Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb - Foundation for Defense of ...

Prior to his split with AQIM, Belmokhtar did not tax populations under his direct control in Mali.181. However, according to then-Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen, other AQIM battalions did tax residents in northern. Mali in 2012.182 ɦ AQIM did, however, abolish “customs, duties, ...
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Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb Financial Assessment

Yaya J. Fanusie Alex Entz December 2017 Terror Finance Briefing Book

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

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FUNDING LEVEL2

$$$ $$ $ KEY AREAS OF ACTIVITY • • •



Primarily based in Algeria and Mali Affiliate in Tunisia Attacks and movement throughout the region, including in Tunisia, Morocco, Ivory Coast, Libya, Niger, and Burkina Faso since 20143 Smuggling networks stretch across the Sahel and Sahara regions

Financial Overview Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), considered al-Qaeda’s wealthiest branch in 2012,4 may make tens of millions of dollars per year, and likely has enough funding to sustain itself and its Sahel affiliates. In 2014, the UN estimated that AQIM had a yearly budget of $15 million.5 The group’s funding has come predominantly from ransoms and from smuggling drugs, cigarettes, arms, and other contraband. AQIM’s first major kidnappings came in 2003, before it joined al-Qaeda, when it abducted 32 Western tourists.6 For the next ten years, ransoms yielded roughly $100 million,7 becoming the predominant source of funding that allowed the group to spread its influence across the Sahel region.8 Money from smuggling, particularly drug smuggling, displaced ransoms as AQIM’s predominant source of funding by 2015. The group’s expenditures are opaque, but appear to go mostly towards paying its fighters, funding and developing a network of loyal tribes and other terrorist groups, and spreading its influence by providing governance.9

Background In 1991, the Algerian military canceled elections to prevent the victory of an Islamist coalition, instigating a violent insurrection. In 1998, some leaders split away from a movement called the Armed Islamic Group – known for its violence against civilians10 – to form the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC, in French).11 In 2006, under its current leader, Abdelmalek Droukdel, the group formally joined al-Qaeda and became AQIM. Several other Sahel-based Salafist jihadi groups merged into AQIM shortly afterward.12 AQIM’s expanded jihadist network and al-Qaeda-lent expertise led to a dramatic increase in its tempo of attacks. The new group targeted neighboring countries in a bid to create an Islamist caliphate.13 In the early 2000s, famed smuggler Mokhtar Belmokhtar, an AQIM commander, established the group’s presence in Mali.14 In 2011, AQIM stood up Ansar Dine to present a local face15 and develop local support in Mali.16 These groups cemented relationships with tribes across the Sahel to facilitate smuggling networks.17 Later in 2011, when Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi fell from power, AQIM acquired some of his weapons stockpile.18 Ethnic cleavages19 and leadership rifts20 in AQIM led to various offshoot groups, including the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) in 2011, and one run by Belmokhtar in late 2012. AQIM co-opted an ethnic Tuareg uprising in Mali in 2012,21 taking control of the northern half of the country in conjunction with Ansar Dine and MUJAO.22 A French military incursion dislodged the militants in early 2013.23 More recently, AQIM has increased its influence, incorporating other militant groups like al-Mourabitoun, which included Belmokhtar’s splinter group.24 In March 2017, AQIM’s strength grew25 when it approved its Saharan offshoot allying with other Sahelian jihadist organizations to form Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, under allegiance to Ayman al-Zawahiri, the head of al-Qaeda.26 Prior to merging, the groups accounted for over 250 attacks in the region in 2016.27

Action Points (for additional details, see page 6-7) 1. Support France and regional actors committed to counterterrorist operations. 2. Formally identify and sanction transnational criminal organizations in West Africa. 3. Ensure European allies end ransom payments. 4. Invest in efforts to leverage media to undermine extremist narratives. 2 | CSIF: Terror Finance Briefing Book

See more information in the Financial Details section

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Main Sources of Funding KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM • AQIM

has likely made more than $100 million from ransoms. • Most of these ransoms have been paid by Western countries.

SMUGGLING AND TRAFFICKING

DRUGS • Illegal

drug trade is an increasingly important funding source. • AQIM tends to tax drug routes, rather than buy and sell drugs directly.

LOOTING AND SPOILS

• AQIM has been actively smuggling

people into Europe since at least 2009. • Regional governments have been complicit in allowing smuggling. • The group smuggles cigarettes, people, arms, and more.

TAXATION AND EXTORTION

• AQIM

claimed significant weaponry from Libya after Gaddafi fell in 2011. • The group looted arms from Malian forces in 2012.

• When

in control of Mali in 2012, AQIM taxed local residents. • The group also taxes smugglers going through their territory.

DONATIONS • Donations

are likely a minor source of funding. • Money comes globally, including from Western Europe.

COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISES AND AGRICULTURE • A

Guinea Bissau-based cell raised funds for the group in 2016 by selling luxury vehicles.

Significant Financial Events

2003

October 2011

March 2012-January 2013

Germany pays about $5.7 million to GSPC for the release of 32 hostages.28

The Gaddafi regime in Libya falls, causing regional unrest. The flood of weapons benefits AQIM financially and militarily.29

AQIM offshoot MUJAO controls northern Mali and taxes local populations.30

June 18, 2013

Fall 2013

2015

G8 countries agree to stop paying ransoms to terrorist groups such as AQIM.31

Areva, a state-run French company, pays roughly $40 million to AQIM to free four French hostages.32

Shifting away from ransoms, taxing and trafficking drugs becomes the primary source of AQIM’s revenue.33

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Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb ACCESS TO BANKING SYSTEM According to the State Department, the Algerian banking sector, although small, is “tightly monitored,” making it unlikely that AQIM transacts much through the banking system when a large, cash-based economy operates in parallel to the formal system. The economy in Mali is similarly cash-based.34 Accordingly, much of the group’s focus is on raising funds in cash for ease of use across the Sahel’s vast unbanked territories. Ransoms, for example, are paid to AQIM in cash,35 and an AQIM cell robbing banks in Morocco was broken up in 2011.36 Cash couriers for AQIM have been known to exploit the region’s informally governed space and porous borders, using their ability to move with some freedom by maintaining numerous cell phones that work in different countries.37

Strategic Strengths • Weak governance in regional states provides opportunities for AQIM to exploit local grievances, including ethnic divisions,38 and gain support by providing a sense of order. AQIM leadership has used marriage with women from local communities to build alliances with tribes.39 • Porous borders and sparsely populated territory with little state authority allow for expansive smuggling chains to continue without significant interdiction or surveillance.40 • The narcotics trade is booming in West Africa. Jihadists’ presence along Sahelian trade routes gives them access to consistent money flows.41 • The formation of Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin allows AQIM to portray itself as “pan-Islamic,” rising above tribal and ethnic divisions,43 and demonstrates the group’s growing ability to co-opt local grievances.44

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Strategic Vulnerabilities • France has shown a commitment to defending its interests in the region, blunting the possibility that AQIM takes large tracts of land without an international response. French forces have shown an ability to quickly roll back AQIM gains. • G8 countries have signed a pledge to not pay ransoms, providing a standard that should make hostage-taking less attractive if signatories stand by it. • Islamic State (IS) affiliates in Algeria, Tunisia, and elsewhere have competed with AQIM for resources and support.45

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb U.S. Government Counter-Measures The U.S. designated AQIM’s predecessor, GSPC, as a terrorist organization in 2002,46 and updated the listing to include the new name AQIM in 2009.47 France took the lead role in pushing MUJAO out of northern Mali in early 2013, but the U.S. assisted with some special forces operatives, logistical support, $120 million in humanitarian aid, and $100 million earmarked for the UN’s mission to stabilize Mali.48 In its 2017 Posture Statement, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) reasserted its commitment to working with France to stabilize Mali, including through “continued airlift and logistical support” to counter AQIM.49 Two dozen U.S. soldiers were deployed with the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in early 2017.50 U.S. policymakers have resisted shifting additional resources towards fighting AQIM given France’s primary role in the region.51 AFRICOM works with the State and Defense Departments and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP).52 The U.S. sent nearly $80 million to Mali from 2008 to 2014 to support TSCTP,53 which focuses on degrading terror groups in part through fighting terror finance and providing social services.54 The State Department also runs a counterterrorism finance program in Africa.55 The U.S. has also sought to curb AQIM’s main funding source by pushing for the G8 to ban ransom payments,56 and for the UN Security Council to warn against them.57

U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) Sanctions

4 organizations, 41 individuals

WILDCARDS

Unexpected developments which would greatly impact the group’s financing

FUNDING INCREASE Mali’s southern neighbors Burkina Faso and Cote d’Ivoire suffer destabilizing political turmoil, creating power vacuums that spread AQIM’s influence and smuggling networks.

Of the four organizations and 41 individuals affiliated with AQIM and designated by OFAC (as of October 20, 2017), two organizations and 33 individuals are also designated by the United Nations. For a detailed listing of designees, please see the Terror Finance Briefing Book Appendices, available on FDD’s website.58

Notable Designations Mokhtar Belmokhtar This Algerian national was designated by OFAC59 and the UN in 2003.60 Dubbed the “Marlboro Man” for his role in smuggling cigarettes,61 Belmokhtar has made millions for AQIM and various splinter groups he has led62 through smuggling across the Sahel.63 Belmokhtar established smuggling networks for goods through familial connections to tribal smugglers64 and has married into multiple tribes.65 He has also kidnapped a number of Westerners,66 netting an estimated $50 million in ransoms in 2013.67 If still alive,68 his current presumed location is Libya.69

FUNDING DECREASE AQIM is challenged by tribes and ambitious, semi-autonomous commanders for control of the drug trade. Turf wars erupt.

Yahya Abu Hammam This Algerian national was designated by the UN70 and the U.S. Treasury Department in 2013.71 Hammam was AQIM’s emir of Timbuktu when the group held northern Mali in 2012,72 and of AQIM’s Sahara Emirate, a role he assumed in late 2012.73 Hammam has played a major role in conducting kidnappings and holding Western hostages for AQIM, and in executing a hostage in 2010.74 He has previously threatened attacks against France.75 His current presumed location is Mali. 5 | CSIF: Terror Finance Briefing Book

FUNDING INCREASE The collapse of the Islamic State’s territorial holdings in Iraq and Syria prompt former IS personnel to defect to AQIM.

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Action Points 1. Support France and regional actors committed to counterterrorist operations. AQIM considers European nations like France and Spain to be its main enemies outside Africa, given their regional proximity and colonial past.76 As such, the U.S. should continue to maintain a light-touch approach to the region, supporting its allies’ efforts to destroy the group.77 Such an approach, paired with continued intelligence sharing, logistical support, and closer military-to-military relations with France and West African states,78 “saves the US from having to assume another major military mission.”79 Of further concern is that AQIM may be playing the long game, planning for French forces to eventually withdraw from Mali, at which point it could secure a large swathe of territory from which to launch attacks.80 The U.S. should thus support the Group of Five (G5) Sahel joint force,81 a counterterrorism coalition manned by troops from Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger, which was approved by the UN Security Council in June 2017.82 The U.S. should work in tandem with France and the UN to ensure that the G5 receives funding. Though the U.S. is scaling back its budget for UN initiatives,83 these funds should be seen as an investment in avoiding higher levels of assistance to a French-led fighting force down the line. Additionally, the U.S. should make clear to France that the G5’s development will take time, and that France must maintain a regional commitment for the foreseeable future.84 Also, the U.S. State Department should continue to allocate funding for Algeria through its Middle East Partnership Initiative85 as a way to support the country’s stability given its strategic location. A regional axis of instability across the Sahel and the Sahara would threaten a variety of American interests, particularly by creating potential safe havens for terrorists, deepening humanitarian crises, and potentially disturbing the economic and political progress which neighboring countries to the south86 have made in the past decade. 2. Formally identify and sanction transnational criminal organizations in West Africa. As early as 2008, UN sources reported that al-Qaeda had likely “forged mutually beneficial links with West African crime networks,” profiting from activities such as document forgery and trafficking in diamonds, drugs, and humans.87 AQIM also paid portions of money acquired from ransoms to drug traffickers as “a form of investment,” receiving a share of the profits in the form of arms and other equipment.88 Transnational criminal organizations threaten the stability of states.89 Fighting them could prove difficult, given that corrupt officials in Sahelian states are often complicit in smugglings or kidnappings90 and use criminal networks as a “political resource.”91 However, little is known to date about the extent or structure of transnational criminal organizations operating in the Sahel, perhaps because senior U.S. officials believe AFRICOM “receives only half of the surveillance assets it needs”92 and there is a dearth of independent local media outlets equipped to investigate and shed light on these criminal networks. Given the importance of smuggling networks to AQIM, the U.S. should commit to stepping up its intelligence resources dedicated to tracking African transnational criminal organizations. Congress could also make military aid contingent on West African countries showing an improved commitment to fighting corruption, which aids and abets transnational crime.93 3. Ensure European allies end ransom payments. AQIM became al-Qaeda’s wealthiest branch by 2012 because of the vast sums it obtained through ransoms. This cash influx coincided with AQIM’s acquisition of arms and its recruiting efforts that made the group deadlier, as exemplified by the takeover of northern Mali in 2012. In 2013, the G8, driven by the U.S. and UK, signed a declaration whereby member countries agreed to no longer pay ransoms.94 However, some countries may be getting around this by having state-run businesses pay ransoms, such as French-run Areva in 2013,95 or by paying ransoms indirectly through misallocated “aid” or other measures. The U.S. needs to take several steps to stop such payments entirely. First, reinvest diplomatically on the current commitment, in tandem with the UK, to make clear that ransoms in any form – even through state-run agencies or “aid” payments – are unacceptable. The U.S. should then seek, through bilateral talks with EU representatives, to expand the ban to all of Europe. Beyond diplomatic pressure, Congress should enable the president to designate countries of particular concern for directly or indirectly financing terrorism. This would allow the U.S. to maintain greater leverage over countries that are not State Sponsors of Terrorism, but may have a mixed record on counterterror finance issues. Lastly, the U.S. could push to provide the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee with the investigatory ability to refer ban infractions to the UN Security Council for more decisive action.96

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Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Action Points 4. Invest in efforts to leverage media to undermine extremist narratives. Targeting AQIM’s financial pipelines may be a futile exercise if progress is not made in dampening the growth of jihadist ideology in northwest Africa.97 Stemming violent Islamist radicalization may seem like an elusive goal, but the U.S. should refrain from defeatism and instead identify the societal levers available and most amenable to influences that can compete with extremist narratives. In much of the Sahel, radio and television are highly influential platforms. An estimated twothirds of the urban population in Burkina Faso, Chad, and Niger consume radio and television programming weekly.98 And while almost 80 percent of adults in Bamako, Mali consume radio, TV, or internet news daily, Voice of America programming reaches only 10 percent of adults in all of these platforms.99 AQIM runs its own robust media operations and communications strategy to support recruitment and messaging.100 The U.S. should expand the Broadcasting Board of Governors’ efforts to support local-language news and cultural programming that encourages respectful ideological debate, critical thinking, and appreciation for ethnic, cultural, and religious diversity, particularly via radio, which has greater reach in rural areas. While media engagement alone cannot be expected to fully deter jihadism, the U.S. counterterrorism strategy should emphasize the importance of strengthening the region’s social resilience so that these states can better enforce the peace, stability, and security of their populations.

An infantryman with MINUSMA on patrol in Timbuktu. The city fell under AQIM control in 2012-2013. Credit: Jane Hahn for the Washington Post/Getty Images

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Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Financial Details Kidnapping foreign nationals was AQIM’s primary fundraising method since inception for nearly a decade,101 but the group is likely to rely more on making money off of drug smuggling and taxation in the near future, partly as a result of the region’s security disintegration.102 AQIM likely makes tens of millions of dollars per year, largely through its involvement with regional smuggling networks that currently move billions in illicit wares and drugs across the Sahel and Sahara each year. AQIM and its associated groups will likely remain opportunistic, growing their connections to the drug and migrants trade while trying to kidnap more Westerners when possible. • An Algerian government investigation found that AQIM made $130 million through ransoms and drug smuggling alone from 2007 to 2010.103 • The UN estimated that AQIM’s annual budget was $15 million in 2014,104 though it may have been as high as $24 million in 2012 when the group held parts of Mali.105 • A 2016 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) report noted “the use of smuggling to collect arms and ammunition, abductions, armed robberies, drug trafficking and taxes on traders” were AQIM’s main sources of income, though their compositions had evolved over time.106 KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM AQIM probably will continue to take hostages, as ransoms have played a major role in the group’s development.107 The group has largely focused on taking hostages from Western countries that pay ransoms, and though the G8 banned ransom payments, it is likely that this rule is not followed strictly. One AQIM affiliate currently holds six foreign hostages.108 The money the group has previously received from ransoms is likely to sustain the group in years to come. • From 2008-2013, AQIM made $91.5 million on seven ransom payments for 20 individuals, for roughly $4.6 million per hostage. Payers of those ransoms included the governments of Austria, Spain, Switzerland, a state-run French company, and two undetermined sources.109 ɦɦ AQIM kidnapped 57 individuals from 2003-2011, including 54 Westerners.110 ɦɦ An AQIM commander claimed that Western countries were the source of much of the group’s funding from ransoms.111 ɦɦ AQIM’s forerunner, GSPC, started making money from ransoms in 2003, when it kidnapped 32 European tourists and received at least $5 million from an unknown European country for their release.112 ɦɦ In 2009, Switzerland paid about $3.75 million to free two hostages.113

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ɦɦ According to then-Treasury Under Secretary David Cohen, the average ransom for an AQIM hostage was $4.5 million in 2010 and $5.4 million in 2011.114 ɦɦ From 2010-2014 alone, AQIM made more than $75 million from ransoms, according to the UN.115 ɦɦ AQIM was so effective at procuring large ransoms that Osama bin Laden considered shifting al-Qaeda’s funding model to be based centrally on ransoms116 as funding from donations declined, based on findings from the deceased al-Qaeda leader’s computer hard drives.117 • Mali authorities reported to FATF that in 2011, AQIM had some of its operatives focus solely on traveling around northern Mali to find Europeans to kidnap.118 • Per a 2013 report by the NGO West Africa Commission on Drugs, there existed “obvious links of complicity between state agents and AQIM or MUJAO over the kidnapping business.”119 ɦɦ Facilitators, including individuals with access to the presidents of Mali and Burkina Faso, received some of the ransom payments. • In 2015, Belmokhtar and AQIM’s Saharan entity raided a hotel in Bamako, Mali, leading to the group holding over 170 hostages. AQIM hoped to use the hostages as bargaining chips to get their imprisoned fighters released; rather than negotiate, Malian commandos stormed the hotel and freed the hostages.120 • In August 2017, AQIM received a $4.2-million ransom payment for a South African hostage, negotiated by a

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Financial Details South African charity and delivered by a French security services agent in Mali.121 This followed the June release of a hostage by AQIM, though it is unclear what the group received as payment for that release.122 • AQIM kidnappings are done “sometimes in coordination with local criminals,” according to Treasury Under Secretary David Cohen.123 ɦɦ Captured al-Qaeda documents show coordination and a common playbook for AQIM, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and al-Shabaab.124 ɦɦ A 2012 letter from AQIM’s leadership rebuked Belmokhtar for securing a “meager price” (roughly $1.1 million from the Canadian government125) for a pair of Canadian diplomats he had taken hostage. The leadership decried him for not coordinating the ransom negotiations with them. AQIM’s leadership typically oversaw kidnappings in the Sahara and, in turn, often worked with al-Qaeda’s central leadership in Pakistan.126 ɦɦ AQIM does not conduct the majority of the kidnappings from which the group profits. Instead, local groups sell captured foreigners to AQIM.127 ·· AQIM was offering $100,000 to local criminals for non-American hostages in 2008-2009, hoping to make more money on eventual ransom payments.128 • European governments that have paid ransoms often pay through state-run companies or label the ransom money as an “aid payment” to a certain country.129 ɦɦ The governments of Austria, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden have all been implicated in paying ransoms to AQIM.130 ɦɦ France, Switzerland, and Spain have paid most of the ransoms accruing to AQIM.131 ɦɦ AQIM and MUJAO have been known to target “nationals of states that were known to be willing to negotiate ransom payments.”132 ɦɦ AQIM continued kidnapping Western hostages, taking a French aid worker and a Swiss missionary in December 2016 and January 2017.133 • According to the Australian government, “AQIM has also used kidnapping to obtain political concessions such as the release of Islamist prisoners.”134

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DRUGS The taxation and direct sale of drugs will likely continue to be AQIM’s most consistent stream of funding in the years to come,135 as the drug trade in West Africa is growing.136 AQIM has spent over a decade cultivating relationships with Latin American drug cartels, tribes, and smugglers. The opportunity for tapping the narcotics market is huge; in 2012, cocaine smuggling alone through Western Africa was valued at $1.25 billion.137 As drugs are increasingly made in Africa, AQIM may move towards direct production in addition to facilitation. • AQIM provides a “vital Sahel way station between suppliers in Latin America and European markets.”138 Latin American drug traffickers smuggle drugs across Africa en route to Europe as a way to diversify away from only sending drugs to Europe by sea, a route that has been increasingly interdicted.139 In addition, African gangs are increasingly producing drugs which are also smuggled on these routes.140 ɦɦ MUJAO leaders were linked to the 2009 “Air Cocaine” incident, wherein the fuselage of a Boeing 727 was found in the Mali desert, destroyed after having transported as much as ten tons of cocaine from Latin America.141 ɦɦ By 2010, Latin American drug cartels were increasingly resorting to flying planes loaded with drugs to “disused runways or improvised air strips” in Africa, where AQIM was believed to be helping to move the drugs into Europe.142 • The involvement of local elites in the drug trade make regional governments hesitant to institute a crackdown.143 • AQIM has tended to profit from drug smuggling by taxing shipments and charging smugglers for “providing protection.” MUJAO was more consistently involved in directly smuggling the drugs, though the two groups often “operated jointly.”144 ɦɦ The full extent of AQIM’s cooperation with Latin American drug cartels is not clear, though there have been reports that AQIM had at least one official meet with a Latin American cartel representative in Guinea-Bissau in 2010 to discuss improved coordination.145 ɦɦ Reports in 2010 indicated that AQIM had agreed with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Financial Details (FARC) to provide protection for drugs being transited across northern Africa.146 ·· In 2009, the U.S. arrested three individuals who sought to act as liaisons between AQIM and FARC in Western Africa,147 though it is unclear the extent to which these individuals were working with AQIM as opposed to name-dropping to “impress their supposed business partner.”148 ɦɦ The extent to which drug trafficking benefitted AQIM and MUJAO is unclear, though MUJAO seems to have benefitted more. A 2013 report from the West African Commission on Drugs states that “there are reasons to believe that AQIM has not been a major player in regional narcotics smuggling networks ... though it may have made a significant contribution to MUJAO’s war chest.”149 • AQIM charged 10 percent of the value of a shipment to provide protection to drug traffickers in the late 2000s.150 • In 2008, Morocco’s interior minister made public the suspected connection between AQIM and the drug trade. A Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) case brought the next year against three Malians who had worked with AQIM marked the group’s increasing involvement in trafficking cocaine and hashish.151 ɦɦ In the DEA sting, one of the arrested drug traffickers noted that AQIM would protect the shipment of cocaine at a rate of $4,200 per kilogram.152 • AQIM’s involvement in the drug trade spans numerous countries and numerous illicit drugs, as marked by a 2012 seizure of “two tons of Indian hemp drugs” linked to AQIM in Mauritania.153 • Also in 2012, AQIM was making money off drug trafficking through the Sahel by requiring traffickers to pay the group for “protection” and “permissions.” The group charged $50,000 for a “convoy of hashish” to pass through its territory unimpeded in 2011.154 ɦɦ It is likely that AQIM’s leadership approved of charging for facilitating convoys of drugs, but that prices were set by “very autonomous battalion commanders.”155 • In 2013, an official at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre stated that AQIM and its forerunner had been involved in the cocaine trade for about a decade, and that this involvement had led to “a massive increase in the quantities of cocaine involved.”156

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• Algerian press reporting from 2013 indicates that AQIM may have traded drugs for weapons in Libya.157 Officials from Niger reported in 2015 that AQIM operatives were captured with money obtained from selling drugs in Libya.158 • In 2015, a majority of the funding for AQIM, Ansar Dine, and MUJAO was coming from their control of “ancient trade routes through the Sahara” used for trafficking drugs. Jihadist groups likely make the bulk of their income from drugs through taxes on shipments going through their territory.159 ɦɦ AQIM, al-Mourabitoun, and MUJAO were “still benefitting from their links to drug cartels” as of late 2016.160 ɦɦ With $1.25 billion worth of cocaine transiting through West Africa annually, a 2015 NGO report estimated that West African traffickers could make up to $150 million per year.161 ·· Hashish is also a major source of revenue for drug smugglers. • AQIM has underwritten drug traffickers with funds obtained from ransoms in exchange for up to half of the profits, paid back as arms and other equipment.162 SMUGGLING AND TRAFFICKING Without strong interdiction efforts from regional governments, smuggling networks are likely to persist, continuing to fill AQIM’s coffers. AQIM is opportunistic and will smuggle – or tax the smuggling of – any goods that it can. In the past, the group has smuggled arms, people, and cigarettes. The group may focus increasingly on trafficking migrants, particularly into Europe.163 • In 2009, the DEA arrested an individual in a West African smuggling ring who stated that “his organization and [AQIM] have collaborated in the human smuggling of Bangladeshi, Pakistani and Indian subjects into Spain.”164 ɦɦ At the time, the group’s main smuggling routes to Europe ran through “Morocco into Spain and through Libya and Algeria into Italy.” • In 2012, the commander of AFRICOM stated that trafficked Libyan arms had bolstered AQIM’s efforts to take over Mali.165

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Financial Details • Arms smuggled from Gaddafi’s stockpiles were worth around $15-$30 million annually in 2015. A report on transnational organized crime estimated that human trafficking across the Sahara was usually worth $8-$20 million, though this number had ballooned to $255-$323 million due to the incipient migrant crisis.166 AQIM would have earned part of both of those figures, based on direct sales and taxation. • In 2017, AQIM was taking government-subsidized fuel in southern Libya and selling it “for at least ten times the price” in neighboring countries.167 • The former commander of AQIM, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, was known as “Mr. Marlboro” due to his cigarette smuggling operation into Italy.168 ɦɦ The market for smuggled illicit cigarettes is massive. In 2009, it was estimated to be worth $468 million in Libya and Algeria alone;169 in 2015, $1 billion in illicit cigarettes were transacted across the Maghreb annually, much of them through Belmokhtar’s network.170 • AQIM has trafficked individuals, mostly economic migrants, from Nigeria and Burkina Faso into Mali to smuggle them into Europe.171 • Smuggling caravans exploit the trails and hideouts that have been developed over the previous centuries of cross-Saharan smuggling.172 • Much of the smuggling done across the Sahel has occurred with the complicity of state governments in the region. This indirectly facilitates AQIM’s funding streams.173 ɦɦ Arms smugglers, including at least one individual smuggling arms to AQIM, have been released by Niger. AQIM killed one high-ranking Malian army officer over “an arms deal with AQIM gone awry.” LOOTING AND SPOILS Barring major territorial gains or another state failing, AQIM is not likely to acquire significantly more weapons or other goods from spoils. Similarly, the group is unlikely to loot to a significant extent, unless under dire financial pressure, as doing so would undermine its attempts to build inroads with local populations. Unlike the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, AQIM leadership has prioritized building tribal alliances and not alienating the local population.174 11 | CSIF: Terror Finance Briefing Book

• After the Gaddafi regime fell in late 2011, AQIM acquired “most of the weapons,” and used some of those weapons to equip other regional jihadist groups.175 ɦɦ AQIM stole Gaddafi’s arms, including anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles, or purchased them from mercenaries who had looted the wares.176 ɦɦ AQIM made money off arms looted from the Gaddafi regime that were smuggled through territory it held. The group also stood to benefit from selling arms it had taken.177 ɦɦ These weapons enabled the group to take control of northern Mali.178 • AQIM and associated groups seized extensive weaponry, including heavy artillery, from Malian forces during their takeover of the northern part of the country in 2012.179 • A 2016 FATF report noted that AQIM and its affiliates are suspected to raise funds through robberies, but such connections are hard to prove.180 TAXATION AND EXTORTION AQIM will continue to tax networks and individuals passing through its territory, though it may use taxes sparingly in order to build a base of support. If the group recaptures territory, it is likely to levy light taxes again as a means to build a state-like apparatus. • Prior to his split with AQIM, Belmokhtar did not tax populations under his direct control in Mali.181 However, according to then-Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen, other AQIM battalions did tax residents in northern Mali in 2012.182 ɦɦ AQIM did, however, abolish “customs, duties, tolls, tariffs and frontiers” when in control of Timbuktu in 2012, likely to curry favor with the local population.183 ɦɦ MUJAO ended taxation in areas it controlled in 2012.184 • AQIM taxes criminal smuggling in southern Libya.185 • The group has extorted individuals with mafia-like protection rackets and robbery.186

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Financial Details DONATIONS As al-Qaeda retrenches and the Islamic State draws back, AQIM is likely to see an increase in donations. The group maintains a global reach and probably will continue to draw resources from regional funders, as well as those in Western Europe and elsewhere. • The Nigerien army seized over half a million dollars in cash from AQIM-linked militants in 2015. This cash had been obtained in part through donations.187 • In 2015, the U.S. Department of State stated that “AQIM also successfully fundraises globally,” with some assistance coming from “supporters residing in Western Europe.”188 COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISES AND AGRICULTURE AQIM’s involvement in commercial enterprises is likely minor and opportunistic. However, given the weak financial regulatory infrastructure in the region, AQIM is likely to continue to launder money from local businesses. • An AQIM cell in Guinea Bissau uncovered by authorities in early 2016 was using profits gained from the sale of luxury vehicles to finance its recruitment and arms purchases.189 EXPENDITURES AQIM’s expenditures reflect the broad nature of the group’s interests. Money is spent largely on fighters, but the group also spends to develop tribal alliances and other terror organizations. • Varying reports from the UN and journalists indicate Ansar Dine and AQIM in 2012 were paying yearly salaries of between $1,000 and $4,800 to the parents of recruited children, with the UN also reporting that parents of children recruited for AQIM received a $600 bonus.190 Mali’s GDP per capita was $777 in 2012.191 ɦɦ MUJAO paid its recruits $100-$400 per month in Mali in 2013.192 • In 2016, AQIM paid more than $800 to individuals “providing information that (could) be used to target MINUSMA convoys.”193 • MUJAO gave its fighters in northern Mali each at least a $300 bonus when the group received ransom payments, according to Reuters.194 12 | CSIF: Terror Finance Briefing Book

• AQIM uses some of its funds to support its affiliated groups. The group has funded and worked with Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, and other al-Qaeda affiliates and sympathetic groups throughout the region.195 ɦɦ Then-Treasury Under Secretary David Cohen said that ransom funds allowed AQIM “to expand its reach and influence” by providing “hundreds of thousands of dollars in financial support to other Africa-based extremist organizations.”196 ɦɦ AQIM has funded Ansar Dine, an offshoot organization, since its formation in 2011,197 including at least one lump payment of roughly $500,000 to the group.198 ɦɦ A former member of the UN’s al-Qaeda and Taliban Monitoring Team reported that AQIM sent Boko Haram $250,000 in 2012.199 ɦɦ AQIM funded Ansar al-Sharia, a terrorist group in Libya200 involved in the 2012 attacks on the U.S. Consulate that killed four Americans.201 ɦɦ In 2013-2014, AQIM sent more than $100,000 to the Mujahidin Shura Council in Gaza, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization.202 • AQIM gives cash payouts to community members to secure “services and short-term loyalty.”203 ɦɦ In Timbuktu in 2012, AQIM funded religious teachers, influencing them to espouse AQIM’s brand of Salafism.204 ɦɦ AQIM used ransom money to procure “vehicles, arms, medical supplies and electronics” from traffickers. The connections built from these trades led to influential traffickers supporting AQIM’s takeover of northern Mali in 2012.205 • AQIM receipts discovered in early 2014 showed a “mundane financial reality,” with meticulous bookkeeping of money spent on workshops, ammunition, and bars of soap.206 • AQIM has often used its funding to win favor with populations under its control, including by financing weddings and paying for medicine for children.207 ɦɦ In 2011, AQIM gave residents of towns in northern Mali free cash, clothes, food, and medicine. The group engaged in trade with the locals, and also paid for residents to establish small local mosques.208

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Financial Details Conclusion A patchwork network of violent Islamist groups and transnational criminal organizations have run rampant in the Sahel region for decades. The U.S. should be careful to avoid combatting these networks and AQIM directly, as France has already taken a leadership role in the region. Instead, the U.S., in collaboration with European partners, should support better governance by Sahelian countries and encourage wealthy nations to stop paying ransoms. Degrading AQIM’s financing starts with a strict enforcement of a ransoms ban. Further, AQIM cannot be allowed to control significant tracts of land from which it could tax and extort a population to pay its expenses. Most of the remainder of AQIM’s funding comes from smuggling drugs and other contraband across the Sahel and into Europe. The international effort to deprive AQIM of its funding should therefore focus on mapping and destroying transnational criminal networks, particularly those focused on smuggling drugs. Nevertheless, the group is resilient and low cost, focused on gradualism, and thus, as with other al-Qaeda affiliates, simply denying the group consistent funding is unlikely to destroy it entirely. In the long run, AQIM must be denied sanctuary through the development of states that can stem the tide of the region’s Salafi jihadist movement, which includes other groups like the Islamic State of Greater Sahara, the IS affiliate whose leadership defected from al-Qaeda. This requires that the nations whose territory jihadists operates in become more formidable in governing their vast swaths of land and securing their borders.

Mauritanian soldiers monitor the Mali-Mauritania border for any signs of AQIM movement. 13 | CSIF: Terror Finance Briefing Book

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Endnotes 1. This report focuses on the fluid network of groups and offshoots associated with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), with particular emphasis on those that recently formed an alliance with AQIM, known as Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam walMuslimin (“Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims”). 2. Based on a scale out of 3 dollar signs, where 1 dollar sign represents tens of millions in funding per year, 2 dollar signs represents low hundreds of millions, and 3 dollar signs represents high hundreds of millions or more in current funding. 3. “Al Qaeda-linked attacks in Mali and neighboring countries since 2014,” Military Edge, accessed October 20, 2017. (http://militaryedge.org/embedmap/?map_ id=12253&mapZoom=6&mapCenter=14.392118083661728% 2C-2.373046875) 4. David Lewis, “Al Qaeda’s richest faction dominant in north Mali: U.S.,” Reuters, July 26, 2012. (http://www.reuters.com/ article/us-mali-usa-africom-idUSBRE86P1IC20120726) 5. United Nations Security Council, “Fifteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2018 (2012) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities,” January 23, 2014, page 14. (http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/41) 6. Erik Alda and Joseph L Sala, “Links Between Terrorism, Organized Crime and Crime: The Case of the Sahel Region,” Stability International Journal of Security and Development, September 10, 2014. (http://www.stabilityjournal.org/ articles/10.5334/sta.ea/) 7. The group received roughly $92 million from 2008-13, and at least another $5 million before 2008. Rukmini Callimachi, “Paying Ransoms, Europe Bankrolls Qaeda Terror,” The New York Times, July 29, 2014. (https://www.nytimes. com/2014/07/30/world/africa/ransoming-citizens-europebecomes-al-qaedas-patron.html); David Lewis and Adama Diarra, “Special Report: In the land of “gangster-jihadists,” Reuters, October 25, 2012. (http://www.reuters.com/article/usmali-crisis-crime-idUSBRE89O07Y20121025) 8. Activity by AQIM, or an associated group, has been reported in Algeria, Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Western Sahara, and Tunisia, among others. 9. Scott Barber, “Kidnapping: Al-Qaeda’s cash cow terrorizes Western tourists and workers in Africa’s Sahel region,” National Post (Canada), February 24, 2013. (http:// nationalpost.com/g00/news/kidnapping-al-qaedas-cash-cowterrorizes-western-tourists-and-workers-in-africas-sahel-region/); Morten Boas, “Guns, Money and Prayers: AQIM’s Blueprint for Securing Control of Northern Mali,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, April 28, 2014. (https://ctc.usma.edu/ posts/guns-money-and-prayers-aqims-blueprint-for-securingcontrol-of-northern-mali)

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10. Jonathan Schanzer, “Algeria’s GSPC and America’s ‘War on Terror’,” The Washington Institute, October 2, 2002. (http:// www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/algerias-gspcand-americas-war-on-terror) 11. Zachary Laub and Jonathan Masters, “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 27, 2015. (https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-qaeda-islamicmaghreb); Christopher S. Chivvis and Andrew Liepman, “North Africa’s Menace: AQIM’s Evolution and the U.S. Policy Response,” RAND Corporation, 2013. (http://www. rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/ RR415/RAND_RR415.pdf) 12. Bill Roggio, “Libyan Islamic Fighting Group joins al Qaeda,” FDD’s Long War Journal, November 3, 2007. (http:// www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/11/libyan_islamic_ fight.php) 13. Christopher S. Chivvis and Andrew Liepman, “North Africa’s Menace: AQIM’s Evolution and the U.S. Policy Response,” RAND Corporation, 2013. (http://www.rand. org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR415/ RAND_RR415.pdf) 14. Andrew Black, “Mokhtar Belmokhtar: The Algerian Jihad’s Southern Amir,” The Jamestown Foundation, May 8, 2009. (https://jamestown.org/program/mokhtar-belmokhtarthe-algerian-jihads-southern-amir/) 15. United Nations Security Council, “QDe.014 The Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb,” September 9, 2014. (https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/ sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/entity/theorganization-of-al-qaida-in-the-islamic) 16. Thomas Joscelyn, “Analysis: Al Qaeda groups reorganize in West Africa,” FDD’s Long War Journal, March 13, 2017. (http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/03/analysis-alqaeda-groups-reorganize-in-west-africa.php) 17. Anouar Boukhars, “Simmering Discontent in the Western Sahara,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 12, 2012. (http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/03/12/ simmering-discontent-in-western-sahara-pub-47461) 18. David Wood, “Libyan Weapons Arming Al Qaeda Militias Across North Africa, Officials Say,” The Huffington Post, February 21, 2013. (http://www.huffingtonpost. com/2013/02/20/libyan-weapons-al-qaeda-northafrica_n_2727326.html)

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Endnotes 19. Mohammed Mahmoud Abu al-Ma’ali, “Al-Qaeda and its allies in the Sahel and the Sahara,” Al-Jazeera Center for Studies (Qatar), May 1, 2012, page 5. (http://studies.aljazeera.net/ResourceGallery/media/ Documents/2012/4/30/2012430145241774734Al%20 Qaeda%20and%20its%20allies%20in%20the%20Sahel%20 and%20the%20Sahara.pdf); Andrew Lebovich, “The Hotel Attacks and Militant Realignment in the Sahara-Sahel Region,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, January 19, 2016. (https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-hotel-attacksand-militant-realignment-in-the-sahara-sahel-region); Note that some scholarship has questioned the role that ethnic cleavages played given that MUJAO was largely composed of Arabs and Berbers. See: Morten Boas, “Guns, Money and Prayers: AQIM’s Blueprint for Securing Control of Northern Mali,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, April 28, 2014. (https://ctc.usma.edu/posts/guns-money-and-prayers-aqimsblueprint-for-securing-control-of-northern-mali) 20. Damien McElroy, “Al-Qaeda’s scathing letter to troublesome employee Mokhtar Belmokhtar reveals inner workings of terrorist group,” The Telegraph (UK), May 29, 2013. (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ al-qaeda/10085716/Al-Qaedas-scathing-letter-to-troublesomeemployee-Mokhtar-Belmokhtar-reveals-inner-workings-ofterrorist-group.html); Christopher S. Chivvis and Andrew Liepman, “North Africa’s Menace: AQIM’s Evolution and the U.S. Policy Response,” RAND Corporation, 2013. (http:// www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/ RR415/RAND_RR415.pdf) 21. Conor Gaffey, “Peacekeeping in Mali: The U.N.’s Most Dangerous Mission,” Newsweek, June 12, 2016. (http://www. newsweek.com/mali-un-mission-northern-mali-conflict-aqimafrica-peacekeeping-468907) 22. U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2015: Chapter 6. Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” June 2016. (https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2015/257523.htm) 23. Bruce Crumley, “France’s Mali Mission: Has al-Qaeda Already Been Defeated?” Time, February 5, 2013. (http:// world.time.com/2013/02/05/frances-mali-mission-has-al-qaedaalready-been-defeated/) 24. “Belmokhtar’s militants ‘merge’ with Mali’s Mujao,” BBC News (UK), August 22, 2013. (http://www.bbc.com/ news/world-us-canada-23796920); “Mali extremists join with al-Qaida-linked North Africa group,” Associated Press, December 4, 2015. (https://www.apnews.com/ eb6aaa78c8cc40d6bbe21f401acd1b06) 25. Caleb Weiss, “Analysis: Merger of al Qaeda groups threatens security in West Africa,” FDD’s Long War Journal, March 18, 2017. (http://www.longwarjournal.org/ archives/2017/03/analysis-merger-of-al-qaeda-groups-threatenssecurity-in-west-africa.php) 15 | CSIF: Terror Finance Briefing Book

26. Thomas Joscelyn, “Analysis: Al Qaeda groups reorganize in West Africa,” FDD’s Long War Journal, March 13, 2017. (https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/03/analysis-alqaeda-groups-reorganize-in-west-africa.php) 27. Caleb Weiss, “Al Qaeda linked to more than 250 West African attacks in 2016,” FDD’s Long War Journal, January 7, 2017. (http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/01/over250-al-qaeda-linked-attacks-in-west-africa-in-2016.php) 28. David Weinberg, “Terrorist Financing: Kidnapping Antiquities Trafficking, and Private Donations,” Hearing before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, November 17, 2015, page 4. (http://www.defenddemocracy.org/content/uploads/documents/ Terrorist_Financing_Kidnapping_Antiquities_and_Private_Donations.pdf ); Based on a 2003 exchange rate of 1.13 euros per dollar. 29. David Wood, “Libyan Weapons Arming Al Qaeda Militias Across North Africa, Officials Say,” The Huffington Post, February 21, 2013. (http://www.huffingtonpost. com/2013/02/20/libyan-weapons-al-qaeda-northafrica_n_2727326.html) 30. Jon Lee Anderson, “State of Terror,” The New Yorker, July 1, 2013. (http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/07/01/ state-of-terror); Christopher S. Chivvis and Andrew Liepman, “North Africa’s Menace: AQIM’s Evolution and the U.S. Policy Response,” RAND Corporation, 2013. (http://www.rand.org/ content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR415/ RAND_RR415.pdf ) 31. George Parker, “G8 leaders pledge to stop paying ransoms to terror groups,” Financial Times (UK), June 18, 2013. (https:// www.ft.com/content/10cc2546-d832-11e2-b4a4-00144feab7de) 32. Rukmini Callimachi, “Paying Ransoms, Europe Bankrolls Qaeda Terror,” The New York Times, July 29, 2014. (https:// www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/world/africa/ransoming-citizenseurope-becomes-al-qaedas-patron.html) 33. Kathleen Caulderwood, “Drugs And Money In The Sahara: How The Global Cocaine Trade Is Funding North African Jihad,” International Business Times, June 5, 2015. (http://www. ibtimes.com/drugs-money-sahara-how-global-cocaine-tradefunding-north-african-jihad-1953419) 34. U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2015: Chapter 2. Africa Overview,” June 2016. (https://www. state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2015/257514.htm) 35. Rukmini Callimachi, “Paying Ransoms, Europe Bankrolls Qaeda Terror,” The New York Times, July 29, 2014. (https:// www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/world/africa/ransoming-citizenseurope-becomes-al-qaedas-patron.html) 36. “Morocco arrests five soldiers over militant arms,” Al-Arabiya (UAE), January 12, 2011. (https://www.alarabiya.net/ articles/2011/01/12/133257.html)

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Endnotes 37. Financial Action Task Force, “Terrorist Financing in West and Central Africa,” October 2016, page 28. (http://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Terrorist-Financing-WestCentral-Africa.pdf ) 38. General Thomas Waldhauser, “United States Africa Command 2017 Posture Statement,” Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 9, 2017, page 12. 39. Modibo Goita, “West Africa’s Growing Terrorist Threat: Confronting AQIM’s Sahelian Strategy,” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, February 2011. (http://africacenter. org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ASB11EN-WestAfrica%E2%80%99s-Growing-Terrorist-Threat-ConfrontingAQIM%E2%80%99s-Sahelian-Strategy.pdf ) 40. David Wood, “Libyan Weapons Arming Al Qaeda Militias Across North Africa, Officials Say,” The Huffington Post, February 21, 2013. (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/20/libyanweapons-al-qaeda-north-africa_n_2727326.html) 41. David Lewis and Adama Diarra, “Special Report: In the land of “gangster-jihadists,” Reuters, October 25, 2012. (http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mali-crisis-crimeidUSBRE89O07Y20121025) 42. Anouar Boukhars, “The Drivers of Insecurity in Mauritania,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 30, 2012. (http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/04/30/drivers-ofinsecurity-in-mauritania-pub-47955); Jason Howerton, “Radical Islamists in Mali Recruit, Pay for Child Soldiers,” Associated Press, October 3, 2012. (http://www.theblaze.com/news/2012/10/03/ radical-islamists-in-mali-recruit-pay-for-child-soldiers/) 43. Jacob Zenn, “AQIM’s Alliance in Mali: Prospects for Jihadist Preeminence in West Africa,” The Jamestown Foundation, April 21, 2017. (https://jamestown.org/program/aqims-alliancemali-prospects-jihadist-preeminence-west-africa/) 44. Interview with RAND Senior Political Scientist Michael Shurkin, August 14, 2017. 45. Emily Estelle and Brenna Snyder, “AQIM and ISIS in Algeria: Competing Campaigns,” American Enterprise Institute, June 2, 2016. (https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/aqim-andisis-in-algeria-competing-campaigns); Jaclyn Stutz, “AQIM and ISIS in Tunisia: Competing Campaigns,” American Enterprise Institute, June 28, 2016. (https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/ aqim-and-isis-in-tunisia-competing-campaigns) 46. U.S. Department of State, “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” accessed October 23, 2017. (https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/ des/123085.htm) 47. U.S. Department of State, Press Release, “The Re-Designation of Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb as a Foreign Terrorist Organization,” October 27, 2009. (https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/ pa/prs/ps/2009/oct/130969.htm)

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48. Jon Lee Anderson, “State of Terror,” The New Yorker, July 1, 2013. (http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/07/01/ state-of-terror) 49. General Thomas Waldhauser, “United States Africa Command 2017 Posture Statement,” Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 9, 2017, pages 12-13. 50. United Nations, “UN Mission’s Summary detailed by Country,” April 30, 2017, page 40. (http://www.un.org/en/ peacekeeping/contributors/2017/apr17_3.pdf ) 51. General Thomas D. Waldhauser, “Advance Policy Questions for Lieutenant General Thomas D. Waldhauser, United States Marine Corps,” Senate Armed Services Committee, June 21, 2016, pages 7-8. (https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/ doc/Waldhauser_%20APQs_06-21-16.pdf ) 52. General David M. Rodriguez, “Advance Policy Questions for General David M. Rodriguez, U.S. Army Nominee for Commander, U.S. Africa Command,” Senate Armed Services Committee, February 13, 2013, pages 7-8. (https://www.armedservices.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Rodriguez%2002-14-13.pdf ) 53. Michael Shurkin, Stephanie Pezard, and S. Rebecca Zimmerman, “Mali’s Next Battle: Improving Counterterrorism Capabilities,” RAND Corporation, 2017, page 18. (https://www. rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1200/ RR1241/RAND_RR1241.pdf ) 54. U.S. Department of State, “Programs and Initiatives,” accessed October 23, 2017. (https://www.state.gov/j/ct/ programs/index.htm#TSCTP) 55. The White House, Press Release, “Fact Sheet: Partnering to Counter Terrorism in Africa,” August 6, 2014. (https:// obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/06/factsheet-partnering-counter-terrorism-africa) 56. George Parker, “G8 leaders pledge to stop paying ransoms to terror groups,” Financial Times (UK), June 18, 2013. (https:// www.ft.com/content/10cc2546-d832-11e2-b4a4-00144feab7de) 57. United Nations Security Council, “Security Council Adopts Resolution 2133 (2014), Calling upon States to Keep Ransom Payments, Political Concessions from Benefiting Terrorists,” January 27, 2014. (http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/ sc11262.doc.htm) 58. “AQIM Appendix,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies. (http://www.defenddemocracy.org/terror-finance-briefing-bookappendices) 59. U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Recent OFAC Actions,” October 24, 2003. (https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/ sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/pages/20031024.aspx) 60. United Nations Security Council, “QDi. 136 Mokhtar Belmokhtar,” September 9, 2014. (https://www.un.org/sc/ suborg/en/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/ individual/mokhtar-belmokhtar)

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Endnotes 61. Christopher S. Chivvis and Andrew Liepman, “North Africa’s Menace: AQIM’s Evolution and the U.S. Policy Response,” RAND Corporation, 2013, page 5. (http://www.rand. org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR415/ RAND_RR415.pdf ) 62. “Profile: Mokhtar Belmokhtar,” BBC News (UK), June 15, 2015. (http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-21061480) 63. Lee Ferran, “Alive After All? U.S. Offers $5M for Mokhtar Belmokhtar,” ABC News, June 3, 2013. (http://abcnews.go.com/ blogs/headlines/2013/06/alive-after-all-u-s-offers-5m-formokhtar-belmokhtar/) 64. United Nations Security Council, “QDi. 136 Mokhtar Belmokhtar,” September 9, 2014. (https://www.un.org/sc/ suborg/en/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/ individual/mokhtar-belmokhtar) 65. “Captured wife of Mokhtar Belmokhtar confirms militant leader ‘alive,’” Middle East Eye, November 23, 2016. (http:// www.middleeasteye.net/news/mokhtar-belmokhtar-still-aliveone-his-wives-confirms-1187655554) 66. Samuel L. Aronson, “AQIM’s Threat to Western Interests in the Sahel,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, April 28, 2014. (https://ctc.usma.edu/posts/aqims-threat-to-westerninterests-in-the-sahel) 67. House Foreign Affairs Committee, Press Release, “Chairman Royce Statement on Reported Killing of Mokhtar Belmokhtar,” March 2, 2013. (https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/press-release/ chairman-royce-statement-on-reported-killing-of-mokhtarbelmokhtar/) 68. Geoff Porter, “AQIM Ten Years On,” The Cipher Brief, January 12, 2017. (https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/ africa/aqim-ten-years-1089) 69. “Captured wife of Mokhtar Belmokhtar confirms militant leader ‘alive,’” Middle East Eye, November 23, 2016. (http:// www.middleeasteye.net/news/mokhtar-belmokhtar-still-aliveone-his-wives-confirms-1187655554) 70. United Nations Security Council, Press Release, “Security Council Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee Adds Djamel Akkacha to Its Sanctions List,” February 5, 2013. (https://www.un.org/ press/en/2013/sc10908.doc.htm) 71. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, “Treasury Designates an Additional Senior Leader of Al-Qa’ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb,” February 14, 2013. (https:// www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1855.aspx) 72. Bill Roggio, “US adds senior AQIM commander to terrorist list,” FDD’s Long War Journal, February 16, 2013. (http:// www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/02/us_adds_aqim_ command.php)

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73. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, “Treasury Designates an Additional Senior Leader of Al-Qa’ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb,” February 14, 2013. (https:// www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1855.aspx) 74. Bill Roggio, “US adds senior AQIM commander to terrorist list,” FDD’s Long War Journal, February 16, 2013. (http:// www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/02/us_adds_aqim_ command.php) 75. Caleb Weiss, “AQIM commander threatens France in audio statement,” FDD’s Long War Journal, December 24, 2015. (http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/12/aqimcommander-threatens-france-in-audio-statement.php) 76. Zachary Laub and Jonathan Masters, “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 27, 2015. (https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-qaeda-islamic-maghreb) 77. Christopher S. Chivvis and Andrew Liepman, “North Africa’s Menace: AQIM’s Evolution and the U.S. Policy Response,” RAND Corporation, 2013, pages 1, 14-15. (http:// www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/ RR415/RAND_RR415.pdf ) 78. Interview with RAND Senior Political Scientist Michael Shurkin, August 14, 2017. 79. Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Military Offers Support, but Not Troops, to Aid France in Africa,” The New York Times, May 12, 2017. (https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/12/world/africa/africa-usmilitary-aid-france.html) 80. Christopher Chivvis, “Mali’s Persistent Jihadist Problem,” The Cipher Brief, January 12, 2017. (https://www.thecipherbrief. com/article/africa/malis-persistent-jihadist-problem-1089) 81. “UN Security Council: G5 Sahel counterterrorism force to move forward,” Africa Times, June 22, 2017. (http://africatimes. com/2017/06/22/un-security-council-g5-sahel-counterterrorismforce-to-move-forward/) 82. Somini Sengupta, “U.N. Security Council Welcomes Deployment of New Counterrorism Force in Africa,” The New York Times, June 21, 2017. (https://www.nytimes. com/2017/06/21/world/africa/security-council-sahel-franceunited-states.html) 83. Colum Lynch, “Trump Administration Eyes $1 Billion in Cuts to U.N. Peacekeeping,” Foreign Policy, March 23, 2017. (http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/23/trump-administrationeyes-1-billion-in-cuts-to-u-n-peacekeeping/) 84. Interview with RAND Senior Political Scientist Michael Shurkin, August 14, 2017. 85. “U.S. Relations with Algeria,” U.S. Department of State, February 2, 2017. (https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/8005.htm)

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Endnotes 86. Vera Songwe, “Africa’s Democratic Transitions Under Construction: Some Lessons from Burkina Faso,” Brookings, November 6, 2014. (https://www.brookings.edu/blog/ africa-in-focus/2014/11/06/africas-democratic-transitionsunder-construction-some-lessons-from-burkina-faso/); Ron Dellums, “Will Guinea’s experiment in democracy succeed?” The Hill, October 7, 2015. (http://thehill.com/blogs/punditsblog/international/256178-will-guineas-experiment-indemocracy-succeed) 87. Amado Philip de Andres, “West Africa Under Attack: Drugs, Organized Crime and Terrorism as the New Threats to Global Security,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, January 2008. (https://www.ucm.es/data/cont/media/www/pag-72513/ UNISCI%20DP%2016%20-%20Andres.pdf ) 88. Francesco Strazzari, “Azawad and the rights of passage: the role of illicit trade in the logic of armed group formation in northern Mali,” Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (Norway), January 2015, pages 3-4. (http://www.clingendael. nl/sites/default/files/Strazzari_NOREF_Clingendael_Mali_ Azawad_Dec2014.pdf ) 89. The White House, “Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing Converging Threats to National Security,” July 19, 2011. (https://obamawhitehouse.archives. gov/sites/default/files/Strategy_to_Combat_Transnational_ Organized_Crime_July_2011.pdf ) 90. Xenia de Graaf, “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Political Economy of Terrorism,” Center for Security Studies, January 17, 2012. (http://isnblog.ethz.ch/conflict/alqaeda-in-the-islamic-maghreb-aqim-and-the-political-economyof-terrorism) 91. Wolfram Lacher, “Organized Crime and Conflict in the Sahel-Sahara Region,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 13, 2012. (http://carnegieendowment. org/2012/09/13/organized-crime-and-conflict-in-sahel-sahararegion-pub-49360) 92. David Wood, “Libyan Weapons Arming Al Qaeda Militias Across North Africa, Officials Say,” The Huffington Post, February 21, 2013. (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/20/libyanweapons-al-qaeda-north-africa_n_2727326.html) 93. Tuesday Reitano and Mark Shaw, “Check your blind spot: Confronting criminal spoilers in the Sahel,” Institute for Security Studies (South Africa), March 14, 2013. (http://www.ceipaz.org/ images/contenido/sahel-crimenorganizado.pdf ) 94. George Parker, “G8 leaders pledge to stop paying ransoms to terror groups,” Financial Times (UK), June 18, 2013. (https:// www.ft.com/content/10cc2546-d832-11e2-b4a4-00144feab7de) 95. Rukmini Callimachi, “Paying Ransoms, Europe Bankrolls Qaeda Terror,” The New York Times, July 29, 2014. (https:// www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/world/africa/ransoming-citizenseurope-becomes-al-qaedas-patron.html)

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96. Annelies Pauwels, “Competing for ransom: AQIM vs. Daesh,” European Union Institute for Security Studies (France), June 2016. (http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/specialinterest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/ Alert_23_Terrorist_kidnapping.pdf ) 97. Yaroslav Trofimov, “Jihad Comes to Africa,” The Wall Street Journal, February 5, 2016. (https://www.wsj.com/articles/jihadcomes-to-africa-1454693025) 98. U.S. Agency for International Development and Equal Access, “Exploring New Media in the Sahel,” 2016. (https:// blumont.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Exploring-NewMedia-in-the-Sahel.pdf ) 99. Broadcasting Board of Governors, “BBG, Gallup Issue Findings on Media Use in the Sahel,” November 14, 2013. (https://www.bbg.gov/2013/11/14/bbg-gallup-issue-findings-onmedia-use-in-the-sahel-region/) 100. Hannah Armstrong, “Analyzing AQIM Jihad Recruitment Propaganda,” Al-Wasat (Bahrain), July 18, 2011. (https:// thewasat.wordpress.com/2011/07/18/analyzing-aqim-jihadrecruitment-propaganda/) 101. Olivier Guitta, “The re-emergence of AQIM in Africa,” Al-Jazeera (Qatar), March 20, 2016. (http://www. aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/03/emergence-aqimafrica-160320090928469.html) 102. Kathleen Caulderwood, “Drugs And Money In The Sahara: How The Global Cocaine Trade Is Funding North African Jihad,” International Business Times, June 5, 2015. (http://www. ibtimes.com/drugs-money-sahara-how-global-cocaine-tradefunding-north-african-jihad-1953419) 103. Robin Yapp, “South American drug gangs funding alQaeda terrorists,” The Telegraph (UK), December 29, 2010. (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/southamerica/ colombia/8230134/South-American-drug-gangs-funding-alQaeda-terrorists.html) 104. United Nations Security Council, “Fifteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2083 (2012) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities,” January 23, 2014, page 14. (http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc. asp?symbol=S/2014/41) 105. Timothy Kustusch, “AQIM’s Funding Sources Kidnapping, Ransom, and Drug Running by Gangster Jihadists,” 361 Security, November 28, 2012. (http://www.361security.com/ analysis/aqims-funding-sources-kidnapping-ransom-and-drugrunning-by-gangster-jihadists) 106. Financial Action Task Force, “Terrorist Financing in West and Central Africa,” October 2016, page 34. (http://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Terrorist-Financing-WestCentral-Africa.pdf )

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Endnotes 107. Katherine Bauer and Matthew Levitt, “Al-Qaeda Financing: Selected Issues,” How al-Qaeda Survived Drones, Uprisings, and the Islamic State, Ed. Aaron Y. Zelin, (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2017), page 94. (http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/ PolicyFocus153-Zelin.pdf ) 108. Caleb Weiss, “Al Qaeda video shows its hostages in northern Mali,” FDD’s Long War Journal, July 2, 2017. (http:// www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/07/al-qaeda-videoshows-its-hostages-in-northern-mali.php) 109. Rukmini Callimachi, “Paying Ransoms, Europe Bankrolls Qaeda Terror,” The New York Times, July 29, 2014. (https:// www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/world/africa/ransoming-citizenseurope-becomes-al-qaedas-patron.html) 110. Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, “The Many Faces of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,” Geneva Centre for Security Policy (Switzerland), May 2011. (https://www.files.ethz. ch/isn/129338/GCSP%20Policy%20Paper%2015.pdf ) 111. Adam Nossiter, “Millions in Ransoms Fuel Militants’ Clout in West Africa,” The New York Times, December 12, 2012. (http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/13/world/africa/ kidnappings-fuel-extremists-in-western-africa.html) 112. David Lewis and Adama Diarra, “Special Report: In the land of ‘gangster-jihadists,’” Reuters, October 25, 2012. (http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mali-crisis-crimeidUSBRE89O07Y20121025) 113. Ibid; Report cites expenditures of 5.5 million francs ($5.9 million), of which about two million francs were spent on “Swiss staff involved in the operation.” 114. Under Secretary David Cohen, “Kidnapping for Ransom: The Growing Terrorist Financing Challenge,” Remarks at Chatham House, October 5, 2012. (https://www.treasury.gov/ press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1726.aspx) 115. United Nations Security Council, “Sixteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2161 (2014) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities,” October 29, 2014. (http:// www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/770) 116. Juan Zarate, Treasury’s War, (New York: PublicAffairs, 2013), page 363. 117. “In villages, al-Qaida lures with cash, candy,” ABC 6 Action News, December 3, 2011. (http://6abc.com/archive/8453758/) 118. Financial Action Task Force, “Terrorist Financing in West Africa,” October 2013, page 25. (http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/ fatf/documents/reports/tf-in-west-africa.pdf )

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119. Wolfram Lacher, “Challenging the Myth of the DrugTerror Nexus in the Sahel,” West Africa Commission on Drugs, August 19, 2013, pages 8. (http://www.wacommissionondrugs. org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Challenging-the-Myth-of-theDrug-Terror-Nexus-in-the-Sahel-2013-08-19.pdf ) 120. Mamadou Tapily, Peter Walker, and Charlie English, “Mali attack: more than 20 dead after terrorist raid on Bamako hotel,” The Guardian (UK), November 20, 2015. (https://www. theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/20/mali-attack-highlightsglobal-spread-extremist-violence); Rukmini Callimachi and Nabih Bulos, “Mali Hotel Attackers Are Tied to an Algerian Qaeda Leader,” The New York Times, November 21, 2015. (https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/22/world/africa/mali-hotelattackers-are-tied-to-an-algerian-qaeda-leader.html) 121. Rukmini Callimachi and Sewell Chan, “Hostage Held by Al Qaeda in Mali for 5 Years Is Freed,” The New York Times, August 3, 2017. (https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/03/ world/africa/mali-stephen-mcgown-south-africa-al-qaeda. html?smid=tw-share) 122. Christina Anderson, “Former Hostage Held by Al Qaeda Describes 6-Year Ordeal in the Sahara,” The New York Times, September 24, 2017. (https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/24/ world/africa/sweden-mali-qaeda-gustafsson.html) 123. Under Secretary David Cohen, “Kidnapping for Ransom: The Growing Terrorist Financing Challenge,” Remarks at Chatham House, October 5, 2012. (https://www.treasury.gov/ press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1726.aspx) 124. Rukmini Callimachi, “Paying Ransoms, Europe Bankrolls Qaeda Terror,” The New York Times, July 29, 2014. (https:// www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/world/africa/ransoming-citizenseurope-becomes-al-qaedas-patron.html) 125. Doug Saunders, “Canada doesn’t negotiate with terrorists. Until it does,” The Globe and Mail (Canada), June 1, 2013. (https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/canada-doesntnegotiate-with-terrorists-until-it-does/article12293766/) 126. “Letter from Leaders of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb to a Sahara-Based Militant Commander,” The New York Times, July 29, 2014, page 4. (https://www.nytimes.com/ interactive/2014/07/29/world/africa/31kidnap-docviewer1.html) 127. Erik Alda and Joseph L Sala, “Links Between Terrorism, Organized Crime and Crime: The Case of the Sahel Region,” Stability International Journal of Security and Development, September 10, 2014. (http://www.stabilityjournal.org/ articles/10.5334/sta.ea/) 128. David Lewis and Adama Diarra, “Special Report: In the land of “gangster-jihadists,” Reuters, October 25, 2012. (http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mali-crisis-crimeidUSBRE89O07Y20121025)

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Endnotes 129. Rukmini Callimachi, “Paying Ransoms, Europe Bankrolls Qaeda Terror,” The New York Times, July 29, 2014. (https:// www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/world/africa/ransoming-citizenseurope-becomes-al-qaedas-patron.html) 130. Christina Schori Liang, “The Criminal-Jihadist: Insights into Modern Terrorist Financing,” Geneva Centre for Security Policy (Switzerland), August 2016, page 7. (http://www.gcsp.ch/ News-Knowledge/Publications/The-Criminal-Jihadist-Insightsinto-Modern-Terrorist-Financing) 131. Sergei Boeke, “Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Terrorism, insurgency, or organized crime?” Small Wars & Insurgencies, August 5, 2016, page 929. (http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/ pdf/10.1080/09592318.2016.1208280?needAccess=true) 132. Wolfram Lacher, “Organized Crime and Conflict in the Sahel-Sahara Region,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 13, 2012. (http://carnegieendowment. org/2012/09/13/organized-crime-and-conflict-in-sahel-sahararegion-pub-49360) 133. Bennett Seftel, “Mali’s Instability: Advantage, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,” The Cipher Brief, January 12, 2017. (https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/exclusive/africa/malisinstability-advantage-al-qaeda-islamic-maghreb-1089) 134. Australian National Security, “Al-Qa’ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM),” accessed October 23, 2017. (https:// www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/ Al-Qaida-in-the-Lands-of-the-Islamic-Maghreb.aspx) 135. United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “Traffickers and Terrorists: drugs and violent jihad in Mali and the wider Sahel,” October 2013, page 7. (https://www.gov. uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ file/256619/Oct_2013_Traffickers_and_Terrorists.pdf ) 136. Carley Petesch, “UN says drug trafficking is a growing problem in West Africa, as production of synthetic drugs and their use increases in the region,” Associated Press, March 2, 2016. (https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2016-03-02/ drug-trafficking-production-up-in-west-africa-un-says) 137. United Nations Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Sahel region,” June 14, 2013, page 3. (http://www.securitycouncilreport. org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2013_354.pdf ) 138. Zachary Laub and Jonathan Masters, “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 27, 2015. (https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-qaeda-islamic-maghreb) 139. Sanjay Badri-Maharaj, “Cocaine trafficking between Latin America and West Africa,” Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, January 2016. (http://www.idsa.in/africatrends/ the-cocaine-trafficking-between-latin-america-and-west-africa_ sbmaharaj_0316)

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140. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa: A Threat Assessment,” February 2013, pages 19-24. (http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-andanalysis/tocta/West_Africa_TOCTA_2013_EN.pdf ) 141. Francesco Strazzari, “Azawad and the rights of passage: the role of illicit trade in the logic of armed group formation in northern Mali,” Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (Norway), January 2015, pages 5-6. (http://www.clingendael. nl/sites/default/files/Strazzari_NOREF_Clingendael_Mali_ Azawad_Dec2014.pdf ) 142. Tim Gaynor and Tiemoko Diallo, “Al Qaeda linked to rogue aviation network,” Reuters, January 13, 2010. (http://www.reuters.com/article/us-drugs-security-aviationidUSTRE60C3E820100113) 143. Wolfram Lacher, “Challenging the Myth of the DrugTerror Nexus in the Sahel,” West Africa Commission on Drugs, August 19, 2013, pages 8-9. (http://www.wacommissionondrugs. org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Challenging-the-Myth-of-theDrug-Terror-Nexus-in-the-Sahel-2013-08-19.pdf ) 144. Financial Action Task Force, “Terrorist Financing in West and Central Africa,” October 2016, pages 21 and 42. (http:// www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/TerroristFinancing-West-Central-Africa.pdf ) 145. Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, “The Many Faces of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,” Geneva Centre for Security Policy (Switzerland), May 2011. (https://www.files. ethz.ch/isn/129338/GCSP%20Policy%20Paper%2015.pdf ); David O’Regan and Peter Thompson, “Advancing Stability and Reconciliation in Guinea-Bissau: Lessons from Africa’s First Narco-State,” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, June 2013, pages 4-5. (http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ SpecialReport-Guinea-Bissau-JUN2013-EN.pdf ) 146. Robin Yapp, “South American drug gangs funding alQaeda terrorists,” The Telegraph (UK), December 29, 2010. (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/southamerica/ colombia/8230134/South-American-drug-gangs-funding-alQaeda-terrorists.html) 147. United States Attorney’s Office, Southern District of New York, Press Release, “Malian Man Sentenced in Manhattan Federal Court to 57 Months in Prison for Conspiring to Provide Material Support to Terrorists,” March 12, 2012. (https:// www.justice.gov/archive/usao/nys/pressreleases/March12/ issaoumarsentencing.html) 148. Wolfram Lacher, “Organized Crime and Conflict in the Sahel-Sahara Region,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 13, 2012. (http://carnegieendowment. org/2012/09/13/organized-crime-and-conflict-in-sahel-sahararegion-pub-49360)

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Endnotes 149. Wolfram Lacher, “Challenging the Myth of the DrugTerror Nexus in the Sahel,” West Africa Commission on Drugs, August 19, 2013, pages 6-7. (http://www.wacommissionondrugs. org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Challenging-the-Myth-of-theDrug-Terror-Nexus-in-the-Sahel-2013-08-19.pdf ) 150. United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “Traffickers and Terrorists: drugs and violent jihad in Mali and the wider Sahel,” October 2013, page 6. (https://www.gov. uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ file/256619/Oct_2013_Traffickers_and_Terrorists.pdf ) 151. Sebastian Rotella, “U.S. prosecution links drugs to terrorism,” The Los Angeles Times, December 19, 2009. (http:// articles.latimes.com/2009/dec/19/nation/la-na-al-qaedacocaine19-2009dec19) 152. Ibid. 153. Anouar Boukhars, “The Drivers of Insecurity in Mauritania,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 30, 2012. (http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/04/30/drivers-of-insecurityin-mauritania-pub-47955) 154. David Lewis and Adama Diarra, “Special Report: In the land of “gangster-jihadists,” Reuters, October 25, 2012. (http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mali-crisis-crimeidUSBRE89O07Y20121025) 155. United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “Traffickers and Terrorists: drugs and violent jihad in Mali and the wider Sahel,” October 2013, page 6. (https://www.gov. uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ file/256619/Oct_2013_Traffickers_and_Terrorists.pdf ) 156. Afua Hirsch, “Cocaine flows through Sahara as al-Qaida cashes in on lawlessness,” The Guardian (UK), May 2, 2013. (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/02/cocaineflows-through-sahara-al-qaida) 157. United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “Traffickers and Terrorists: drugs and violent jihad in Mali and the wider Sahel,” October 2013, page 7. (https://www.gov. uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ file/256619/Oct_2013_Traffickers_and_Terrorists.pdf ) 158. Financial Action Task Force, “Terrorist Financing in West and Central Africa,” October 2016, pages 19-20. (http://www. fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Terrorist-FinancingWest-Central-Africa.pdf ) 159. Kathleen Caulderwood, “Drugs And Money In The Sahara: How The Global Cocaine Trade Is Funding North African Jihad,” International Business Times, June 5, 2015. (http://www. ibtimes.com/drugs-money-sahara-how-global-cocaine-tradefunding-north-african-jihad-1953419)

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160. Christina Schori Liang, “The Criminal-Jihadist: Insights into Modern Terrorist Financing,” Geneva Centre for Security Policy (Switzerland), August 2016. (http://www.gcsp.ch/NewsKnowledge/Publications/The-Criminal-Jihadist-Insights-intoModern-Terrorist-Financing) 161. “Libya: a growing hub for Criminal Economies and Terrorist Financing in the Trans-Sahara,” The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, May 11, 2015, page 3. (http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/ uploads/2015/05/2015-1.pdf ) 162. Francesco Strazzari, “Azawad and the rights of passage: the role of illicit trade in the logic of armed group formation in northern Mali,” Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (Norway), January 2015, pages 3-4. (http://www.clingendael. nl/sites/default/files/Strazzari_NOREF_Clingendael_Mali_ Azawad_Dec2014.pdf ) 163. Interview with RAND Senior Political Scientist Michael Shurkin, August 14, 2017. 164. Sebastian Rotella, “U.S. prosecution links drugs to terrorism,” The Los Angeles Times, December 19, 2009. (http:// articles.latimes.com/2009/dec/19/nation/la-na-al-qaedacocaine19-2009dec19) 165. David Lewis, “Al Qaeda’s richest faction dominant in north Mali: U.S.,” Reuters, July 26, 2012. (http://www.reuters.com/ article/us-mali-usa-africom-idUSBRE86P1IC20120726) 166. “Libya: a growing hub for Criminal Economies and Terrorist Financing in the Trans-Sahara,” The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, May 11, 2015, pages 1-2. (http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/ uploads/2015/05/2015-1.pdf ) 167. “Militants find sanctuary in Libya’s wild south,” Associated Press, July 13, 2017. (https://www.voanews.com/a/militants-findsanctuary-in-libya-wild-south/3942381.html) 168. Erik Alda and Joseph L Sala, “Links Between Terrorism, Organized Crime and Crime: The Case of the Sahel Region,” Stability International Journal of Security and Development, September 10, 2014. (http://www.stabilityjournal.org/ articles/10.5334/sta.ea/) 169. Wolfram Lacher, “Organized Crime and Conflict in the Sahel-Sahara Region,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 13, 2012. (http://carnegieendowment. org/2012/09/13/organized-crime-and-conflict-in-sahel-sahararegion-pub-49360) 170. “Libya: a growing hub for Criminal Economies and Terrorist Financing in the Trans-Sahara,” The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, May 11, 2015, page 3. (http:// globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/2015-1.pdf )

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Endnotes 171. Michael Duffy, “The Sahel, Libya, and the Crime-Terror Nexus,” Foreign Policy Journal, October 30, 2015. (http://www. foreignpolicyjournal.com/2015/10/30/the-sahel-libya-and-thecrime-terror-nexus/) 172. Colin Freeman, “Revealed: how Saharan caravans of cocaine help to fund al-Qaeda in terrorists’ North African domain,” The Telegraph (UK), January 26, 2013. (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/mali/9829099/Revealedhow-Saharan-caravans-of-cocaine-help-to-fund-al-Qaeda-interrorists-North-African-domain.html) 173. Wolfram Lacher, “Organized Crime and Conflict in the Sahel-Sahara Region,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 13, 2012. (http://carnegieendowment. org/2012/09/13/organized-crime-and-conflict-in-sahel-sahararegion-pub-49360) 174. Thomas Joscelyn, “Libya’s Terrorist Descent: Causes and Solutions,” FDD’s Long War Journal, September 27, 2016. (https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/09/libyasterrorist-descent-causes-and-solutions.php) 175. David Wood, “Libyan Weapons Arming Al Qaeda Militias Across North Africa, Officials Say,” The Huffington Post, February 21, 2013. (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/20/libyanweapons-al-qaeda-north-africa_n_2727326.html) 176. Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, “The Many Faces of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,” Geneva Centre for Security Policy (Switzerland), May 2011. (https://www.files.ethz. ch/isn/129338/GCSP%20Policy%20Paper%2015.pdf ) 177. General David M. Rodriguez, “Advance Policy Questions for General David M. Rodriguez, U.S. Army Nominee for Commander, U.S. Africa Command,” Senate Armed Services Committee, February 13, 2013, page 7. (https://www.armedservices.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Rodriguez%2002-14-13.pdf ) 178. Ibid. 179. “Rebel Forces in Northern Mali,” Conflict Armament Research and Small Arms Survey, April 2013. (http://www. conflictarm.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Rebel_Forces_ in_Northern_Mali.pdf ) 180. Financial Action Task Force, “Terrorist Financing in West and Central Africa,” October 2016, page 11. (http://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Terrorist-Financing-WestCentral-Africa.pdf ) 181. Erik Alda and Joseph L Sala, “Links Between Terrorism, Organized Crime and Crime: The Case of the Sahel Region,” Stability International Journal of Security and Development, September 10, 2014. (http://www.stabilityjournal.org/ articles/10.5334/sta.ea/) 182. Under Secretary David Cohen, “Confronting New Threats in Terrorist Financing,” Remarks before the Center for a New American Security, March 4, 2014. (https://www.treasury.gov/ press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2308.aspx) 22 | CSIF: Terror Finance Briefing Book

183. Francesco Strazzari, “Azawad and the rights of passage: the role of illicit trade in the logic of armed group formation in northern Mali,” Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (Norway), January 2015, page 7. (https://www.clingendael. nl/sites/default/files/Strazzari_NOREF_Clingendael_Mali_ Azawad_Dec2014.pdf ) 184. Ibid. 185. Hans-Jakob Schindler, “The United Nations View on al-Qaeda’s Financing Today,” How al-Qaeda Survived Drones, Uprisings, and the Islamic State, Ed. Aaron Y. Zelin, (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2017), page 89. (http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/ Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus153-Zelin.pdf ) 186. Australian National Security, “Al-Qa’ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM),” accessed October 23, 2017. (https:// www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/ Al-Qaida-in-the-Lands-of-the-Islamic-Maghreb.aspx) 187. Financial Action Task Force, “Terrorist Financing in West and Central Africa,” October 2016, pages 19-20. (http://www. fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Terrorist-FinancingWest-Central-Africa.pdf ) 188. U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2015: Chapter 6. Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” June 2016. (https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2015/257523.htm) 189. Financial Action Task Force, “Terrorist Financing in West and Central Africa,” October 2016, pages 23-4. (http://www. fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Terrorist-FinancingWest-Central-Africa.pdf ) 190. David Lewis and Adama Diarra, “Special Report: In the land of ‘gangster-jihadists,’” Reuters, October 25, 2012. (http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mali-crisis-crimeidUSBRE89O07Y20121025); Jason Howerton, “Radical Islamists in Mali recruit, pay for child soldiers,” Associated Press, October 3, 2012. (https://www.cbsnews.com/news/islamists-inmali-recruit-pay-for-child-soldiers/) 191. The World Bank, “GDP per capita (current US$),” accessed September 28, 2017. (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?end=2012&start=1960) 192. Francesco Strazzari, “Azawad and the rights of passage: the role of illicit trade in the logic of armed group formation in northern Mali,” Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (Norway), January 2015, page 8. (https://www.files.ethz.ch/ isn/192065/Strazzari_NOREF_Clingendael_Mali_Azawad_ Dec2014.pdf ) 193. Sergei Boeke, “Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Terrorism, insurgency, or organized crime?” Small Wars & Insurgencies, August 5, 2016, page 924. (http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/ pdf/10.1080/09592318.2016.1208280?needAccess=true)

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Endnotes 194. David Lewis and Adama Diarra, “Special Report: In the land of ‘gangster-jihadists,’” Reuters, October 25, 2012. (http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mali-crisis-crimeidUSBRE89O07Y20121025) 195. Juan Zarate, Treasury’s War, (New York: PublicAffairs, 2013), page 365. 196. Under Secretary David Cohen, “Kidnapping for Ransom: The Growing Terrorist Financing Challenge,” Remarks at Chatham House, October 5, 2012. (https://www.treasury.gov/ press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1726.aspx) 197. Thomas Joscelyn, “Analysis: Al Qaeda groups reorganize in West Africa,” FDD’s Long War Journal, March 13, 2017. (http:// www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/03/analysis-al-qaedagroups-reorganize-in-west-africa.php) 198. United Nations Security Council, “QDe.014 The Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb,” September 9, 2014. (https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1267/ aq_sanctions_list/summaries/entity/the-organization-of-al-qaidain-the-islamic) 199. Tim Cocks, “Boko Haram too extreme for ‘al Qaeda in West Africa’ brand,” Reuters, May 28, 2014. (http:// www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-bokoharam-analysisidUSKBN0E81D320140528) 200. U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2015: Chapter 6. Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” June 2016. (https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2015/257523.htm) 201. Bill Roggio, “Ansar al Shariah issues statement on US Consulate assault in Libya,” FDD’s Long War Journal, September 12, 2012. (http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/09/ ansar_al_shariah_issues_statem.php) 202. Under Secretary David Cohen, “Confronting New Threats in Terrorist Financing,” Remarks before the Center for a New American Security, March 4, 2014. (https://www.treasury.gov/ press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2308.aspx); U.S. Department of State, “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” accessed October 23, 2017. (https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm) 203. Christopher S. Chivvis and Andrew Liepman, “North Africa’s Menace: AQIM’s Evolution and the U.S. Policy Response,” RAND Corporation, 2013, page 6. (http://www.rand. org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR415/ RAND_RR415.pdf ) 204. Morten Boas, “Guns, Money and Prayers: AQIM’s Blueprint for Securing Control of Northern Mali,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, April 28, 2014. (https://ctc. usma.edu/posts/guns-money-and-prayers-aqims-blueprint-forsecuring-control-of-northern-mali)

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205. United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “Traffickers and Terrorists: drugs and violent jihad in Mali and the wider Sahel,” October 2013, page 6. (https://www.gov. uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ file/256619/Oct_2013_Traffickers_and_Terrorists.pdf ) 206. Under Secretary David Cohen, “Confronting New Threats in Terrorist Financing,” Remarks before the Center for a New American Security, March 4, 2014. (https://www.treasury.gov/ press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2308.aspx) 207. Ibid. 208. Rukmini Callimachi and Martin Vogl, “Candy, cash -- alQaida implants itself in Africa,” Associated Press, December 4, 2011. (http://archive.boston.com/news/world/africa/articles/2011/12/04/ candy_cash____al_qaida_implants_itself_in_africa/) 209. Wolfram Lacher, “Organized Crime and Conflict in the Sahel-Sahara Region,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 13, 2012. (http://carnegieendowment. org/2012/09/13/organized-crime-and-conflict-in-sahel-sahararegion-pub-49360)