Delhi Police - Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative

Political control over the Delhi Police – a policy position

23/1/2014

Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative The recent protest staged by the Delhi Chief Minister Arvind Kejriwal has brought up the question of legitimate political control over the Delhi Police. Whether it is the centre or the state government that has control, the nature of political control over the police must be defined and delineated with proper checks and balances. As an organization working on the subject of police reforms for more than a decade now, the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI) provides a brief policy position for a better understanding of what is needed to move ahead on this important issue. The current position 

Article 239AA of the Constitution of India designates the Lieutenant Governor as the administrator of Delhi.



Article 239AA 3(a) of the Constitution of India does not give the Legislative Assembly of Delhi power to make laws on policing and public order. This power lies with the Parliament of India.



Section 4 of the Delhi Police Act 1978 vests the superintendence of the police in the administrator, thus by law, the superintendence of the Delhi Police comes under the Lieutenant Governor.

CHRI supports the demand to bring the Delhi Police under the supervision of the state government as a way to bring in more localized accountability. This will require amendments to the above provisions. Importantly, the precise roles of the political executive and the police chief in overseeing the police have to be defined in law. The role of the Security Commission A Security Commission has been established for Delhi and began meeting in 2012. This is a bi-partisan body that is to make broad policy towards better policing, frame performance indicators, evaluate police performance yearly, and help the police to prepare state and district level policing plans against which to assess police performance. This is a body designed to prevent illegitimate political interference in policing by giving the political executive a legitimate and delineated role in overseeing policing. 23, January, 2014

B-117, Sarvodaya Enclave, New Delhi – 110017. www.humanrightsinitiative.org

Page 1

The Security Commission is made up of: 

Lieutenant Governor (LG), Delhi - Chairperson



Chief Minister



Leader of Opposition in the Delhi Legislative Assembly



Joint Secretary in charge of the UT Division, MoHA



Commissioner of Police – Secretary / Convenor



Five Independent Members selected by the Administrator from a panel prepared by the Search Committee constituted for the purpose by the Administrator

A clear transparent list of who the independent members is not available anywhere. Through RTI requests, we have collected names of individuals who have been present as independent members in some of the Commission meetings: 

Ms. Renana Jhabwala, National Coordinator, SEWA



Professor Shyam B. Menon, Vice Chancellor, Bharat Ratna Dr. B.R. Ambedkar University



Retired Justice C.K. Mahajan



Professor Najeeb Jung, Vice Chancellor, Jamia Millia Islamia University1



Mr .Praveen Swami, Deputy Editor, The Hindu

The SSC has held a total of 5 meetings since 2012. This is hardly enough for a body with as wide a mandate as the SSC. Through the CM’s presence on the SSC, the Delhi government can hugely influence and shape policing orientation, priorities, and planning in Delhi. It is not that at present, the Delhi government has no access to policy making or provisioning the police to make it effective. The role of the SSC needs to be highlighted and its potential understood in the ongoing debate.

1

Mr. Najeeb Jung was appointed as an independent member to the Security Commission during the tenure of the last Lieutenant Governor (LG). Mr. Jung is now the LG himself and thereby the Chair of the Commission and no longer an independent member. There is a need to clarify these changes. 23, January, 2014


Page 2

Suggested model for the police-politician relationship Control over the police becomes a source of tremendous power that can be misused to serve partisan interests. Balancing these conflicting ideas of how the control is exercised and the type of relationship that should exist between the police and the political executive will lead to an accountable and transparent police service. The need is to lay down with precision the powers of the Minister-in-charge (or the Administrators in Union Territories) on one hand and the police chief on the other, the scope of directions that can be given from the political executive to the police chief and importantly those that cannot, identify processes to be followed and the consequences for when they are not followed. In this modelling the political executive retains its supremacy of supervision and control while the police have “operational responsibility”, rather than being 'independent' or 'autonomous' (words that do not have good connotations in a democracy when referring to a coercive force). We urge that the model for policing explained below is widely circulated, discussed and put into effect. This modelling is not in law or policy anywhere in the country. CHRI has consistently advocated that this formulation should be written into state and central Police Acts. If the Delhi Police were brought under the Delhi government, the framework would be2: 1. The Commissioner of Police shall be responsible to the Minister in charge for: a. Carrying out the functions and duties of the Police; b. The general conduct of the Police; c. The effective, efficient, and economical management of the Police; d. Tendering advice to the Minister in charge; e. Giving effect to any lawful directions. 2. The Commissioner of Police shall not be responsible to, and must act independently of, the Minister in charge regarding: a. The maintenance of order in relation to any individual or group of individuals; and b. The enforcement of the law in relation to any individual or group of individuals; and c. The investigation and prosecution of offences; and d. Decisions about individual Police officers.

2

If this were to apply to a state police force, the terminology would apply to the Director General of Police as the police chief and the Minister-in-charge. 23, January, 2014


Page 3

3. The Minister in charge may give the Commissioner directions on matters of Government policy that relate to a. The prevention of crime; b. The maintenance of public safety; c. The delivery of police services; and d. General areas of law enforcement. 4. No direction from the Minister in charge to the Commissioner of Police may have the effect of requiring the non-enforcement of a particular area of law. 5. The Minister in charge must not give directions to the Commissioner of Police in relation to the following: a. Enforcement of the criminal law in particular cases and classes of cases b. Matters that relate to an individual or group of individuals c. Decisions on individual members of the police 6. If there is dispute between the Minister in charge and the Commissioner of Police in relation to any direction under this section, the Minister in charge must, as soon as practicable after the dispute arises, a. Provide that direction to the Commissioner of Police in writing; and b. Publish a copy in the Gazette; and c. Present a copy to the Legislature *** For more information, please contact: Vidya Venkat Media and Communications Officer Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative B-117 Sarvodaya Enclave, New Delhi-17 +91 (011) 43180224. www.humanrightsinitiative.org twitter.com/chri_int

The Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative is an international NGO with a mandate from the Commonwealth of Nations and consultative status at the United Nations, working toward the practical realisation of human rights in the countries of the Commonwealth.

23, January, 2014


Page 4