Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula - Foundation for Defense of ...

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula Financial Assessment

Yaya J. Fanusie Alex Entz July 2017 Terror Finance Briefing Book

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula FUNDING LEVEL1

$$$ $$ $ KEY AREAS OF ACTIVITY •

Yemen, particularly in the center of the country and along the southern coast2

Financial Overview Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) remains well-funded despite a sharp decrease in revenue following the loss of the Yemeni port city of Mukalla. It is also likely to see its income rise by exploiting the instability and sectarianism brought by Yemen’s civil war. At present, AQAP is likely making in the low- to mid-tens of millions of dollars per year,3 funding itself mostly through criminal opportunism and donations. However, when the group controls major economic centers, taxation becomes its most lucrative funding source. For example, when AQAP held Mukalla from mid-2015 to mid-2016, it brought in roughly $60 million in looted cash from the central bank and garnered an estimated $2 million per day in port taxes.4 The income earned in the past few years is likely enough to sustain the group for some time. Yemeni officials estimate AQAP needs about $10 million per year to operate.5 Given the surplus the group earned in Mukalla from taxes and bank looting, it is likely that the group maintains considerable cash reserves.

Background In the late 1980s, North Yemen President Ali Abdullah Saleh welcomed Yemenis and others who fought the Soviets in Afghanistan, resettling them with $20 million from Osama bin Laden6 and using them to counter Marxists in South Yemen and unify as one state.7 These militants formed al-Qaeda in Yemen (AQY) in 1998 and carried out the USS Cole bombing two years later.8 The U.S. worked in concert with Yemen to degrade AQY. Though largely destroyed by 2003,9 a 2006 prison escape fueled AQY’s resurgence.10 In January 2009, AQY merged with al-Qaeda forces in Saudi Arabia to form AQAP,11 launching several attempted attacks on the U.S. from 2009-10.12 In the spring of 2011, AQAP captured territory in Yemen for the first time, ruling according to a strict interpretation of sharia and declaring an emirate.13 President Saleh stepped down due to Arab Spring protests in late 2011,14 which helped stoke a civil war. Months later, U.S.-backed forces pushed AQAP out of its land holdings.15 In early 2015, AQAP took responsibility for the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris.16 Saudi Arabia’s involvement in Yemen’s civil war later in 2015 gave AQAP space to expand amidst the chaos,17 capturing the large port city of Mukalla in April 2015.18 In early 2016, AQAP operated freely in Yemen’s largest province,19 and held much of the country’s coastline.20 Saudi and UAE forces joined Yemeni troops21 to recapture Mukalla in April 2016,22 but they have occasionally tolerated23 AQAP elements also fighting Iran-backed Houthis.24 AQAP often rebrands25 to dissociate from al-Qaeda (AQ),26 and teams up with local tribes.27 AQAP has clashed with the Islamic State (IS) in Yemen,28 but is stronger despite some defections.29 AQAP often stokes Shiite-Sunni sectarian tensions to gain recruits.30 Former President Saleh, though mainly supporting the Houthis,31 has allegedly used AQAP operatives to weaken his successor, President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi.32 AQAP calls for attacks against the U.S.,33 which it sees as its main enemy.34

Action Points (for additional details, see page 6) 1. Expand prohibition on ransoms from G8 to EU. Refuse ransom settlements negotiated by Gulf states. 2. Pressure Gulf countries to aggressively enforce international AML/CFT regulations and police charitable donations. 3. Pressure the Hadi government to fully reject AQAP, and provide intelligence and air support to pro-Hadi forces fighting AQAP. 4. Undermine AQAP’s ability to endear itself to local communities and to reemerge post-civil war. 2 | CSIF: Terror Finance Briefing Book

See more information in the Financial Details section

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Main Sources of Funding OIL AND GAS SALES • AQAP

earns money on oil mostly through taxation and some direct sales. • Yemen’s government rejected an AQAP request to share profits on exported oil in 2016.

• AQAP

earned $2 million per day from taxes on “goods and fuel” while in control of the port city of Mukalla.

LOOTING AND SPOILS • Most

of AQAP’s armament has been looted from Yemeni security forces.

• AQAP

facilitates local sex trafficking through forced marriages. • In 2015, AQAP smuggled oil from areas it controlled around Yemen and sold it.

CASH FROM THE BANKING SYSTEM

KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM • AQAP

told AQ partners that ransoms provided half of the group’s funding in 2012. • The group netted $30 million in ransoms from 2011-13.

DONATIONS

• AQAP

has looted numerous banks across Yemen. • The group stole roughly $60 million from the central bank branch in Mukalla in 2015.

EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE

• Fake

charities and other donations were a major source of funding at least through 2015.

Significant Financial Events

SMUGGLING AND TRAFFICKING

TAXATION AND EXTORTION

• Other

AQ branches have supported AQAP with arms and fighters.

2010 Osama bin Laden instructs AQIM to support AQAP financially.35

May 2011

2011-13

AQAP seizes millions of dollars from a provincial bank in Zinjibar.36

AQAP makes roughly $30 million from ransoms, fueling the group’s offensives.37

April 2015

April 2015-April 2016

April 2016

AQAP seizes the port city of Mukalla, looting roughly $60 million from the city’s central bank branch.38

AQAP earns up to $2 million per day from port taxes in Mukalla.39

AQAP loses control of Mukalla,40 but still profits from smuggling and taxing oil along the southern Yemeni shore.41

3 | CSIF: Terror Finance Briefing Book

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula ACCESS TO BANKING SYSTEM AQAP has acquired substantial funds from conventional banks in territory it held, but the group probably moves money mostly through Yemen’s money exchange sector. AQAP seized roughly $60 million from the Yemeni central bank in Mukalla,42 but conventional banking systems are not available throughout Yemen; in 2010, only roughly four percent of Yemenis had bank accounts.43 Even so, AQAP compensated the victims of one of its attacks with checks, made out in Yemeni rials, cashable “at a bank in Aden.”44 Fearing seizure of their assets, many banks closed once AQAP came into control in parts of Yemen.45 Some money exchanges, however, stayed open and did business with the group, holding accounts and transferring Saudi riyals to pay fighters on AQAP’s behalf.46 When AQAP held Mukalla, three banks and three exchange houses capable of processing international transactions remained open.47 For example, the al-Omgy Money Exchange, an exchange with 95 offices across Yemen, had an account on behalf of AQAP that controlled money the group had raised through extortion and taxation. AQAP used the exchange to pay its fighters around Yemen.48 AQAP also levied a 10 percent surcharge on transactions done through the exchange. This relationship led the U.S. government to designate the exchange for sanctions in 2016.49 Additionally, a June 2016 Camstoll Group report noted that AQAP-linked entities, including charities, had publicized their accounts at Yemeni financial institutions to raise funds.50

Strategic Strengths

Strategic Vulnerabilities

• The Saudi-led military operation in Yemen prioritizes the Houthi threat over AQAP, giving AQAP room to grow.

51

• AQAP has adapted its strategy in recent years, pushing

• • •

•

for a more gradual adoption of sharia, and building better rapport with locals by providing order and public goods, and obscuring the group’s identity by adopting a local brand.52 AQAP’s connection to al-Shabaab and the broader AQ network gives it access to funding pipelines and weaponry.53 AQAP often pays fighters better and more consistently than pro-government forces, prompting some defections to the group.54 The sectarian element of Yemen’s war has encouraged some Sunni tribes to ally with AQAP to halt the Houthi advance, allowing AQAP to stretch its resources and influence.55 AQAP’s extensive Yemeni connections allow fighters to blend in with tribes, which are often wary of Yemeni government forces.56


• Kidnapping revenue is inconsistent and dependent upon countries’ willingness to pay ransoms.

• Looting is one of AQAP’s largest sources of income,

but is nonrenewable and is less likely without territorial expansion. • AQAP’s looting also risks alienating the population, to which AQAP is especially sensitive as it seeks to develop local support. • AQAP’s ability to expand services and infrastructure is weak compared to its government adversaries. The local Yemeni government now in control of Mukalla has invested in providing better services than AQAP, and the UAE has assisted the reconstruction and helped provide security, which has boosted shipping commerce. The model has proven successful thus far and will likely undermine AQAP’s base of support in the community.57

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula U.S. Government Counter-Measures The Treasury Department designated AQAP as a terrorist organization in 2010.58 Former Yemeni President Saleh59 was a “fickle” partner in the fight against AQAP,60 occasionally cooperating with the group.61 From 2012-14 – after Saleh’s departure – the U.S. provided Yemen with roughly $750 million in aid of all types.62 In 2017, the U.S. gave $49 million in humanitarian aid and nearly $14 million in arms sales and military and police aid.63 The U.S. has also provided Saudi Arabia with arms and training, though those resources have largely been used to fight Houthi rebels.64 The U.S. conducted 160 airstrikes in Yemen, many from drones, from 2011-2016,65 including one that killed U.S.-born propagandist Anwar al-Awlaki.66 U.S. Special Forces have operated alongside Gulf soldiers to fight AQAP, including supporting Yemeni and Emirati forces fighting to recapture Mukalla in April 2016.67 In early 2017, the U.S. designated parts of Yemen as “areas of active hostilities,” allowing for more expansive U.S. involvement,68 and stepped up airstrikes considerably, hitting AQAP 80 times from January to May 2017.69 U.S. special operations teams in April 2017 increased their intelligence-gathering activities in Yemen.70 Some analysts contend that civilian casualties associated with U.S. drone strikes and “reckless” Saudi air strikes71 have helped galvanize AQAP’s fundraising and recruitment efforts72 and have not effectively diminished the group’s abilities.73

U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) Sanctions

5 organizations, 19 individuals

WILDCARDS

Unexpected developments which would greatly impact the group’s financing

FUNDING DECREASE Islamic State fighters dispersing from Syria go to the group’s affiliate in Yemen, while Iran steps up support for the Houthis. This squeezes AQAP from the north and the south.

Of the five organizations and 19 individuals affiliated with AQAP and designated by OFAC (as of June 23, 2017), two organizations and seven individuals are also designated by the United Nations. For a detailed listing of designees, please see the Terror Finance Briefing Book Appendices, available on FDD’s website.74

Notable Designations ‘Abd al-Wahhab Muhammad ‘Abd al-Rahman Al-Humayqani This Yemeni national was designated for using his network of charities75 to fundraise for AQAP,76 and for traveling around the region on the group’s behalf. Humayqani was an AQAP emir in a Yemen governorate in 2011, and serves as secretary general of a political party he helped create to serve as a front for AQAP.77 Yemeni President Hadi met with Humayqani after his designation – as did then-secretary general of the UN, Ban Ki-Moon – and refuses to extradite him.78 He has not been sanctioned by the UN as of July 2017.79 His current presumed location is Yemen or Saudi Arabia.80

FUNDING INCREASE AQAP unites operationally with al-Shabaab in order to share resources and augment fighting power.

Abdallah Faysal Sadiq al-Ahdal Since 2010, Yemeni national Al-Ahdal has allegedly used his charity, Rahmah Charitable Organization, to fundraise for AQAP. Al-Ahdal is reportedly part of an AQAP “banking network” that has laundered money for the group.81 He is accused of having used the al-Omgy Money Exchange, a sanctioned entity referenced in the above “Access to Banking” section, to transfer money for foreign fighters.82 He has not been sanctioned by the UN as of June 2017.83 His current presumed location is Yemen. 5 | CSIF: Terror Finance Briefing Book

FUNDING INCREASE AQAP gains influence by covertly backing a new Islamist political party in Yemen. The group’s recruiting and access to resources expands.

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Action Points 1. Expand prohibition on ransoms from G8 to EU. Refuse ransom settlements negotiated by Gulf states. In 2011-13, AQAP’s primary source of funding came from ransoms. Oman, Qatar, and France have paid large ransom sums, although France has since agreed to not pay ransoms. AQAP continues to seek to kidnap more foreign nationals. The U.S. executive branch should elevate the importance of not paying ransoms in its diplomatic dealings with the EU, encouraging the bloc to adopt a ransom ban like the G8 did in 2013.84 Further, the U.S. should make clear to Gulf states like Oman and Qatar that arranging for or paying ransoms is tantamount to funding terrorism. Congress should enable the president to designate countries of particular concern for directly or indirectly funding terrorism for additional penalties or sanctions. 2. Pressure Gulf countries to aggressively enforce international AML/CFT regulations and police charitable donations. Fraudulent charities and terror financiers have raised money for AQAP around the Gulf. Recognizing this issue, the U.S. recently has partnered with Saudi Arabia and other nations in the region to form the Terrorist Financing Targeting Center (TFTC).85 The U.S. should use this forum to share intelligence, help track regional terror financiers, and push for the member countries to uphold the TFTC’s mission by prosecuting terror financiers in their jurisdictions. Further, the U.S. should lean on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and give FATF proof of Gulf countries’ negligence in not prosecuting terror financiers and fraudulent charities. 3. Pressure the Hadi government to fully reject AQAP, and provide intelligence and air support to pro-Hadi forces fighting AQAP. The focus of the Hadi government, and its Saudi and UAE allies, has been on fighting the Houthis. This has led to situations where AQAP and Yemeni government forces are “battlefield allies,” leaving AQAP largely unchallenged outside of minor clashes with UAE troops.86 The U.S. must make clear that any such alliances of convenience are unacceptable, as is any situation that leads to AQAP, or AQAP-linked groups, obtaining political legitimacy and influence through an invitation to peace negotiations. AQAP must be militarily defeated. The U.S. must therefore encourage the Hadi government and its allies to press offensives into AQAP-held territory when possible. Parts of Yemen have already been designated as areas of active hostilities, providing legal and operational latitude for U.S. forces to assist in the fight against AQAP. The U.S. should give this support. 4. Undermine AQAP’s ability to endear itself to local communities and to reemerge post-civil war. Since 2015, AQAP has been successful in winning local support by downplaying its al-Qaeda brand, aligning itself with tribal groups, improving local governance, and taking a “gentler” and more gradual approach to implementing its understanding of sharia law.87 Although the U.S. Embassy in Sanaa closed in 2015,88 the U.S. should use its Yemeni Affairs Unit in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia to go beyond providing humanitarian aid and identify, vet, and support civil society associations in Yemen that will be crucial for post-conflict recovery and governance. The U.S. should also provide as much transparency as is reasonably possible in reporting the impact drone strikes have on the civilian population, including outlining the measures the U.S. has taken to avoid civilian deaths. This is critical to undercut AQAP recruitment of locals.89 Further, given reporting that shows AQAP seeking to form a political party as a front for increasing recruitment and funding,90 the U.S. must ensure that the Hadi government unequivocally considers any such political parties as illegitimate and dangerous, and thus bars them from entering into the mainstream political process.


Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Financial Details AQAP’s war chest, built up from its time in control of significant territory, most notably Mukalla in 2015-16, is probably large enough to sustain the group for some time.

• AQAP likely makes in the low- to mid-tens of millions of dollars per year with taxes on smuggled fuel and donations

comprising most of the group’s current income. ɦɦ When in control of Mukalla, the group garnered perhaps more than $750 million between revenue from the port and central bank seizures.91 ɦɦ From 2011-13, it is likely that the group made roughly $20 million per year, based on an average of $10 million per year in ransoms and internal AQAP statements saying ransoms made up half of the group’s budget.92 ɦɦ On top of the funding sources the group had in 2011-13, when it controlled less territory, the group now makes an undetermined amount from smuggling fuel.93

• In 2014, the U.S. Department of State believed that AQAP’s top funding sources were robberies, ransoms, and donations;94 in 2015, the State Department noted the continuing relevance of these sources, but stated that the seizure of Mukalla had given the group “access to additional sources of revenue,” including theft from the central bank.95

• In 2015, the UN estimated that AQAP’s main sources of funding were bank looting and kidnapping for ransom.96 • In 2015, the U.S. Department of State noted that “AQAP’s funding has historically come from theft, robberies, and kidnap for ransom operations; and donations from like-minded supporters,” though this mix was shifting after seizing Mukalla.97

• AQAP’s operating budget was estimated to be about $10 million a year as of the seizure of Mukalla in April 2015.98 OIL AND GAS SALES If forces fighting for Yemen’s President Hadi lose control of terrain, AQAP could regain control of oil pipelines and infrastructure. Given AQAP’s desire to win over local communities, it is likely to exploit these for financial gain rather than attack them to hurt its enemies. In the short-term, AQAP will continue to exploit Yemen’s hinterlands by taxing and smuggling oil.

• To fund the local government in Mukalla in April

2015, AQAP “tacked on extra charges to fuel sales and imports as a way to secure a source of revenue” for the city.99

• In 2016, prior to losing Mukalla, tribes cooperating

with al-Qaeda controlled much of Yemen’s oil infrastructure, according to a Reuters investigation.100 ɦɦ The decision of international oil companies to stop production and largely abandon the oilfields,101 rather than work under AQAP, diminished the group’s ability to earn revenue. Some of the oil fields were “operated entirely by indigenous


staff” after AQAP seized control, but most of AQAP’s revenue from oil seems to have come from smuggling and taxation, rather than production.102 ɦɦ Fuel imported into ports that AQAP held in 201516 (including Mukalla and Ash-Shihr) were taxed by AQAP and smuggled throughout Yemen.103

• AQAP sought a profit-sharing agreement on

exported oil with the Yemeni government in 2016. In the agreement, AQAP would export oil with the government’s blessing; AQAP would take a quarter of the profit, and would send three-quarters to the government. The Yemeni government rejected that plan.104 ɦɦ AQAP controlled Yemen’s “largest oil export terminal,” stocked with two million barrels of oil, when it took over Mukalla. However, the group was unable to export the barrels without such an agreement with the Yemeni government, and so the terminal remained closed.105

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Financial Details TAXATION AND EXTORTION AQAP has often yielded its taxation power as a way to win support, not just gain revenue. The group tends to tax trade and businesses rather than individuals. Indeed, AQAP has previously abolished individual taxes under its purview. The group also extorts large companies.

• In mid-2011, AQAP abolished the existing taxes in several towns as a way to win popular support.106 Individual income taxes in Yemen ranged from 10 percent to 20 percent in 2011, while standard corporate taxes were 20 percent.107

• In 2015, when AQAP was in control of Mukalla, local

traders noted that the group filled “hundreds of oil trucks,” and smuggled the fuel across Yemen to sell, including to government-run stations.115

• In 2016, after AQAP was pushed out of Mukalla, the

group made money by taxing and directly smuggling fuel transported along the Yemeni coast.116

LOOTING AND SPOILS

• In 2012, AQAP made money by charging tolls at

AQAP is likely to continue targeting Yemeni military bases and depots to arm itself in the future. Most of the group’s armament has come from such looting operations.

• According to the UN Security Council, as well as the

• In early 2015, AQAP launched a series of attacks on

checkpoints.108

Yemeni government and local traders, AQAP earned “up to $2 million every day in taxes on goods and fuel” coming into Mukalla from 2015-16.109 ɦɦ Local traders estimated AQAP’s daily revenue from the port to be “as high as $5 million a day from customs duties” and fuel smuggled on “hundreds of oil trucks.”110

• AQAP abolished taxation for citizens living in Mukalla in 2016, but extorted fees from ships.111

• AQAP extorted $1.4-$4.7 million from Yemen’s national oil company in Mukalla, publishing their demand and distributing it through local media.112

SMUGGLING AND TRAFFICKING Smuggling oil is likely to remain a preeminent funding source so long as AQAP continues to hold large sections of Yemen’s coast. The group also has engaged in arms trafficking and human trafficking to arm itself and ingratiate itself with local communities.

• UN investigators reported that in 2012, AQAP

facilitated human trafficking by creating “marriage tents” in an occupied province and forcing local women to marry its fighters. Sometimes, “girls are given away as gifts” to the group.113

• After capturing Mukalla and much of the Yemeni

coast in 2015, the State Department noted that AQAP’s control of this territory “made these areas highly vulnerable to maritime smuggling of weapons, materials, and goods used to finance AQAP.”114


government military bases in Yemen, repeatedly looting bases and seizing weapons.117 ɦɦ In early 2015, AQAP seized large Yemeni arms depots,118 including one containing “dozens of tanks, Katyusha rocket launchers and small arms,” as part of its push to conquer Mukalla.119 ɦɦ Per a UN report in 2015, most of AQAP’s armament was looted from Yemeni “military and security premises.”120 ɦɦ Since March 2015, AQAP has “plundered thirteen army units across Yemen.”121

• In October 2014, facing a decline in funding, AQAP looted $140,000 from a post office.122

KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM Now without significant territorial holdings, AQAP is likely to turn some of its focus back to ransom payments. Half of AQAP’s budget came from ransom money from 2011-13, then its largest source of funding. AQAP has developed a relationship with some Yemeni tribal leaders wherein it pays the tribes for hostages, and then negotiates large ransoms for their return.

• In a 2012 letter from Nasser al-Wuhayshi, then the

head of AQAP, to his counterparts with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), he stated that “kidnapping hostages is an easy spoil,” both “a profitable trade and a precious treasure.” Al-Wuhayshi estimated that half of his budget for his operations were covered by ransom payments.123

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Financial Details • In 2013, U.S. officials believed that kidnapping for

ransom was AQAP’s “single largest source of funds,” supplanting donations as efforts to stem such flows were increased.124

• Analysis by The New York Times in 2014 found two

major ransom payments to AQAP: $9 million in 2011 for three French nationals, paid by the French government,125 and $20.4 million in 2012-13, paid by Oman and Qatar, for four Europeans. Oman and Qatar act as intermediaries for European governments paying ransoms in Yemen.126 ɦɦ European countries have allegedly directly paid ransoms to AQAP. They have done so over the protestations of Yemeni government officials, who in 2014 said the ransom payments had revitalized the group, bringing it back from a financial crunch that had required AQAP militants to sell their guns. The ransom payments encouraged a group of “gunmen who essentially work on commission for al Qaeda,” abducting foreigners in Yemen’s capital, Sanaa. Ransoms probably are paid in cash, through negotiators acting as intermediaries with AQAP.127

• In 2014, according to then-Treasury Under Secretary

for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen, “AQAP used ransom money it received for the return of European hostages to finance its over $20 million campaign to seize territory in Yemen between mid2011 and mid-2012.”128

• In early 2014, Yemeni officials told the UN that

“around 30 per cent of kidnappings in Yemen were committed by AQAP.”129

• Yemeni tribes sell individuals they kidnap to AQAP,

“who demands ransoms in the millions of dollars to finance operations.”130 ɦɦ As early as 2012, Yemeni tribes sold kidnapped foreigners to AQAP rather than ransom them on their own.131

CASH FROM THE BANKING SYSTEM Unless more protections are taken against AQAP accessing the international banking system, the group will likely exploit Yemeni banks to access and move cash. This vulnerability was shown by the continued operation of some banks with connections to the international banking system when AQAP held Mukalla. Though Yemen has a minimal formal banking presence, AQAP will likely also continue to loot banks to pay for its governance and operations.

• In 2011, AQAP forces looted the provincial bank in Zinjibar, netting the group a sum in the low millions of dollars.132

• The group robbed “a number of local banks and

exchange companies, including the Agriculture Credit Bank and a branch of the National Bank,” in August 2014.133 ɦɦ AQAP seized roughly $92,000 from the agricultural bank in Mukalla in 2015.134

• AQAP looted roughly $30 million worth of deposits from commercial banks in Mukalla in April 2015.135

• AQAP looted the Yemeni central bank branch in

Mukalla in 2015, bringing in over $61 million, according to a UN official, citing estimates given by several member states.136 A U.S. airstrike destroyed up to $42 million of the estimated $61 million haul.137

• In 2016, the Camstoll Group reported that AQAP

had looted millions more from “more than a dozen financial institutions in Yemen.”138

DONATIONS The sectarian nature of the fighting in Yemen has burnished AQAP’s ability to tap donors across the Gulf. Donations to AQAP have consistently played a major role in the group’s funding, and show no sign of diminishing.

• An increased number of Saudi AQAP members from 2008-10 may have improved the group’s ability to fundraise through foreign donations.139

• The U.S. State Department’s 2015 Country

Reports noted that “donations from like-minded” supporters were a historically consistent source of funding for AQAP.140


Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Financial Details ɦɦ Many of these donations are routed through Saudi Arabian charities.141

• In 2017, the UN noted that “AQAP continues to receive significant donations, including under the cover of charitable organizations.”142

• According to the Australian government, AQAP makes money from “donations collected in mosques,” as well as from donors in countries including Yemen and Saudi Arabia.143

EXPENDITURES AQAP has consistently used its funds to ingratiate itself with local communities, and will likely continue to do this as it attempts to build local support. While AQAP has moved away from providing direct governance, it still bankrolls social services and infrastructure development in areas it controls.

• In addition to providing fighters, AQAP also sent arms to al-Shabaab in 2009-10.151

• After first seizing territory in 2011, AQAP’s local face, EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE As multiple parties vie for control in Yemen, AQAP is likely to continue to leverage the growing regional conflict to secure funding and resources. The group has ties to the Hadi government, and Saudi Arabia has allowed AQAP financiers to work unencumbered throughout its territory. AQAP has also benefitted from AQ’s wider network, with the group receiving arms and funds from other affiliates.

• A 2010 letter from Osama bin Laden to AQIM directed the group’s leadership to provide funds to AQAP.144

• A confidential source with apparent access to the Yemeni security apparatus claimed that former President “Saleh paid [AQAP head Qassim] al-Raymi $70 million” for a cover-up in which AQAP claimed false responsibility for a 2013 hospital attack that killed over 50 civilians.145

• A 2015 UN report stated that “Somali militants have regularly travelled to Yemen to fight alongside AQAP.”146

• Weapons from the Saudi-led coalition have

inadvertently been transferred to AQAP when the groups have fought together.147

• Several political and military leaders closely linked to

President Hadi have been sanctioned by the U.S. for providing financial assistance to AQAP,148 including the governor of one of Yemen’s governorates whom the Treasury Department in 2016 stated had raised and transferred money to AQAP.149

• Saudi Arabia has repeatedly failed to prosecute

individuals in its country who are raising money on behalf of AQAP. Indeed, individuals have appeared on Saudi state television and met with Saudi Arabia’s grand mufti after being sanctioned by the U.S.150


Ansar al-Sharia, “provided water, electricity, and food”152 to areas under its control, paid for by AQAP.153 ɦɦ The group provided sharia-based courts to maintain order,154 as well as education and compensation for damage done by U.S. airstrikes.155 ɦɦ AQAP’s administration of the territory it controlled in 2011-12 cost $20 million per year. Most of this money came from war spoils and ransoms.156

• In 2011, AQAP provided compensation for civilians

it killed, in one instance paying $56,000 by check to the families of each of the four civilians it killed in an attempted robbery.157

• Community engagement efforts on behalf of AQAP

since 2011 have included drilling and maintaining water wells, compensation to those killed in drone attacks, and “paying for those who need to travel for medical treatment.”158

• In 2012, AQAP sent “tens of thousands of dollars” to a terrorist network in Egypt.159

• The perpetrators of the January 2015 attack against

Charlie Hebdo claim to have been funded by AQAP’s central administration. Though these allegations have not been confirmed, the attack likely only cost roughly $30,000.160 ɦɦ An AQAP publication estimated that $4,200 was all the group would need to destroy a commercial U.S. aircraft.161

• Upon taking Mukalla in April 2015, AQAP provided

a $3.7 million162 budget to the city council to provide governance.163 ɦɦ AQAP did not directly rule Mukalla. The money provided went towards public salaries but did not include a mandate that AQAP run the city.164

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Financial Details ɦɦ AQAP provided “basic services, such as drinking water, electricity, and fuel;” according to the secretary general of the council that ran Mukalla, money for these services came from the looted central bank. AQAP’s forces paired with tribal militias to prevent looting or destruction of government property.165 ɦɦ AQAP ran the Mukalla seaport, purchasing fuel and generators.166 ɦɦ The group also helped distribute food, develop infrastructure, provide medical supplies, and put on community events.167 ɦɦ In late 2015, AQAP established a religious police force that enforced sharia around Mukalla, the extent of its direct governance.168

• In late 2015, the group allegedly paid back income

taxes to government workers, deeming the payroll taxes “un-Islamic.”169

• AQAP promised to reimburse families whose homes were damaged by the destruction of Sufi shrines around Mukalla in late 2015.170

• In 2016, senior fighters in AQAP could make $1,100

a month, while most fighters made $200 monthly.171 Houthi fighters made $200-$300 per month on average, while Yemeni soldiers made just $140-$150.172 ɦɦ In 2012, AQAP recruited “with the promise of a new rifle, a new car, and salaries as high as $400 per month.” It also provided public goods and assistance at the tribal level, to communities rather than individuals, as a way of developing a network of affiliated tribes.173

• AQAP’s media office, al-Malahem Media Foundation, produces videos, reports, and magazines as propaganda for the group’s activities.174

AQAP’s funding is highly contingent on its battlefield successes. If the group recaptures Mukalla or other major ports, or major oil infrastructure, it stands to benefit from a large, consistent revenue source. AQAP’s extensive war chest and deep roots of support across Yemen’s relatively ungoverned hinterlands provide an opportunity for the group to sustain itself and build local rapport for the foreseeable future. The group’s future territory gains will likely come under the auspices of a non-AQ organization to avoid international scrutiny and to broaden its popular support. The U.S. and its allies should expect a protracted, complex military campaign in Yemen to take place alongside peace talks pushing for a pluralistic government in Sanaa.

A Yemeni soldier stands guard on a beach in the city of Mukalla in southern Yemen April 22, 2017. Credit: REUTERS/Aziz El Yaakoubi 11 | CSIF: Terror Finance Briefing Book

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Endnotes 1. Based on a scale out of 3 dollar signs, where 1 dollar sign represents tens of millions in funding per year, 2 dollar signs represents low hundreds of millions, and 3 dollar signs represents high hundreds of millions or more in current funding. 2. Maher Farrukh, “2017 Yemen Crisis Situation Report,” American Enterprise Institute, February 8, 2017. (https://www. criticalthreats.org/briefs/yemen-situation-report/2017-yemencrisis-situation-report-february-8-2017) 3. From 2011-13, the group made roughly $30 million from ransoms, or about $10 million per year, which AQAP members estimated provided half of the group’s funding. If AQAP still has access to the sources of funding providing the other roughly $10 million per year, which likely included donations and other external assistance, its increased smuggling activities in the region and control of territory around Mukalla make us comfortable estimating the group makes “low to mid tens of millions.” For more details, please see “Overall Funding” in the Financial Details section; Saeed Al Batati, “Yemen: The truth behind alQaeda’s takeover of Mukalla,” Al-Jazeera (Qatar), September 16, 2015. (http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/09/yemen-truth-alqaeda-takeover-mukalla-150914101527567.html) 4. United Nations Security Council, “Eighteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities,” July 19, 2016, pages 10-11. (http:// www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2016/629); Yara Bayoumy, Noah Browning, and Mohammed Ghobari, “How Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen has made al Qaeda stronger - and richer,” Reuters, April 8, 2016. (http://www.reuters.com/ investigates/special-report/yemen-aqap/) 5. Yara Bayoumy, Noah Browning, and Mohammed Ghobari, “How Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen has made al Qaeda stronger - and richer,” Reuters, April 8, 2016. (http://www.reuters.com/ investigates/special-report/yemen-aqap/) 6. John F. Burns, “Yemen Links to bin Laden Gnaw at F.B.I. in Cole Inquiry,” The New York Times, November 26, 2000. (http:// www.nytimes.com/2000/11/26/world/yemen-links-to-bin-ladengnaw-at-fbi-in-cole-inquiry.html?pagewanted=all) 7. Evan Hill and Laura Kasinof, “Playing a Double Game in the Fight Against AQAP,” Foreign Policy, January 21, 2015. (http:// foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/21/playing-a-double-game-in-thefight-against-aqap-yemen-saleh-al-qaeda/) 8. “Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP),” Council on Foreign Relations, June 19, 2015. (http://www.cfr.org/yemen/alqaeda-arabian-peninsula-aqap/p9369) 9. “Profile: Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,” BBC News (UK), June 16, 2015. (http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middleeast-11483095)


10. “Hunt on for Yemeni jailbreakers,” BBC News (UK), February 4, 2006. (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_ east/4682214.stm); “Al-Qaeda in Yemen,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 7, 2009. (http://carnegieendowment. org/files/0708carnegie-yemen.pdf ) 11. United Nations Security Council, “Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: QDe.129 Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP),” January 19, 2010. (https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/ sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/entity/al-qaida-inthe-arabian-peninsula-(aqap)) 12. United States House of Representative, Hearing before Committee on Homeland Security, “Understanding the Threat to the Homeland From AQAP,” September 18, 2013. (https:// www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113hhrg86483/html/CHRG113hhrg86483.htm) 13. J. Dana Stuster and Ellen Noble, “The Failed Islamic States Index,” Foreign Policy, August 7, 2014. (http://foreignpolicy. com/2014/08/07/the-failed-islamic-states-index/) 14. Kareem Fahim and Laura Kasinof, “Yemen’s Leader Agrees to End 3-Decade Rule,” The New York Times, November 23, 2011. (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/24/world/middleeast/yemensaleh-transfer-power-deal-saudi-arabia.html) 15. Michael Horton, “Fighting the Long War: The Evolution of Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, January 23, 2017. (https://www.ctc.usma.edu/ posts/fighting-the-long-war-the-evolution-of-al-qaida-in-thearabian-peninsula) 16. Catherine E. Shoichet and Josh Levs, “Al Qaeda branch claims Charlie Hebdo attack was years in the making,” CNN, January 21, 2015. (http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/14/europe/ charlie-hebdo-france-attacks/) 17. Saeed Al-Batati and Kareem Fahim, “War in Yemen Is Allowing Qaeda Group to Expand,” The New York Times, April 16, 2015. (https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/17/world/ middleeast/khaled-bahah-houthi-rebel-yemen-fighting.html) 18. Ayisha Amr, “How al Qaeda Rules in Yemen,” Foreign Affairs, October 28, 2015. (https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/yemen/2015-10-28/how-al-qaeda-rules-yemen) 19. Ahmed Alwly, “Despite Arab, US attacks, AQAP still holding out in Yemen,” Al-Monitor, May 13, 2016. (http://www. al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/05/yemen-al-qaeda-usterrorism-hadi-mukalla-drones.html) 20. Yara Bayoumy, Noah Browning, and Mohammed Ghobari, “How Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen has made al Qaeda stronger - and richer,” Reuters, April 8, 2016. (http://www.reuters.com/ investigates/special-report/yemen-aqap/) 21. Asa Fitch, “After al Qaeda’s Ouster, a Push to Revive Yemen Port,” The Wall Street Journal, May 16, 2017. (https://www.wsj. com/articles/after-al-qaedas-ouster-a-push-to-revive-yemenport-1494927002)

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Endnotes 22. Thomas Joscelyn, “Arab coalition enters AQAP stronghold in port city of Mukalla, Yemen,” FDD’s Long War Journal, April 25, 2016. (http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/04/ arab-coalition-enters-aqap-stronghold-in-port-city-of-mukallayemen.php); United Nations Security Council, “Eighteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities,” July 19, 2016. (http://www. un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2016/629) 23. Maggie Michael and Ahmed Al-Haj, “Pro-government tribal leader among dead in US raid in Yemen,” Associated Press, February 16, 2017. (https://apnews.com/ d927fc2962f44a6d8edf6a790b556bbc/pro-government-triballeader-among-dead-us-raid-yemen) 24. Yaroslav Trofimov, “Is Al Qaeda Winning in Saudi-Iran Proxy War in Yemen?” The Wall Street Journal, September 10, 2015. (https://www.wsj.com/articles/is-al-qaeda-winning-insaudi-iran-proxy-war-in-yemen-1441877581); Hugh Naylor, “Saudi-led coalition plans ground attacks in Yemen after taking key city,” The Washington Post, July 29, 2015. (https:// www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/saudi-ledcoalition-plans-ground-attacks-in-yemen-after-taking-keycity/2015/07/28/a2131646-315d-11e5-a879-213078d03dd3_ story.html?utm_term=.f71ead1e4e81) 25. Christopher Swift, “Arc of Convergence: AQAP, Ansar al-Shari’a and the Struggle for Yemen,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, June 21, 2012. (https://www.ctc.usma. edu/posts/arc-of-convergence-aqap-ansar-al-sharia-and-thestruggle-for-yemen) 26. The U.S. government has consistently rejected the idea that these rebrandings differentiate the group from AQ. See: U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Counter Terrorism Updates and Removals; Transnational Criminal Organizations Removal; Syria Designations Update,” June 21, 2017. (https://www. treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/ Pages/20170621.aspx) 27. Saeed Al-Batati and Kareem Fahim, “War in Yemen Is Allowing Qaeda Group to Expand,” The New York Times, April 16, 2015. (https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/17/world/ middleeast/khaled-bahah-houthi-rebel-yemen-fighting.html) 28. Michael Horton, “AQAP in Southern Yemen: Learning, Adapting and Growing,” The Jamestown Foundation, October 14, 2016. (https://jamestown.org/program/aqap-southern-yemenlearning-adapting-growing/) 29. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Nathaniel Barr, “Neither Remaining Nor Expanding: The Islamic State’s Global Expansion Struggles,” War on the Rocks, February 23, 2016. (https:// warontherocks.com/2016/02/neither-remaining-nor-expandingthe-islamic-states-global-expansion-struggles/)


30. United Nations Security Council, “Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen established pursuant to Security Council Committee resolution 2140 (2014),” February 20, 2015, pages 13-14. (http://www.securitycouncilreport. org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2015_125.pdf ) 31. Thomas Joscelyn, “Unfinished Business,” The Weekly Standard, June 5, 2017. (http://www.weeklystandard.com/ unfinished-business/article/2008216) 32. United Nations Security Council, Press Release, “Security Council 2140 Sanctions Committee Designates Three Individuals as Subject to Assets Freeze, Travel Ban,” November 7, 2014. (http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11636.doc.htm) 33. Inspire Magazine, “New video message from al-Qā’idah in the Arabian Peninsula’s Shaykh Qāsim al-Raymī: ‘An Inspire Address #1: A Lone Mujāhid or An Army By Itself,’” May 7, 2017. (http://jihadology.net/category/inspire-magazine/) 34. Thomas Joscelyn, “AQAP leader says America is the ‘primary enemy,’” FDD’s Long War Journal, December 24, 2015. (http:// www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/12/aqap-leader-saysamerica-is-the-primary-enemy.php) 35. Osama bin Laden, “Letter from UBL to ‘Atiyatullah al-Libi 4 (English Translation),” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, May 2010, page 26. (https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/ uploads/2013/10/Letter-from-UBL-to-Atiyatullah-Al-Libi-4Translation.pdf ) 36. Christopher Swift, “Arc of Convergence: AQAP, Ansar al-Shari’a and the Struggle for Yemen,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, June 21, 2012. (https://www.ctc.usma. edu/posts/arc-of-convergence-aqap-ansar-al-sharia-and-thestruggle-for-yemen) 37. Rukmini Callimachi, “Paying Ransoms, Europe Bankrolls Qaeda Terror,” The New York Times, July 29, 2014. (https:// www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/world/africa/ransoming-citizenseurope-becomes-al-qaedas-patron.html) 38. United Nations Security Council, “Eighteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities,” July 19, 2016, pages 10-11. (http:// www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2016/629) 39. Ibid, page 11. 40. Saeed Al-Batati, Kareem Fahim, and Eric Schmitt, “Yemeni Troops, Backed by United Arab Emirates, Take City From Al Qaeda,” The New York Times, April 24, 2016. (https://www. nytimes.com/2016/04/25/world/middleeast/yemeni-troopsbacked-by-united-arab-emirates-take-city-from-al-qaeda. html?_r=0)

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Endnotes 41. Noah Browning, Jonathan Saul, and Mohammed Ghobari, “Al Qaeda still reaping oil profits in Yemen despite battlefield reverses,” Reuters, May 27, 2016. (http://www.reuters.com/ article/us-yemen-security-smuggling-idUSKCN0YI0Q2) 42. United Nations Security Council, “Eighteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities,” July 19, 2016, pages 10-11. (http:// www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2016/629) 43. Ulf Laessing, “ANALYSIS - Fight vs al Qaeda funding faces tough obstacle: cash,” Reuters, November 10, 2010. (http://www. reuters.com/article/idINIndia-52814020101110) 44. Evan Hill and Laura Kasinof, “Playing a Double Game in the Fight Against AQAP,” Foreign Policy, January 21, 2015. (http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/21/playing-a-double-gamein-the-fight-against-aqap-yemen-saleh-al-qaeda/) 45. Saeed Al-Batati and Ben Hubbard, “Yemeni Bankers Get in Trouble Over a Customer, Al Qaeda,” The New York Times, November 15, 2016. (https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/16/ world/middleeast/yemen-al-qaeda-bank.html) 46. United Nations Security Council, “Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen established pursuant to Security Council Committee resolution 2140 (2014),” February 20, 2015, pages 24-5. (http://www.securitycouncilreport. org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2015_125.pdf ) 47. Yaya Fanusie and Landon Heid, “What ISIS Is Banking On,” Forbes, June 17, 2016. (https://www.forbes.com/sites/ realspin/2016/06/17/what-isis-is-banking-on/#1d5d71ef1651) 48. Saeed Al-Batati and Ben Hubbard, “Yemeni Bankers Get in Trouble Over a Customer, Al Qaeda,” The New York Times, November 15, 2016. (https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/16/ world/middleeast/yemen-al-qaeda-bank.html) 49. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, “Treasury Designates Financial Supporters of al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula,” November 1, 2016. (https://www.treasury.gov/presscenter/press-releases/Pages/jl0601.aspx) 50. “Sanctions Intelligence Update: Yemen: Assessing Risk to the Financial System,” The Camstoll Group, June 2016. (https://www.camstoll.com/wp-content/ uploads/2016/06/06222016YemenSIU.pdf ) 51. “Yemen’s al-Qaeda: Expanding the Base,” International Crisis Group, February 2, 2017. (https://www.crisisgroup.org/middleeast-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/174-yemens-al-qaeda-expanding-base) 52. Katherine Zimmerman, “AQAP Post-Arab Spring and the Islamic State,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 2017, pages 45-50. (http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus153-Zelin.pdf ) 14 | CSIF: Terror Finance Briefing Book

53. Sudarsan Raghavan, “Somalis fleeing to Yemen prompt new worries in fight against al-Qaeda,” The Washington Post, January 12, 2010. (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ article/2010/01/11/AR2010011103929.html) 54. Michael Horton, “AQAP in Southern Yemen: Learning, Adapting and Growing,” The Jamestown Foundation, October 14, 2016. (https://jamestown.org/program/aqap-southern-yemenlearning-adapting-growing/) 55. Zachary Laub, “Yemen in Crisis,” Council on Foreign Relations, April 19, 2016. (http://www.cfr.org/yemen/yemencrisis/p36488) 56. Thomas Joscelyn, “Resolving the Conflict in Yemen: U.S. Interests, Risks, and Policy,” Testimony before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, March 9, 2017. (http://www.defenddemocracy. org/content/uploads/documents/030917_TJ_Resolving_ Conflict_Yemen.pdf ) 57. Asa Fitch, “After al Qaeda’s Ouster, a Push to Revive Yemen Port,” The Wall Street Journal, May 16, 2017. (https://www.wsj. com/articles/after-al-qaedas-ouster-a-push-to-revive-yemenport-1494927002) 58. U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Recent OFAC Actions,” January 19, 2010. (https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/ sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20100119.aspx) 59. Simon Henderson, “Fighting al-Qaeda: The Role of Yemen’s President Saleh,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 7, 2010. (http://www.washingtoninstitute. org/policy-analysis/view/fighting-al-qaeda-the-role-of-yemenspresident-saleh) 60. Evan Hill and Laura Kasinof, “Playing a Double Game in the Fight Against AQAP,” Foreign Policy, January 21, 2015. (http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/21/playing-a-double-gamein-the-fight-against-aqap-yemen-saleh-al-qaeda/) 61. Jane Novak, “Yemen strikes multifaceted deals with al Qaeda,” FDD’s Long War Journal, February 11, 2009. (http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/02/yemens_ multifaceted.php) 62. Jeremy M. Sharp, “Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations,” Congressional Research Service, February 11, 2015. (https://fas. org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL34170.pdf ) 63. “Yemen,” Security Assistance Monitor, accessed July 24, 2017. (http://www.securityassistance.org/yemen) 64. Ben Hubbard, “U.S. Fingerprints on Attacks Obliterating Yemen’s Economy,” The New York Times, November 13, 2016. (https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/14/world/middleeast/ yemen-saudi-bombing-houthis-hunger.html) 65. Bill Roggio and Bob Barry, “Charting the data for US air strikes in Yemen, 2002 - 2017,” FDD’s Long War Journal, January 29, 2017. (http://www.longwarjournal.org/multimedia/Yemen/ code/Yemen-strike.php)

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Endnotes 66. Scott Shane, “The Lessons of Anwar al-Awlaki,” The New York Times, August 27, 2015. (https://www.nytimes. com/2015/08/30/magazine/the-lessons-of-anwar-al-awlaki.html) 67. Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Missy Ryan, “U.S. forces now on the ground supporting combat operations in Yemen, Pentagon says,” The Washington Post, May 6, 2016. (https:// www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/05/06/us-forces-now-on-the-ground-supporting-combat-operations-inyemen-pentagon-says/?utm_term=.f3663619b364); Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Missy Ryan, “U.S. Special Operations force extends Yemen mission against al-Qaeda,” The Washington Post, June 17, 2016. (https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ checkpoint/wp/2016/06/17/u-s-special-operations-forces-shiftto-long-term-mission-in-yemen/?utm_term=.b153c5bad425) 68. Charlie Savage and Eric Schmitt, “Trump Administration Is Said to Be Working to Loosen Counterterrorism Rules,” The New York Times, March 12, 2017. (https://www.nytimes. com/2017/03/12/us/politics/trump-loosen-counterterrorismrules.html) 69. Thomas Joscelyn, “Unfinished Business,” The Weekly Standard, June 5, 2017. (http://www.weeklystandard.com/ unfinished-business/article/2008216) 70. Barbara Starr, “US ground operations stepped up inside Yemen,” CNN, April 4, 2017. (http://www.cnn. com/2017/04/04/politics/yemen-us-military-operations/ index.html) 71. Alexandra Zavis and Zayd Ahmed, “U.S. arms sold to Saudis are killing civilians in Yemen. Now the Trump administration is set to sell them more,” Los Angeles Times, June 13, 2017. (http:// www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-yemen-us-arms-2017story.html) 72. The Drone Memos: Targeted Killing, Secrecy, and the Law, Ed. Jameel Jaffer, (New York: The New Press, 2016), pages 8-23; Michael B. Kelley, “Obama’s Drone War In Yemen May Be Al Qaeda’s Best Recruitment Tool Ever,” Business Insider, May 30, 2012. (http://www.businessinsider.com/obamas-covert-dronewar-in-yemen-prompting-more-terror-2012-5) 73. Thomas Joscelyn, “Resolving the Conflict in Yemen: U.S. Interests, Risks, and Policy,” Testimony before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, March 9, 2017. (http://www.defenddemocracy. org/content/uploads/documents/030917_TJ_Resolving_ Conflict_Yemen.pdf ) 74. “AQAP Appendix,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies. (http://www.defenddemocracy.org/terror-finance-briefing-bookappendices)


75. Abigail Hauslohner, “Yemeni ‘global terrorist’ says he has counterterrorism advice for Washington,” The Washington Post, February 16, 2014. (https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ middle_east/yemeni-global-terrorist-says-he-hascounterterrorismadvice-for-washington/2014/02/15/c689f72a-8e51-11e3-878ed76656564a01_story.html?utm_term=.0baeda98e645); Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen, “Confronting New Threats in Terrorist Financing,” Remarks before the Center for a New American Security, March 4, 2014. (https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/ jl2308.aspx) 76. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, “Treasury Designates Al-Qa’ida Supporters in Qatar and Yemen,” December 18, 2013. (https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/ press-releases/Pages/jl2249.aspx) 77. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, “Treasury Designates Al-Qa’ida Supporters in Qatar and Yemen,” December 18, 2013. (https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/ press-releases/Pages/jl2249.aspx) 78. David Andrew Weinberg, “Ban Ki-Moon shakes hands with alleged al Qaeda emir,” FDD’s Long War Journal, June 23, 2015. (http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/06/ban-ki-moonshakes-hands-with-alleged-al-qaeda-emir.php) 79. United Nations Security Council, “Consolidated United Nations Security Council Sanctions List,” July 24, 2017. (https:// scsanctions.un.org/fop/fop?xml=htdocs/resources/xml/en/ consolidated.xml&xslt=htdocs/resources/xsl/en/consolidated.xsl) 80. Humayqani conducted interviews on state television in Saudi Arabia as late as 2015; David Andrew Weinberg, “Obama is Right: The Gulf Arabs Ride Free on Terrorism,” The National Interest, April 26, 2016. (http://nationalinterest.org/feature/ obama-right-the-gulf-arabs-ride-free-terrorism-15945?page=2) 81. Thomas Joscelyn, “US Treasury continues to target AQAP’s financial network,” FDD’s Long War Journal, December 7, 2016. (http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/12/us-treasurycontinues-to-target-aqaps-financial-network.php) 82. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, “Treasury Designates Key Facilitators and Front Company Providing Support to Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula,” December 7, 2016. (https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/ Pages/jl0673.aspx) 83. United Nations Security Council, “Consolidated United Nations Security Council Sanctions List,” July 24, 2017. (https:// scsanctions.un.org/fop/fop?xml=htdocs/resources/xml/en/ consolidated.xml&xslt=htdocs/resources/xsl/en/consolidated.xsl) 84. George Parker, “G8 leaders pledge to stop paying ransoms to terror groups,” Financial Times (UK), June 18, 2013. (https:// www.ft.com/content/10cc2546-d832-11e2-b4a4-00144feab7de)

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Endnotes 85. Javier E. David, “US, Gulf countries form new group to stem flow of terror financing,” CNBC, May 21, 2017. (http://www. cnbc.com/2017/05/21/us-gulf-countries-form-new-group-tostem-flow-of-terror-financing.html) 86. Thomas Joscelyn, “Unfinished Business,” The Weekly Standard, June 5, 2017. (http://www.weeklystandard.com/ unfinished-business/article/2008216) 87. Katherine Zimmerman, “AQAP Post-Arab Spring and the Islamic State,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 2017, pages 45-51. (http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus153-Zelin.pdf ) 88. U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations with Yemen,” February 2, 2017. (https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/ bgn/35836.htm) 89. The Drone Memos: Targeted Killing, Secrecy, and the Law, Ed. Jameel Jaffer, (New York: The New Press, 2016), pages 8-23; Michael B. Kelley, “Obama’s Drone War In Yemen May Be Al Qaeda’s Best Recruitment Tool Ever,” Business Insider, May 30, 2012. (http://www.businessinsider.com/obamas-covert-dronewar-in-yemen-prompting-more-terror-2012-5) 90. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, “Treasury Designates Al-Qa’ida Supporters in Qatar and Yemen,” December 18, 2013. (https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/ press-releases/Pages/jl2249.aspx) 91. An estimate formed by summing the roughly $60 million the group took from the Mukalla central bank branch (of which roughly $20 million escaped the U.S. airstrike) with the estimated $2 million per day the group earned in taxes from the port; United Nations Security Council, “Eighteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities,” July 19, 2016, pages 10-11. (http:// www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2016/629); Ayisha Amr, “How al Qaeda Rules in Yemen,” Foreign Affairs, October 28, 2015. (https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ yemen/2015-10-28/how-al-qaeda-rules-yemen); Yara Bayoumy, Noah Browning, and Mohammed Ghobari, “How Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen has made al Qaeda stronger - and richer,” Reuters, April 8, 2016. (http://www.reuters.com/investigates/specialreport/yemen-aqap/) 92. Rukmini Callimachi, “Paying Ransoms, Europe Bankrolls Qaeda Terror,” The New York Times, July 29, 2014. (https:// www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/world/africa/ransoming-citizenseurope-becomes-al-qaedas-patron.html) 93. Noah Browning, Jonathan Saul, and Mohammed Ghobari, “Al Qaeda still reaping oil profits in Yemen despite battlefield reverses,” Reuters, May 27, 2016. (http://www.reuters.com/ article/us-yemen-security-smuggling-idUSKCN0YI0Q2)


94. U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2014: Chapter 6. Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” June 2015. (https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239413.htm) 95. U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2015: Chapter 6. Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” June 2016. (https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2015/257523.htm) 96. United Nations Security Council, “Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen established pursuant to Security Council Committee resolution 2140 (2014),” February 20, 2015. (http:// www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D274E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2015_125.pdf ) 97. U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2015,” June 2016. (https://www.state.gov/documents/ organization/258249.pdf ) 98. Yara Bayoumy, Noah Browning, and Mohammed Ghobari, “How Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen has made al Qaeda stronger - and richer,” Reuters, April 8, 2016. (http://www. reuters.com/investigates/special-report/yemen-aqap/); Saeed Al Batati, “Yemen: The truth behind al-Qaeda’s takeover of Mukalla,” Al-Jazeera (Qatar), September 16, 2015. (http://www. aljazeera.com/news/2015/09/yemen-truth-al-qaeda-takeovermukalla-150914101527567.html) 99. Ayisha Amr, “How al Qaeda Rules in Yemen,” Foreign Affairs, October 28, 2015. (https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/yemen/2015-10-28/how-al-qaeda-rules-yemen) 100. Yara Bayoumy, Noah Browning, and Mohammed Ghobari, “How Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen has made al Qaeda stronger - and richer,” Reuters, April 8, 2016. (http://www.reuters.com/ investigates/special-report/yemen-aqap/) 101. Stephen Ewart, “Ewart: As Yemen descends into chaos, Nexen quietly leaves Arabian Peninsula,” Calgary Herald (Canada), February 18, 2015. (http://calgaryherald.com/ business/energy/ewart-as-yemen-descends-into-chaos-nexenquietly-leaves-arabian-peninsula) 102. Yara Bayoumy, Noah Browning, and Mohammed Ghobari, “How Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen has made al Qaeda stronger - and richer,” Reuters, April 8, 2016. (http://www.reuters.com/ investigates/special-report/yemen-aqap/) 103. “Yemen’s al-Qaeda: Expanding the Base,” International Crisis Group, February 2, 2017. (https://www.crisisgroup.org/ middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/174yemen-s-al-qaeda-expanding-base) 104. Yara Bayoumy, Noah Browning, and Mohammed Ghobari, “How Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen has made al Qaeda stronger - and richer,” Reuters, April 8, 2016. (http://www.reuters.com/ investigates/special-report/yemen-aqap/) 105. “Yemen Retakes Oil Export Terminal From Al Qaeda,” The New York Times, April 25, 2016. (https://www.nytimes. com/2016/04/26/world/middleeast/yemen-retakes-oil-exportterminal-from-al-qaeda.html)

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Endnotes 106. J. Dana Stuster and Ellen Noble, “The Failed Islamic States Index,” Foreign Policy, August 7, 2014. (http://foreignpolicy. com/2014/08/07/the-failed-islamic-states-index/) 107. “International Tax: Republic of Yemen Highlights,” Deloitte, 2011. (https://www.scribd.com/document/73243912/ Deloitte-Yemen-Highlights-Tax-Duties-2011) 108. Christopher Swift, “Arc of Convergence: AQAP, Ansar al-Shari’a and the Struggle for Yemen,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, June 21, 2012. (https://www.ctc.usma. edu/posts/arc-of-convergence-aqap-ansar-al-sharia-and-thestruggle-for-yemen) 109. United Nations Security Council, “Eighteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities,” July 19, 2016, page 11. (http://www. un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2016/629); Yara Bayoumy, Noah Browning, and Mohammed Ghobari, “How Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen has made al Qaeda stronger and richer,” Reuters, April 8, 2016. (http://www.reuters.com/ investigates/special-report/yemen-aqap/) 110. Yara Bayoumy, Noah Browning, and Mohammed Ghobari, “How Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen has made al Qaeda stronger - and richer,” Reuters, April 8, 2016. (http://www.reuters.com/ investigates/special-report/yemen-aqap/) 111. Ibid. 112. Ibid. 113. United Nations Security Council, “Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen established pursuant to Security Council Committee resolution 2140 (2014),” February 20, 2015, page 39. (http://www.securitycouncilreport. org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2015_125.pdf ) 114. U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2015,” June 2016. (https://www.state.gov/documents/ organization/258249.pdf ) 115. Yara Bayoumy, Noah Browning, and Mohammed Ghobari, “How Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen has made al Qaeda stronger - and richer,” Reuters, April 8, 2016. (http://www.reuters.com/ investigates/special-report/yemen-aqap/) 116. Noah Browning, Jonathan Saul, and Mohammed Ghobari, “Al Qaeda still reaping oil profits in Yemen despite battlefield reverses,” Reuters, May 27, 2016. (http://www.reuters.com/ article/us-yemen-security-smuggling-idUSKCN0YI0Q2) 117. Katherine Zimmerman, “AQAP: A Resurgent Threat,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, September 11, 2015. (https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/aqap-a-resurgent-threat)


118. Ayisha Amr, “How al Qaeda Rules in Yemen,” Foreign Affairs, October 28, 2015. (https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/yemen/2015-10-28/how-al-qaeda-rules-yemen) 119. “Al Qaeda in Yemen seizes huge weapons depot from army,” Associated Press, April 17, 2015. (http://www.cbsnews.com/news/ al-qaeda-in-yemen-seizes-huge-weapons-depot-from-army/) 120. United Nations Security Council, “Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen established pursuant to Security Council Committee resolution 2140 (2014),” February 20, 2015, page 25. (http://www.securitycouncilreport. org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2015_125.pdf ) 121. “Yemen’s al-Qaeda: Expanding the Base,” International Crisis Group, February 2, 2017. (https://www.crisisgroup.org/ middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/174yemen-s-al-qaeda-expanding-base) 122. Abu Bakr al-Yamani, “AQAP loots Yemeni citizens’ livelihood to fund its crimes,” Al-Shorfa, November 6, 2011, accessed via Wayback Machine February 8, 2017. (https://web. archive.org/web/20141117210520/http:/al-shorfa.com/en_GB/ articles/meii/features/2014/11/06/feature-01) 123. Nasser al-Wuhayshi, “Second Letter from Abu Basir to Emir of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb,” Associated Press, August 6, 2012. (http://www.longwarjournal.org/images/al-qaida-papershow-to-run-a-state.pdf ); Bill Roggio, “Wuhayshi imparted lessons of AQAP operations in Yemen to AQIM,” FDD’s Long War Journal, August 12, 2013. (http://www.longwarjournal.org/ archives/2013/08/wuhayshi_imparts_les.php) 124. Ken Dilanian, “Al Qaeda group is operating on ransom money from the West,” Los Angeles Times, October 21, 2013. (http://articles.latimes.com/2013/oct/21/world/la-fg-yemenransom-20131021) 125. Ibid. 126. Rukmini Callimachi, “Paying Ransoms, Europe Bankrolls Qaeda Terror,” The New York Times, July 29, 2014. (https:// www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/world/africa/ransoming-citizenseurope-becomes-al-qaedas-patron.html) 127. Ellen Knickmeyer, “Al Qaeda-Linked Groups Increasingly Funded by Ransom,” The New York Times, July 29, 2014. (https://www.wsj.com/articles/ransom-fills-terroristcoffers-1406637010) 128. Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen, “Confronting New Threats in Terrorist Financing,” Remarks before the Center for a New American Security, March 4, 2014. (https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/ press-releases/Pages/jl2308.aspx)

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Endnotes 129. United Nations Security Council, “Fifteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2083 (2012) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities,” January 23, 2014. (http:// www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/41) 130. U.S. Department of State, “2014 Investment Climate Statement,” June 2014. (https://www.state.gov/documents/ organization/229320.pdf ) 131. Based on a 2012 exchange rate of 215 Yemeni rials to one U.S. dollar, and AQAP forces looting “billions” of rials; Christopher Swift, “Arc of Convergence: AQAP, Ansar al-Shari’a and the Struggle for Yemen,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, June 21, 2012. (https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/arc-ofconvergence-aqap-ansar-al-sharia-and-the-struggle-for-yemen) 132. Christopher Swift, “Arc of Convergence: AQAP, Ansar al-Shari’a and the Struggle for Yemen,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, June 21, 2012. (https://www.ctc.usma. edu/posts/arc-of-convergence-aqap-ansar-al-sharia-and-thestruggle-for-yemen) 133. Abu Bakr al-Yamani, “AQAP loots Yemeni citizens’ livelihood to fund its crimes,” Al-Shorfa, November 6, 2011, accessed via Wayback Machine February 8, 2017. (https://web. archive.org/web/20141117210520/http:/al-shorfa.com/en_GB/ articles/meii/features/2014/11/06/feature-01) 134. United Nations Security Council, “Eighteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities,” July 19, 2016, pages 10-11. (http:// www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2016/629); based on a 2015 exchange rate of roughly 217.4 rials to one U.S. dollar. 135. “Yemen’s al-Qaeda: Expanding the Base,” International Crisis Group, February 2, 2017. (https://www.crisisgroup.org/ middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/174yemen-s-al-qaeda-expanding-base) 136. United Nations Security Council, “Eighteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities,” July 19, 2016, pages 10-11. (http:// www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2016/629); In addition to $1.5 million in U.S. dollars, AQAP seized 13 billion Yemeni rials, worth about $59.8 million at a 2015 exchange rate of 217.4 Yemeni rials per U.S. dollar. 137. Ayisha Amr, “How al Qaeda Rules in Yemen,” Foreign Affairs, October 28, 2015. (https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/yemen/2015-10-28/how-al-qaeda-rules-yemen); Nine billion of 13 billion rials were destroyed in the airstrike.


138. “Sanctions Intelligence Update: Yemen: Assessing Risk to the Financial System,” The Camstoll Group, June 2016. (https://www.camstoll.com/wp-content/ uploads/2016/06/06222016YemenSIU.pdf ) 139. Gabriel Koehler-Derrick, “A False Foundation? AQAP, Tribes and Ungoverned Spaces in Yemen,” The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, September 2011, pages 132-4, 146. (https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/ uploads/2012/10/CTC_False_Foundation3.pdf ) 140. U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2015,” June 2016. (https://www.state.gov/documents/ organization/258249.pdf ) 141. Christopher Swift, “Arc of Convergence: AQAP, Ansar al-Shari’a and the Struggle for Yemen,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, June 21, 2012. (https://www.ctc.usma. edu/posts/arc-of-convergence-aqap-ansar-al-sharia-and-thestruggle-for-yemen) 142. United Nations Security Council, “Nineteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2253 (2015) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities,” January 13, 2017, page 12. (http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc. asp?symbol=S/2017/35) 143. Australian National Security, “Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP),” 2013. (https://www. nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/AlQaidaintheArabianPeninsulaAQAP.aspx) 144. Katherine Zimmerman, “A New Model for Defeating Al Qaeda in Yemen,” American Enterprise Institute, September 2015. (https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/A-NewModel-for-Defeating-al-Qaeda-in-Yemen.pdf ) 145. Sarah Phillips, “Assisting Al Qaeda: How U.S. Strategy Could Empower AQAP in Yemen,” Foreign Affairs, August 30, 2015. (https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ yemen/2015-08-30/assisting-al-qaeda) 146. United Nations Security Council, “Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen established pursuant to Security Council Committee resolution 2140 (2014),” February 20, 2015, page 37. (http://www.securitycouncilreport. org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2015_125.pdf ) 147. “Yemen’s al-Qaeda: Expanding the Base,” International Crisis Group, February 2, 2017. (https://www.crisisgroup.org/ middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/174yemen-s-al-qaeda-expanding-base)

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Endnotes 148. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, “Treasury Designates Al-Qaida, Al-Nusrah Front, AQAP, And Isil Fundraisers And Facilitators,” May 19, 2016. (https://www. treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0462.aspx); U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, “Treasury Designates Al-Qa’ida Supporters in Qatar and Yemen,” December 18, 2013. (https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/ jl2249.aspx); Thomas Joscelyn, “US Treasury continues to target AQAP’s financial network,” FDD’s Long War Journal, December 7, 2016. (http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/12/ us-treasury-continues-to-target-aqaps-financial-network.php); “Yemen’s al-Qaeda: Expanding the Base,” International Crisis Group, February 2, 2017. (https://www.crisisgroup.org/middleeast-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/174-yemens-al-qaeda-expanding-base) 149. Katherine Zimmerman, “AQAP Post-Arab Spring and the Islamic State,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 2017, page 54. (http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/ Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus153-Zelin.pdf ); U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Designates Al-Qaida, Al-Nusrah Front, AQAP, And Isil Fundraisers And Facilitators,” May 19, 2016. (https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/ jl0462.aspx) 150. David Andrew Weinberg, “Saudi Arabia Honors Its Nastiest Clerical Ideologues,” The National Interest, October 16, 2015. (http://nationalinterest.org/feature/saudi-arabia-honorsits-nastiest-clerical-ideologues-14093) 151. Sudarsan Raghavan, “Somalis fleeing to Yemen prompt new worries in fight against al-Qaeda,” The Washington Post, January 12, 2010. (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ article/2010/01/11/AR2010011103929.html) 152. Evan Hill and Laura Kasinof, “Playing a Double Game in the Fight Against AQAP,” Foreign Policy, January 21, 2015. (http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/21/playing-a-double-gamein-the-fight-against-aqap-yemen-saleh-al-qaeda/) 153. Iona Craig, “Toll climbs in Yemen’s fight against al-Qaeda,” USA Today, May 18, 2012. (http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/ news/world/story/2012-05-16/yemen-al-qaeda-war/55047454/1) 154. Christopher Swift, “Arc of Convergence: AQAP, Ansar al-Shari’a and the Struggle for Yemen,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, June 21, 2012. (https://www.ctc.usma. edu/posts/arc-of-convergence-aqap-ansar-al-sharia-and-thestruggle-for-yemen) 155. “Yemen’s al-Qaeda: Expanding the Base,” International Crisis Group, February 2, 2017. (https://www.crisisgroup.org/ middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/174yemen-s-al-qaeda-expanding-base)


156. “Second Letter from Abu Basir to Emir of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb,” Associated Press, August 6, 2012. (http:// www.longwarjournal.org/images/al-qaida-papers-how-to-runa-state.pdf ) 157. Evan Hill and Laura Kasinof, “Playing a Double Game in the Fight Against AQAP,” Foreign Policy, January 21, 2015. (http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/21/playing-a-double-gamein-the-fight-against-aqap-yemen-saleh-al-qaeda/) 158. Michael Horton, “AQAP in Southern Yemen: Learning, Adapting and Growing,” The Jamestown Foundation, October 14, 2016. (https://jamestown.org/program/aqap-southern-yemenlearning-adapting-growing/) 159. Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen, “Confronting New Threats in Terrorist Financing,” Remarks before the Center for a New American Security, March 4, 2014. (https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/ press-releases/Pages/jl2308.aspx) 160. “Le Financement des Attentats de Paris (7-9 Janvier et 13 Novembre 2015) (The Financing of the Paris Attacks (7-9 January and 13 November 2015)),” Center for the Analysis of Terrorism (CAT), October 20, 2016. (http://cat-int.org/index. php/2016/10/17/le-financement-des-attentats-de-paris-janvieret-novembre-2015/?lang=en) 161. Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen, “Confronting New Threats in Terrorist Financing,” Remarks before the Center for a New American Security, March 4, 2014. (https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/ press-releases/Pages/jl2308.aspx) 162. Saeed Al Batati, “Yemen: The truth behind al-Qaeda’s takeover of Mukalla,” Al-Jazeera (Qatar), September 16, 2015. (http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/09/yemen-truth-al-qaedatakeover-mukalla-150914101527567.html) 163. Ayisha Amr, “How al Qaeda Rules in Yemen,” Foreign Affairs, October 28, 2015. (https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/yemen/2015-10-28/how-al-qaeda-rules-yemen) 164. Ben Hubbard, “Al Qaeda Tries a New Tactic to Keep Power: Sharing It,” The New York Times, June 9, 2015. (https://www. nytimes.com/2015/06/10/world/middleeast/qaeda-yemen-syriahouthis.html?_r=0) 165. Saeed Al Batati, “Yemen: The truth behind al-Qaeda’s takeover of Mukalla,” Al-Jazeera (Qatar), September 16, 2015. (http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/09/yemen-truth-al-qaedatakeover-mukalla-150914101527567.html) 166. Saleh al-Batati and Asa Fitch, “A Yemeni City Adjusts to Life After al Qaeda’s Retreat,” The Wall Street Journal, June 13, 2016. (https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-yemeni-city-adjusts-tolife-after-al-qaedas-retreat-1465859600)

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Endnotes 167. “Yemen’s al-Qaeda: Expanding the Base,” International Crisis Group, February 2, 2017. (https://www.crisisgroup.org/ middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/174yemen-s-al-qaeda-expanding-base); Asa Fitch, “After al Qaeda’s Ouster, a Push to Revive Yemen Port,” The Wall Street Journal, May 16, 2017. (https://www.wsj.com/articles/after-al-qaedasouster-a-push-to-revive-yemen-port-1494927002) 168. Ayisha Amr, “How al Qaeda Rules in Yemen,” Foreign Affairs, October 28, 2015. (https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/yemen/2015-10-28/how-al-qaeda-rules-yemen) 169. Yara Bayoumy, Noah Browning, and Mohammed Ghobari, “How Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen has made al Qaeda stronger - and richer,” Reuters, April 8, 2016. (http://www.reuters.com/ investigates/special-report/yemen-aqap/) 170. Ayisha Amr, “How al Qaeda Rules in Yemen,” Foreign Affairs, October 28, 2015. (https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/yemen/2015-10-28/how-al-qaeda-rules-yemen) 171. Michael Horton, “AQAP in Southern Yemen: Learning, Adapting and Growing,” The Jamestown Foundation, October 14, 2016. (https://jamestown.org/program/aqap-southern-yemenlearning-adapting-growing/); “Yemen’s al-Qaeda: Expanding the Base,” International Crisis Group, February 2, 2017. (https:// www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabianpeninsula/yemen/174-yemen-s-al-qaeda-expanding-base) 172. Saeed Al-Batati and Nour Youssef, “It’s Not Bullets Forcing Yemeni Troops Off the Battlefield. It’s the Pay,” The New York Times, September 12, 2016. (https://www.nytimes. com/2016/09/13/world/middleeast/yemen-military-houthirebels.html?_r=0); “Yemen’s al-Qaeda: Expanding the Base,” International Crisis Group, February 2, 2017. (https://www. crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabianpeninsula/yemen/174-yemen-s-al-qaeda-expanding-base) 173. Christopher Swift, “Arc of Convergence: AQAP, Ansar al-Shari’a and the Struggle for Yemen,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, June 21, 2012. (https://www.ctc.usma. edu/posts/arc-of-convergence-aqap-ansar-al-sharia-and-thestruggle-for-yemen) 174. Katherine Zimmerman, “A New Model for Defeating Al Qaeda in Yemen,” American Enterprise Institute, September 2015. (https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/A-NewModel-for-Defeating-al-Qaeda-in-Yemen.pdf )
