over the new county government and, because of the resources now at their command, acquired a source of power largely independent of their former political patrons. Nevertheless, pre-election political campaigning required significant funding which—prior to the launch of the county government—could only be obtained from the powerful Kenyan political agents and the parties that they had established as their electoral vehicles, the most important of which were two political blocks: 1) the Jubilee Alliance, led by Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto and primarily comprised of Uhuru’s The National Alliance (TNA) and Ruto’s United Republican Party (URP), and 2) the Coalition for Reform and Democracy (CORD), led by Raila Odinga, Kalonzo Musyoka, and Moses Wetangula and composed of a large number of parties, including Raila’s Orange Democratic Movement (ODM). For this reason, despite their imminent autonomy, Marsabit local leaders needed to attach themselves to national political parties. Simultaneously, the combination of population growth and the constitutional stipulation that a successful presidential candidate must secure twenty-five percent of the vote in at least twenty-four (out of forty-seven) counties tremendously increased the electoral importance of Northern Kenya in 2013; the established parties could no longer afford to ignore the region as they had in the past.66 To this end, the political blocks operating at the county and national levels formed partnerships. Alliance-making between them was largely determined by Abshiro’s early allegiance to Ruto’s URP. A ReGaBu member of the Marsabit County Assembly explains: We were all in Jubilee initially, us and the Borana, too. But then the URP candidate [Abshiro—KC] was Borana. We felt they may not give us a TNA ticket, because they were too close: URP and TNA. Mohammed Ali was a founding member of the URP. Ruto had 65

Dalle 2015; Barasa, Lucas, and Ken Bett. “Gabra elders to name final choice for Marsabit governor.” Daily Nation, December 7, 2016. http://www.nation.co.ke/counties/marsabit/Gabra-final-choice-Marsabitgovernor/3444778-3477862-kkapswz/index.html/.; KO76, Borana member of the Marsabit County Assembly, interviewed in Marsabit on the 27th April 2016; KO80, Borana politician, interviewed in Marsabit on the 14th September 2016. 66 Carrier and Kochore 2014.

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a lot of influence in the dryland areas. We felt he may not allow us to compete. So, our being in CORD is not because we wanted to be in CORD, not because we believed in that, but because it was a fallback position. It was a vessel for us to win the election.67 Thus, Abshiro contested under the umbrella of the Jubilee Alliance—which won the national presidential and National Assembly elections—while ReGaBu joined forces with CORD. Because of the impending devolution, for the first time since the 1997 return of multiparty politics to Kenya the formation of these alignments between Marsabit and national political agents signified genuine alliance-making (between political agents of comparable standing), rather than a patron-client relationship, elevating the status of Marsabit local leaders. For this reason, despite his loss, Kenyatta and Ruto (now president and deputy president, respectively) rewarded Abshiro with a convenient sinecure—chairmanship of the board of the National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF)—from which he could prepare to contest governorship again in 2017; at the same time, another Marsabit Borana, Hassan Gurach Wario Arero, became the Cabinet Secretary for Sports, Culture, and the Arts.68 The inclusion of Marsabit local leaders in Kenyan state managers’ alliance-making and the increased role of customary leaders were two new characteristics of Marsabit politics introduced in the 2013 elections. They joined its more familiar components: the uneasy balancing between inter- and intra-ethnic allegiances and, predictably, interethnic violence. Shortly after the ReGaBu victory, clashes between the Borana and Gabbra erupted in Moyale. They continued until early 2014 and led to the death of more than one hundred people and— supposedly—to displacement of 72,000 of Moyale’s inhabitants, a number roughly equivalent to the total population of the former district; 30,000 of them fled to Ethiopia.69 The relations between the Borana and Gabbra were so bad that the Anglican Church of Kenya had to fly Borana clergymen from Marsabit to Moyale for fear that they would be attacked in the Gabbra territory between the two towns. The Marsabit county commissioner70 accused politicians of



KO79, Rendille member of the Marsabit County Assembly, interviewed in Nairobi on the 29th April 2016. KO5, national government civil servant from Marsabit, interviewed in Nairobi on the 25th February 2016; KO7, member of parliament from Marsabit County, interviewed in Nairobi on the 3rd March 2016; KO38, civil servant, Marsabit County Government, interviewed in Marsabit on the 13th April and 14th September 2016; KO79, Rendille member of the Marsabit County Assembly, interviewed in Nairobi on the 29th April 2016. 69 These figures likely overestimate the number of affected individuals. 70 Centrally appointed official who replaced—and performs some of the functions of—the former district commissioner. 67 68

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fueling the conflict, which only came to an end following the intervention of the central government and the involvement of Borana and Gabbra customary leaders.71 4.2. The protagonists of contemporary Marsabit politics The political agents who ushered in this new era of Marsabit politics for the most part belong to the same category of individuals who had previously served as the local conduits of the national government. Although some poorly educated community representatives were elected in 2013 to the new Marsabit County Assembly, the majority of its members—and all the more influential political agents who obtained the higher-ranking positions of the governor, deputy governor, and seats in parliament—belong to the small class of educated inhabitants of Marsabit. In a county where in 2013 the literacy rate was 26.2 percent, the leading political agents’ educational credentials stand out. Hassan Wario, the Cabinet Secretary for Sports, Culture, and the Arts, has a PhD from the University of East Anglia. Governor Ukur Yatani obtained a Master’s degree from the University of York. Senator Abubakar Godana Hargura is an engineer, with a Master’s degree from the Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology. Three of Marsabit’s MPs also hold Master’s degrees: Joseph Lamasolai Lekuton (Laisamis) from Harvard University, Francis Chachu Ganya (North Horr) from George Mason University, and Ali Rasso Dido (Saku) from King’s College London. The education that they received allowed these individuals to acquire administrative experience through employment in various state institutions. Thus, both Hargura and Ukur started their careers as Marsabit District officials, Ali Rasso was a military officer, and Chachu Ganya ran the National Cereals and Produce Board. Before he joined politics, Lekuton worked as a schoolteacher in the United States, continuing the long tradition of educators’ involvement in Marsabit politics. Mirroring the transplantation of ReGaBu from KNUT to formal political life, a number of teachers also became influential powerbrokers in the county: Lekuton himself followed in the footsteps of Alex Isako Umuro, the two-term Gabbra Marsabit North MP, while three out of ten members of Ukur’s county executive committee (CEC; equivalent to the ministerial cabinet of the county government) were former teachers. 71

Saferworld 2015; “Escalating clashes in northern Kenya.” IRIN News, December 11, 2013. http://www.irinnews.org/report/99312/briefing-escalating-clashes-northern-kenya/.; “Hundreds displaced following Moyale clashes.” Star (Nairobi), December 6, 2013. http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2013/12/06/hundredsdisplaced-following-moyale-clashes_c868177/.; KA14, Anglican priest, interviewed in Marsabit on the 24th April 2016.

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Relatedly, teachers played a key role in mobilizing support in the 2013 elections: “[t]eachers are people on the ground. Since teachers are well spread, we used them as our grassroots people.”72 Some political agents in Marsabit already had an established support base: Abshiro, Chachu, Lekuton, and Ukur had previously served in parliament and built the connections they needed to successfully contest their chosen positions. However, Kenya’s post-devolution political system created a large number of new positions that were now open for contestation; these roles had to be filled by relative newcomers. Given their close connections to the communities in which they are based, teachers were in a good position to launch political careers, but it was not the only path to candidacy. For example, because of the high status that the Borana society historically accorded those who kill members of enemy communities—a social institution that Schlee has infamously referred to as a ‘killer complex’73—Ali Rasso was, as a retired colonel in the Kenyan army, well positioned to demonstrate his Borantiti (or Boranness) to potential constituents.74 Alternatively, contenders could tap into their social networks; a member of the Marsabit County Assembly, a former banker, provides the following description of his experience: Support on the ground is important. Elders and the old political leadership are very important […] At the bank I was always close to people with resources. And they were satisfied with the service I provided them with. I would always come out of the back office and help: help the elderly, guide them, in terms of what accounts they should open, what services the bank provides. I had a good rapport with the leadership of the district: the DC [district commissioner—KC], the prison warden. If someone was arrested by the police, I would save them, because of my connections with those people. And they felt that already I’d been serving them well, and in politics I would serve them better. I learned who is who in my community while I was in the bank. So, when I went to the field, I knew who is who.75 Successful candidates had to, therefore, both establish—or tap into existing—connections with their potential constituents and align themselves to powerful political leaders. The latter task required that prospective office-holders navigate the often complex relationships between the

KO81, retired teacher, Marsabit County, interviewed in Marsabit on the 15th September 2016; also Tablino 2004; KO3, member of parliament from Marsabit County, interviewed in Nairobi on the 23rd February 2016; KO7, member of parliament from Marsabit County, interviewed in Nairobi on the 3rd March 2016; KO74, Borana member of the Marsabit County Assembly, interviewed in Marsabit on the 24th April 2016. 73 Schlee 1989. 74 Dalle 2015. 75 Member of Marsabit County Assembly. 72

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most influential political agents in Marsabit. While the nature of the county-level elections largely limited interethnic tensions in 2013 to the contest between the Borana on the one hand and the ReGaBu communities on the other—and, therefore, between Abshiro (and Chachu Tadicha) and Ukur—intra-ethnic divisions played a major role in the poll. The clan-based disunity among the Borana that yielded two gubernatorial candidates from the ethnic group—and facilitated Ukur’s victory—is the most prominent example. Unsurprisingly, Ukur’s Gabbra were not, however, immune to internal—or, specifically, intra-phratry—divisions. Thus, Chachu Ganya’s reelection campaign was subject to a strong challenge from Galgalo Bonaya Huri. As I discuss later in this paper, in subsequent years Ukur himself would also face a cross-phratry competitor Umuro Sora Adano. Because of the flexibility of the Rendille social organization, unlike their Borana and Gabbra counterparts, political agents vying for control over that ethnic group could not easily resort to well-established internal groupings. In any case, as an Ariaal, Lekuton had no incentive to highlight interethnic divisions: “he’s everyone to everyone, so it’s not clear what ethnic group he’s in.”76 Instead, the incumbent Laisamis MP, a Christian, sought to employ religious identity to mobilize his constituents—most of whom are Christian or follow traditional beliefs—against Hargura, who is a devout Muslim. Lekuton’s efforts were successful in the 2007 elections, when he narrowly saw off the future senator’s challenge for his Laisamis seat; in the run-up to the 2013 elections, however, he failed to prevent Hargura’s senatorial nomination.77 The relationships between the most powerful Marsabit political agents worsened considerably following the 2013 elections, as Ukur and his allies in the new county government took advantage of the powers granted to them by the constitution and sidelined members of parliament (including the senator) and opposition members of the county assembly, who found themselves cut off from the resources allocated to the county. A member of parliament offers the following account of the relationships between political agents who operate at the national and county levels:

KO80, Borana politician, interviewed in Marsabit on the 14th September 2016. Hammer, Joshua. “The African Front.” New York Times, December 23, 2007. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/23/magazine/23kenya-t.html.; KO7, member of parliament from Marsabit County, interviewed in Nairobi on the 3rd March 2016; KO38, civil servant, Marsabit County Government, interviewed in Marsabit on the 13th April and 14th September 2016; KO75, Borana member of the Marsabit County Assembly, interviewed in Marsabit on the 27th April 2016; KO76, Borana member of the Marsabit County Assembly, interviewed in Marsabit on the 27th April 2016; KO80, Borana politician, interviewed in Marsabit on the 14th September 2016. 76 77

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Devolution is a new thing, and anything new must continue to evolve with time… and people to develop understanding and generate ideas. What is currently happening is relationship between leaders… I would not consider it to be bad, but I would consider it to be challenging, in that everybody appears to be having… protecting their turf, protecting their power base. The governor feels that the members of parliament… they’re trying to overreach, maybe in terms of demanding for resources, demanding for projects for their areas and people. So, this means the national-level politicians—senators and members of parliament—and those at the grassroots sometimes appear to look at priorities in terms of different prisms. […] And I think there’s also power posturing between different levels of politicians, where everybody thinks that yes, this is my turf, and I must protect it.78 While relatively junior political agents—such as the county assembly member quoted above—need to carefully negotiate the obstacles posed by their more powerful peers’ disagreements, such infighting also prevents any single leader—or coalition of leaders—from assuming a dominant position in Marsabit politics, opening the political space in the county. A mid-level political agent describes his relationship with his nominal superior, one of Marsabit’s most powerful figures, thusly: “to criticize my leader is my democratic right. I’m not a tea lady or a bootlicker, or his henchman. He cannot dictate anything to me, but we consult each other to bring service to our people.”79 The complexity of the political arena in which these agents operate explains the continuing importance of customary governance systems in contemporary politics in Marsabit, where the holders of customary offices exert a powerful (though not unlimited) influence over the formal, state-based political processes. Given the historically diffuse nature of political authority in the ethnic groups that inhabit Marsabit, this state of affairs cannot be attributed to the persistence of customary systems. In fact, as the Gabbra case demonstrates, the power of customary leaders in some cases increased at the turn of the twenty-first century. A few decades earlier, the historically weak Gabbra hayyuu and jallaba would have been unlikely to mobilize support from their coethnics that would be comparable to that received by Ukur in 2013. On the other hand, Ukur—or any other new leader drawn from the class of educated political agents— would not have been able to unite all phratries behind him. Although evidence is very fragmentary, it appears that both categories of leaders (customary and new) recognized the potential benefits of cooperation: to customary leaders it offered the possibility of accessing 78 79

KO3, member of parliament from Marsabit County, interviewed in Nairobi on the 23rd February 2016. KO80, Borana politician, interviewed in Marsabit on the 14th September 2016.

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resources and contributing to decisions from which—given their lack of educational credentials and lack of familiarity with the structures of the Kenyan state—they were otherwise excluded; new leaders—separated from their coethnics by their education, life experiences, and relative wealth—could, meanwhile, take advantage of the customary leaders’ social networks to mobilize voters. This type of partnership was demonstrated most clearly at the Kalacha meeting in 2012. However, its roots in the Gabbra society probably reach deeper, although evidence is very fragmentary. The only well-documented instance of cooperation between Gabbra customary and new leaders before 2013 is presented by Soga, who examines the Algana political agents’ efforts to coopt the customary governance system to their attempt to prevent Bonaya Godana’s reelection as the North Horr MP in 1997.80 This campaign included efforts to expand the scope of the political authority historically vested in the customary leaders of the Algana phratry and to create new “traditional” offices. Bonaya saw off the electoral challenge that year, but it appears that he and his successors subsequently worked with customary leaders to bridge the divide between the two categories of political agents. Customary leaders’ contribution to the electoral success of their peers involved in formal politics extends beyond the Gabbra. In the words of a Rendille member of the Marsabit County Assembly, “I got my position because of discussion in my tribe, with elders.”81 Burji elders were also instrumental in the ethnic group’s negotiations with political agents representing larger communities and in the selection of its candidates for the position of the deputy governor.82 On the other hand, the failure of the abba gadaa’s attempt to impose his (or the Ethiopian government’s) preferred gubernatorial candidate of the Kenyan Borana forced them to come to terms with the weaknesses of their customary governance system. As I detail later in this paper, in the run-up to the 2017 elections the Borana restricted the abba gadaa’s involvement to the ritual role that his predecessors had usually played and instead relied on extensive negotiations undertaken within the semi-formal Borana Council of Elders—which includes Borana customary leaders from Isiolo, Marsabit, Nairobi, and other locations in Kenya (but not in Ethiopia)—in the selection of their gubernatorial challenger. In this way, they not only prevented the recurrence of the 2013 inter-clan split, but also brought the emerging hybrid—part customary, part state 80

Soga 2001. KO79, Rendille member of the Marsabit County Assembly, interviewed in Nairobi on the 29th April 2016. 82 KO7, member of parliament from Marsabit County, interviewed in Nairobi on the 3rd March 2016. 81

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based—contemporary Kenyan Borana governance system closer to the model successfully pioneered by the Gabbra. As an adaptation to Marsabit’s particular, ethnic-centric political system, this type of partnership between customary and new leaders is not unprecedented. Analogous arrangements have emerged, in other ethnically-divided areas of Kenya, most notably in Mandera County to the east of Marsabit, where Garre elders emerged as the most influential powerbrokers, handpicked subservient new leaders to fill political positions, and successfully mobilized their coethnics to weaken the electoral performance of representatives of the rival Somali clan, the Degodia.83 Its demonstrated ability to generate electoral success makes this type of collaboration between customary and new leaders unlikely to disappear, although—as I discuss in subsequent paragraphs—its longevity depends on political agents’ ability and willingness to distribute resources to other alliance participants in a manner perceived as equitable and fair. 4.3. Marsabit’s devolved government Beyond political maneuvering among political agents, devolution radically reshaped the relationship between the ordinary inhabitants of Marsabit and the Kenyan state. The powers and resources granted to the new county government allowed it to affect the lives of Marsabit’s denizens to a much greater extent than the remote and often disinterested pre-devolution government ever had. First, following devolution, decisions that had once been made in Embu or Nairobi without any local input—or much regard for Marsabit’s inhabitants’ wellbeing—became the responsibility of the county government, which strongly emphasizes the importance that it accords to public participation.84 A senior county government official offers the following description of the decision-making process in Marsabit: These projects are not dictated by the national government. These are projects people themselves have decided. They say: this is the kind of project we want. Before the national government would do a project; because locals were not involved, it would not be used. 83

Carrier and Kochore 2014; Ongeri, Boniface. “Mandera sacrifices democracy in the altar of clannism.” Standard (Nairobi), January 10, 2013. https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000074660/mandera-sacrifices-democracyin-the-altar-of-clannism/. 84 KO51, senior civil servant, Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries, Marsabit County Government, interviewed in Marsabit on the 22nd April 2016; KO66, member of the Marsabit County Executive Committee, interviewed in Marsabit on the 26th April 2016; KO166, senior civil servant, Ministry of Education, Skills Development, Youth, and Sports, Marsabit County Government, interviewed in Marsabit on the 26th April 2016.

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[…] Projects are allocated per sub-county. During sensitization, during public participation, local people are asked to prioritize given the budget, for example 50 million per year. They may say they want roads, or classrooms. The kind and number of projects they propose is checked at the county, for example how many roads budget can cover. […] Consultation process is continuous, throughout the year.85 To some extent, public consultations served a propaganda function intended to build popular support for the county government’s policies. For instance, Ukur and other key members of the county government appear to have sought to physically distance themselves from ordinary people. Notably, the county government headquarters was constructed outside Marsabit Town: “In reality they built it so far because they don’t want people to go there. Those big men don’t want people to ask them for help. It’s 100 shillings for a boda [approximately USD 1—KC] from town to the governor’s office; one way. Many people can’t afford it. If you want to go and ask for funding, and you’re poor, you can’t go there. They say that they’ll organize visits to different villages so that people can talk to officials, but then that maybe happens once a year.86 Furthermore, constituents’ priorities were only one of many factors that influence allocation of funds. Instead, decision-making primarily reflected the agendas of the leading political agents: Ukur and other powerful figures in the county government. Nevertheless, as Kenya’s democracy has become more entrenched, the need to retain existing supporters and attract new voters has emerged as an important element of political calculus. The primacy of ethnicity in Marsabit politics has not weakened the impact of this development on political agents active in the county. Although Marsabit voters are near-certain to vote for representatives of their ethnic group—or ones who are allied with its leaders—no individual political agent is guaranteed her coethnics’ support. Instead, she is required to attract such support; otherwise she either risks elimination during pre-election negotiations within the ethnic group (usually led by customary leaders) or a split vote that, as the history of political life in Marsabit demonstrates, can be disastrous for the candidate’s electoral prospects. In these circumstances, public consultations offer the political agents leading the county government a valuable opportunity to identify their constituents’ preferences and provide them with public services that they need (or, at least, to pretend to do so). Regardless of its actual influence on decision-making processes, public participation serves, 85

KO45, senior civil servant, Ministry of Roads, Public Works, and Transport, Marsabit County Government, interviewed in Marsabit on the 21st April 2016. 86 KA15, Borana professional, interviewed in Marsabit on the 17th September 2016.

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therefore, an important function in post-devolution Marsabit politics. Relatedly, new leaders in Marsabit have generally depended on customary leaders to establish relationships with ordinary members of their ethnic groups and to deliver the vote. They recognize, however, the potential value that direct links to the population offer them in the democratic context in which they operate. For this reason, and second, the county government bega to create a lower-level administrative apparatus that can help it to bridge the gap between its leadership and Marsabit’s inhabitants, make it easier to hear their demands and identify signs of discontent, and—thereby—limit the population’s ability to challenge the leadership’s position. Ukur’s county government established sub-county and ward administration in 2014. The county assembly suspended the creation of the lowest planned rung of the administrative apparatus managed by the county government—village administration—pending delineation of village boundaries, which at the time of my field research in 2016 had not yet been completed.87 The sub-county and ward administrators, who are appointed by the county government, serve as its representatives to the inhabitants of these territorial units, promote its work, organize public consultation events, and transmit its directives to the population. Despite the lack of village administration, ward administrators took advantage of the good relationship between Ukur and the county commissioner, whose office continues to maintain its own parallel (and officially distinct) system of administration (which includes deputy county commissioners, assistant county commissioners, chiefs, and assistant chiefs), and have used chiefs and assistant chiefs to perform functions equivalent to those of village administrators.88 Third, the KES 20 billion that Ukur’s government received between 2013 and 2017 made it possible to greatly expand provision of public services. In 2013, there were 162 public early childhood development (ECD) centres in Marsabit; in the first three years of its existence (by 2016), the county government constructed an additional 90 ECD centres and trained 160 caregivers. As a result, ECD enrolment nearly doubled from 11,000 children in 2013 to 19,000 in 2016. The county government also created a scholarship fund to help students from Marsabit to attend universities and teacher training colleges. Although post-ECD education is the national 87

Sub-counties are coterminous with parliamentary constituencies and wards are the territorial units from which members of the county assembly are elected. As such, both categories of administrative entities already had welldefined boundaries. Many villages, however, did not. 88 KO49, deputy sub-county administrator, Marsabit County Government, interviewed in Marsabit on the 22nd April 2016; KO50, ward administrator, Marsabit County Government, interviewed in Marsabit on the 22nd April 2016; KO66, member of the Marsabit County Executive Committee, interviewed in Marsabit on the 26th April 2016.

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government’s responsibility, the county government—in collaboration with MPs’ Constituency Development Funds (CDF)—constructed dormitories and laboratories and provided science materials to secondary schools.89 The county government also built a new hospital in North Horr and added an ophthalmology unit to the existing hospital in Marsabit Town. In 2013, there was only one ambulance in the county; by 2016, that number had increased to eleven. The thirteen doctors working in the county in 2013 were in the course of the next three years joined by three new colleagues; in the same period the number of nurses increased from 172 to 280.90 Livestock production was supported through the construction of sale yards, livestock pens, market stalls, and boreholes, in addition to the first export abattoir in Marsabit.91 Despite these significant achievements, public service provision continued to be insufficient to meaningfully address Marsabit’s great development and humanitarian needs. It is in part because of the distribution of responsibilities between the county and national governments. For instance, while ECD education has been devolved—allowing the county government to considerably increase the number of ECD centres and their enrolment—primary and secondary schools are managed by the national government, which has shown little interest in improving the quality of education in the county.92 Two other functions that have not been devolved—major transport infrastructure and security—have seen, however, significant progress. Security in the historically very dangerous Marsabit has improved considerably, and despite tense interethnic relations, the previously common attacks on travellers along the IsioloMoyale road—which, in response to the demands from Marsabit’s inhabitants, the national government has tarmacked (with construction completed in 2016)—have largely disappeared.93

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KO166, senior civil servant, Ministry of Education, Skills Development, Youth, and Sports, Marsabit County Government, interviewed in Marsabit on the 26th April 2016. 90 Mugo, Josiah. “North Horr get a Ksh 450m level four hospital.” Citizen TV (Kenya), August 7, 2016. https://citizentv.co.ke/news/north-horr-get-a-ksh-450m-level-four-hospital-136182/.; KO39, senior civil servant, Ministry of Health Services, Marsabit County Government, interviewed in Marsabit on the 21st April 2016; KO55, civil servant, Ministry of Health Services, Marsabit County Government, interviewed in Marsabit on the 25th April 2016. 91 KO45, senior civil servant, Ministry of Roads, Public Works, and Transport, Marsabit County Government, interviewed in Marsabit on the 21st April 2016; KO51, senior civil servant, Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries, Marsabit County Government, interviewed in Marsabit on the 22nd April 2016. 92 KO66, member of the Marsabit County Executive Committee, interviewed in Marsabit on the 26th April 2016. 93 Kochore 2016; “How new Isiolo-Marsabit road is boosting commerce as security improves.” Capital FM (Nairobi), September 27. 2016. http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/business/2016/09/new-isiolo-marsabit-road-boostingcommerce-security-improves/.; KO7, member of parliament from Marsabit County, interviewed in Nairobi on the 3rd March 2016.

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In addition, the weak organizational capacity of the relatively young county government undermined its ability to provide high-quality public services or adequately monitor the performance of its staff. Ukur acknowledged these faults and created the Governor’s Delivery Unit to improve implementation and oversight of his administration’s policies.94 The Unit was, however, unlikely to address the primary and, for Ukur, most damaging source of public dissatisfaction with public service delivery in the county: the widespread accusations of ethnic favouritism. To assuage fears that it would discriminate against the communities—primarily the Borana—whose political representatives the ReGaBu coalition defeated in the 2013 elections, upon its creation the county government chose to use the revenue allocation formula that the national Commission on Revenue Allocation (CRA) developed to determine distribution of devolved funds to individual county governments. The CRA intended the formula to maximize the allocation of resources to Kenya’s poorest counties, including Marsabit. Most of these counties are geographically large, making service provision more difficult and expensive. For this reason, the CRA included land area as a criterion (responsible for eight percent of the total revenue) used to calculate resource allocation. This provision greatly benefitted Marsabit, which received a considerable share of the devolved revenue despite its relatively small population. Application of the ostensibly neutral CRA formula within Marsabit disproportionately benefitted the inhabitants of the sparsely-populated, but geographically large Laisamis and North Horr sub-counties—who are primarily Rendille and Gabbra—while the populations of the more densely-populated, but physically smaller Moyale and Saku sub-counties—the Borana and (in Saku) the Burji—received relatively lower allocations. Although the land area provision’s impact on resource distribution has been limited, perception of preferential treatment accorded to the Rendille and, especially, the Gabbra led to discontent not only among the Borana, but also Ukur’s Burji coalition partners.95 Ethnic imbalance appears to have been particularly pronounced where the CRA formula did not apply. Regardless of budget allocations, the quality of public services provided in non

KO38, civil servant, Marsabit County Government, interviewed in Marsabit on the 13th April and 14th September 2016; KO66, member of the Marsabit County Executive Committee, interviewed in Marsabit on the 26th April 2016. 95 KO7, member of parliament from Marsabit County, interviewed in Nairobi on the 3rd March 2016; KO66, member of the Marsabit County Executive Committee, interviewed in Marsabit on the 26th April 2016; KO74, Borana member of the Marsabit County Assembly, interviewed in Marsabit on the 24th April 2016; KO75, Borana member of the Marsabit County Assembly, interviewed in Marsabit on the 27th April 2016; KO76, Borana member of the Marsabit County Assembly, interviewed in Marsabit on the 27th April 2016; KO79, Rendille member of the Marsabit County Assembly, interviewed in Nairobi on the 29th April 2016. 94

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Gabbra areas was claimed to be particularly poor. According to a Borana member of the Marsabit County Assembly: The way the government responds to needs in my ward is different from the way they respond in other areas. You may ask for repair of broken boreholes. It will be done reluctantly and not provided as required. We have resources, vehicles, we can rush technicians, but it doesn’t happen.”96 Furthermore, employment in the county government and outside contracts—both major sources of patronage for the county government—were apparently disproportionately allocated to the Gabbra.97 Although there is little evidence, improper issuance of government contracts is believed to have been widespread and served as the primary tool through which funds were diverted into the pockets of Ukur’s supporters.98 In 2015, Ukur himself was claimed to have been involved in embezzlement or misuse of KES 1.1 billion (approximately USD 10.5 million) and investigated by the national Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission.99 Not only the Gabbra benefited from the alleged corrupt practices in the county government. Ukur’s close ally Lekuton (MP for Laisamis) was apparently the recipient of a large number of county government contracts and, with the administration’s backing, profited from the sale of land for the Lake Turkana Wind Project (LTWP) in Loiyangalani (in Laisamis) which, when completed, is expected to generate between fifteen and eighteen percent of Kenya’s energy output. Because the area’s inhabitants claim to have never received appropriate compensation for the loss of the 40,000 acres of their ancestral land purchased for the LTWP, Lekuton’s involvement in the project damaged his relationship with his constituents.100 The MP might have

KO75, Borana member of the Marsabit County Assembly, interviewed in Marsabit on the 27th April 2016. KO74, Borana member of the Marsabit County Assembly, interviewed in Marsabit on the 24th April 2016; KO79, Rendille member of the Marsabit County Assembly, interviewed in Nairobi on the 29th April 2016. 98 (“MCA Qalicha Huka Claims of Corruption in the County Department of Water.” Marsabit Times, October 17, 2016. http://marsabitimes.com/qalicha-huka-claims/.; KO38, civil servant, Marsabit County Government, interviewed in Marsabit on the 13th April and 14th September 2016. 99 Bett, Ken. “Governor to Appear Before Anti-Graft Team.” Daily Nation, November 24, 2015. http://allafrica.com/stories/201511240267.html/.; “Governor Ukur Yattani Asked To Account For Public Funds.” Marsabit Times, November 29, 2016. http://marsabitimes.com/governor-ukur-asked-to-account-for-public-funds/.; “KES 1.1 b Audit Query is Inaccurate, Marsabit County Government States.” Marsabit Times, November 30, 2016. http://marsabitimes.com/ksh1-1b-audit-query-is-untruemarsabit-county-government/.; “Embezzlement Claims Plague Marsabit County Governor.” Marsabit Times, November 30, 2016. http://marsabitimes.com/embezzlementclaims-plague-marsabit-county-governor/. 100 KO75, Borana member of the Marsabit County Assembly, interviewed in Marsabit on the 27th April 2016; KO76, Borana member of the Marsabit County Assembly, interviewed in Marsabit on the 27th April 2016; also Enns 2016; Cormack, Zoe, and Abdikadir Kurewa. “Gone with the wind?” Centre for Contemporary African History Blog, 96 97

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used the wealth that he is alleged to have obtained through the land deal in Loiyangalani to recoup the financial losses he had incurred in his election campaigns, including the bruising contest with Hargura in 2007. His considerable fortune certainly appears to have greatly contributed to his ability to secure electoral victory: “Lekuton is very shrewd. He would fly the chopper the day before the elections to distribute money to people and win. He transported his supporters from Saku to Laisamis to get more votes.”101 As the discussion of inequitable distribution of county government revenue demonstrates, such pursuit of wealth and its use to build popular support are an integral component of postdevolution Marsabit politics. In order to stay in power, politicians are required to distribute resources to their supporters. However, the simultaneous political salience of both ethnic and sub-ethnic collective identities in the county greatly complicates political agents’ task. Throughout the history of postcolonial Marsabit, successful new leaders have adapted the composition of their winning coalition to reflect the population of the electoral unit in which they operated. Thus, in 2013 Ukur’s effort to unite the Gabbra and build an interethnic alliance with the Burji and Rendille paid off in the elections for county-level positions, while the splintering of the Borana vote contributed to their defeat. Following the elections, however, Ukur’s political calculus changed: although the ReGaBu coalition and unification of the Gabbra allowed him to become the governor, Ukur’s primary political base was his phratry and its members expected to be rewarded for their support. Sub-ethnic favouritism in both county government employment (according to a list widely shared on social media in 2016, ten out of twenty-five Gabbra directors in county government ministries were Gar) and contracts generated dissatisfaction among the other phratries. Efforts to placate them required further resources, limiting the amount of county government revenue that could be redirected to Ukur’s ReGaBu allies. This concentric pattern governing the allocation of funds led to discontent not only among the defeated Borana, but also among political agents representing the Burji, the Rendille and, to a lesser extent, the non-Gar Gabbra. Although some of them—including Lekuton—were rewarded for their support,

February 7, 2017. https://centreforcontemporaryafricanhistory.com/2017/02/07/gone-with-the-wind/.; “Uhuru kicks off Africa’s biggest wind power project in Marsabit.” Capital FM (Nairobi), July 2, 2015. https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2015/07/uhuru-kicks-off-africas-biggest-wind-power-project-in-marsabit/. 101 KO38, civil servant, Marsabit County Government, interviewed in Marsabit on the 13th April and 14th September 2016.

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as the 2017 elections approached other leading ReGaBu politicians became increasingly dissatisfied with Ukur’s performance as the governor: When you’re a governor, you hold the resources, which devolution is all about. You have to prove that alliance, distribute to others their share. In terms of employment, people have to have shares. In terms of resource distribution, people have to have shares. That’s why we’re having challenges. We’re having an issue with the county governor. We Rendille don’t feel there’s consultation in terms of what needs to be done. Then people say that the governor has employed more from that community… the lower cadre positions, going through the public service board, which is supposed to be independent, but really works with governor. People have been complaining. Resource allocation, also people complaining. some constituencies are getting more than others. Also in terms of who does what. So, construction. How fair is procurement process? The noise has been that it’s not fair, that the governor’s people get it. […] The alliance may get realigned. […] We have big debates among the Rendille: do we stay with the Gabbra, or do we move to the Borana?102 4.4. The 2017 election campaign As the considerable funds allocated to Marsabit continued to flow from the national government, widespread dissatisfaction with Ukur’s administration was heightened by growing appreciation of the value of controlling the county government. Whereas during the 2012-2013 election campaign Ukur’s early realization of the power that would be commanded by the holder by the office of the governor had not been shared by most other political agents, including his ReGaBu allies, who—accustomed to Marsabit’s marginal position within the Kenyan state—had for the most part underestimated the scale of post-devolution transformation, inability to access the resources redirected by the county government to the Gabbra (and Gar) convinced Marsabit politicians of the necessity of careful preparation for the next elections in 2017. Planning for the forthcoming gubernatorial contest began in earnest in 2015.103 The ReGaBu alliance—in the form in which it had won the 2013 elections—gradually disintegrated.104 The LTWP in Loiyangalani—in which not only Lekuton, but also the county government were involved—raised concerns among the Rendille worried about the perceived encroachment of outsiders on their territory, although the diffuse nature of the customary governance system and the continuing rivalry between Hargura and Lekuton made universal 102

Influential Rendille politician, interviewed in the first half of 2016. KO38, civil servant, Marsabit County Government, interviewed in Marsabit on the 13th April and 14th September 2016. 104 KO75, Borana member of the Marsabit County Assembly, interviewed in Marsabit on the 27th April 2016. 103

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repudiation of ReGaBu unlikely.105 The Burji were equally dissatisfied with the county government: The Burji are a very aggressive community: businesspeople, farmers. When they fight for contracts, they feel they’re not favoured. Now they want to defect to the other side. They wanted to be an equal part of the government. In reality there are those in government who control the resources. The Burji feel they should get contracts, but they’re lacking. Just a few individuals among them are rewarded; the rest are left behind. So, they feel the Borana are likely to offer better leadership. So, they’re likely to sit down with the Borana.106 Despite their relatively small numbers, as a more internally cohesive group than the Rendille, the Burji form an important voting bloc in Marsabit politics; their defection posed a significant threat to the viability of ReGaBu. Even more damaging to Ukur’s re-election prospects was the emergence of a Gabbra challenger for his position, the non-governmental organization worker Umuro Sora Adano (known as ‘USA’), who launched a campaign for the office of the governor with the support of two prominent figures in the ethnic group: Bonaya Godana’s widow—and member of the East African Legislative Assembly—Sarah Bonaya and Alex Isako Umuro’s daughter Dibo Umuro.107 While the fragile coalition that Ukur had created in the run-up to the previous elections splintered, the Borana were working to avoid repeating their analogous 2013 failure. The prospect of the power offered by the office of the governor attracted three candidates: Abshiro, the Kajiado County Commissioner Kello Harsama, and another civil servant Guyo Kuchana Halake. Abshiro, although the leading candidate, faced significant challenges. He had lost the gubernatorial contest in 2013 and, as the Moyale MP, had apparently misappropriated CDF funds intended for development projects. He also had antagonistic relationships with many influential Borana— including his successor as the Moyale MP Roba Duba—who sought to undermine his candidacy,



KO74, Borana member of the Marsabit County Assembly, interviewed in Marsabit on the 24th April 2016; KO75, Borana member of the Marsabit County Assembly, interviewed in Marsabit on the 27th April 2016; KO76, Borana member of the Marsabit County Assembly, interviewed in Marsabit on the 27th April 2016; KO79, Rendille member of the Marsabit County Assembly, interviewed in Nairobi on the 29th April 2016. 106 KO75, Borana member of the Marsabit County Assembly, interviewed in Marsabit on the 27th April 2016. 107 Abdi, Ali. “Controversy as Yattani and his clan rival are endorsed.” Standard (Nairobi), December 11, 2016. https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000226445/controversy-as-yattani-and-his-clan-rival-are-endorsed/.; KO38, civil servant, Marsabit County Government, interviewed in Marsabit on the 13th April and 14th September 2016. 105

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including by questioning his Borantiti (Boran-ness).108 The combination of Abshiro’s relative vulnerability and of the limited following garnered by the other two candidates threatened the viability of the Borana challenge to Ukur’s (and Gabbra) dominance in Marsabit politics. To strengthen the Borana electoral prospects, their leaders devised a process intended to select a sole gubernatorial candidate from the ethnic group. The Borana Council of Elders—which comprises customary leaders working in collaboration with new leaders—played a leading role in this process and, following extensive negotiations across Borana clans both in Marsabit and elsewhere in Kenya, anointed Abshiro as the Borana contender in the forthcoming elections. It was only after the decision had been made in Kenya that the abba gadaa was asked for his blessing for Abshiro’s candidacy.109 On their own, the Borana do not have a sufficient number of voters to win county elections in Marsabit. Abshiro and his associates set out, therefore, to construct a new interethnic alliance intended to unseat Ukur. Rasso, the MP for Saku and a key Abshiro ally, was charged with the task convincing the Burji, who predominantly reside in his constituency, to abandon ReGaBu. The negotiations were complicated by the Burji demands for representation in parliament or, more specifically, for his seat. Although Rasso refused to resign, in October 2016 the talks resulted in the formal endorsement of Abshiro’s candidacy—in exchange for the position of the deputy governor—by a section, but not all, of the Burji elders. The Burji affiliation with Abshiro’s alliance appears to have strengthened in April 2017 following Ukur’s decision to replace his Burji deputy Omar Abdi Ali with another Burji Hassan Marsa.110 Internal divisions among the Rendille—historically much more pronounced than among the Burji—also prevented the Borana efforts to entice the entire ethnic group to join the new coalition. Some 108

Abshiro’s father came from Wollo in Northern Ethiopia and assimilated into the Borana. Given the historical fluidity of ethnic allegiances in the area, his adoption of an alternative identity was not at all unusual—previous Moyale MP Abajillo Osman Araru also belonged to an assimilated family—but more recently the increasing rigidity of ethnic divisions has made perceptions of indigeneity more politically salient. 109 KE40, Borana jallaba, interviewed in Badassa, Saku Sub-county, on the 20th April 2016; KO74, Borana member of the Marsabit County Assembly, interviewed in Marsabit on the 24th April 2016; KO76, Borana member of the Marsabit County Assembly, interviewed in Marsabit on the 27th April 2016; KO80, Borana politician, interviewed in Marsabit on the 14th September 2016; KO81, retired teacher, Marsabit County, interviewed in Marsabit on the 15th September 2016. 110 “Rendille, Burji elders endorse Mohamed Ali to run for Marsabit gubernatorial seat come 2017.” Mediamax Network (Kenya), October 9, 2016. http://www.mediamaxnetwork.co.ke/videos/english/261107/261107/.; “Burji Community Withdraws Support For Yattani’s Gubernatorial Bid.” Marsabit Times, April 2, 2017. http://marsabitimes.com/burji-withdraw-support-for-ukur/.; KO75, Borana member of the Marsabit County Assembly, interviewed in Marsabit on the 27th April 2016.

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Rendille wanted to field a gubernatorial candidate of their own; Senator Hargura, the most influential representative of the ethnic group responded to this wish by announcing his candidacy for the office in May 2016. Hargura’s brief campaign appears to have been initiated to appease internal critics and enhance his bargaining position in talks with Abshiro. A few months later he joined the Borana-led coalition and a group of Rendille elders associated with the senator officially endorsed Abshiro’s candidacy.111 In addition, Abshiro secured the support of the representatives of small (non-Garre) Somali clans known as the ‘corner tribes’ (a designation that originated in Mandera politics).112 Cohesion of the alliance that Abshiro had cobbled together from such disparate parts was weak—as evidenced by occasional public disagreements between its leaders—but the main threat to its success came from Ukur.113 Cognizant of his diminishing electoral prospects, Ukur sought to take advantage of the weakness of Abshiro’s coalition. To this end, he deployed the considerable resources at his command to undermine the opposition alliance from within. Abshiro and his associates could not match the county government funds that Ukur could redirect to support his re-election campaign: Ukur’s chances of reelection are shaky, but it’s a money issue. Money is a factor. Right now he has the funding of the county government: what will he do with it? He may give a chunk to the Rendille [and other ethnic groups—KC].114 A practiced master of divide-and-rule, Ukur also attempted to exploit divisions within the ethnic groups supporting his candidacy. First, he secured the support of political agents threatened by the ascendancy of their more powerful co-ethnics: Lekuton and John Loto Segelan—his 111

Abdi, Ali. “Senator Harugura to vie for Marsabit Governor's seat in 2017 polls.” Standard (Nairobi), May 12, 2016. http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000201537/senator-harugura-to-vie-for-marsabit-governor-s-seat-in2017-polls/.; “Rendille, Burji elders endorse Mohamed Ali to run for Marsabit gubernatorial seat come 2017.” Mediamax Network (Kenya), October 9, 2016. http://www.mediamaxnetwork.co.ke/videos/english/261107/261107/.; KO7, member of parliament from Marsabit County, interviewed in Nairobi on the 3rd March 2016; KO74, Borana member of the Marsabit County Assembly, interviewed in Marsabit on the 24th April 2016; KO79, Rendille member of the Marsabit County Assembly, interviewed in Nairobi on the 29th April 2016; KO80, Borana politician, interviewed in Marsabit on the 14th September 2016. 112 Aden, Abdi. “Clans, conflicts and devolution in Mandera, Kenya.” Insight on Conflict October 14, 2014. https://www.insightonconflict.org/blog/2014/10/clans-conflicts-devolution-mandera-finding-durable-solutionconflict-degodia-garre/.; Abdi, Ali. “Clans back ex-NHIF boss for Marsabit governor.” Standard (Nairobi), March 11, 2017. https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001232231/clans-back-ex-nhif-boss-for-marsabit-governor/. 113 “Senator Hargura And Sakuu Mp Openly Disagree.” Marsabit Times, October 13, 2016. http://marsabitimes.com/raso-hargura-disagree/.; “Hargura and Abshiro on Matters Politics.” Marsabit Times, October 13, 2016. http://marsabitimes.com/hargura-and-abshiro/. 114 KO80, Borana politician, interviewed in Marsabit on the 14th September 2016.

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candidate for the senator—among the Rendille and Roba Duba among the Borana.115 Second, he sought to fragment existing ethnic groups by offering support to splinter identities. Most notably, the Waata (or Wayyu, as their contemporary leaders prefer to call them) have historically usually been considered a lower-status sub-group of the Borana.116 Unhappy about their marginalization, however, political agents in the community have claimed a distinct ethnic identity. Ukur supported their effort to establish the Wayyu as a separate ethnic group and, in return, received their endorsement during the election campaign.117 Within his own ethnic group Ukur’s balkanizing tactics turned, however, against him. The candidacy of Umuro Sora Adano received considerable support among the Gabbra disappointed with the preferential treatment that Ukur gave to his fellow Gar. His plan to replicate the 2012 Kalacha meeting—at which customary leaders from the five phratries had anointed him as the sole Gabbra gubernatorial contender—backfired when the validity of the endorsement that he received at an event he organized in the town in June 2016 was disputed by influential members of the ethnic group. In December customary leaders gathered at Kalacha again to affirm their support for Ukur; Umuro held his own meeting a few kilometres away, however, and claimed to be the only legitimate representative of the Gabbra in the forthcoming gubernatorial contest.118 Following the Gabbra split, Marsabit had three contenders for the office of the governor. Much like prior to the 2013 elections, they aligned themselves with national political camps, although party affiliation had little influence on the gubernatorial contest: according to a Borana member of the Marsabit County Assembly, “it’s about governors, it’s about Mohammed Ali [i.e.



KO75, Borana member of the Marsabit County Assembly, interviewed in Marsabit on the 27th April 2016; KO76, Borana member of the Marsabit County Assembly, interviewed in Marsabit on the 27th April 2016; KO79, Rendille member of the Marsabit County Assembly, interviewed in Nairobi on the 29th April 2016; KO80, Borana politician, interviewed in Marsabit on the 14th September 2016. 116 Salvadori 2000: 37-40. 117 Kimanthy, Kennedy. “Clan elders endorse Yatani for re-election.” Daily Nation, August 14, 2016. http://www.nation.co.ke/counties/Clan-elders-endorse-Yatani-for-reelection/1107872-3344392-11h5pekz/.; KO38, civil servant, Marsabit County Government, interviewed in Marsabit on the 13th April and 14th September 2016. 118 Barasa, Lucas, and Matilida Ikidii. “Gabra Elders Endorse Marsabit Governor Ukur Yatani for Second Term.” Daily Nation, June 8, 2016. http://allafrica.com/stories/201606081298.html/.; Marsabit Times, June 19, 2016. http://marsabitimes.com/gabbra-youth-and-proffesionals-refute-amb-ukurs-endorsement/.; Barasa, Lucas. “Elders finally endorse Yatani re-election as Marsabit governor.” Daily Nation, December 7, 2016. http://www.nation.co.ke/counties/marsabit/Elders-finally-endorse-Yatani/3444778-3478668-huhp2t/index.html/. ; Abdi, Ali. “Controversy as Yattani and his clan rival are endorsed.” Standard (Nairobi), December 11, 2016. https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000226445/controversy-as-yattani-and-his-clan-rival-are-endorsed/. 115

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Abshiro—KC], not Jubilee, not Uhuru.”119 Despite Abshiro’s longstanding association with Uhuru and Ruto—whose TNA and URP combined in September 2016 to form the Jubilee Party of Kenya (in which they were joined by smaller outfits)—for a time the national government appeared to court Ukur, who had good relationships with a number of other governors in Northern Kenya, an important battleground in the forthcoming elections. Since Jubilee’s victory in the 2017 national elections appeared likely, it was also in Ukur’s interest to join the new party. Either because Ukur had already served his purpose by bringing other governors into Jubilee or due to their relationship with Abshiro and the high probability of his success in the gubernatorial contest, Uhuru and Ruto refused, however, to offer the Marsabit governor a ‘direct ticket’ in the elections, which would have allowed him to skip a potentially damaging primary confrontation with his Borana challenger. Instead, Ukur—along with Chachu Ganya, Lekuton and Roba Duba—chose to launch his own electoral vehicle, the Frontier Alliance Party (FAP), which promised to support the president and deputy president’s re-election. With Ukur sidelined, Abshiro and his allies meanwhile for all intents and purposes obtained the coveted Jubilee direct ticket. The third gubernatorial aspirant, Umuro, chose to contest the election under the umbrella of KANU, of which his backer Sarah Godana’s husband had once been a deputy chairman. The relative popularity of the three parties—Jubilee, ascendant in Kenyan politics; KANU, fifteen years after it lost power a shadow of the former ruling party; and FAP, a makeshift solution for an outmaneuvered political agent—reflected the apparent electoral prospects of the candidates.120 Given the power and resources commanded by its holder, the contest for the office of the governor was by far the most important electoral race in Marsabit. Reflecting the distribution of power in post-devolution Kenya, the parliamentary elections had, in contrast, become less important than they had once been. The sitting MPs had joined the alliances led by the two leading gubernatorial contenders and their own performance would in large part depend on the fortunes of their principals: “this journey is too long; you need support. If you don’t get any, it gets difficult to get votes.”121 At the time of my field research, Rasso’s position in Saku appeared

KO76, Borana member of the Marsabit County Assembly, interviewed in Marsabit on the 27th April 2016. “Senator Hargura And Sakuu Mp Openly Disagree.” Marsabit Times, October 13, 2016. http://marsabitimes.com/raso-hargura-disagree/.; “Ukur Decides To Face Off With Mahmud Ali in Jubilee Party Primaries.” Marsabit Times, March 12, 2017. http://marsabitimes.com/ukur-and-abshiro-in-jubilee-primaries/. ]; “Frontier Alliance Party jumps into the fray with Ukur at the Helm.” Marsabit Times, March 14, 2017. http://marsabitimes.com/fap-jumps-into-the-fray-with-ukur-at-the-helm/.; KO38, civil servant, Marsabit County Government, interviewed in Marsabit on the 13th April and 14th September 2016. 121 KO76, Borana member of the Marsabit County Assembly, interviewed in Marsabit on the 27th April 2016. 119 120

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secure; his most important opponent, the former MP Hussein Sasura, known as Finje122 because of his stinginess, was poorly regarded and did not appear to pose a significant threat to his successor. The political future of Roba Duba—sidelined by his more powerful Borana peers Abshiro and Rasso, teamed up with a gubernatorial candidate highly unpopular among the Borana, and facing multiple challengers for his Moyale seat—was far more uncertain. Widely recognized as a highly skilled politician, but alienated from the popular Hargura and mired in allegations of corruption, Lekuton also faced a difficult race. Of the three pro-Ukur MPs, only Chachu Ganya—who, despite his increasing unpopularity, did not attract a significant electoral challenge—appeared likely to retain his seat.123 In the tense atmosphere ahead of the elections, interethnic hostility increased once again. It manifested itself in progressively more severe forms. In August 2016, Roba Duba predicted interethnic conflict in Marsabit.124 In October, the county commissioner had to cancel campaign rallies that threatened to turn into interethnic clashes.125 In March 2017, Ukur’s motorcade was attacked in Moyale.126 In April, the county was rocked by a spate of killings that Hargura attributed to Ukur’s supporters.127 In July, a few weeks before the elections, Ukur’s apparent attempt to influence the election results by bribing an electoral commission official further increased interethnic hostility in Marsabit.128 Later that month Abshiro and Ukur’s supporters clashed during Uhuru Kenyatta’s campaign rally in Marsabit. In an effort to deescalate the rising

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A slang term for KES 50 (approximately USD 0.5), the highest amount of money that he would reportedly give to needy constituents. 123 Murimi, James. “Marsabit MPs clash over preferred gubernatorial candidate in next polls.” Mediamax Network (Kenya), August 12, 2016. http://www.mediamaxnetwork.co.ke/news/243348/marsabit-mps-clash-over-preferredgubernatorial-candidate-in-next-polls/.; KO38, civil servant, Marsabit County Government, interviewed in Marsabit on the 13th April and 14th September 2016; KO74, Borana member of the Marsabit County Assembly, interviewed in Marsabit on the 24th April 2016; KO76, Borana member of the Marsabit County Assembly, interviewed in Marsabit on the 27th April 2016; KO80, Borana politician, interviewed in Marsabit on the 14th September 2016. 124 Murimi, James. “Marsabit MPs clash over preferred gubernatorial candidate in next polls.” Mediamax Network (Kenya), August 12, 2016. http://www.mediamaxnetwork.co.ke/news/243348/marsabit-mps-clash-over-preferredgubernatorial-candidate-in-next-polls/. 125 Bett, Ken. “Govt bans parallel meetings in Marsabit.” Daily Nation, October 6, 2016. http://www.nation.co.ke/counties/Govt-bans-parallel-meetings-in-Marsabit/1107872-3407254-format-xhtmlefmemaz/index.html/. 126 Mwendwa, Irene. “Rival attacked my motorcade – Yatani.” Daily Nation, March 6, 2017. http://www.nation.co.ke/counties/marsabit/Yatani-motorcade-attack/3444778-3838564-reir60z/index.html/. 127 “Governor Yattani Refuses To Be Associated With Recent Killings In The County.” Marsabit Times, April 16, 2017. http://marsabitimes.com/uk-refuses-assosiation-with-recent-killings/. 128 “Mohamud Ali Files Another Complaint.” Marsabit Times, July 13, 2017. https://marsabitimes.com/mohamudali-files-another-complaint/.

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tensions, the electoral commission suspended the gubernatorial campaign in the county.129 For the same reason, during his next visit to Marsabit, Uhuru promised the defeated gubernatorial candidate a position in the national government.130 In the light of the preceding discussion of Marsabit’s post-devolution politics, the outcome of Abshiro and Ukur’s struggle for power did not surprise. On election day in August, Abshiro won the gubernatorial contest by a wide margin, gaining fifty-six thousand votes, compared to Ukur’s forty-eight thousand. The rest of Abshiro’s coalition also fared well. Hargura and Rasso retained their seats in parliament. Jubilee candidates Safia Sheikh Adan (Woman Representative), Marselino Malimo Arbelle (Laisamis), and Qalicha Gufu Wario (Moyale) defeated the incumbent pro-Ukur MPs Nasra Ibrahim, Lekuton, and Roba Duba. Of Ukur’s allies only Chachu Ganya successfully defended his seat (in North Horr). In the county assembly election, Jubilee secured seven seats, two more than FAP.131 The acute interethnic tensions which the political agents from both blocs incited throughout the long campaign did not disappear on election day. A few days after the elections, panga-wielding assailants killed two men in Marsabit Town.132 At the time of writing, it remains unclear if the attack was politically motivated. Given the deep interethnic divisions in the county, however, the probability of post-election violence appears to be high. 5. Conclusion The transformation of the Kenyan state that took place after 2013 granted the political agents from Marsabit political power and status comparable to those of the state managers in charge of Kenya’s central administration, effectively elevating political agents who had previously been little more than conduits for the national government’s interests in the area into the ranks of the 129

“President Uhuru Campaigns in Marsabit.” Marsabit Times, July 26, 2017. https://marsabitimes.com/presidentuhuru-campaigns-in-marsabit/.; “Ukur And Abshiro Summoned By Marsabit County Commander And IEBC.” Marsabit Times, July 27, 2017. https://marsabitimes.com/ukur-and-abshiro-summoned-by-county-commander/.; Psirmoi, Daniel. “IEBC suspends campaigns in Marsabit County over chaos.” Standard (Nairobi), July 28, 2017. https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001249557/iebc-suspends-campaigns-in-marsabit-county-over-chaos/.; Mwendwa, Irene. “IEBC fines Marsabit candidates Sh4m.” Nation (Nairobi), August 3, 2017. http://www.nation.co.ke/counties/marsabit/IEBC-Yatani-and-rival-Sh4m/3444778-4043330-5hx3ez/index.html. 130 “President Uhuru Kenyatta dangles carrot in Marsabit.” KDRTV, August 5, 2017. http://www.kdrtv.com/president-uhuru-kenyatta-dangles-carrot-in-marsabit/. 131 The other seats in the county assembly were captured by smaller parties (IEBC 2017). 132 Rutto, Stephen. “Panic in Marsabit as panga-wielding gang murders two.” Star (Nairobi), August 13, 2017. http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2017/08/13/panic-in-marsabit-as-panga-wielding-gang-murders-two_c1615808/.

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state-managing elite. Elsewhere in Kenya the redefinition of the political position of local elites gave rise to heated disputes between the national government and governors, who demanded increased powers and funds. The political agents involved in the struggle for the control of the Marsabit county government have, however, played a very limited role in this contestation between state managers operating at different levels of Kenya’s new governance structure. Although Ukur Yatani developed close relationships with the governors of neighbouring counties and in 2015 was elected to serve as the secretary of the Council of Governors, the challenges of governing his divided county and, later in his term, the disintegration of the ReGaBu alliance and the emergence of powerful contenders for his position prevented the Marsabit governor from active participation in national politics. Because neither Ukur nor his main rival Mohammed Ali (Abshiro) opposed the Jubilee dominance in national politics, for President Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President William Ruto the stakes in the 2017 gubernatorial contest in Marsabit were low. For these reasons, national politics did not significantly influence the 2017 elections in Marsabit. Instead, the campaign reflected the county’s particular ethnicity-centric political system. The interactions between different groups of local state managers vying for control of the county government followed well-established patterns of political contestation that had emerged in the course of Marsabit’s inhabitants’ engagement with the Kenyan state. As a result of policies pursued by the colonial authorities, the previously highly fluid ethnic identities gradually hardened. The increased prominence of ethnic allegiances in Marsabit did not, however, lead to corresponding decline of powerful sub-ethnic (clan or phratry) identities. After Kenya’s independence, political agents who sought to establish themselves as intermediaries between their communities and state managers relied on the two sets of collective identities in their efforts to mobilize popular support. These electoral tactics increased the political salience of both types of collective identities, which accordingly assumed the role of parameters structuring political interactions in Marsabit. Political agents active in Marsabit politics—both before and after devolution—have had to carefully navigate the ethnic and sub-ethnic allegiances of their constituents. To do so, they have relied on support from customary leaders, who have consequently retained—and, in some cases, increased—their political power. The continuing importance of customary leaders and the uneasy balance between both types of collective identities creates a highly complex and fluid political system which, despite the growing rigidity

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of collective identities that has taken place in the context of extension of the role of the Kenyan state, echoes the historical adaptability and flexibility of the precolonial governance and social practices in Marsabit and offers valuable insights into the complexity of ethnic politics. Appendix. List of research respondents cited in the working paper. Given the politically sensitive nature of the research project, no identifying information was collected during field research. KA14, Anglican priest, interviewed in Marsabit on the 24th April 2016 KA15, Borana professional, interviewed in Marsabit on the 17th September 2016 KE40, Borana jallaba, interviewed in Badassa, Saku Sub-county, on the 20th April 2016 KO3, member of parliament from Marsabit County, interviewed in Nairobi on the 23rd February 2016 KO5, national government civil servant from Marsabit, interviewed in Nairobi on the 25th February 2016 KO7, member of parliament from Marsabit County, interviewed in Nairobi on the 3rd March 2016 KO38, civil servant, Marsabit County Government, interviewed in Marsabit on the 13th April and 14th September 2016 KO39, senior civil servant, Ministry of Health Services, Marsabit County Government, interviewed in Marsabit on the 21st April 2016 KO45, senior civil servant, Ministry of Roads, Public Works, and Transport, Marsabit County Government, interviewed in Marsabit on the 21st April 2016 KO49, deputy sub-county administrator, Marsabit County Government, interviewed in Marsabit on the 22nd April 2016 KO50, ward administrator, Marsabit County Government, interviewed in Marsabit on the 22nd April 2016 KO51, senior civil servant, Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries, Marsabit County Government, interviewed in Marsabit on the 22nd April 2016 KO55, civil servant, Ministry of Health Services, Marsabit County Government, interviewed in Marsabit on the 25th April 2016 KO66, member of the Marsabit County Executive Committee, interviewed in Marsabit on the 26th April 2016 KO74, Borana member of the Marsabit County Assembly, interviewed in Marsabit on the 24th April 2016 KO75, Borana member of the Marsabit County Assembly, interviewed in Marsabit on the 27th April 2016 KO76, Borana member of the Marsabit County Assembly, interviewed in Marsabit on the 27th April 2016 KO79, Rendille member of the Marsabit County Assembly, interviewed in Nairobi on the 29th April 2016 KO80, Borana politician, interviewed in Marsabit on the 14th September 2016 KO81, retired teacher, Marsabit County, interviewed in Marsabit on the 15th September 2016 KO166, senior civil servant, Ministry of Education, Skills Development, Youth, and Sports, Marsabit County Government, interviewed in Marsabit on the 26th April 2016 References Bassi, Marco. 2005. Decisions in the Shade: Political and Juridical Processes among the Oromo-Borana. Trenton, New Jersey: Red Sea Press. Baxter, P.T.W., 1978: “Boran Age-Sets and Generation-Sets: Gada, a Puzzle or a Maze?” In Age, Generation and Time. Some Features of East African Age Organisations, edited by P.T.W. Baxter and Uri Almagor. New York: St. Martin's Press: 151–182. Branch, Daniel. 2011. Kenya: Between Hope and Despair, 1963-2011. New Haven: Yale University Press. Carrier, Neil, and Hassan H. Kochore. 2014. “Navigating Ethnicity and Electoral Politics in Northern Kenya: The Case of the 2013 Election.” Journal of Eastern African Studies 8 (1): 135–52.

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