ForeienAffairs - The Retum of AuthoritarianGreatPowers- Azar Gat
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FOREIGN AFFAIRS
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'I'he Return ofAuthoritariau
Orirt Powers
F.om Foreign ljlarirs , July/Ausust 2oo7 Summary:Liberaldemooacy,l€dby the UnitedStates,hay haveenergedtiumpha.t{rom the sreatstrusslesofthe twentiethcentury. lut the post-coldwar rise ofe@nomically su@sstul - and nondenooatic - Chinaand Ru$ia nry relresent a viable altemativelath to moderniry that leavesliberal democracl's ultimate victory and future doninmce in doubt. Azot catX Erer Weir on Protssor o/Notional Secu.ity otTel Autu Uniuetsity ond the outhor oJ War in Human Ciuilbation. THE E NDO F T HEEN DOTH IS T O R Y Today'stlobal lib€ral democrancorder facestwo challentes.The firet is radical islam - and it is the l€ser of the tho challengs. Although the proponentsof radi@l Islam find lib€ral d€mocracfrepugnant,and the mov€mentb often d$cribed as the new fascist th!€at, the societi€ from which it a.is€sa!€ generallypoor and sta&ant. They representno viable alternativ€to modernity and poseno world.lt is mainlythepotentialuee of w€aponsofmassd$truction -. paticularlyby significantmilitarythr€atto the developed nonstateactors- that males nilitant lslam a rnenac€. gleatpowers:theW$t's old ColdWar rivals from the riseof nond€mocratic Thesecond,and moresitnificlnt, challeryeemanates Autho.ita.iancapitalistg!€atpowers Chinaand Ru$ia,now op€ratintunde!autholitariancapitalist,raiherthancoinmunist,regim€s. playeda leadiryrolein the internationals)€temup until 1948.Theyhavebe€nabsentsincelhen.But today,th€yseempobedfor a
but the curr€ntpredominance of democracy ascendancy allears io b€ deeplyentrenched, couldbefar lesssecure. Capitalism's relentlessly sinceearlymodernity,itslower-pric€d Capit lism hasexpanded roodsandsuperioreconomicpowerercdinr and by Karl M6rxin Th€ comDunistManifesto. r€dm€s,a proc$s mostnemomblydescfibed transformiryall othefsocioeconomic capitalismhadthesameeff€cton communism,eventually "burying"it withoutthe prov€rbialshot Contraryto Marx'saypectations, revolution,ledto the rhe of lhe beingfir€d.Thetriumphofth€ msrlet, llecipitatingandr€inforcedby th€ ind$trial-t€chnoloSical the emeEence of masssocie$,and evergeater affluence.In the posG middleclasr,int€Bive ulbanizition,the spreadof education, naturallyemeryed ColdWar €rs (jst asin the nineteenthcenturyandthe 195osand 196os),it i6widelybelievedthat liberaldemocracy by FlancisFulruyama. Today,moreth.n halfofthe world'sst6t€shaveelected fom th€s developments, a viewfamouslyespoused rovernments,and clo€€to half havesufiiciently entr€nchedlib€ral riSht! to be conside.edfully fr€e. especially ove!its nondemocratic calitalistrivalsofthe two orld wars,Germanyand Butth€ realonsforthetriunph ofd€moc.acy, Authoritariancapitalbtstater,todayexemplifiedbychina and Russia,nay Japan,w€lemorecontinSent thanis usudllyassum€d. .epreseota viable alternativelath to moderity, which in tum suggeststhat there is nothing inevitable about libefal d€nocracy's ultinate victoN-' or futuredominance. CHRONICLE ORA DEFEATNOTFORETOLD The liberal democraticcampde{eaiedjt-sauthoritarian, fascist,and @mmunist rivals alike in all of the three hajor Ereat-lowe. sFugglesof the t$ enti.th ceotury .. the two iorld wars ed the ColdWar. In tlying to determine exactlywhat a@unted for this decisiveoutcone, it is temptinS to trace it to the specialtraits and intlinsic advantaEeof lib€ral democracy. internationalconduct.Perhaps theymorethar conpensatefor cafying a lighterstickabroad is democracies Onelosible advantage hith a Breate.abilit to elicit intemational coope.ationthrouShthe bonds and discilljne of the global mrrket system.This explanation is probably@uect for the Cold War, when a B.eatlyexpandedglobal economywasdominatedby the democraticpowers,bui it doesnot apply to the two $odd ware.Nor is it true that liberal demdacis succeedb€caus they alwayscling together.Again, this was true, at leastasa confibuting factor, during the Coldwar, when the democraticcapita]istcampkept its unity, where$ grcaing antaaoniso betweenthe SovietUnion and China puled the onmunist bloc alart. Durins World War I, however,the ideolo8icaldivide betweenthe two sidessas much les clear.The Anglo-Frenchalliancewasfar frcm prerdainedt it wd aboveall a function of balanceof poser calculationsrather than liberal c@pelation. At the closeof the ninet€enthcenturJ,power politics had brought the United Kingdom and Fldce, bitterly altagonistic countries,to the brinl of s ar and promlted the Unjted Kingdon to activelyseekan alliancewith Cemany. Libe.al ltaly's b.eak from th€ Tnlle Aliance andjoiniry of the Entente,despiteits rilalry with France,was a tunction of the AnsloFrenchaliance, as Italy's peniisular location madeit haaldous for the country to be on a side opposedto the lesding naritine po{er of the time, rhe United Kngdon. Similarl, dunns World Wa. Il, Fmnceaas quickly ile{eatedand taken out of the Allies side fwhich $?s to include nondemocraticSovietRussia),wheHs the risht wing totalitarian pos ers fouSht on the sane side. Studiesof
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democracies'alliancebehalior swgest that democraticregimessho$ no greatertendencyto stick togetherthd other t)"es of resimes. No. did the totalitarian €pitalist resimeslose world war ll becausetheir demooatic oppon€ntsheld a mo.al hisb sround that inslhed sreat€rdertion from theirpeople,astbe historianRi.hdd O!r.yand otherehaveclaimed.Durinsthe 19303andearly194os,fascisn and Nazismwere excitins new idelogies thai Eeneratedna$ive polular enthciasn, whereasdemodacy stood on the idelosical defensive, appearinsold and dispirited.If anrthins,the fascisteginesprorednore inslirin8 in wartjne thaDtheir democratic ofthei. militariesis widelyjudgedtoha\€beensupcfior. adveNaries, andthebattlelieldperformance Uberal dem@racy'ssupposedlyinherent econonic advantageis alsofar les clea! than is often sslmed. All of the bellige.entsin the n!€ntieth century'sgreat stfu€glcsprclcd hishly efiectivein producint for war. During World War I, semiautocraticGermany comminedits resourcesas etrectivelyN its democraticrivals did. After early victolies in world War ll, Nazi Ge.manys ecoDomic mobilization and rnilitary prcduction prord lu during the critjcal years1940-42.wel posiiioned at tbe time to tunclanentallr slter the tlobal balaDceof power by destroyinsthe Soriet Union md straddling all of continental Europe,Germanyfailed be@useits arned forceswere meaterly suppliedfor tbe task. The reasonsfor this deficie.cy .emain a natter of historical debate,bui one of thc problems ras the djstence of comletios cente6 of authorit' in the Nazisystem,in which Hitlels "divide and rule" tactic and Party guardintoftheir dsisneddomainsbadachaoticefrect.Fulthermore,flon the fall of Francein,Iune1940to the functionanes'jealous Ieliry in GelmaDythat the war hadpracticallybeenson. cermansetbackbeforeMoscowin D.cenber 1941,tberewas! widesp.ead All the sane,from 1942onna.d (by$hich tine is nas toolate),G€rmmyEreatlyintensifiedits economicmobilizationandcauShtu! its productionvoluhe the liberaldenocracies in termsofthe shar€ofGDPdevotedto the wa. (aLthoush with andevensurpassed of economicnobilizntionin inpetial Japanandthe renainedmuchlowerthanthat ofthe massiveU.S.econon)1.Likewise,levels SovietUnion exceededthoseof the United Statesand the United Kjnsdom thanlG to .ulhless efrorts that weredi.ectly Onb durint tbe CotdWardid the Solietcommandeconomyeihibit deepenintstructuralweakneses- weakn€ss€s staS$of for the SovietUnion'sdo{nfall.The Sovietststen h.d successfully responsible teneratedthe eldy andintermediata ai the .etimentalDedt€chniques of massproductiondurint wofldWar indBi.ialization(albeitat a frithtfut humancost)andexcelled it provedill equipped ofthe Byslen'srigidityandlackof inc€ntives, ll. tt alsokept abreastmilitarilyduringthe Coldwar- aut because dndlhe damandsofthe informatjona8€andtlobalizrtion. sta86 ofdev€lopment to coDewith the advanced that the toialitariancatitalislrcgimesof NaziG€lmanyand imperialJapanwouldhavep.oved Theleis no rcason,how€v€r,to suppose that favo.itismand unaccountabilityVpisllyc.eatein hadtheysu8n€d. The inefiici€ncics inferio!economically to the democ.acics the rishF of their moreefflcientcapitalisteconomies, suchr€gim€smigbthavebeenoffseiby hither levelsol socialdiscipline.Eecause to the liberaldemocraciesthln the sovietUniondid; Nazi winarotalitarianDowerscouldha\econstituted.mor€viablechallenge not Geiinanywasj udsedro be sucha chall€nreby the Alliedpowersbefo.eanddurjnsWorldw.r Il.The libemldemocracicsdid possess overc€rmanyintermsofeconomicandt€chnolotic0ldevelotment,sstheydid in r€lationto tbeir oth$ an inher€ntadvantage
They arediffe.entfor eachtypeof adversary. win the treat struttlesof lh€ th€ntiethcentury?Thereasons Sowhy did the deDocracies CernanyandJalan,in wsr becs$ecermanyandJapansere medium-sized theh nondemocratic copitslistadverearies, defeated ba*s andtheycameup againstthefar superior- but hardlypreordain€d countrieswith limit€dresource - €conomic8nd military coalitionofrhe dcmocrsricpowersand Russiao.the SovieiUoion.Th€defealofcommunism,howev€r,hadmuchmo.elo do $ilh world - poss$s€dmuchSfeater !o includenost of the dev€loped strucruralfacroN.Thecapitalistcamp- whichafter1945expanded p.eventedth€n from tuuy of the communisteconomi€s economic Dowerthanthe communistbloc,andthe inh€rentin€fficiency the SovietUnionand Chinaeere lary€randthushadth€ potential Esourcesandcatchingup to the West.Togeth€r, exploiringtheirvast their e@nomicsyst€ms limitedthem,where.s capitllistcamp.Uhimately,theyfailedbecause to'benorc poe.ertulthanthe democratic playeda decisii'e b€cause theyweretoo small.ContinEency the nondemocraric calii.list powers,GermanyandJlpan, weredefeated capitalistpowersand in falor ofthe d€moc.acies. rolein tipling thebalanceatainstthe nondem@ratic AMERICANf,XCEPTION The most decisiveelenenr of continsencywasthe United State. -{fter all, it sas liltle mofe than a chanc€of histo.y that the scionof exlDndaqoss Anslo,saxonliberalhmwouldsprouton the othersideof theAtlantic,institutionalize heriiasesith iodependence, 'ts inmigraiionf.om Eurole,ands crete on a oneof the nosr habitableandthiniy populatedterrito.iesin lhe world,feedoffof masive ofecononicand nililary night. A liberalre8imeaod scalewhat$?s -- andstillis - by far the worlds largestcon@ntration continental of its attractivenesto otherstructuraltraitshada lor to do with the UnitedStates€conomicsucces,andevenwith its size,because imnigrants. But the Unjted Stateswould scecely haveachi6'ed suchsreatnessbad it not beenlocatedin a larticula.ly advantag€ols And location,of ofCnnadr,AusEalia,and Newz€alanddemonstrate. niche,asthe .ounterexamples andv;$ ecolosicllgeographic conditionamongnany for bringint aboutthe Eiantand,indeed,UnitedStatcsasthe course,althoughcrucial,wasbut onenecessary DaramountDoliti@lfad of ihe twentieth @ntury, Contingencywas at least d responsibleas liberalisn for the United Statcs emergence io the New World ard, hence,fo. its later ability to rescuethe Old Wo.ld. Throughourthe twentieth century,the United States'power ensistentl)_surlassedthat of ihe next two sbongeststatescombine4 and this decisivelytilted the global balanceof posrr in favor of whicherer side Washinstonwason. If any factor gavcthe liberal democraciesthei! edge,it wasaboveaI the existenceof the United Statesrather than any inherent adEDtage.In fact, had it not been for the United States,liberal dem@racynay well hale lost the sreat stru8glesof the twentieth century. This is a soberingthougtrtthat is often oredookedin studiesof the spreadof d.nocracy in the tr€ntieth century, and it nakes the world today aPPearnuch more conringentand tenuousttEn linear theorje of developmentsugset. If it werenot for the U.S.factor, the judgment of later seaerations on libml dem@racys ould probably haveechoedthe negatile rcrdict o. democracy'sperfornan.e, i$ued by the foudh entury Bc
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Creek, in the \€ke of AtheN' defeatin the PeloponnesianWar. THENEW SECOND WORLD But the audit of war is, of course,not the o.ly one that sdieties - democraticdd nondememtic - underyo. Onemust ask how the totaljtarie capitalist powerswould haveddeloped had they not beendefeatedby war. Would ther $ith time and further developnent, haveshedtheir former idenhty and embracedliberal d€mocracy,astbe fomer @nmunist resjDq of eastemEurole eventuallydid? was the capitalist iDdustdal stateof imperial Germanybefo.e Wodd war I ultifrately boring to|ard increasint pdliamentary control and democratization?Or would it havedevelopedinto an authoritarian oligarchic regime,dominatedby an alliancebetweenthe oflicialdom, the arned forces,and industry, as inperial Jalan did (in spite of the latter's liberal interlude in the 192os)?bberalization seemse\en more doubtful in the ose of Nazi Ge.manyhad jt susived, let alonet.iuhphed. Becauseall thesemajor bistoriol experineDt6we.e cut short by war, the answersto the* questiom remain a matter of speculation.But perhapsthe
[email protected] of other authorjtarjan capit.list regimessince 1945can offer a clue. Studiesthat corc!this periodshowihatdemocfacies senerallyoutdoothersrstemsecononically.Autboritarianc.pitalistrctimesareat leasrd successtul'- if not mofe so - in the ca.ly stasesof delelopfrent, but they tend to demo$atize after crossint a .erlajn ihreshold This s€eN to havebe€na.ecurinS lattern in EastAsia,southernEurope,and LatinAmerica. of economicandsocialderclopment. pattemsfiom these{indings,ho|ever, maI be misleading, beausetbesampleser .bout development Theattemprto d.awconclusions pull exededby the UnitedStatesandthe libe.alhetemonyhasbent itselfmaybe polluted.Since1945,the eno.mousSrar'itatiohal pare.nsof dselopment$oddhide. Because th€iotalitarianc.litalist greatpowers,Germany.nd Japan,w€recrush€din war,andthesecounrieswer€subsequently that to a sseepiryrstructuring anddemocfatiation.Consequently, smallercountries threatened by Soliet!owe., theylent themselves cho* capjtohsm overcommunismhad no rival politicll and economicmodelto €mulateand no posertulinternationalplayersto turn probablyhrd ss mucbio countri$' erentualdemocratization to orherthanth€ lberal denocranccamp.Thse smalland medium-sized do with the oi'emhelmint influenc€of the Westemlib€ral hetemony as $ith internal processes.Presently,Singalore is the onlX reSime,and €!€nit islilelyto ch.nte economythat still maintainsa semiauthoritarian examplcofa counrrysirh a rrulydevelop€d gr€atpoworsthat prole resista.tto the undei rhemfluenceofthe liberalorder$ithin whichit ope.ales.But areSingapore-like influenceof this orderpo$ible? ofnondemo$aticdants,sboveall formedycommunistand booming Thequestionis nade relevantby the lecentemertenc€ authoritarian capiralhtChina.Russia,too,j! retrestintfrom its postcomnunistliberalismandassumintan increasintlylutbofito.ian throuth a liberaldemocracies character a! it! economicclout8rois. Someb€lievethatthesecountri€scouldultimatelyb€come th€y m.y haveenou8hBeishtlocreate incr€asin8 afilu€nce, andouLrideinfluenc€.Aitemotively, ofintemal development, combination S€condWorld.Theycouldestablish a potr€rfulautho.ita.iancapitalistorderthat but economically edvanced a newnondemoc.atic in th€ tlobal economyon its andthe militaryjthat is nationalhtin orientatjonrandthat participates alliesloliticalelites,industrialists, ownterms,asimperialOermanyand imp€rialJsPandid creat6 p!€surs for democratization that an authoritarianstat€structure It is hidely cont€nded that economicandsociald€velopm€nt stateg mayb€ ableto excelin massmanufactu.intbut not in the sdvanced cannorconrain.rh€rei6 slsotheviewthat 'clos€dsocieties" the datasetis incomplete. lnperial and NaziCermlnystoodat of rheinformarioneconoDy.Thejury on theseissuesh still out,becsuse the fofefront o{ rbe advancedscientincand manufactu.inSeconomiesof their tines, but somewould arguethat th€i! succ€ssno longer NondcnogaticSingatoreh.s a hit hly successful informalion the information€conomyis muchmorediversified. aDDlies because not a bit coun!ry.lt h'ill takea lonttime beforeChinarsches the sta8ewhenthe possibilityof rsa ciry-state, ei;nomy,but Sinsapore stat€wilh an ad!€ncedcapitalilteconomycanbetested.Allthat canbe saidatthe momentis that thereis nothint in an authorit&.ian whe.easthereis a the historiql recordto sutgestthat a t.ansitionto demeracyby today'sauthoritariaocalitalistpoNersb inevitable, gre&tdealto suggest that suchpowelshavefar greate!eonomic and militalypoteotiallhan theircornmunistpredee$orsdid. Chim and Rusia repr€senta return of econonically successtulauthoritarian capitalist powere,which haveb€enahsentsincethe defeat of cernany and Japan in r94s, but th€y a.e much larSerthan the l.tter tlro countriesevertler€ Althoush Gernany wasonly a medium-sizedcountry unconfortably squeezedat the centerof Euro!€, it twice nearlybrol€ out of its confinesto becomea true world poser on accountof its econonicand militaryniSbt.In r94r,Japanwasstill behindthe l€adinssreatpo$ersin lermsofeconomic developm€nt,but its B.osth rate since 1913had beenthe highestin the world. UltiDately, ho{eve., both Gernany and Japanwer€too small -- in terns of polulation, r*ourcs, and potential -. to tak€ on the United States.?re6ent'dayChina,on the other hand, is the playerin theinremationalsl stem in termsotpopulationandis experiencing slectaculareconomicgrosth. ByshiftingfroD Larsest Chioahasssitchedro a far mo.eefficientbrandof authoritdidisn. As ChinarapidlynaFo$sthe econonic @mmunbo to caDjralism. sap with lhe devei;!€d {orld, the possibility looms that it will becomea true althoritarian supellos er. Evenin irs curcnt bastioosin the West,the liberal lolitical and e.onomic cosensus is wlnerable to uoforeseendevelopnents,suchas a crushingeconomiccrisis that could disrupt the slobal Eadint systemor a r$lrgenc€ of ethnic atrife in a Europeincreasinglytroubled by immEration and erhnic minorities. We.e the West to be hit by suchupheavals,support for liberal democmcyin Asia, Latin ADerica, and Aftica -. shere adherenceto that mod€l is mo.e recent,incon!]€te, and insecure- could be shake.. A successlulnondenocratic Secondworld could then be regardedby many asan attlactive alternatile to liberal democracy IOR DEMOCRACY r/L{KINCTHEWORLDSA-FE
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Althoush the rise of authoritarian calitalist great powerswould not ne@$anly bad to a nondemocraticheg€monyor a Mr, it midt imply that the neartotal domindce of liberal dem@racysincethe SovietUnion's collaps€will be shortlived and that a univ€rsl "democ.aticpeace"is still far off The new authoritarian capitalist poweN could b@me aBd€eplyintesrated into the rorld eonoDy as iDpe.ial ce.many and inperial Jape rere and not cbooseto pursueautarky, asNazi Germanyand the communistbloc did. A Breatlower China may alsob€ l€$ rdisionist than the tenitoriary confined Cermanyand Japanwe.e (although Russia,which is still reeling iiom havinSlGt an emlire, is morelikely to tend toward revisionism).StiI, Be!in8, Moscow,and their future followers miSht wel be on antatonistic t€ms with the denogatlc countdes,with all the potential fo. supicion, iNecurity, and conflict that this entails -. while holdiry considerablymo.e power than any of the democracies'past rirals everdid. Sodos the sreater po*er potstial of authoritarian @pitalism meanthat the traNforDation of the forme. communistareat powe.s may ultinately prove to havebeena netative dselolment for Slobaldenocmcy?It is too early to tell. Econonically, the liberalization of the former conmunGt countd€s hassiven the slobal econohy a bemendousboost, and the.e mar be more in stote. But the possibility of a nove towa.d prct€ctionism by them in the future also ne€dsto be ta\en into accomt .- and asiduousty avoided.It was, afte. att, the lrospect of gr@ing prctectionisn in the wodd economyat th€ tum of the twentieth century and the protectionistl€Dt of the 193osthat helpedradicali?4the noddem@ratic@pitalist posers of the time and p.ecipitate both wo.ld wars. On the positir€ side for the d€nocracies,the collaFe of the SovietUnion and its enpire stlipped Moscowof about half tbe resourcesit commandeddurint the ColdWar, with easternEuropeabsorb€dby a trcat\ expandeddemocmticEurope.This is perhapsth€ most sirnificant chansein the rlobal balanceof power sincethe forc€d postuar democraticreorientatjon of Cemany and Jalan under U.S. tutelage.Moreoler, China may still ev€ntuallydemocratize,and Russiecould relerse its drift awayfrom democracy.rf Chinaand Russia do not becomedemocr.tic, it will be critical that India .emain so,both becauseof its {ital role in balanciq China and beau* of the modelthat it representsfor other deleloPint countries. But th€ most important fector renains the United Stat€!. For all the criticisD leveledatainst it, the United States-- and its alliancewith Europe- standsasthe sintle molt impotant ho?€for th€ future of tibelal democ.acy.Despiteits probl€Insand weakn$ses,the United States6till commanib a Slobalpffitio. ofstren$h and ts likely to r€tain it ei€n as the autho tarian capltalist poweN 8row. Not only are its cDP and prcductiviB' grolrth ret€ th€ high$t in the dev€lopedsorld, but ss an immiSrant country with about one-fourth the population d€nsity ofboth th€ Eulope6n Union and Chinaand one-tenthofthat ofJapan and India, the United Stat€sstill has considerablepot€niial to grow - both economicallyand in term! of lopulation - whereasthose others are all experiencint atiry and, China'seconomicSrorth rateis amongthe hithestin th€world,andd!€n th€ couniry'shute uhimately,shrinkingpopulatjons, population and still low levelsof d€velolm€nt, luch groMh harborsthe most radical potential for chanre in dobal power relatioG. But evenif China'ssulerior gro{th rate p€rsist! and it! CDPsurpa$$ that of the United Statesby the 2o2os, asis often fo.€csst,Chinawill still havejust overon€-thirdof the UnitedStatesw€ahhper c.pit! and,h€nce,coftiderablyle6seconomicand militarypower.closin8 that far more challentint gap with the d€velop€dworld sould t lc sevelsl morc
[email protected], CDPalone is lno(n to b€ a poor mealure of a countryrslorrcr, snd evokint it to celebrateChlna'sasc€nd€ncyis highly misleadinS.A! it wasdurint the twentieth century,rhe U.S.factor remainsthe Sreat€stguerente€thst liberal democracywil not be thrown on the defensiveand rel€$ted !o a wlnerablepositionon the perilheryofthe intefnationalsyst€m.
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