these articles is to be placed usefully in the context of the work done by social scientists. Typically, students of the
This Journal is also published in French under the title Revue internationale des sciences sociales.
Topics of recent issues: Towards a policy for social research (vol. X X I I , no. 2) Trends in legal learning (vol. X X I I , no. 3) Controlling the h u m a n environment (vol. X X I I , no. 4) of forthcoming issues: Computers and documentation in the social sciences Regional variations in nation-building Race relations
U R A vi ft
international social science Journal volume XXIII
1971
unesco, pans
international social science journal
Vol. XXIII, N o . I, 1971
Published quarterly by Unesco
Understanding aggression Lionel Tiger Robert Bigelow José M . R . Delgado David A . H a m b u r g Robert A . Hinde Ole R . Holsti N . A . Kovalsky T . Adeoye L a m b o Jane van LawickGoodall Shib K . Mitra Philippe Ropartz
Editorial Introduction Relevance of ethology to h u m a n aggressiveness The neurological basis of violence Recent research on hormonal factors relevant to h u m a n aggressiveness The nature and control of aggressive behaviour Crisis, stress and decision-making Social aspects of international aggression Aggressiveness in the h u m a n life cycle within different socio-cultural settings S o m e aspects of aggressive behaviour in a group of free-living chimpanzees Group aggression and research on violence Aggressive behaviour and social behaviour in animals
7 9 18 27 36 48 53 68 79 89 98
104
Professional and documentary services Items and announcements N e w periodicals Approaching international conferences Documents and publications of the United Nations and Specialized Agencies Books received
113 116 131 138 150
Opinions expressed in signed articles are those of the authors and d o not necessarily reflect the views of Unesco. Permission for the reproduction of articles appearing in this Journal can be obtained from the Editor. Correspondence arising from this Journal should be addressed to: The Editor, International Social Science Journal, Unesco, Place de Fontenoy, 75 Paris-7e. Editor: Peter Lengyel Printed by Imprimerie Chaix-Desfosses, Paris © Unesco 1971 Printed in France SHC.70/I.96/A
understanding aggression
Editorial
The present issue of the Journal is devoted to the work of an interdisciplinary meeting on the implications of recent scientific research on the understanding of h u m a n aggressiveness, held at Unesco Headquarters from 19 to 23 M a y 1970. The majority of the following articles are versions of papers originally presented at the meeting, while those by J. M . R . Delgado, N . A . Kovalsky and J. van Lawick-Goodall were subsequently prepared specially for this issue and in part are based on their oral contributions to the discussions. The introduction by Lionel Tiger, likewise a participant, attempts to s u m u p the work of the meeting, at the same time giving some of the author's o w n views on the subject at hand.
7
Lionel Tiger
Introduction
The articles in the present issue of the International Social Science Journal were the basis and in part the result of Unesco 'sfirstmajor effort to understand the causes and processes of h u m a n aggressiveness. Perhaps more significant than the factual and theoretical contents of the articles is their origin. N o t only d o they represent w o r k from a number of very different national backgrounds, but of scientific disciplines as well. Thus an expert on the role of the sense of smell in aggressive interactions of small m a m m a l s w a s able to enter into discussion with an art historian w h o outlined the relevance of sculpture and painting for stimulating and recording aggressiveness; an analyst of hostility a m o n g chimpanzees joined a colleague concerned with the effect of stress on the performance of h u m a n politicians at times of aggressive crisis; a neurophysiologist w h o probes the h u m a n brain with electrodes encountered an expert on the interactions of small groups of people. It need not be disrespectful to participants—of which this writer was one—to say that thefirstmajor topic of discussion and one which involved m u c h heat (and aggressive emotionality) also belongs a m o n g the most tediously overdiscussed issues in the social sciences: is aggressiveness learned or is it instinctive? This was the obviously predictable outcome of a situation where biological and cultural scientists were brought together in the same room. W h a t could not have been predicted w a s the extent of both reconciliation and intellectual reconstruction which was possible in the course of any given session. Individually, participants apparently gained new insights, and collectively this w a s perhaps matched by the realization of some real measure of mutual comprehension, the suspension, if not shedding, of some professional biases, the extension of personal brain w o r k to encompass annoying data and, not insignificantly, the establishment of patterns of personal goodwill a m o n g participants, if only as a tacit recognition of their individual commitment as h u m a n beings to controlling aggressiveness. The issue was clarified as a result of the presentation of various positions on the nature-nurture question as well as the ensuing discussion: it became clear that n o complex animal, including m a n , could exist without some basic biological endowment which included behavioural predispositions, or without some extensive social experience which included formal and informal learning.
9 Int. Soc. Sd. /., Vol. X X H I , No. 1, 1971
Lionel Tiger
T o suggest h o w irrelevant the question is in practice, and h o w misguided in the scientific sense, let us put it another way. W e mustfirstrecognize the extent of h u m a n violence, plunder and destructiveness.1 If w e assume that h u m a n aggressiveness in the warlike sense is instinctive, it follows directly that the aggressive manifestations w e see about us represent our instinctive endowment and must be dealt with in that context. O n the other hand, if w e assume that aggression is broadly cultural and results from learning, then it follows directly that humans are animals w h o rather routinely create cultures which lead to aggressiveness. If anything, the latter diagnosis is the more worrisome because it implies that humans are inept at precisely those activities—cultural ones—in which w e are supposed to be skilled, and it is a complex and trying violation of h u m a n conceits about efficacy, providence and judiciousness. Nevertheless, h u m a n s are skilled at culture-making and managing. Whatever the outcome of scientific discussions about the source of violence and aggressiveness, it is clear that social manipulations will underlie tutored and successful management of aggressive disruptions of peaceful life. Pertinent to this task are two central scientific questions: what kind of creature is it with which w e must cope in this attempt at management, and are there limits on our invention of social procedures which are established by our genetic inheritance and by the life cycles arising directly from this broadly inflexible inheritance? W h a t is urged by the papers and discussions of the Unesco meeting is that the answer to these questions must emerge from a synthetic understanding of what m a n is in the widest possible biosociological sense. For example, one broad biological fact which is normally overlooked by students of aggressive behaviour is that organized hurtful aggressiveness in the form of war is not a h u m a n problem but a male problem. Almost exclusively, it is males w h o create and staff the more or less elaborate social mechanisms for applying force and weaponry to h u m a n interactions. Only exceptionally are females pressed into military service. Where they are, it is usually for supportive functions and not to form raiding parties which go beyond the territorial boundaries of the group in question. Undoubtedly this is due in good measure to a variety of traditions and practices which focus on sexual differentiation in socialization. But this identical pattern emerges in so m a n y cultures which comprehend a variety of histories, economies, kinship and educational systems, etc., that one must invoke the law of parsimony to ask if there is something c o m m o n to all males and all females as bio-social creatures which stimulates this statistically improbable regularity. A critical clue to solving this puzzle was reported at the meeting and it is almost depressingly simple: hormones. In both experimental and natural situations involving both h u m a n s and other primates, a relationship has 1.
For example, see Derek Freeman, ' H u m a n Aggression in Anthropological Perspective', in : J. D . Carthy and F . J. Ebling (eds.), The Natural History of Aggression, London, Academic Press, 1966.
10
Introduction
been shown between the level of the hormone testosterone in the body and assertive, aggressive activity. A t puberty, the h u m a n female doubles her testosterone while the male—from a higher base—suddenly acquires at least ten times the testosterone he had before and possibly as m u c h as thirty times. W h e n this is added to the sexual differences related to running and throwing ability, in weight and strength, etc., a physiological facilitation of male aggressiveness as opposed to female is indicated, and the interplay between social and physical characteristics is more clearly seen. This assumes considerable importance in the context of the evidence about h u m a n evolution which was discussed at the meeting. B y and large, it is generally accepted that h u m a n physical structure is obviously the result of our evolution in the Darwinian sense, and that our control over this structure is relatively limited as far as drastic changes are concerned. However, it is scarcely as commonly accepted that the behaviour of the evolved body can also reflect our evolution in comparable ways. Such has been the persuasiveness of the notion that all h u m a n behaviour is learned—a sophisticated version of the tabula rasa principle—that the obvious responsiveness and impressionability of the h u m a n being has been offered as proof of the unimportance of any inherited constraints on h u m a n social behaviour. N o n e the less, there is n o w considerable evidence that hunting and probably warring were in fact significant factors in h u m a n evolution and in the selection of the integrated combination of body and behaviour which marks any species. Unless the principles which govern the genetics of h u m a n s are entirely different from those which govern other animals, and unless there exist different kinds of translation of genetic history into the behavioural present, then the question of the integrated combination of body and behaviour must bear some relationship to our current circumstances, if the conclusion is correct about the central importance of hunting for h u m a n evolution.1 A s a number of participants stressed during the meeting, this by n o means implies that h u m a n aggressiveness leading to violence is inevitable. However, it does seem likely that it is a pattern which is easy to learn, and in this sense a helpful synthesis of biological and cultural explanations is possible when it becomes clearer that the role of biological endowment is to set limits and establish emphases in the profile of activities and enthusiasms around which h u m a n learning and teaching revolve. Consequently, in this context the very different hormonal situations of males and females as well as other physiological characteristics provide a basis of propensity for the extreme sexual differences w e can observe in the conduct of violent aggressive h u m a n enterprise. Again, this is another w a y of saying that the h u m a n animal devotes himself more assiduously to those activities and interests to which and for which it has had commitment through a lengthy period of evolution marked by both physiological and behavioural evolution and selection. 1.
A n important and comprehensive discussion of h u m a n hunting is in I. D e Vore and R . B . Lee (eds.), Man the Hunter, Chicago, III., Aldine, 1968. See in particular the contribution of W . B . Laughlin, 'Hunting: A n Integrating Biobehavior System and its Evolutionary Importance'.
11
Lionel Tiger
Such a perspective m a y appear unusual and improper in view of h o w contemporary social scientists construe the definable sources of h u m a n action. Hence it is important to c o m m e n t briefly o n this if the over-all meaning of these articles is to be placed usefully in the context of the w o r k done by social scientists. Typically, students of the social sciences receive n o serious instruction in biology and consequently are unaware of current knowledge about the relationships between genetic coding and behaviour in other animals. (This is necessarily an acute generalization; it is dealt with more fully in m y b o o k Men in Groups.1) At the risk of oversimplifying the reason for this, it is perhaps enough to say that the over-all situation results from the break-up of the natural sciences into social sciences and biological ones—even though D a r winian theory provided ample and stimulating justification for assimilating knowledge of organic evolution with the social behaviour in which context this evolution has necessarily to take place, given the importance of sociosexual selection for genetic patterns. However, in part because of a variety of anti-racist, economic and political positivist theories in the more scientifically advanced countries, the hiatus grew between the study of the social behaviour of m a n and that of the other animals. It also grew more assured with time and with the success, within its competence, of learning theory-based formulations about social behaviour and structure, and by the tacit and systematic rejection of 'instinctivist' explanations of h u m a n behaviour as both demeaning and dangerous. 2 This has had important consequences for the study of aggressiveness. A n y discussion of the wholly or partly biological basis of h u m a n aggressiveness has been marked by extensive assertions of strong feelings, elaborate misunderstandings, forthright and self-justifying ignorance, and the expression of the fear that attributing any biological basis to aggressiveness will encourage aggressive persons in their anti-social acts and will further restrict the role of mercy and gentility in social interactions. With little understanding of m o d e r n biological techniques and findings, social scientists have felt competent to assert that aggressive activity has no biological bases. With almost equal confidence, biological scientists with little formulated awareness of the variability and complexity of h u m a n social structures have asserted the primacy of biological factors in the stimulus and even guidance of aggressivity. But as both the dire facts of h u m a n aggressiveness and the accomplishments and sophistication inherent in these articles suggest, such partisan antisynthesis is neither scientifically necessary nor perhaps morally possible. F o r example, one unrefuted proposition emerging from our discussion was that 1. 2.
Lionel Tiger, Men in Groups, N e w York, R a n d o m House and London, Thomas Nelson, 1969, For early, prescient and strategic statements of the problem, see: Earl W . Count, 'The Biological Basis of H u m a n Sociality', American Anthropologist, 1958; Ronald Fletcher, Instinct in Man, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1957. For a more recent discussion see Robin Fox, 'The Cultural Animal', Social Science Information, February 1970, reprinted in Encounter, July 1970; and for a description and assessment of the new data about h u m a n evolution and their application to social understanding, see John Pfeiffer, The Emergence of Man, N e w York, Harper & R o w , 1969.
12
Introduction
it is extremely difficult to correlate the aggressiveness of communities with their form of government. Governments of all ideology and philosophy, to say nothing of standard of living, m a y become as readily committed to armament and even military adventure as any other. T o m o v e from the cliché that ' G o d is on our side' to the more difficult truth that n o such easy identification is even possible, is a considerable advance towards seeing the problem as concerning species, not local conditions. Thus a more elaborate and even more tragic vision is involved, based not on particular systems of propertyholding, allocation of wealth, or attitudes to the sacred, but rather on an almost medical conception of aggressiveness as epidemic, contagious and anti-vital instead of being solely the effect of the operations of malice or incompetence or the more usual combination of both. In effect, this is to assert nothing more surprising than that there exist propensities for violent aggressiveness which the h u m a n animal has inherited as a result of specific adaptations through his evolution, and that these propensities m a y be stimulated in various communities by, for example, economic activities such as imperialist patterns of trade or educational practices which are essentially chauvinistic and derogate minorities or foreigners. O f course, this ungenerously oversimplifies the matter. T h e way in which genetic information—such as is encoded in the D N A molecules—isfirstof all acquired through evolution and then transmitted through individuals' life cycles, is by no means obvious. N o r are the structural and historical procedures of societies in terms of which hostilities between communities are stimulated and initiated, so clear and precise that there remain n o controversies between social scientists or historians regarding the causes and character of any particular event. N o n e the less, to appreciate the complexity of an analytical problem is a reasonable beginning towards its solution, and the effect of the present issue of the Journal must be to indicate the kinds of complexities involved. Since the articles speak for themselves, it m a y be enough here to sketch very economically what some of the salient factors underlying and surrounding aggressive encounters were thought to be, and h o w they m a y be usefully understood in the wider context of h u m a n endeavour. First of all, it w a s often noted during the meeting, that aggressiveness as a forceful social process need not be harmful, but that the impetus for violent hostile activity m a y equally well—and certainly more frequently—result in provident forcefulness of broad benefit to h u m a n beings. For example, armies can, with perhaps similar enthusiasm and identical organization, function in situations of flood control as well as napalm raiding. A group of m e n can loot and pillage, or play football for thousands of appreciative spectators. A team of researchers can develop improved insulin, or improved 'anti-personnel rockets'. T h e difference between the results is all important. But the reason w h y the difference exists very likely depends upon local and immediate factors, and the specific cause of violent-aggressive as opposed to constructive-aggressive activity in particular circumstances remains broadly idiosyncratic. This underscores the essentially social nature of aggressiveness. Despite a view of aggressiveness as an 'instinct' depending on an energy model of the
13
Lionel Tiger
organism in which the individual 'has' aggressiveness which it must discharge, the aggressiveness which retained the attention of the meeting was that which took place in groups: it was socially stimulated, socially mediated, and socially controlled.1 While little else could sensibly be expected from members of a gregarious species, the stress throughout the meeting o n the social character of what is in a real sense anti-social behaviour none the less suggests the general trend of research in this area. Even w h e n individual violent aggressiveness is studied, the results of detailed investigation are ambiguous. Thus contrary to the widespread notion that violent crimes increase in large cities where individuals live supposedly anomic, harrassed lives, homicides in fact usually occur between relative intimates: violent persons rarely attack at random and without specific interpersonal cause. Furthermore, it does not hold that urban living conditions necessarily imply a higher rate of violent crime than exists in rural areas. W h a t is more significant is the effectiveness of social integration in the cities as opposed to the countryside; in Hungary, for example, homicide rates are higher in rural areas than in relatively well-integrated Budapest. N o r is crowding itself the answer—as it m a y be for some other animals. It is not density which matters as m u c h as the social meaning which attaches to density and the expectations of people as to certain amounts of personal and even psychological space. In other words, as in other areas too, aggressive violence is situation-specific. It is also—perhaps unduly stressing the point—of course species-specific. Given, however, the polyvalent and multi-faceted nature of h u m a n gregariousness, there were no hard-and-fast rules which could be generated at the meeting, except that people are willing and able to fight for reasons which m a y not be reasonable by strict standards of logic and for ideals which m a y not strike all people as especially desirable or even agreeable. It is, however, almost always possible to predict that people will be more likely to interact violently w h e n they are uncertain about their opponents' possible intentions. Violence m a y be incipient when members of a group have been brought up in the course of socialization to believe that their group is best and the others barely h u m a n or even inhuman (what Erik Erikson has called 'pseudo-speciation', and which is intriguing in view of the role of hunting in h u m a n evolution, and the relationship between gods, animals and m a n which can be identified in m a n y simple and complex cultures). Even the simple fact that political leaders become fatigued in crises and operate under stress with decreasing discrimination and failing ability to solicit potentially valuable dissonant information can be portentous. People will d o battle when their economic interests appear to be threatened, even though 1.
For one influential view, see Konrad Lorenz, On Aggression, London, Methuen, 1966, and for a critique see Robert Hinde's contribution to this issue (page 48). In m y o w n book, Men in Groups, op. cit., I have approached some problems raised by biological study of h u m a n beings in their corporate activity and have argued, specifically, that the male group is the intervening variable between the individual person with all his genetic propensities and the elaborately co-operative enterprises of war.
14
Introduction
the costs of warfare m a y far outweigh the possible economic loss which conflict is meant to stave off. Inasmuch as territorial disputes m a y involve land often marginal (by definition) to the major processes of a nation, the same principle applies—that humans undertake with some enthusiasm hostile actions to achieve economic and neo-economic ends which are unjustified economically in m o n e y costs, to say nothing of h u m a n ones. Between some communities there exist institutionalized patterns of violence which extend deeply into their histories and whose justification can lie in n o more convincing assertion than that G r o u p A has always fought Group B and sees neither reason nor w a y to change this durable pattern. That these examples are connected with not only historical and habitual procedures, but also with methods of rearing the young, learned attitudes to the self, the structure and size of families, etc., goes without saying. Whether or not generalized principles about such personal experience and its effect on subsequent aggressive activity can be extracted from such an unorganized mass of data seemed questionable to m a n y participants. N o n e the less, certain apparently defensible and legitimate descriptions of the causes and forms of violence emerged. A m o n g h u m a n beings and perhaps even a m o n g chimpanzees, the loss of self-esteem jeopardizes individuals' ability to stand apart from violence; possibly a suitably cautious statement could be m a d e about groups as well. T h e problems associated with selfesteem are apparently more severe in respect to young males as far as aggressiveness is concerned particularly in economies which d e m a n d lengthy periods of apprenticeship and training before the individual can acquire a fulfilling sense of adult personal efficacy. There is evidence which indicates that in times of crisis it is always important for leaders to have the time to review the over-all situation, meditate their reactions, exchange conflicting viewpoints with their colleagues and, of course, rest physically. It is important that children be taught during their educational experience that the obvious satisfactions they enjoy in living in a particular community are not a reflection upon the moral and political capacity of other societies to provide their members with legitimate and dignified satisfactions, and that one need not preclude the other. A t the same time, it is important to permit continuity of intimate relations, and this refers not only to individual persons and their immediate family and friends, but also to the social context within which these occur, so that n o severe and vexing disjunction exists or is felt to exist between private experience and its healthy public counterparts. Just as the enormous diversity of h u m a n arrangements and desires must be tolerated, it seemed central to the issue that c o m m o n international sense of what constitutes the h u m a n being and his uncurtailable rights and incontestable claim to contribute to an exchange with the h u m a n community c o m e into being. While the expression of violence in the mass media m a y stimulate a cavalier attitude towards h u m a n suffering, it is likewise possible that the opposite will occur once persons w h o are physically removed from grotesque situations are brought into relatively direct contact with the h u m a n meaning
15
Lionel Tiger
of otherwise abstract information about wars, deaths and the despoilation of h u m a n structures. Here, experience is not wholly reassuring in view of the apparent ease with which soldiers in action can 'dehumanize' their enemies, and the actual pleasure which some actively take in the acts offightinga n d destruction.1 Again, the enthusiasm for battle and the honour this m a y bring suggests the traditional if not prehistorical importance of this personal gesture, and that it is a w a y of acquiring self-esteem of little contemporary practicality appears of scant concern to m a n y young m e n . Moreover, the fact that nearly everywhere older males with power accept and encourage this militant self-assertion—through wars, drafts and compulsory military service— and which mothers however reluctantly must accept, adds an additional catalyst to a compound which appears to need little to become unstable. N o n e the less, as was noted several times during the meeting, most of the people for most of the time and in most places manage to avoid fighting violently with each other. This observation permits a very general c o m m e n t to be m a d e . A s animals, h u m a n beings are clearly successful (and, indeed, to their embarrassment are n o w too successful) in breeding, not to mention surviving. W e evolved in a manner so as to permit sensitive interaction with perhaps 35-100 persons, but n o w of course must live in communities whose numbers supersede by m a n y times even that upper limit. In addition, w e vigorously engage in the import and export of symbolic materials which must affect the internal balance of forces in an otherwise closed community—as governments w h o try to control such symbolic materials from without presumably understand. Despite temporary impediments, movement of members of the species and their symbolic artefacts across boundaries will continue in increasingly ramified ways as the planet becomes really and symbolically smaller in relation to the people w h o live o n it. In one of the following articles it is described h o w chimpanzees find ways of managing hostilities in relatively harmless ways, even if the disputes which threaten violence are real and bitter for the participants. O n the whole, humans do likewise, though the exceptions are usually extraordinarily costly and humiliating to the spirit of the species. It is presumably this humiliation and also this spirit which stimulates the convening of groups of people to discuss aggressiveness in some constructive fashion. One of the defensible, economical and appro1.
See for example, the extraordinary personal document from the Second World W a r by J. Glenn Gray, The Warriors, N e w York, Harper, 1960. A n account of the same war, but with a radically different perspective on the creation of suffering and thefinalityof inequity is Albert Speer's Inside the Third Reich, N e w York, Macmillan, 1970. Unsatisfactorily but also revealingly, Speer attempts to explain the peculiarfictionswhich war permits, and the nature of the social bonds which maintain the coherence of warring communities under the most stressful and empirically hopeless conditions. Perhaps the most striking fact about the conduct of the war as seen from the G e r m a n side is the absurd triviality of m a n y of the considerations which passed as policy, and the intense personalizing involved in m a n y issues which should have been organized on purely technical and managerial principles, and which led to massive consequences for reasons having often to do with little more than the fragility, fear, vanity and thoughtless gratuitousness of individual persons. T h e incalculable criminality of the system within which these persons performed is another matter, and is germane when some articulation is sought between individuals and collectives at times when the latter become aberrant and bizarre.
16
Introduction
priately whimsical definitions of m a n is that w e are the problem-creating animal; and, by extension, the problem-solver too. But what matters is h o w the problem is defined. In these articles, the problem of aggressiveness is defined broadly, deeply, in detail, with a sense of mechanism, a sense of over-all structure, with an honest sense of the difficulty, and a tragic grasp of the energies abused by the angry turmoils of war. Presumably, it is m o r e than felicitously symmetrical to say that if mankind is to survive as a species, then it must live as a species, and this directly implies that w e k n o w ourselves as a species. It is conceivable that all animals regard themselves as outside the natural order, as w e so regard ourselves; perhaps other animals likewise cannot tolerate too m u c h reality. It would be a characteristically h u m a n paradox were w e drastically to differentiate ourselves from the natural world and its processes by insistently putting ourselves into it in order to acquire the knowledge and sense of judgement with which to keep our communities alive. Lionel Tiger is associate professor of anthropology at Livingston College, Rutgers University, New Jersey (United States). Among his more recent publications are M e n in Groups (1969) and 'The Biological Basis of Sexual Discrimination', Impact of Science on Society (Vol. XX, No. 1, 1970), and he is at present preparing (with Robin Fox) a study entitled T h e Biology of Social Relations.
17
Robert Bigelow
Relevance of ethology to h u m a n aggressiveness
Most modern scholars accept the thesis that w e are animals, that our ancestors evolved through a long series of animal forms before they became what w e would n o w call h u m a n . W e should, therefore, be able to learn a great deal about the basic components of h u m a n behaviour, including h u m a n aggressiveness, from studies of n o n - h u m a n animals. Impressive progress has already been achieved in this direction by psychologists, physiologists, anthropologists and ethologists, but we have yet to grasp the full significance of ethology and h u m a n evolution. Our culture is deeply imbued with a belief in a profound dichotomy between the h u m a n mind and body. Mental activity, and 'higher' forms of behaviour, have been attributed to supernatural sources which were not regarded as natural, biological agencies. Thought and language are still widely considered in supernatural terms, and such subtle conceptual difficulties continue to stand between us and a fuller understanding of our biological selves. O u r old, deep-rooted reluctance to admit that w e are animals is a fundamental source of current disagreement. S o m e of our most biologically oriented scientists have, perhaps unwittingly, extended this old conceptual dichotomy very deeply into the framework of modern ethology and psychology. They assume that learned behaviour is not biological, that it cannot be inherited genetically, and hence that it could not have evolved in the biological sense. This is reasonable in so far as specific languages, religions and ideas are not, as such, contained in the genes which are transmitted from parents to offspring. But w e confuse the issue when w e overlook the cultural significance of the biological evolution of those very organs which m a k e learning possible. M a n y of today's leading ethologists and psychologists have discarded the old conceptual dichotomy between learned and unlearned behaviour. Like the old 'spermist-ovist' controversy, 'learned versus instinctive' disputes are beginning to recede into history. But some of those w h o still subscribe to the older conceptions have been outstandingly successful at disseminating their ideas. Conceptions of 'spontaneous instincts' are still widely accepted as established facts. Certain well-known modern writers dissociate biological 'instincts'
18 Int. Soc. Sei. J., Vol. XXIII, N o . 1, 1971
Relevance of ethology to h u m a n aggressiveness
from cultural environment to a most remarkable extent. Konrad Lorenz, for example, accepts Freud's contention that instincts are sources of motivation which, without any outward stimulation, impel organisms to d o things. H e believes w e are inhabited by an 'aggression-instinct' which is not a reaction to external stimuli but rather a 'force' which arises unbidden inside us, rather like steam in a boiler, and demands release—usually through violence and war. Such views dissociate biology from culture almost completely. If they were in accord with the available evidence w e would, of course, have to face the rather frightening implications of these beliefs. W e cannot, with reason, ignore evidence merely because it suggests unpleasant conclusions. Recent evidence, however, does not support these views. Social deprivation early in life m a y severely distort the expression of behaviour which has long been regarded as 'instinctive'. Socially deprived female monkeys show grossly abnormal sexual and maternal behaviour. They can be induced to mate only with great difficulty, and react with hostility to their o w n offspring.1 Maternal behaviour is strong and obvious in normal female monkeys w h o have not been socially deprived in early life; such behaviour is clearly learned. If it were even predominantly unlearned ('instinctive') it would appear in less distorted forms in socially deprived females. Larks reared in unusual environments sing unusual songs. Chaffinches have to imitate the songs of other chaffinches. Even imprinting is a form of learning.2 These are but a few of the m a n y lines of recent evidence which have convinced so m a n y modern authorities that the old conceptual dichotomy between learned and unlearned behaviour must be rejected. W e are indeed the products of our biological evolution. W e inherit h u m a n sets of genes which interact in ways that produce h u m a n nervous and endocrine systems. Because of our h u m a n structural organization, w e respond to stimuli in distinctively h u m a n ways. In this sense, our behaviour is 'predetermined' by our genes. But genes contain n o hearts or eyes or brains or patterns of adult behaviour; they are molecules of D N A . Under very special conditions they will interact, not only with each other, but also with molecules in the environment surrounding them, in ways that build the complex structures of a living organism. T h e bodies they produce are largely 'predetermined' by the interacting genes. Sets of rabbit genes build rabbits, mouse genes build mice, and h u m a n genes build m e n . Biological development is channelled into very strictly limited patterns—and subsequent behaviour is limited accordingly. Nature-nurture interactions, however, begin at the very outset of development and continue throughout life. Learning is a nature-nurture interaction. H u m a n culture is a nature-nurture interaction between our biological bodies and environmental stimuli encountered in our homes, schools, newspapers and o n our television screens. Learning abilities are limited by 1. 2.
H . F. Harlow and M . K . Harlow, 'The Affectional Systems', in: A . M . Schrier, H . F. Harlow and F. Stollnitz (eds.), Behavior of Nonhuman Primates: Modern Research Trends, Vol. 2, N e w York and London, Academic Press, 1965. S . A . Barnett, 'Instinct' and 'Intelligence' : The Science of Behaviour in Animals and Man, London, MacGibbon & Kee, 1967.
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Robert Bigelow
the biological structure of bodies. Rabbits lack the physical structures required for learning h u m a n languages. Learning is nevertheless a fundamental feature of development, especially in m a m m a l s , and most particularly in m a n . W e cannot assume that only blind, spontaneous 'instincts' were inherited from biological processes while learning is derived from quite another, presumably supernatural, source. Biological evolution has clearly provided us with the structural equipment required for what w e call cultural evolution. T h e task before us is not to explain this very likely possibility away, but rather to understand h o w biological evolution produced the very capacity for h u m a n culture. The problem before us is to understand the evolution of the h u m a n brain. A s proposed in m y recent book, 1 I believe warfare played a major role in h u m a n evolution. T h e average size of the h u m a n brain increased threefold during the Pleistocene, and this remarkable transformation could not have taken place so rapidly without a very powerful selective force. The h u m a n brain n o w contains some 9-12 thousand million neurons, each with about 25,000 possible connexions with other neurons. The evolution of this amazing social instrument involved a series of profound reorganizations of m a n y genes, and this vast genetic change took place within a few million years. Recent evidence suggests that the Pleistocene began around 4 million (rather than 1 or 2 million) years ago. But even 4 million years is not a long span of time for such a profound transformation of such a complicated structure. N o other brains trebled in size during the Pleistocene.2 Archaeological evidence suggests that h u m a n evolution m a y have taken place in two major bursts. Artifacts associated with Homo erectus appear rather suddenly around 500,000 years ago—and thefirstclear records of Homo sapiens are less than 50,000 years old.3 But whether the transformation of the h u m a n brain was gradual or spasmodic, the rate of change was outstandingly rapid. N o relatively mild selective forces, such as those n o w acting on baboons, can account for h u m a n evolution. H u m a n s with the smallest brains were at a severe reproductive disadvantage during the Pleistocene. S o m e selective force w a s hitting them, continuously, even when their brains were twice as large as those of any other animals. This force was concentrated on the line that led to m a n . N o n - h u m a n predators did not begin to prey on m a n alone. M a n y other species suffered from starvation, disease and accidents. (As a result, they acquired varying degrees of disease-resistance, greater agility and improved adaptation for getting and digesting food.) But w e are looking for a force that conferred a very strong advantage on intelligence. Intelligence was clearly favoured in m a n y evolving lines, but the least intelligent h u m a n s were not favoured even when they were far more intelligent than any other species. T h e final major change in h u m a n evolution was a remarkable increase in the complexity 1. 2. 3.
R . S. Bigelow, The Dawn Warriors: Man's Evolution Toward Peace, Boston, Mass., AtlanticLittle, Brown, 1969 and London, Hutchinson, 1970. Brain size is not a reliable criterion of intelligence for the comparison of human individuals, but the large size of the human brain is clearly related to the human level of intelligence. S. L . Washburn (personal communication).
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Relevance of ethology to h u m a n aggressiveness
of the brain, and the brain is primarily a social instrument. The factors that forced this rapid evolution of the brain must therefore have been directly related to social life. W e must look for a very powerful, distinctively h u m a n , social force—and warfare meets these requirements. N o other m a m m a l s fight wars on anything like a h u m a n scale, and warfare is a violently social interaction. Defined as competition between 'closed' social groups, with intent to kill (if necessary) on both sides, warfare could not have affected early h u m a n evolution unless early humans lived in social groups. N o t so m a n y years ago it was widely assumed that australopithecines were solitary animals. A s recently as 1962 Dobzhansky, for example, believed it was 'possible though not certain that some of the australopithecines hunted not singly but in bands . . .\1 A t that time, Dobzhansky was clearly thinking of proto-men as solitary animals w h o m a y (or m a y not) have been only beginning to hunt in bands. In the light of recent studies of baboons and other primates, this view is n o longer acceptable.2 Every primate species has been found to be a social species. This w a s one of m a n y recent ethological discoveries with vital relevance to sociology.3 W e are not the only social animals, and the evolutionary roots of h u m a n social interactions (of culture in general and warface in particular) extend far backward into pre-human stages of our evolution. Social deprivation during infancy has severe and permanent effects on the behaviour of m o n keys (as noted above, even such presumably 'instinctive' patterns as maternal behaviour fail to develop normally). M o n k e y s are profoundly social animals, and most of their social behaviour is learned through the use of their brains. Recent ethological research has also clarified the biological advantage of social life.4 Social co-operation protects infants and juveniles from lions and other large predators, and survival of the genes of infants has a direct evolutionary advantage. This is clearly relevant to early h u m a n evolution, and it is important to note that survival o n the open savannah, far from trees, requires an ability to deal with lions face to face. Baboons do this today. A single baboon is not a match for a lion, but groups of co-operating males can, and do, prevent lions and leopards from feeding at will on young baboons. 5 O u r o w n ancestors also lived on open savannah, and lions m a y have helped to lay foundations for both h u m a n co-operation and h u m a n aggression. Early m e n were probably learning to hunt, but their survival as a species required not only food but also protection of their infants. Even the best-fed infants had to be protected. 1. 2.
3. 4. 5.
T . Dobzhansky, Mankind Evolving: The Evolution of the Human Species, N e w Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1962. S. L . Washburn and D . A . Hamburg, 'Aggressive Behavior in Old World Monkeys and Apes', in: Phyllis C . Jay (ed.), Primates: Studies in Adaptation and Variability, N e w York, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1968. See also: I. D e Vore (ed.), Primate Behavior: Field Studies of Monkeys and Apes, N e w York, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965. Kropotkin and others were aware of this many years ago, but most scholars have only recently begun to accept it. See: P. A . Kropotkin, Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution, 1902. ( N o w available in Extending Horizons series, Boston, Mass., Porter Sargent.) Kropotkin, op. cit. S. L . Washburn and I. D e Vore, film entitled: Baboon Behavior, Berkeley, Calif., University of California, 1963.
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Ethological attention has also been directed toward studies of nonh u m a n primate communication systems. T h e relation of these to h u m a n language is still far from clear. N o n - h u m a n primate communication systems are not language in the h u m a n sense. There are, however, some possibly promising clues. Monkeys and apes transmit, and interpret, extremely complicated combinations of auditory, visual, tactile and olfactory signals. These signals pass from animal to animal not singly, but in very complex patterns. Their interpretation requires very complex brains. Most of these c o m p o u n d signals seem to mediate agonistic and pacificatory exchanges within the social group. They convey motivational information concerning ever-changing status in the group's dominance hierarchy. Their major function seems to be control (and occasional release) of aggressiveness in the maintenance of social order and co-operation.1 T h e biological advantage of these communications is very clear: well-organized, socially cohesive groups are more successful at defending infants from lions. Future research in this area m a y throw important light on the problem of controlling h u m a n aggression. If the very foundations of our language served the purpose of controlling aggressiveness, w e m a y n o w contain the basic biological equipment for preventing war. N o n - h u m a n primates seem to have relatively few signals for c o m m u n i cating information about events outside their social groups. Barks, chutters and other sounds convey accurate information about lions, snakes, raptorial birds and other external threats2—but most of the communication repertoire of monkeys is devoted to internal affairs. H u m a n s also transmit patterns of non-verbal signals bearing information about motivation and social status. Earlier forms of communication have been elaborated to the point where w e can 'drink to one another only with our eyes'. This is not language in the strict sense, but it m a y convey a lot of interesting information to brains that are able to see the light. Even in apes and monkeys, brains that can interpret complex motivation-signals carry a potential for dealing 'with signals about external affairs. This is already clear from Struhsaker's study of vervet monkeys; and a chimpanzee is n o w learning to communicate with h u m a n s in sign language.3 If external affairs began to acquire greater life-and-death importance, a selective advantage would have been conferred on groups which maximized their basic potential for dealing with signals about events outside the group. This would have happened when other h u m a n groups became the greatest threat to any single group's survival. A t that point, natural selection (through direct intergroup competition) would have favoured an increase in the basic potential itself—that is, in the size and efficiency of the brain. Evolution rapid enough to treble the size of the brain in a few million years requires not only a very strong selective force, but also a means of 1. 2. 3.
P. Marier, 'Communication in Monkeys and Apes', in: I. DeVore (ed.), Primate Behavior: Field Studies of Monkeys and Apes, N e w York, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965. T . T . Struhsaker, 'Auditory Communication among Vervet Monkeys (Cercopithecus aethiops)', in: S. A . Altmann (ed.), Social Communication Among Primates, Chicago, 111., University of Chicago Press, 1967. R . A . Gardner and B . T . Gardner, 'Teaching Sign Language to a Chimpanzee', Science, Vol. 165, 1969, p. 664-72.
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Relevance of ethology to h u m a n aggressiveness
reproducing a rapid series of arrays of very marked genetic variation. Rapid evolution is impossible unless selection is constantly 'presented' with a broad array of variation from which to 'select'. Sewall Wright 1 has described a'variation-generation' system which meets these requirements. B y 'genetic drift' he means more than the narrow conception of the term described in textbooks (and sometimes called the 'Sewall Wright effect') which in this narrow sense refers only to random changes in gene frequency due to small population size. For Wright himself genetic drift has a larger meaning: any and all factors, including inbreeding and selection, which promote genetic divergence between small component groups within a larger population. A n y species which is characteristically subdivided and persistently re-divided into small, relatively isolated groups of a few hundred individuals, will become very diverse genetically—even in an otherwise stable environment. Such a species will carry great potential for rapid evolution, and if subjected to a very strong selective force, this potential will be realized. Anthropological and ethological evidence suggest that such a population structure was characteristic of australopithecines, Homo erectus and Homo sapiens, during the Pleistocene. Mutation is the ultimate source of genetic variation, but gene mutation alone cannot, in higher organisms, provide sufficient variation for really rapid evolution. Single genes, as such, are not the targets of selection. Selection acts o n individuals, which are always the result of interactions between complex combinations of genes. Sexual recombination enormously increases variation, by producing, at every generation, a new array of unique gene combinations. W h e n a species is divided into m a n y small, relatively isolated groups, inbreeding and random changes in gene frequency increase variation in yet another dimension. Inbreeding leads to genetic uniformity within a given group, but when separately applied to m a n y different groups within a species, the variation of the species as a whole is greatly increased, as can be seen in modern dogs. Certain levels of gene flow (migration) between groups ensure enough outbreeding to counteract the harmful effects of excessive inbreeding, and m a y enhance rather than eliminate the intergroup genetic variation. Prehistoric m e n were probably extremely variable genetically, and selection has always had plenty of variation from which to select. If warfare was the force that increased h u m a n mental capacity, successful warriors must have been, on the average, m o r e intelligent than other m e n . Despite current bias against 'the military mind', there is ample evidence that this was so. H u m a n warfare is an organized activity. Success in war has always been due, primarily, to co-operation. Co-operation requires communication and efficient brains. H u m a n wars are not w o n entirely by blind ferocity in the individual soldiers. R o m a n s were probably n o more ferocious, as individuals, than Carthaginians or Gauls. But R o m a n legions were not disorganized 1.
S. Wright, 'Evolution in Mendelian Populations', Genetics, Vol. 16, 1931, p . 97-159; 'Isolation by Distance', Genetics, Vol. 28, 1943, p. 114-38 and Vol. 31, p . 39-55; 'Statistical Genetics and Evolution', Bull. Am. Math. Soc, Vol. 48, 1942, p. 223-46. See also: 'Genetics of Populations', Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. 10, Chicago, 111., London, Toronto, William Benton, 1968.
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Robert Bigelow
agglomerations of ferocious brutes; the legionnaires co-operated, often with spine-chilling effectiveness. Such co-operation required great emotional restraint, and a high degree of distinctively h u m a n intelligence. N o other species has ever co-operated so effectively. W e must pause before attributing mental inferiority to other h u m a n groups, racial or military. W a r s have destroyed vast quantities of promising genetic material, but the loss has been recovered in at least two ways. There is a pronounced reproductive advantage to life o n fertile land, and h u m a n males have both the capacity and the propensity for broad dissemination of their genes. In elephant seals, baboons and humans, young males are genetically expendable. This ethically execrable observation is a most important evolutionary fact. N o t all the best warriors were killed in battle, and those w h o survived willingly accepted the genetic role of fallen comrades. Most primitive societies were polygamous, and the chieftains (war leaders) had the largest harems. O n e male can keep a lot of females pregnant (which is w h y prize bulls are m o r e expensive than cows). In primitive warfare, including that described in the Old Testament, males of all ages were often slaughtered in defeated villages, and the w o m e n were used as concubines. The genetic effects of this practice are obvious: genes of victorious warriors were very strongly favoured. A n d tribes w h o were able to conquer and hold the most fertile land were in a better position to feed and rear their offspring than tribes w h o were forced to live in deserts. Life in the Kalahari was probably undertaken, originally, as a last resort—and bushmen n o w comprise a very small proportion of our species. It is widely believed that prehistoric m e n were peaceful creatures w h o rarely resorted to warfare. It is said they were so widely dispersed that violent intergroup conflicts must have been extremely rare. Flies, however, cluster around rich sources of food, antelope herd together in regions rich with grass, and w e can surely assume that australopithecines were more numerous wherever game, fruits,fishand water were most plentiful. They had the largest brains on earth, and were surely able to perceive that climate and food supplies were more favourable in some areas than in others. If they were always widely and uniformly dispersed, some force must have held them apart against their will—and it is most unlikely that any other animal species was able to d o this. Intergroup competition cannot be ignored, even in defence of the thesis that prehistoric m e n were always well dispersed. They were almost certainly, however, less widely dispersed in certain areas. Where the amenities of prehistoric life were most abundant, there was probably m o r e intense and frequent competition, group against group. Such competition would have placed a strong advantage o n the most eifective co-operation, communication and brains. A s brain efficiency increased, the most intelligent humans would have begun to perceive the advantage conferred by intergroup co-operation. Those with brains enough would have begun to realize that integration had m o r e survival value than segregation. This perception would have been (and still is) very difficult—because its achievement requires co-operation with m a n ' s most deadly enemy: h u m a n foreigners. It was achieved nevertheless, and some armies became far bigger than others. A t this point, the pace of evolution
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Relevance of ethology to h u m a n aggressiveness
quickened. The disadvantage of limiting co-operation to one small group of personal acquaintances became severe. 'Empires' appeared along the Nile, Tigris-Euphrates, Indus and H w a n g - H o rivers. Relative peace, imposed at first by force, prevailed between traditionally hostile villages. Arts of civilization began to grow in this newly created atmosphere of (relative) peace. But arts of large-scale government were n e w to m a n , and when internal co-operation broke d o w n within an 'empire', warlike barbarians swarmed over its walls and destroyed it. Each disintegration of internal cohesion was followed by an age of savage violence. The conquering barbarians were never 'noble savages' in Rousseau's sense. But after each Dark A g e , descendants of the old marauding destroyers built bigger and better systems of co-operation on the ruins of the old ones; and m e n learned slowly that more social power is conferred by voluntary than by coerced co-operation. T h e promotion, however, through friendly persuasion, of willing co-operation—between recent enemies—requires exceedingly efficient brains, and great emotional restraint, in all concerned. H u m a n progress in this art has been necessarily slow and very painful. Teachers cannot teach what they themselves have failed to learn, and even the best teachers must depend upon the learning abilities of their pupils. Teaching requires an exchange between communicating minds; 1 social learning is achieved by two-way intercommunication, and success is limited by the physical efficiency of the communicating brains. W e cannot hope to establish universal peace by eliminating all forms of enforced restraint before w e have acquired both the biological equipment and the cultural training required for universally intelligent, voluntary, peaceful interactions. This is well and widely k n o w n , but is often overlooked by people whose impatience for social justice and peace interferes with their perception of hard and unpleasant, but unfortunately unavoidable, facts. W e will continue to expand and improve opportunities for individual expression, but w e must learn to d o this through research and education. Until w e learn h o w peace can be maintained without central governments, law courts, police forces and armies, w e cannot dispense with these manifestations of our biological and cultural shortcomings. In our present state of ignorance, the violent destruction of one imperfect social system will merely lead to its replacement by another, possibly even more coercive, dominance hierarchy. A t the present very critical stage of h u m a n evolution, the road to peace leads not through bloody revolution, but through rapid transformation and reform. This cannot be achieved without promoting competition. Oppressed classes, races and nations must be given the opportunity to compete on fair and equal terms, but such competition can, and must, be held below the point of bloody violence. This cannot be done without restraint—and the power to impose restraint. O u r police must be able to deal intelligently with 1.
The word 'mind' is used here in a functional sense, as proposed by Delgado, i.e. 'mind' is a process comparable with the circulation of the blood, whereas 'brain' is a physical entity comparable to the heart. Delgado defines the mind as 'the intracerebral elaboration of extracerebral information'. See: J. M . R . Delgado, Physical Control of the Mind: Toward a Psychocivilized Society, N e w York, Harper & R o w , 1969.
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one of the most difficult of all h u m a n problems: when and h o w m u c h force to use, or not to use. If they fail, w e ourselves must share the blame. Violence follows failures to communicate, and communication requires brains. W e must cultivate, in ourselves as well as in our police, that crucial balance between co-operation and conflict which has played such an important role in both baboon and h u m a n evolution. This will require very high intelligence as well as great emotional control. Whether or not our species, as a species, contains a sufficient proportion of individuals with the biological (mental) capacity to learn the behaviour required for global peace is anybody's guess. W e can, however, try to use what brains w e have to maximal advantage. W e can try to bring about a vast improvement in our education systems. This is probably more important, n o w , than the exploration of outer space. W e cannot improve our schools until w e learn h o w to do so, and learning this will involve m a n y widely different fields of study—all of which will have to give consideration to the biological potential and limitations provided by our evolutionary background. If our ability to co-operate was evolved in response to demands of intergroup competition, the very structure of our nervous and endocrine systems m a y contain mechanisms designed for dealing with these two apparent opposites. Ethological research has revealed that m a n y animals, fromfishto primates, show agonistic behaviour involving a balance between threat and submission, advance and retreat. It is therefore very likely that our o w n brains and endocrine systems contain mechanisms which, if adequately understood, could be utilized in the prevention of war. This possibility will be considered in the course of future research on the neural and endocrine aspects of brain function, in ethological studies of agonistic behaviour, and in anthropological and sociological research on very large-scale h u m a n problems. W e have so m u c h to learn, and (more important) so m u c h to 'un-learn', that w e cannot afford to be complacent about our future prospects. There m a y , however, be at least some cause for optimism: w e m a y possess the biological equipment required for preventing war. W e are not enslaved by blind, spontaneous 'aggression-instincts'. Throughout the bloody course of history w e have learned a great deal about the value of voluntary co-operation, and about the need for discipline while it is being learned. Without prematurely discarding our peace-imposing dominance hierarchies, we can at least orient ourselves toward a future state of voluntary, global co-operation in which police forces and armies are unnecessary. If w e can intelligently aim our descendants toward this goal, the warfare of our h u m a n ancestors m a y eventually become as obsolete as thefinsand gills of our fish ancestors. Like fins and gills, warfare will have played a crucial role in our evolution, and yet be forever abandoned by our descendants.
26
Robert Bigelow was assistant and associate professor at McGill University from 1953 to 1962, and is at present a lecturer and reader in zoology at the University of Canterbury in Christchurch (New Zealand). He is the author of various articles appearing in zoological journals, and his most recent book, The D a w n Warriors: M a n ' s Evolution Toward Peace, was published in 1969.
José M . R . Delgado
T h e neurological basis of violence
Environment and neuronal mechanisms The chronicle of h u m a n civilization is the story of a co-operative venture consistently marred by destructive acts, and every advance has been accompanied by the increased efficiency of violent behaviour. Early m a n needed considerable physical strength and skill to defend himself or to attack beasts and other m e n with stones, arrows, or swords. Until recently, violence had limited consequences and the mobility of aggressive groups w a s limited by geographical distance or natural barriers. The invention of explosives, development of firearms, and modern means of transportation have m a d e unskilled individuals more powerful than mythical warriors of the past, and have placed a vast arsenal of ingenious weapons at the disposal of m a n . Technology has thus facilitated the performance of all types of violence, including crimes against property, assassination, riots and wars, threatening individual life, national stability, and the very continuance of civilization. It is also alarming to note that while primitive forms of rage-driven violence persist, n e w types of aggressive behaviour have evolved, such as practising cruelty 'for kicks' with detachment from the attacked subject, or as a means of imposing political conformity. Scientists, philosophers, and statesmen recognize that time is running out and that immediate solutions must be found to ensure the peaceful coexistence of m a n . This growing concern has promoted creation of groups for the study of antisocial behaviour and proposals of educational, political and economic measures to increase conviviality. It is generally accepted that violence is displaced aggression which surfaces in response to frustration about environmental circumstances. C o m m o n l y cited causes include poverty, overpopulation, hunger, social injustice, and ideological or racial antagonisms. Local and national governments recognize these problems and legislation reflects their continuous effort to improve standards of housing, health and education. While it is obvious that sensory stimuli from the environment provoke violence, I would like to draw attention to the other essential (and usually neglected) component within m a n himself: the neurological basis of aggressive
27 Int. Sac. Sei. J., Vol. X X m , N o . 1, 1971
José M . R. Delgado
behaviour. It must be recognized that the evaluation of h u m a n circumstances precedes every behavioural response, whether of apathy, co-operation, or rebellion, and that this processing of stimuli takes place within the functioning brain. H u m a n aggressiveness is a behavioural response characterized by the exercise of force in an attempt to inflict injury or damage to persons or property. This phenomenon m a y be analysed in its three components: (a) environmental circumstances including economic, ideological, political, social, and familial factors acting upon the individual; (b) reception of this information from the environment through sensory pathways, and its interpretation by cerebral mechanisms which trigger emotional feelings and behavioural responses; (c) performance of individual and social responses which constitute the observable manifestations of violence. M o s t present research and knowledge are limited to consideration of environmental factors and observed behaviour, while the essential link of brain physiology is usually ignored. Social sciences, which have a behavioural rather than a physiological orientation, are rapidly developing partly due to increasing public concern about juvenile violence, educational problems and general social unrest. Interpersonal and intergroup relations are investigated with reference to such dimensions as emotions, economics, culture, and working conditions, all of which are involved in m a n ' s adaptation to his ever more complex surroundings. All behavioural interactions, however, and the mechanisms underlying anxiety, violence, drives and motivations depend on intracerebral activities, which are usually excluded from social studies. Both neuro-psycho-behavioural and social sciences are very active areas of research, but their present rate of growth is too slow and their objectives too limited to improve significantly our perilously unbalanced civilization which is dedicated to the material exploitation of nature without giving parallel attention to the mind as power source of h u m a n intelligence. I a m well aware that although learning has detectable electrical correlates in the brain and emotional behaviour m a y be controlled by cerebral radio stimulation, these and similar facts m a y seem rather distant from the problems created by acts of violence. W e must realize, however, that the potential of new fields should be evaluated in terms of the newly discovered principles and their possible applications. T h e spectacular advances in treatment of cardiac patients are based on prior knowledge of the anatomical and functional properties of the heart. The miracles of open heart surgery, organ transplantation, pacemakers and other therapies which have saved the lives of m a n y thousands of patients would not have been possible if the heart were still k n o w n only as an untouchable red p u m p . In the past, cardiac therapy was based o n exorcisms, mysterious herbs, and the application of leeches. Perhaps in s o m e of today's mental therapies there is still a veil of mystery and mysticism related to inadequate understanding of neurophysiology. Information about the cerebral mechanisms which can trigger or inhibit violent reactions m a y be decisive for our survival, and technology is already
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The neurological basis of violence
available to undertake this task. W e need only the dedication of more intellectual and economic resources to carry out the research. Even n o w , some information is available about the intracerebral mechanisms of violence, and it should be taught to both educators and students. Control of forces comes only after understanding; teachers have the obligation and students the right to learn about the mechanisms and determinants of their o w n behaviour, as well as about physics, history and other subjects. Life can be more or less constructive or frustrating according to h o w it is interpreted, and children can be trained to be more or less aggressive. While intracerebral mechanisms are initially structured by genetic endowment, they are then decisively moulded by early experience. W h e n the interaction between brain physiology and experience is widely recognized and understood, w e m a y learn to take m o r e active direction infiltering,encouraging, or rejecting stimuli in our environment.
Prédation, basic needs and violence Scientists in m a n y disciplines including ethologists, anthropologists and naturalists have reviewed the zoological scale in search of ancestral determinants of m a n ' s aggressive tendencies. Their general consensus is that animals in the wild d o not fight to kill members of their o w n species, but d o exhibit aggression at mating time and also w h e n the territory required for their feeding and sleeping needs is challenged. O u r closest relatives, the monkeys and apes, maintain a hierarchical group organization with threatening gestures, verbal scolding and submissive acts, and some species are k n o w n to separate sparring young males. Blood is seldom drawn in intraspecies struggles, while it is usually shed in other types of confrontations. Predatory behaviour is considered alimentary activity, for the drive to obtain food does not entail anger or ferocity. The fulfilment of basic needs such as gaining proper space for family living or food supply, winning of a mate and establishment of social rank within a group are normal activities of individual development. T h e very growth of a h u m a n child is considered by some psychiatrists as an act of aggression, but it must be clearly distinguished from a third area of behaviour, acts of violence. These phenomena involve wilful destruction of life or property without the direct fulfilment of a basic personal need and are contrary to the general social welfare. Differentiation between 'physiological aggression' and 'antisocial violence' is clear in most cases, although the moral evaluation is sometimes debatable. A race riot m a y be interpreted as a natural expression of grievances and beneficial to the rioting group, while it is considered reprehensible antisocial behaviour by the dominant class. In any event, aggression and violence depend o n factors which m a y be unequivocally identified and evaluated.
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José M . R . Delgado
Genes and medium While animal behaviour derives from genetic inheritance and the physical environment, and animals use their natural weapons to obtain adequate food and space, h u m a n behaviour is moulded primarily by a third and unique factor: cultural environment. In our search for the origin of m a n ' s aggressive tendencies and possible means to control them, let us review findings in these areas. GENETIC INHERITANCE
T h e question has been asked whether there is a 'killer instinct' in m a n , an animalistic tendency derived from the long struggle for survival, printed irrevocably in our genes. Scientists disagree—quite violently—on this matter, some insisting that w e are uncontrollable beasts, and others maintaining that w e are basically harmless creatures lacking reflex inhibitions. Geneticists believe that genetic inheritance does not set the behavioural pattern for m a n ' s life, but that it does m a k e development of different traits more probable. The fact is that teaching is m u c h more effective than selective breeding for promoting behavioural change. M a n ' s genetic pool has altered so little that at conception, all recent and future inhabitants of the world m a y be quite equipotential. F r o m that m o m e n t o n the physical and (after birth) cultural environment change m a n . In 50-75 per cent of cases, a child is considered to exhibit approximately the amount of intelligence his parents show. In practical terms this means that, given the same environment, he often reacts about as efficiently as his parents. It is known, however, that intellectual capacity and characteristics such as an apparent tendency to 'over react' can be either augmented or diminished according to the cultural influences, and that stimuli which provoke anger and violence in one society m a y be neutral for members of other groups. While genetic selection is decisive for our physical formation, our mental and emotional development depend on the environment and without this nourishment the greatest potential genius—the geneticist's dream child—would be an idiot. PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT
For m a n as well as animals, the physical surroundings are critical for survival and normal development. Diet deficiencies are responsible for millions of deaths annually and cause irreparable brain damage in countless surviving infants. Overcrowding introduces an element of stress which is not conducive to normal growth. M a n ' s need for food and space can lead him to perform acts of antisocial violence including robbery and murder.
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T h e neurological basis of violence
SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT Animals and m a n have a potential for violence. While the possession of guns gives a horrible efficiency to h u m a n aggression, w e must realize that the teeth and claws of a lion will d o n o harm if the animal is well fed, comfortable and is not threatened. The problem is not so m u c h the availability of weapons as the wish to kill. In m a n , lack of food or space d o not necessarily lead to violence, because relatively peaceful societies are found in some poor and crowded areas. In other settings, a single incident or even a false rumour has mushroomed into riots involving thousands of people and resulting in massive property destruction and r a n d o m killing. Under rigid political systems, development of individual aggressiveness m a y be restricted and severely penalized in the interests of the group. In such situations, it is the organized group that usually becomes more aggressive towards other groups. By contrast, in very competitive, open societies, flexible power structures encourage the expression of m a n y aggressive acts in order to attain individual success. Cultural transmission is responsible for mobilizing m a n into a destructive force. Even the most idealistic religious or political systems have excluded some groups and have thus taught, facilitated, or condoned aggression on the basis of racial, national, or ideological differences. Cultural imprinting can be remarkably effective in producing radical behavioural changes. Violence is a product of cultural environment and is an extreme form of aggression, distinct from the modes of self expression required for survival and development under normal conditions. M a n m a y react to unpleasant or painful stimuli with violence—he m a y retaliate even more vigorously than he is attacked—but only if he has been taught by his culture to react in this manner. A child can learn to react to frustration with equanimity or aggression. A major role of education is to instil self control in individuals so that they will not over react in the face of threats and pressures. W e should remember that the most basic instincts can be redirected: it is normal for an animal to urinate when its bladder is full and to m o u n t any available female during the mating season, but in m a n such behaviour can be controlled through training. The distinctly h u m a n quality of cerebralization of behaviour is possible through education. In short, whether or not it can be ascertained that in the wild state there are species of animals that kill their o w n kind, and whether or not h u m a n aggression is considered an instinct, nothing in m a n ' s genes forces h i m to commit murder. Atomic war is not an inevitable consequence of man's evolution. W e are suffering from the effects of an environment which has channelled our potentially positive, aggressive and competitive energy into destructive violence. It is also true that w e are facing formidable ideological conflicts. Fortunately, modern technology has provided us not only with the means to destroy ourselves but also with the m e a n s to discover and influence the mechanisms of violence at its source within the brain.
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Violence in the brain It would be naïve to try to understand the reasons for a riot by recording the cerebral electrical activity of the participants, but it would be equally naive to ignore the fact that each participant has a brain and that determined neuronal constellations are reacting to sensory inputs subsequently producing the behavioural expression of violence. Both neurophysiological and environmental factors must be evaluated, and today methodology is available for their combined study. A s pointed out by Lorenz, humanity in general behaves in no way more intelligently than animals would under the same circumstances, and this alarming situation is due largely to '. . . that spiritual pride which prevents m e n from regarding themselves and their behavior as parts of nature and as subject to its universal laws'. 1 Experimental investigation of the cerebral structures responsible for aggressive behaviour is an essential counterpart to social studies, and this fact should be recognized by sociologists as well as biologists. A new experimental approach to the study of brain functions in behaving subjects has established that w e can investigate the brain mechanisms responsible for the onset, development and maintenance of specific mental functions, and that w e can influence them by physical and chemical means. Ultimately, w e should be able to influence the genetic, environmental and intracerebral levels in order to substitute, at least in part, h u m a n intelligence for natural change in the formation and education of individual mental activities. If w e could modify mental mechanisms, the consequences would be far m o r e important than those of extending m a n ' s life span or limiting his birth-rate, because to influence the mind is to direct the source of all h u m a n activities. By means of electrical stimulation of the brain w e can alter its activity in m a n y ways. W e can effect the release of ideokinetic formulae stored in the neurons and activate motor fragments of aggression performed without purpose, awareness, or adaptability, which are similar to the simple motor movements evoked by motor cortex stimulation. This is probably the explanation of what w e call 'false' rage, which is not properly oriented, cannot be conditioned, and does not appear to leave a m e m o r y trace. In other experiments, brain stimulation m a y produce a painful sensation that enrages the animal and elicits a violent response. T h e fact that aggressive behaviour in monkeys usually appears not during, but from one to two seconds after brain stimulation, favours this explanation. T h e animals' vocalizations and facial expressions indicate that they have felt unpleasant sensations. It is k n o w n that artificial activation of sensory imputs which induce unwanted sensations m a y be followed by aggression. Behaviour can also be evoked by brain stimulation which is not just a fragment of violence or a reaction to discomfort but is a complete and purposefully directed act. In colonies of cats, monkeys and apes, one m e m b e r can be induced, by radio stimulation of any of several brain areas,
1.
Konrad Lorenz, 'Ritualized Fighting', in: J. D . Carthy and F. J. Ebling (eds.), The Natural History of Aggression, p. 39-50, N e w York, Academic Press, 1964, 159 p.
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The neurological basis of violence
to become aggressive. While under the influence of the artificially evoked emotion, the animal will, however, behave according to his social surroundings, attacking a recognized enemy, sparing a friend and avoiding a superior in rank. In patients implanted with electrodes for diagnostic purposes, certain stimulations have evoked violent reactions of rage and destruction. T h e emotional potential can be evoked artificially, but it is always expressed according to the subject's previous experience and evaluation of his present environment. These facts call attention to the decisive role of education in moulding personality. In the near future, w e should k n o w enough to plan more rational behavioural imprinting of neurons during the decisive years of early childhood. M a n y questions await answers. C a n w e identify the cerebral areas responsible for aggression? Where in the brain are the environmental inputs of physical and symbolic punishment interpreted as undesirable and thus converted into triggers for subsequent aggression? H o w does cultural training influence the reactivity of specific cerebral areas? C a n neurophysiological mechanisms of violence be re-educated or are individual responses set for life after early imprinting? Scientific advances have proved that mental functions and h u m a n behaviour can be modified by surgery (frontal lobotomy), by electronics (brain stimulation), and by chemistry (use of tranquillizers), thus placing the mind within experimental reach. T h e ability to influence mental activity by direct manipulation of cerebral structures is certainly novel in the history of m a n , and present objectives are not only to increase our understanding of the neurophysiological basis of mind but also to influence cerebral mechanisms by means of instrumental manipulation. The working hypotheses m a y be summarized as follows: (a) there are basic mechanisms in the brain responsible for all mental activities, inducing perceptions, emotions, abstract thought, social relations, and the most refined artistic creations; (b) these mechanisms m a y be detected, analysed, influenced and in some instances substituted by means of physical and chemical technology (this approach does not claim that love or thoughts are exclusively neurophysiological phenomena, but accepts the obvious fact that the central nervous system is absolutely necessary for any behavioural manifestation, and plans to study the mechanisms involved); (c) predictable behavioural and mental responses can be evoked by direct manipulation of specific brain areas; (d) w e can substitute intelligent and purposeful determination of neuronal functions for blind, automatic responses. W e must realize that violence is not in the knife of the assassin, death is not in the barrel of a gun, war is not determined byflyingmissiles, and destruction is not in atomic energy. These elements are only m a n - m a d e products; of themselves they are static, and to act they must be directed by our thinking brains. W e are perhaps experiencing the greatest crisis in m a n ' s history as w e find ourselves trapped by our o w n machines, our confidence eroded by the growing anxiety of social, racial and political conflicts. A sense of the futility of life, lack of purpose and understanding lead to frustration and antisocial behaviour. This attitude is the result of a basic misconception of
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the role of an individual in society. Happiness is not realized by the acquisition of a power base by each isolated individual. Alone, m a n has n o destiny. His 'humanness' is the gift of culture, and his fulfilment can be realized as he absorbs, modifies and transmits culture, accepting a role in his society and thus contributing to the destiny of the h u m a n race. The individual perishes; mankind survives and evolves.
Psychogenesis in the school curriculum Liberation from and domination of the environment was possible w h e n w e discovered the laws of Nature and directed them with our intelligence. In a similar way, w e cannot ignore the biological laws of the mind. W e should use our brains to direct our behaviour rather than to accept its determination by u n k n o w n forces. Through education w e should provide awareness of the elements, including intracerebral mechanisms, which intervene in the formation of personal identity, and w e should teach the processes of decision-making and choice. Freedom requires the recognition of biological drives and their intelligent direction through processes of sublimation, substitution, postponement, or simply their satisfaction with civilized refinement. Individual freedom will increase w h e n w e understand the setting of our personality in early childhood, and w h e n w e develop means for the acceptance, rejection, or evaluation, and also the emotional interpretation of the information constantly impinging on us from our surroundings. For this purpose, a programme of psychogenesis should be established at an early age, based on latest information about the physiology, psychology and biochemistry of personality formation. Courses on psychogenesis should be available to parents as well as educators and children, because parents initially control the environment of their infants, whose responses to sensory stimuli, whether chosen or random, will establish patterns of behaviour forming the basis of their personalities. In agreement with our experimental findings and as mentioned in m y recent book, 1 the postulates of psychogenesis are: The mind does not exist at the m o m e n t of birth. The mind cannot appear in the absence of sensory inputs. Individual identity and personal behaviour are not properties of the brain which will unfold automatically through neuronal maturation, but are acquired functions which must be learned and therefore depend essentially on the reception of sensory inputs. Violence is a pattern of behavioural response related to the function of specific areas of the brain. Expressions of violent responses depend essentially on previous sensory inputs and experience.
1.
José M . R . Delgado, Physical Control of the Mind: Toward a Psychocivilized Society, N e w York, Harper & R o w , 1969, 280 p. Vol. X L I of the World Perspectives series, edited by R . N . Anshen.
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The neurological basis of violence
The purpose of education is not the unveiling of individual mental functions but their creation and genesis. Symbols from the environment will be physically integrated within the brain as molecular changes in the neuronal structure. M a n is not born free but is subservient to genes and education. Personal freedom is not inherited, nor is it a gift of Nature, but one of the highest goals of civilization which requires awareness and intellectual and emotional training in order to process information and choose consciously and intelligently a m o n g alternatives. Education should not be authoritarian because mentalflexibilityis thus reduced, handicapping creativity and forcing behavioural conformity or producing hyper-reactive rejection and rebellion. Education should not be permissive either, because other kinds of automatisms are thus developed, determined by the blind chance of environmental circumstances. In a permissive atmosphere, the individual m a y be a slave to his o w n emotions, while an authoritarian upbringing creates a tyranny of inhibitions and conformism. Both extremes are undesirable and it is preferable to direct mental and behavioural development toward a self-determination of goals, knowing that if w e want to create free individuals, w e must teach them to be so. Understanding the cerebral mechanisms involved in behavioural responses provides a feedback which modifies these mechanisms, introducing elements of conscious determination. The h u m a n being is a functional trinity of sensory inputs and behavioural responses connected by the essential link of intracerebral processes. T h e three aspects are equally essential, even if, in the past, only thefirsttwo were considered important while the brain remained an unreachable mystery. Today w e have begun to unravel the secrets of cerebral activities, and a n e w perspective for knowing m a n is emerging from scientific explorations.
José M . R. Delgado received his medical training at Madrid University where he later became associate professor of physiology. In 1952 he began work at Yale University and at present professor of physiology at the Yale University School of Medicine. Dr. Delgado is on the editorial board of various scientific publications, including the Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, the International Journal of Neuropharmacology, and the International Review of Neurobiology. He is the author of over 200 articles in scientific journals and his most recent book, Physical Control of the M i n d : Toward a Psychocivilized Society, appeared in 1969.
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David A . H a m b u r g
Recent research on hormonal factors relevant to h u m a n aggressiveness*
In light of present knowledge, it is very difficult to clarify biological aspects of h u m a n aggressiveness. Aggressive behaviour has not been a prominent subject in biological sciences. Even in behavioural biology, very few research workers have directed their attention toward this problem area until the past few years. Thus, well-substantiated data are regrettably lacking on m a n y crucial questions. W h e n solid information is in short supply, authority tends to substitute for evidence, and conflicting authorities clash acrimoniously. This tendency has lately been quite obvious in regard to the possible role of biological factors in h u m a n aggressiveness. O n e m a y be entitled to hope that the emergence of a mature science of h u m a n behavioural biology over the next decade or two will g o a long w a y toward settling these controversies. There are m a n y reasons w h y aggressive behaviour has not been the subject of extensive research in biological sciences. It is very complex and experimental controls are difficult. The relevant observations are often unpleasant, even physically dangerous for the observer. Relevance to m a n of observations o n other animals—even those closely related to m a n by all biological criteria—are often doubted. Both within the scientific community and beyond, it is difficult to view m a n truly as an animal, especially as a violent animal with a long evolutionary heritage of aggressiveness and biological equipment that supports such behaviour. Moreover, the belief is widespread, even a m o n g scientists, that biological factors would not be modifiable. This is curious in light of the discoveries of modern biomedical science which have shown that even severe genetic diseases can be ameliorated by appropriate environmental modification, especially if the underlying biochemical mechanisms are k n o w n . 2 A particularly unfortunate part of the controversies surrounding h u m a n aggressiveness is the tendency to view possible biological and social contributing factors in a dichotomous, either/or way. This perhaps reflects the artificial barriers that have been erected between biological and social sciences altogether. In the area of aggressiveness, as elsewhere, there is need for a more unified view of life sciences, in which m a n y processes that have traditionally 1. 2.
This w o r k w a s m a d e possible by National Institute of Mental Health Grant N o . M H - 1 0 9 7 6 . H . Harris, The Principles of Human Biochemical Genetics, N e w Y o r k , American Elsevier, 1970.
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Recent research o n hormonal factors
been kept in watertight compartments could be brought into dynamic relation with each other. In regard to h u m a n aggressiveness, there seems little doubt a m o n g biologists that social factors play an enormously important role in the learning and expression of aggressive patterns. This recognition does not exclude the possibility that underlying biological processes m a y influence the ease of learning such patterns and some forms of their expression. S o m e of these aggressive propensities m a y possibly reflect basic characteristics of the species, laid d o w n by the genes in the wiring diagram of the brain, the chemical processing of information in the nervous system, and the influence of hormones on the brain and other tissues. S o m e aggressive propensities m a y possibly reflect biological differences between the sexes; others between immature and mature organisms of a given sex; still others, differences between individuals of a given age and sex. Biological variability in all of these dimensions is formidable and m a y have some bearing on the readiness with which w e learn and express aggressive patterns. These questions are susceptible to empirical investigation with the powerful tools of modern biological science and point the w a y toward an emerging field of social biology. Despite the serious obstacles referred to above, progress is currently being m a d e . W e can n o w identify several promising lines of inquiry and delineate models that deserve a high priority for further scientific exploration. A m o n g the various biological approaches, hormonal ones are particularly interesting because: (a) there is a substantial tradition of research implicating male sex hormone in aggressive behaviour of adult males in m a n y m a m m a l i a n species—this evidence has been reviewed elsewhere and will not be repeated here;1 (b) recent work has extended such observations to primates, and has highlighted the role of long-term developmental processes in hormonebehaviour relations;2 (c) the emergence of biochemical techniques for precise, reliable measurement of hormones and related molecules offers drastically improved opportunities for analysing such problems. 3 Hormonal influences upon brain organization early in life have been shown to affect later aggressive and sexual behaviour.4 The pioneering work in this area was done with rodents. For example, Seymour Levine and others have shown that brief treatment of new-born female rats with male sex hormone, testosterone, results in lifelong abolition of female sex behaviour and a tendency toward male patterns of aggressive behaviour as well.5 Neo-natally castrated male rats show female-like patterns offightingbehaviour in a shock-induced experimental situation. Like females, they d o not show increased fighting 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
J. P. Scott, 'Hostility and Aggression in Animals', in: E . L . Bliss (ed.), Roots of Behavior, p. 167-78, N e w York, Harper, 1958. R . C . Boelkins and J. F . Heiser, 'Biological Bases of Aggression', in: D . N . Daniels, M . F . Gilula and F. M . Ochberg (eds.), Violence and the Struggle for Existence, p. 15-48, Boston, Mass., Little, Brown & C o . , 1970. L . Martini and A . Pecile, Hormonal Steroids 2, N e w York, Academic Press, 1965, 673 p. G . Harris, 'Sex Hormones, Brain Development and Brain Function', Endocrinology, Vol. 75, 1964, p. 627-48. S. Levine and R . F . Mullins Jr., 'Hormonal Influences on Brain Organization in Infant Rats', Science, Vol. 152, 1966, p. 1585-92.
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w h e n testosterone is injected in adult life. However, later castration (e.g. at time of weaning) does not have this aggression-diminishing effect. Evidently, there is an early sensitive period in this species during which testosterone has a profound enduring effect o n aggressiveness. Recent experiments on ring doves and rats have examined the question whether such effects of early testosterone are likely to be mediated by a direct action of the hormone on the developing brain, and if so h o w this action might take place.1 T h e results indicate that androgens accumulate selectively in central as well as in peripheral target tissues. W h e n tritium-labelled testosterone was injected intravenously, it was quickly metabolized and selectively localized in the hypothalamus, as well as in the pituitary gland and genital tissues such as the seminal vesicles. Dihydrotestosterone, a highly active metabolite of testosterone also accumulated differentially in these tissues. Little information is so far available concerning the anatomical localization of sites at which the sexual differentiation of the brain occurs, or on the underlying biochemical mechanisms. In developing an experimental approach to these problems, Clayton, Kogura and Kraemer m a d e the reasonable assumption that the early effects of testosterone in the brain must involve enhanced R N A synthesis in differentiating areas. They have used autoradiographic methods to examine the acu'e effect of testosterone on the incorporation of tritiated uridine into the R N A of the brain of the new-born female rat.2 Their experiments show that the acute effect of administered testosterone is to reduce significantly the incorporation of uridine into brain tissue in general. However, two highly localized regions of the brain, in the anterior hypothalamus and in the amygdala, have been detected in which this reduction of incorporation of tritiated uridine under testosterone treatment does not occur. These two regions of the brain are implicated by m u c h experimental work in C N S functions related to sexual behaviour and gonodatropin release. Their unique activity in Clayton's experiments suggests that they are directly involved in the sexual differentiation process, i.e. testosterone seems to stimulate R N A metabolism only in these two regions of the brain during the critical period for behavioural sex differentiation. Research on the role of testosterone in the development of aggressive behaviour has n o w been extended to primates.3 W h e n testosterone is given in large doses to pregnant monkeys (rhesus macaque), spanning the second quarter of gestation, any female offspring that ensue are abnormal. These infant monkeys have some anatomical and behavioural characteristics of the male type. This research was based on the earlier perception of sex diffe1. 2. 3.
J. M . Stern, Distribution and Binding of 'H-androgens in Neural and Peripheral Tissues of Rats and Ring Doves; Effects of Progesterone and Other Steroid Hormones, Rutgers University, 1970 (thesis). R . B . Clayton, J. Kogura and H . C . Kraemer, 'Sexual Differentiation of the Brain: Effects of Testosterone on Brain R N A Metabolism in Newborn Female Rats', Nature, Vol. 226, 1970, p. 810-12. W . Young, R . G o y and C . Phoenix, 'Hormones and Sexual Behavior', Science, Vol. 143, 1964, p. 212-18.
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Recent research on hormonal factors
rences in the behaviour of infant monkeys, the males being more aggressive. Reliable behavioural norms have been established, documenting these sex differences in behaviour during infancy. Indeed, they appear almost as soon as the infants are capable of any sustained activity. (Similar differences are observed in wild macaques and baboons.) In the hormone experiments, the social behaviour of the untreated female offspring was like that already described for other normal females, but the behaviour of the treated females (whose mothers had received testosterone during pregnancy) m u c h more closely resembled that of males. The masculinized female offspring threatened, initiated play and engaged in rough-and-tumble play patterns more frequently than the controls. Like the normal males, these masculinized females also withdrew less often from the initiations, threats and approaches of other monkeys. Eight such female monkeys exposed to male sex hormone while in the uterus have been observed until they reached adult status. A s adults, they continued to exhibit threatening behaviour toward other monkeys, but the other aggressive characteristics have diminished somewhat under the laboratory conditions employed so far.1 Recentfieldstudies of baboons and macaques have shown two features of ground living, old world monkeys that are pertinent here—relating individual development to evolutionary adaptation: There is m u c h evidence of rough-and-tumble play a m o n g males. Their frequent repetition of such play patterns amounts to a kind of practice of aggressive behaviour over several years, from infancy onward. In this w a y , they develop complex motor skills that utilize their formidable anatomy, including their great canine teeth and massive temporal muscles. There are marked sex differences in anatomy and behaviour. T h e adult males defend the troop and also regulate internal disputes within the group. 2 Taking the experimental and field observations together, it appears that the male's early aggressive inclination (presumably based on genetic factors mediated by hormonal effects on brain differentiation and muscle growth) is developed through social learning and ultimately put to adaptively significant use. These observations have some generality for complex, old world monkeys and great apes that spend m u c h of their time on the ground, and m a y well have significance for the evolution of m a n . It is at least plausible that basic processes of this sort have continued to operate throughout the long course of h u m a n evolution. Considering the extraordinary learning capacities that are characteristic of the h u m a n species, it seems quite unlikely that the early exposure of brain cells to male sex hormone would establish fixed, complex patterns of aggressive behaviour for a lifetime. Rather, it seems likely that some more general 1. 2.
R . W . Goy, 'Organizing Effects of Androgen on Behaviour in Monkeys', in: R . P. Michael (ed.), Endocrinology and Human Behaviour, p. 12-29, N e w York, Oxford University Press, 1968. S. L . Washburn and D . A . Hamburg, 'Aggressive Behavior in Old World Monkeys and Apes', in: P. C . Jay (ed.), Primates: Studies in Adaptation and Variability, p. 458-78, N e w York, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1968.
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orientation or temperamental inclination might be influenced by early male hormone, so that aggressive patterns are attractive and readily learned. (I shall return to this point shortly.) But is there any evidence at all of similar effects in h u m a n development? T h e monkey experiments have quite recently been followed by an investigation of girls w h o had been exposed to androgens in utero, i.e. their developing brains in foetal life had c o m e into contact with chemical compounds similar to the male sex hormone. 1 A total of twenty-two such girls have been studied, mostly in the 10-12 year age range. Those with striking anatomical abnormalities had undergone surgical correction shortly after birth. With interviews and projective tests, information w a s obtained from each girl and from at least one parent in each of several behavioural categories. T h e research design undertook to control for observer bias. T h e results indicated that the early-androgenized girls, as contrasted with a control group, tended to be described by self and others as tomboys, to engage in outdoor sports requiring m u c h energy and vigour, to prefer rough play, and to prefer toys ordinarily chosen by boys (such as guns). This is a provocative study that will require careful replication. Nevertheless, these observations raise an important question and illustrate a line of inquiry that has grown from basic research on the biology of sex differentiation to an important h u m a n problem. Experimental methods for analysing the deployment of attention in the developing primate—monkey, ape, or child—could be helpful in understanding the complex roots of aggressive behaviour. For example, it is feasible to expose isolation-reared monkeys to different kinds of stimuli in order to determine whether they have preferences within the sphere of aggressive behaviour. U p o n providing various types of visual input, some types might elicit more sustained attention than others. For example, in light of the early sex differences in aggressive behaviour, it would be reasonable to predict that males, if exposed visually to a variety of play patterns, would spend more time than females in viewing rough-and-tumble play. A recent m o n k e y experiment is pertinent here.2 Though the investigator was not primarily concerned with aggressive behaviour, hisfindingsare interesting in this context. H e raised monkeys in a total isolation chamber for the first nine months of life, during which he exposed them to various types of visual input from coloured slides. These slides depicted monkeys in various activities and also depicted various non-monkey stimuli. A m o n g the various categories presented, it is quite notable that monkey pictures elicited m u c h m o r e interest than non-monkey pictures. Moreover, pictures of monkeys threatening were especially potent in eliciting behavioural responses. Between two and a half and four months of age, threat pictures yielded a particularly high frequency of disturbance. Similar results were obtained with the use of motion-picture films in the same experimental design. Thesefindingssuggest that there is a period in early development during which the infant m o n k e y 1. 2.
J. Money and A . A . Ehrhardt, 'Prenatal Hormonal Exposure: Possible Effects on Behaviour in M a n ' , in: R . P . Michael (ed.), op. cit., p. 32-47. G . P . Sackett, 'Monkeys Reared in Isolation with Pictures as Visual Input: Evidence for an Innate Releasing Mechanism', Science, Vol. 154, 1966, p. 1468.
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is highly responsive to the threatening facial expression which is characteristic of the species. Given an inclination of this sort, one can imagine h o w the infant in the natural environment would learn a great deal about threat and attack behaviour. Through the processes of observational learning, which appear to be so important in primate development, it seems highly probable that once the infant monkey's attention is powerfully drawn to threat stimuli, he would rapidly go on to learn the conditions under which threat and attack patterns are likely to occur, and the behaviour that is effective in terminating them. Future research will determine whether exposure of the brain to testosterone in utero has a bearing on differentiation of circuits that will ultimately mediate response dispositions like those occurring to the threat stimulus in infancy. In studying problems of this kind, w e must bear in mind that the correlation, if any, between androgen levels and aggressive behaviour need not be contemporary, but rather might well be developmental. In other words, a high level of androgen secretion at an earlier point in life might affect the brain in such a w a y that the individual would be predisposed toward the development of aggressive behaviour subsequently. In such a case, it seems overwhelmingly probable that the hormonal effects would interact with conditions of the social environment during the years of growth and development. F r o m the standpoint of h u m a n development, this poses very difficult problems. T h e possibility that variations in early androgen exposure might influence the interests or preferences of the growing child in respect to aggressive and sexual behaviour is particularly intriguing because it would provide a crucial link between biological and psychosocial processes. Unfortunately, it is exceedingly difficult to get the vital information in m a n . In order to d o this, it would be very helpful to determine the hormonal situation during pregnancy. W h a t are the points of entry to determining the exposure of the brain to testosterone during foetal life? With methods that have become available quite recently, it is possible to measure testosterone and other androgens in tiny amounts in the blood and urine of the mother. The more difficult questions concern the way in which the mother's androgen situation is affecting the foetus. In some countries it has been possible to utilize the circumstance of therapeutic abortion for important research on this problem. In Sweden, where therapeutic abortions m a y be performed at mid-pregnancy by caesarean section, it has been possible to perfuse the foetus and so to get a dynamic picture of steroid metabolism in the early developing organism. While this does not solve any problems of later behaviour, it does help to understand what m a y be learned from the mother about the situation in the foetus. In due course, it m a y well become possible to get a picture of foetal endocrine activity by measuring testosterone and its metabolites in the blood and urine of the mother throughout pregnancy. There is a rapid transfer of steroids across the placenta from foetus to mother. T h e foetus uses the maternal urinary route of excretion. Thus, some leverage m a y be obtained by the discovery of so-called unique metabolites; that is, metabolites m a d e only or chiefly by the foetus. W h e n such metabolites appear in the urine of the mother,
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there is a high probability that they are coming from the foetus. O n e interesting lead in this connexion is the tendency of the h u m a n foetus to m a k e 16-hydroxylated steroids. Perhaps other distinctive features of foetal steroid metabolism will be discovered in the next few years. However, this is a very difficult area in which progress has been understandably slow. Before leaving this topic, another recent primate developmental study deserves mention. 1 O n the island colonies in Puerto Rico, several rhesus macaque free-ranging groups live under semi-natural conditions. Animals have been individually identified and various experimental interventions have been undertaken. O n e of these was the castration of ten young males. Four of these monkeys were castrated in infancy; the other six later in development. There was some tendency for the long-term behavioural effects to be stronger for the former than for the latter, but this point is not decisive. Several long-term effects of castration o n social behaviour were observed. The castrates showed: (a) a strong preference for associating with the other castrates; (b) a heightened tendency to care for immature monkeys; and (c) relatively low dominance status. However, there were marked individual differences in aggressive behaviour; and those w h o established friendships were able to fight and defeat m u c h larger animals. This study suggests the potentiality of integrating field and laboratory techniques. M u c h of the preceding material has had to do with a very early developmental phase. W e n o w turn briefly to a later developmental phase, puberty. In light of the evidence on testosterone's significance for the development of aggressive behaviour in m a n y vertebrate species, the question of puberty's hormonal effects on behaviour in primates is intriguing. T h e advent of precise, reliable biochemical methods for measuring minute quantities of testosterone (and closely related steroids) provides m u c h better opportunities for answering such questions than existed even a few years ago. S o m e observations in n o n - h u m a n primates are of interest in this connexion. In the isolation-rearing experiments of Harlow and associates, the general tendency is for the isolation-reared monkeys to be exceedingly fearful and prone to violence, both to self and others. This aggressiveness does not spontaneously decline with the passage of years after they are brought out of isolation. Indeed, there are some indications that these tendencies become further heightened with the passage of time. The time of these observations roughly coincides with puberty, and it is quite possible that the exacerbation observed m a y be related to increases in level of circulating androgens. In a similar vein, it is interesting to note that several species of n o n - h u m a n primates have been observed in recentfieldstudies to have striking behavioural changes at adolescence, generally in the direction of heightened agonistic tendencies in one form or another.2 1. 2.
A . Wilson, Social Behavior of Free-Ranging Rhesus Monkeys with an Emphasis on Aggression, Berkeley, Calif., University of California, 1968 (thesis). See: Wilson, op. cit.; and J. van Lawick - Goodall, 'The Behaviour of Free-Living Chimpanzees in The G o m b e Stream Reserve,* in: J. M . Cullen and C . G . Beer (eds.), Animal Behaviour Monographs, p. 165-296, London, Bailliere, Tindall & Cassell, 1968.
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Several recent reports are directly pertinent to the role of sex hormones in personality development in the adolescent and young adult h u m a n , and draw attention to the promotion of aggressiveness in adolescents, by androgen administration (in this case, the mildly potent androgen, dehydroepiandrosterone). Moreover, recent biochemical studies implicating dihydrotestosterone as the 'biologically active form' of testosterone, accentuate the desirability of obtaining m o r e detailed information about the various androgenic c o m pounds present in the plasma of adolescents. Their possiblyfluctuatingconcentrations during this period of development should also be examined in view of the cyclicity of levels of testosterone excretion in normal males. Biochemical studies with the newer techniques show that there are sex differences in testosterone and androstenedione levels prior to puberty but there appears to be no remarkable increase in the levels of these androgens during the period from age 3 to 9. 1 F r o m age 9 on, boys show a gradual increase in testosterone levels. There is a great deal of variation in androgen levels for any given age. Are these individual differences related to any aspect of aggressiveness? O f particular interest are the data for pubertal boys (ages 10-15). Here one sees a dramatic increase in testosterone levels in the order of tenfold, as well as striking individual differences for a given age level. Does this change responsiveness to provocative stimulation or lower frustration thresholds? Let us n o w turn our attention to mature organisms. Are any hormonal fluctuations associated with changes in aggressive behaviour? S o m e recent work has been directed to the possibility that aggressive tendencies m a y vary in relation to hormonal fluctuations of reproductive cycles in mature organisms. In studies o n the monkeys of the Puerto Rican colony, the frequency of aggressive behaviour was found to fluctuate cyclically as a function of the colony's reproductive state.2 Males were wounded and died significantly more frequently during the mating season than at any other time of year. T h e data on differential injury and mortality were interpreted to m e a n that during the mating season adult males experience high levels of androgens which are responsible for increases in the frequency of severe aggressive interactions. While this is a plausible interpretation, direct hormone assays were not m a d e . W e have recently undertaken studies of the h u m a n menstrual cycle, seeking hormone-behaviour correlations.3 O n e aspect of this work has to do with the occurrence of heightened irritability at certain times of the cycle. It is clinically well k n o w n that fluctuations of m o o d frequently occur in correlation with the menstrual cycle. Typically the pre-menstruum is likely to be a phase of increased irritability and depression. Several studies have documented the disproportionately high rate of occurrence of various types of disturbance during the pre-menstrual and menstrual phases. These have 1. 2. 3.
D . T . Lunde and D . A . Hamburg, 'Androgens and Aggressive Behavior', in: S. Levine (ed.), Hormones and Human Behavior, N e w York, Academic Press (in press). Wilson, op. cit. D . A . Hamburg, R . H . M o o s and I. D . Yalom, 'Studies of Distress in the Menstrual Cycle and the Postpartum Period', in: R . P. Michael (ed.), op. cit., p. 94-116.
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David A . Hamburg
included: psychiatric hospital admissions; suicide attempts; neurotic and psychotic depressions; assaultive behaviour in hospitalized psychiatric patients; accidents; and crimes of violence. It is perhaps curious that despite the rather extensive documentation of these relationships there has been little attempt to study the role of hormonal factors in their etiology. W h a t is the incidence and severity of different symptoms in the menstrual, pre-menstrual and inter-menstrual phases of the menstrual cycles in a sample of relatively young married w o m e n ? W e undertook a large-scale questionnaire study to obtain answers to this question. Previous research relating to menstrual and pre-menstrual symptoms constituted the most important source of symptoms for inclusion in the questionnaire. Six descriptive categories were utilized to provide a roughly quantitative estimate of severity. T h e questionnaire was mailed to all wives of graduate students at a large American university. Approximately 1,100 replies were received after one follow-up letter. W e found that 52 per cent of these w o m e n reported marked irritability in the pre-menstrual phase of some menstrual cycles; 30 per cent reported marked pre-menstrual irritability during their most recent cycle. Their reports of pre-menstrual irritability exceeded those of pre-menstrual tension, depression, or m o o d swings. Thesefindingsare generally similar to those of Coppen and Kessel in England in respect to: (a) prevalence of the pre-menstrual syndrome; and (b) appreciable nature of distress and functional impairment. Are these psychological reactions related to hormonal fluctuations? There is an interesting hormonal feature of the pre-menstrual reactions: they occur at a time of withdrawal of progesterone and estrogen from the circulation. Pre-ovulatory plasma progesterone levels are extremely low—about 1 microgram per cent. Progesterone concentration is higher in the second half of the cycle—2-3 micrograms per cent. There is often an abrupt rise beginning about mid-cycle, and a rapid fall starting several days before the onset of menstruation. The latter point is strengthened by measurement of progesterone in h u m a n ovarian vein blood. By thefirstday of menstruation, there is often no detectable progesterone. O n e line of inquiry in this area involves the concomitant measurement of progesterone and behavioural variables through the menstrual cycle, centring attention particularly on thefinalweek of the cycle, and utilizing comparisons of w o m e n w h o do and d o not have severe pre-menstrual distress. Estrogen falls too, but not necessarily at the same rate as progesterone. Moreover, little is k n o w n of differences in rate of fall of the three principal estrogens: estradiol, estrone and estriol. In our research, w e have not found progesterone levels or rate of fall to be correlated with over-all distress, but possible relations to irritability have not yet been adequately analysed. Moreover, w e did not measure estrogens, and the estrogen-progesterone ratio m a y be important. In several m a m m a l i a n species, estrogens heighten susceptibility to seizures, and clinical observations suggest that this is also true of epileptic w o m e n . In any event, such hormonal changes at the end of each menstrual cycle must interact with important psychological and environmental variables such as: (a) the personal meaning of being a w o m a n ; and (b) current respon-
44
Recent research o n hormonal factors
sibilities. In general, the possibility of hormonal influences o n female aggressiveness deserves m u c h further study. Clinical observations suggest that certain non-reproductive hormones m a y affect the probability of aggressive behaviour in m a n . T h e most striking observations are the markedly increased irritability associated with hyperfunction of the adrenal cortex and also with hyperfunction of the thyroid gland. In Cushing's disease, in which there is excessive secretion of adrenocortical hormones and very high circulating concentrations of these hormones, patients are often described as being easily aroused in anger. With successful treatment of the condition, this behaviour tends to diminish. Similar observations have been m a d e in patients w h o were given large doses of exogenous corticosteroids. The same statements apply to Grave's disease (hyperthyroidism) and to exogenously given thyroid hormone. That is, high levels of circulating thyroid hormone, however produced, are associated with a strong tendency to respond angrily to frustrating circumstances. With diminishing levels of thyroid hormone, irritability tends to diminish also. Little is k n o w n of the endocrine concomitants of anger, threat and attack in m a n . There are, however, intriguing clues involving steroid hormones and also biogenic amines, the latter occurring not only in the general circulation via secretion of the adrenal medulla, but also endogenously in the brain. Intake of c o m m o n l y used drugs also affects brain amines. 1 S o m e years ago w e found, in experiments with h u m a n subjects, that when persons participated in stressful interviews, the degree of anger elicited was significantly and linearly related to plasma Cortisol concentrations.2 In later work w e obtained some evidence that social differences m a y have a bearing o n the anger-cortisol relation. If the expression of anger w a s socially approved and personally congenial, the tendency toward adrenocortical activation appeared to be less than w h e n the expression of anger was not socially approved, was personally distressing, and when retaliation was anticipated. Since the latter conditions often prevail in h u m a n societies, the possibility of chronic adrenal stimulation under conditions of chronic agonistic experience deserves additional investigation. M u c h m o r e work has been done in rodents than in other animal groups on physiological and biochemical responses to crowding, stranger contact, and aggressive interactions.3 A number of studies in recent years have been concerned with the relations of population density, endocrine function and behaviour.4 In investigations with a variety of small m a m m a l i a n species, involving both laboratory andfieldstudies, evidence has emerged suggesting 1. 2. 3. 4.
J. R . Tinklenberg and R . C . Stillman, 'Drug Use and Violence', in: D . N . Daniels, M . F , Gilula and F. M . Ochberg (eds.), Violence and the Struggle for Existence, p. 327-65, Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1970. H . Persky, D . Hamburg, H . Basowitz, R.Grinker, M . Sabshin, S. Korchin, M . Herz, F. Board and H . Heath, ' Relation of Emotional Responses and Changes in Plasma Hydrocortisone Level After Stressful Interview', A . M . A . Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry, Vol. 79,1958, p. 434-47. D . A . Hamburg, 'Crowding, Stranger Contact, and Aggressive Behavior', paper presented at World Health Organization Symposium, Stockholm, 1970; to be published in: L . Levi (ed.), Society, Stress and Disease, N e w York, Oxford University Press, 1971. J. Christian and D . Davis, 'Endocrines, Behavior and Population', Science, Vol. 146, 1964, p. 1550-60.
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David A . H a m b u r g
that as population density increases to high level, adrenal function tends to increase considerably and gonadal function tends to diminish; moreover, such increases in population density are, in m a n y species, associated with a striking tendency toward aggressive behaviour—either increases in amount of such behaviour or the appearance of highly unusual forms of aggression. There are also intriguing observations suggesting the possibility of increased susceptibility to a variety of diseases under conditions of high population density. Effects of increasing population density are considerably influenced by the genotype and the prior experience of the animals.1 Crowding significantly enhances the toxicity of various sympathomimetic amines, especially amphetamine, in mice. 2 Several sedatives and tranquillizing drugs such as phénobarbital, chlorpromaxine, and reserpine afford protection to such grouped animals. Adrinergic blocking agents protect mice against the crowding effect to a substantial extent, whereas monoamine oxidase inhibitors tend to enhance the crowding effect. Investigations are under w a y to clarify the biochemical mechanism of such effects. Related research currently deals with metabolism of biogenic amines—both catechol and incole amines in various regions of the brain—under several agonistic conditions in mice and rats.3 These conditions include: (a) aggregation; (b) contact with strangers; and (c) shock-induced fighting. These investigations lead us beyond strictly hormonal studies to hormonerelated biochemistry of information-processing in the nervous system, and into the broader field of h u m a n biochemical genetics.4 The latter provides a powerful set of concepts and techniques for analysing h u m a n diseases, some of which clearly involve disorders of brain and behaviour. O n e of these, only discovered a few years ago, is of interest here because it is characterized by peculiarities in the aggressive sphere. In due course, clarification of the mechanisms underlying this disorder m a y provide clues to neurochemical processes involved in the mediation of aggressive behaviour. The Lesch-Nyhan syndrome is a disorder of purine metabolism in which overproduction of uric acid is accompanied by severe behaviour disturbance including unusual aggressive manifestations.5 T h e disease is transmitted as an X-linked recessive trait, and a specific enzyme deficiency has been delineated. These patients have bouts of stereotyped self-mutilating behaviour, resulting in serious damage to digits and lips. Although they are generally amiable with other people, bouts of attacking behaviour frequently occur towards others in which they not only attack verbally but hit, bite and break glasses.6 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
D . D . Thiessen, 'Population Density and Behavior: A Review of Theoretical and Physiological Contributions', Texas Reports on Biology and Medicine, Vol. 22, 1964, p. 266-314. J. D . Cole, 'Experimental Effects of Amphetamine: A Review', Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 68, 1967, p. 81-90. E . L . Bliss and J. Ailion, 'Response of Neurogenic Amines to Aggregation and Strangers', Journal of Pharmacology and Experimental Therapeutics, Vol. 168, N o . 2, 1969, p. 258-63. H . Harris, op. cit. W . L . Nyhan, J. A . James, A . J. Teberg, L . Sweetman and L . G . Nelson, ' A N e w Disorder of Purine Metabolism with Behavioral Manifestations', Pediatrics, Vol. 74, 1969, p. 20-27. L . H . Dismang and C . F . Cheatham, 'The Lesch-Nyhan Syndrome', American Journal of Psychiatry, Vol. 127, 1970, p. 671-7.
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Recent research o n hormonal factors
A w o m a n carrying the gene for this disease can n o w be identified by an assay for the abnormal enzyme. This permits rational genetic counselling. Quite recently it has become possible to tap the amnioticfluidof such a pregnant mother and determine biochemically whether the foetus has the abnormal enzyme. If so, a therapeutic abortion can be done if all parties consent. The purines involved in this disease have some similarity to environmental purines such as caffeine, the active ingredient of coffee, and theobromine, the active ingredient of tea. In current experiments, large doses of caffeine have induced self-mutilation by biting in rats.1 Similar results have been obtained with related compounds in rabbits and mice. This work opens u p a range of research possibilities on the effects of various brain-stimulating purines on parameters of aggressive behaviour. In this way, clues m a y arise regarding the role of purine metabolism in specific brain regions in mediating aggressive behaviour. It is conceivable that the internal accumulation of CNS-stimulants such as these purines m a y have a bearing on individual differences in h u m a n aggressiveness. A t the early stage of current knowledge, the main value of this work for our present topic is that it provides a clinical-experimental model for the analysis of aggressive behaviour in the framework of h u m a n biochemical genetics. Thus, a widening range of biological studies—including endocrine, biochemical, genetic, evolutionary and neurophysiological approaches—is being brought to bear on problems of h u m a n aggressiveness.2 T o be truly fruitful in clarifying such problems, these biological sciences must ultimately work in conjunction with social sciences toward the deeper understanding of m a n . 1. 2.
W . L. Nyhan, ' H u m a n Purine Metabolism and Behavior', Engineering and Science, Vol. 33, 1970, p. 45-9. See: S. Garattini and E . B. Sigg (eds.), Aggressive Behaviour, N e w York, John Wiley & Sons, 1969, 369 p.; J. D . Carthy and F. J. Ebling (eds.), The Natural History of Aggression, N e w York, Academic Press, 1964; A . B . Rothballer, 'Aggression,Defense,andNeurohumors',in: C . D . Clemente and D . B . Lindsley (eds.), Aggression and Defense, p. 135-70, Los Angeles, Calif., University of California Press, 1967; J. M . R . Delgado, 'Aggression and Defense Under Cerebral Radio Control', in :Clementeand Lindsley (eds.), op. cit., 1968, p. 171-93 ; R . E . Moyer, 'Internal Impulses to Aggression', Transactions of the New York Academy of Sciences, Vol. 31, 1969, p. 104-14; J. L . Brown and R . W . Hunsperger, 'Neuroethology and the Motivation of Agonistic Behaviour', Animal Behaviour, Vol. 11, 1963, p. 439-48; and R . W . Doty, 'Electrical Stimulation of the Brain in Behavioral Context', Annual Review of Psychology, Vol. 20, 1969, p. 289-311.
David A. Hamburg is professor and chairman of the Department of Psychiatry of the Stanford University School of Medicine. His professional activities are numerous and wide-ranging, including membership on the Mental Health Extramural Research Advisory Committee of the National Institute of Mental Health, the Committee on Life Sciences and Social Policy of the National Academy of Science INational Research Council, the Advisory Committee on Medical Education of the Carnegie Commission and the Panel on Mental Health and the Behavioral Sciences of the President''s Scientific Advisory Committee. Dr. Hamburg is the author of numerous articles and studies dealing with psychological stress and endocrine function, coping behaviour, neuroendocrine genetics, and the biological basis and development of aggressive behaviour.
Robert A . Hinde
The nature and control of aggressive behaviour
M u c h controversy about the control of aggression in animals and m a n has arisen from difficulties of definition. Most writers agree that behaviour directed towards causing physical injury to another individual should be labelled as aggressive—'directed towards' implying that the ways in which the behaviour changes with alterations in external conditions are such as to maximize the probability of such a consequence. But because attack can be dangerous to the attacker it is often limited to threatening movements, or associated with movements of self-protection or withdrawal: it is almost impossible to divorce attack from these other 'agonistic' movements. Furthermore m u c h behaviour directed towards causing physical injury results in settling status, precedence or access to some object or space; and m a n y argue that all behaviour with such consequences should be labelled as aggressive. The c o m m o n use of 'aggressive' as a synonym for 'self-assertive' or 'go-getting' is in harmony with this view. The psychiatrist Storr (1968) goes further and argues that the basis of intellectual achievement lies in the aggressive part of h u m a n nature, basing his argument o n the observation that w e describe intellectual effort with 'aggressive' words—for instance w e speak of 'attacking' and 'getting our teeth into' problems. But speech idioms scarcely provide suitable material on which to base scientific conclusions of this sort, and the absurdity of Storr's contentions are manifest when w e examine what they would really mean. If intellectual endeavour and aggressive behaviour were really related in the way Storr proposes, w e should expect that a person highly motivated with respect to one would also tend to be highly motivated with respect to the other, and that external factors particularly conducive to one would also be conducive to the other. This is against c o m m o n experience. The distinctions necessary for denning the category of aggressive behaviour are clarified by the use of examples from animals. It is suggested that it is profitable to distinguish between: Aggressive behaviour, directed towards causing physical injury to others, which as an incidental consequence m a y result in settling status or access to some object or space, but which does not vary in a way which maximizes such consequences. For example, in a flock of sparrows one individual
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The nature and control of aggressive behaviour
m a y be liable to attack or threaten any other individual which approaches within a certain distance. If at that m o m e n t it happens to be in the vicinity of a limited food source, its behaviour m a y determine access to that food, but this is (in this sense) only an incidental consequence of the aggression. (If its aggressive behaviour is totally unrelated to context, it m a y establish precedence in all contexts, but it can scarcely be said to be directed to that end.) Aggressive behaviour, likewise directed towards causing physical injury to others, variations in whose occurrence or nature are such as to maximize access to some object or space. Thus the aggressive behaviour of a territorial bird is limited to a particular area, and m a y be more intense in some parts of that area than others. In this sense it is directed to establishing precedence within that area. Such 'instrumental' aggression m a y form part of a sequence of behaviour directed towards an end quite other than physical injury, when the presence of another individual forms an obstacle to the achievement of that end. Behaviour, directed towards settling status as to access to some object or space, of which physical injury to others, if it occurs, is only an incidental consequence. Consider, for example, a flock of sparrows feeding in the snow w h e n a passer-by throws them a piece of bread; and suppose one birdfliesm o r e rapidly to the crumb than the others and eats it, as a consequence of which the others starve. T h e behaviour of that bird m a y be 'self-assertive', but it is not 'aggressive' since its behaviour was not directed towards causing the physical h a r m to others which resulted. Other types of behaviour—for example nest-building behaviour, which often involves n o immediate competition with others and n o harm, even incidental, to others except perhaps as a very remote consequence. In the present view, only thefirsttwo categories qualify as aggressive behaviour. N o w if aggressive behaviour is held to include all ways in which m a n expresses his individuality or asserts himself over his physical environment, w e should clearly be badly off without it. But surprising as it m a y seem, there are some w h o argue that aggressive behaviour defined in the narrow sense of behaviour likely to cause physical injury to others is a desirable h u m a n characteristic. Such arguments rest on loose thinking. For instance, the view that aggressive behaviour must be desirable because it arose through natural selection involves confusion between advantages to the individual and advantages to the species, and neglects the changed social environment in which m a n n o w lives. The view that aggressiveness is beneficial because it ensures that thefitterindividuals get precedence in access to valuable commodities equates fitter with more aggressive and is therefore circular; implies that society wishes to preserve the m o r e aggressive individuals; and neglects other ways of producing competition. The view that aggression ensures peace and order assumes that aggression is always potentially present. If this view is taken as implying that a hierarchy imposed from above gives a stable society, it assumes that a stable society in this sense is desirable: this is by n o means clearly the case, since it m a y conceal
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untold tensions. In any case this view neglects the interests of those at the bottom of the hierarchy. The view that aggression forms part of m a n y proper h u m a n activities either involves a loose definition of aggression (games can be competitive and pleasurable without being directed towards physical injury) or runs contrary to the biological evidence (aggressive behaviour m a y accompany sex, but hinders rather than enhances it). Finally, Lorenz has argued that individual affectional bonds exist only in those species which show aggressiveness, and from this has implied that m a n y of the best aspects of social life exist only because of their antitheses. Even if this is true as a statement concerned with inter-species differences, it is of doubtful relevance to the question of whether the aggressiveness of an individual enhances the probability of his showing affectional bonds. Although the ramifying consequences of abolishing all aggressive traits from h u m a n personality cannot be predicted, our present concern is clearly with their reduction. It is therefore necessary to examine the causal bases of aggression in the individual. T o this end, some consideration of the bases of aggression in animals is helpful. B y definition, aggression is directed towards other individuals, and the presence of another individual is thus a basic cause of aggressive behaviour. Studies of animals show that the stimulus characters which elicit aggression m a y be extremely simple, for example the red breast of the robin. In addition to such external factors, the occurrence of aggressive behaviour depends also on the internal state. Thus the difference between the aggressive behaviour of a flocking bird and that which it shows a m o n t h or two later w h e n behaving territorially is primarily a consequence of changes in the endocrine balance. However, the operation of such internal motivational factors m a y be m o r e indirect than appears atfirstsight: although passerine birds in a caged flock show more aggressive behaviour w h e n food-deprived than w h e n not, the increase is more a consequence of their increased locomotor activity bringing them into proximity m o r e often, and of the reduced readiness of threatened birds to withdraw from food, than of a direct effect of hunger on aggressiveness (e.g. A n d r e w , 1957; Marler, 1956). However, even if such internal factors have little effect on the intensity of aggressive behaviour, they m a y effect the context in which it occurs. T w o other types of factor are k n o w n to augment aggressiveness. O n e is frustration (Dollard et al., 1939). Although the emphasis placed by earlier writers on the role of frustration in the induction of aggression certainly overstated the case, it has been shown that aggression in animals is augmented by frustration. For instance, a pigeon trained to peck a key for food is especially likely to attack another individual tethered nearby during periods w h e n the key is disconnected from the food magazine (Azrin et al, 1966). O f course the definition of frustration is itself difficult, and the view that all aggression is caused by frustration easily becomes circular. Another factor predisposing animals to aggression is pain (Ulrich, 1966): thus two rats confined together are especially likely to fight if subject to electric shock.
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The nature and control of aggressive behaviour
Fear can act likewise, and the intensive fighting of a cornered animal can be regarded as involving the augmentation of aggression either by fear or by the frustration of escape. Both these groups of factors, frustration, and pain and fear, are k n o w n to operate in nature. Granted that aggressive behaviour requires the presence of another individual and that certain motivational states m a y influence the propensity to aggression, the question remains, does aggressive behaviour ever occur spontaneously? There are some w h o believe that m a n and animals have an 'instinct' for aggression which inevitably finds expression (e.g. Lorenz, 1966), and therefore hold that the solution to aggression is to ensure its expression through useful, or at least harmless, channels. This view depends on an energy model of motivation: the organism's activities are held to depend on stores of energy which are expended in action. Such theories have been used by Freud (who termed the energy 'libido'), by MacDougall, Lorenz, Tinbergen and others. However, such models are useful only at a very superficial level of analysis, and are sometimes misleading even there (Hinde, 1960). Thus the question of h o w m a n ' s aggressive energies can be channelled into constructive forms of behaviour, often posed in this context, is a pseudo question: if aggressiveness is reduced there will be time and opportunity for other types of behaviour, but they are likely to be different in kind from aggression, and to depend on different motivational states and environmental factors. Returning to the question of spontaneity, it has been shown that the aggressive behaviour of animals can be spontaneous in the sense that the individual will seek for fights (i.e. show appetitive behaviour directed towards bringing it into a context wherefightingwill be elicited). For example, Siamese fightingfishwill learn to swim through a lucite ring if this is followed by the presentation of a mirror, or of a model, which elicits their o w n agonistic behaviour. T h e effectiveness of such models in causing the fish subsequently to swim through the ring varies with their effectiveness in eliciting aggressive behaviour (Thompson, 1963). It has also been shown that the tendency to show 'aggressive behaviour fluctuates with time, and that sometimes attack can be elicited by a stimulus which would at other times be quite inadequate. But it remains unproven that the tendency to aggression rises steadily after an encounter u p to the point at which it inevitably bursts forth, as Lorenz has claimed. Indeed, the consequences of an aggressive encounter are complex, involving both incremental and décrémentai effects on subsequent aggressiveness: which preponderates depends on a variety of factors including both the outcome of the initial encounter and the time until the next. Thus often an aggressive encounter does not lower the subsequent tendency to aggression, but rather temporarily enhances it. Little is yet k n o w n about the duration of either the incremental or the décrémentai effects. So far w e have considered only the causal factors operating when aggression is actually precipitated. Going back further in time, the propensity to aggression is influenced by a variety of factors operating throughout the life of the individual. In the h u m a n case the nature of the parental care received, experience
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with siblings and with peers, the cumulative effects of frustrating conditions, the example of those in positions of authority, and previous experience in aggressive situations are all believed to be of importance. A s yet, however, our knowledge of h o w these factors operate is extremely scanty, and in most cases w e can give little m o r e than yes or n o answers to whether or not a particular type of experience affects the subsequent propensity to aggression (Hinde, 1970). In conclusion, it is suggested that the term 'aggressive behaviour' is most usefully restricted to behaviour directed towards causing physical h a r m to others. T h e ways in which it is or is not related to other types of behaviour is thus an open issue. It is held that it is not useful to picture aggressive behaviour as depending on instinctive energy, which could be directed into other channels. But the propensity to aggression can be traced to certain types of causal factors operating both earlier in life to affect the propensity to aggression, and in the immediate precipitation of an aggressive episode. Understanding of these factors can lead to suggestions as to h o w aggression can be reduced— reduction in crowding, reduction in frustration, improved conditions of rearing and so on. If aggression is reduced, other constructive types of activity become possible.
BIBLIOGRAPHY A N D R E W , R . J. 1957. Influence of hunger on aggressive behaviour in certain buntings of the genus Emberiza. Physiol. Zool., vol. 30, p. 177-85. A Z R I N , N . H . ; H U T C H I N S O N , R . R . ; H A K E , D . F . 1966. Extinction-induced aggression. / .
exp. anal. Behav., vol. 7, p. 223-8. D O L L A R D , J.; D O O B , L . W . ; M I L L E R , N . E . ; M O W R E R , O . H . ; S E A R S , R . R . 1939. Frustration
and aggression. N e w Haven, Conn., Yale University Press. H I N D E , R . A . 1960. Energy models of motivation. Symp. Soc. Exp. Biol, vol. 14, p. 199-213. . 1970. Animal behaviour. 2nd ed. N e w York, McGraw-Hill. H U T C H I N S O N , R . R . ; A Z R I N , N . H . ; H U N T , G . M . 1968. Attack produced by intermittent
reinforcement of a concurrent operant response. / . exp. anal. Behav., vol. 11, p. 489-95. L O R E N Z , K . 1966. On aggression. London, Methuen. M A R L E R , P. 1956. Studies offightingin chaffinches: (3) Proximity as a cause of aggression. Brit. J. anim. Behav., vol. 4, p. 23-30. S T O R R , A . 1968. Human aggression. Allen Lane, The Penguin Press. T H O M P S O N , T . E . 1963. Visual reinforcement in Siamesefightingfish.Science, vol. 141, p. 55-7. U L R I C H , R . E . 1966. Pain as a cause of aggression. Am. Zool., vol. 6, p. 643-62.
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Robert A. Hinde has been a Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge, since 1958 and a Royal Society Research Professor since 1963. He is also Honorary Director of the Medical Research Unit on the Development and Integration of Behaviour at the University of Cambridge. Professor Hindé's recent publications include 'The Study of Mother-Infant Interaction in Captive Group Living Rhesus Monkeys' (with Dr. Y. Spencer-Booth), in: Proc. Roy. Soc, Ser. B , N o . 169; Bird Vocalizations: Their Relation to Current Problems in Biology and Psychology (1969); and Short Term Changes in the Neural Activity and Behaviour (with Dr. G. Horn) (1970).
oie R. Hoists
Crisis, stress a n d decision-making
' W h a t is relevant for policy' in times of crisis, according to President Nixon's principal foreign policy adviser, 'depends not only on academic truths but also on what can be implemented under stress'.2 Observations by others w h o have experienced or studied international crises vary widely. Consider the following: 'Hence, a decision-maker m a y , in a crisis, be able to invent or work out easily and quickly what seems in normal times to both the "academic" scholar and the layman to be hypothetical, unreal, complex or otherwise difficult'.3 'In every case, the decision [to go to war] is based upon a careful weighing of the chances and of anticipating consequences. . . . In no case is the decision precipitated by emotional tensions, sentimentality, crowd-behavior, or other irrational motivations'.4 ' W e have faith that m a n , w h o has been endowed with the wit to d ie the means of his self-destruction, also has enough wit to keep those means under effective control'.5 ' W e create and enjoy crises. . . . W h y ? I don't k n o w . I wish I knew. But all of us like them. I k n o w I enjoy them. . . . There is a sense of elation that comes with crises'.6 ' Y o u see a poor, rather stupid fellow behind a desk and you wonder w h y he couldn't d o better than that [in crisis situations]. Unfortunately, that picture comes u p too often'.7 'I saw first-hand, during the long days and nights of the Cuban crisis, 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
7.
I gratefully acknowledge thefinancialsupport of the C a n a d a Council for m y research o n crisis. Henry A . Kissinger, 'Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy', in: James N . Rosenau (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy, p . 265, rev. ed., N e w Y o r k , T h e Free Press, 1969. H e r m a n K a h n , On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios, p . 38, N e w Y o r k , Praeger, 1965. Theodore Abel, ' T h e Element of Decision in the Pattern of W a r ' , American Sociological Review, Vol. V I , 1941, p . 855. John Foster Dulles, ' T h e Problem of Disarmament', State Department Bulletin, 12 M a r c h 1956, p . 416. Unidentified diplomat, quoted in Chris Argyris, Some Causes of Organizational Ineffectiveness within the Department of State, p . 4 2 , Washington, D . C . , Center for International Systems Research, Department of State, 1967, (Publication N o . 8180). Dwight D . Eisenhower, Address to Washington Post B o o k and Author lunch, quoted in Palo Alto Times, 1 October 1965.
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Ole R . Holsti
h o w brutally physical and mental fatigue can n u m b the good sense as well as the senses of normally articulate m e n ' . 1 'That kind of [crisis-induced] pressure does strange things to a h u m a n being, even to brilliant, selfconfident, experienced m e n . For some it brings out characteristics and strengths that perhaps they never k n e w they had, and for others the pressure is too overwhelming'. 2 H o w d o individuals and groups respond to the pressures and tensions of a crisis? D o w e tend to approach such situations with high motivations, a keen sense of purpose, extraordinary energy and enhanced creativity? Is necessity, as K a h n suggests, the mother of invention? O r , is our capacity for coping with the problem reduced, perhaps even to the point of serious impairment? W h e n under intense pressure d o w e characteristically take the more cautious path, or are w e more prone to taking high risks? Is our sense of what constitutes risk in any way altered? The answers to these questions are always important for persons w h o find themselves faced with a crisis. They assume extraordinarily wide significance w h e n the individuals are national leaders and the context is that of a contemporary international crisis: the ability of national leaders to cope with situations of intense stress m a y affect the lives of millions, if not the future of mankind. Despite the importance of these questions, m a n y descriptive or prescriptive theories of international politics either ignore them or assume that the answers are self-evident. Consider, for instance, s o m e of the basic premises of deterrence theories: that decisions by both the déterrer and the déterrée will be based on dispassionate calculations of probable costs and gains, accurate evaluations of the situation, and careful assessments of relative capabilities; that the value hierarchies of both the déterrer and the déterrée are similar at least to the point that each places the avoidance of war at or near the top; and that both sides maintain tight centralized control over decisions which might involve or provoke the use of force. Deterrence thus presupposes rational and predictable decision processes. N o system of deterrence, however powerful the weapons, is likely to prove effective against a nation led by a trigger-happy paranoid, or by one seeking personal or national self-destruction or martyrdom, or by decision-makers willing to play a form of international Russian roulette, or by leaders whose information about and communication with an adversary are so incomplete that their decision-making processes are largely dominated by guesswork, or by those w h o regard the loss of most of their nation's population and resources as a 'reasonable' cost for the achievement of foreign-policy goals. Clearly the assumptions of deterrence are valid most of the time and under most circumstances, even in relationships of considerable enmity such as 'cold wars'. Otherwise, w e would be at war almost continuously. Most 1. 2.
Theodore C . Sorensen, Decision-Making in the While Mouse, p. 76, N e w York, Columbia University Press, 1964. Robert F. Kennedy, 'Thirteen Days: The Story About H o w the World Almost Ended', McCalls, November 1968, p. 148.
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deterrence theories further assume, however, that threats and ultimatums are not only effective for influencing an adversary's behaviour but also that they will enhance calculation, control and caution while inhibiting recklessness and risk-taking. There m a y be a recognition that 'the rationality u p o n which deterrence must be based is frangible',1 but there is also a tendency to assume that these rationalistic premises require little if any modification for crisis situations. Deterrence theorists tend to be sanguine about the creativity of policy-makers under stress.2 T o be sure, they often recognize s o m e special features of crisis—for example, the difficulties of normal communication between adversaries.3 But the lesson drawn from such examples is usually that lack of control over the situation m a y be used as a bargaining asset to force the adversary into a disadvantageous position, not only once, but in repeated encounters. Clearly this s u m m a r y is a grossly oversimplified view of the rich literature on deterrence. Nevertheless, there is a substantial element of truth in a critic's assertion that ' T h e theory of deterrence, however, first proposes that w e should frustrate our opponents by frightening them very badly and that w e should then rely o n their cool-headed rationality for our survival.'4 T h e more general question is h o w crisis—defined here as a situation of unanticipated threat to important values in which decision time is short6—is likely to affect policy processes and outcomes. W h a t are the probable effects of crisis upon abilities which are generally considered essential to effective decision-making? These include the ability to: (a) identify major alternative courses of action; (b) estimate the probable costs and gains of alternative policy choices; (c) distinguish between the possible and the probable; (d) assess the situation from the perspective of other parties; (e) discriminate between relevant and irrelevant information; (f) tolerate ambiguity; (g) resist premature action; and (h) m a k e adjustments to meet real changes in the situation (and, as a corollary, to distinguish real from apparent changes). This list is by n o means exhaustive. N o r does it unrealistically portray
1. 2.
3. 4. 5.
Bernard Brodie, quoted in Philip Green, Deadly Logic: The Theory of Nuclear Deterrence, p. 159, N e w York, Schocken Books, 1966. See, for example: T h o m a s C . Schelling, Arms and Influence, p. 96, N e w Haven, Conn., Yale University Press; 1966, K a h n , op. cit., p. 37-8 ; Albert Wohlstetter and Roberta Wohlstetter, Controlling the Risks in Cuba, London, Institute of Strategic Studies, April 1965, (Adelphi paper N o . 17). See especially Thomas C . Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, N e w York, Oxford University Press, 1963. Karl Deutsch, The Nerves of Government, p. 70, N e w York, T h e Free Press, 1963. This definition of crisis is taken from Charles F . Hermann, 'Some Consequences of Crisis which Limit the Viability of Organizations', Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. VIII, 1963, p. 61-82. There are many usages of the term 'crisis'. For extensive critical reviews of these, see: Charles F . Hermann, Crises in Foreign Policy, Indianapolis, Ind., Bobbs-Merrill, 1969 ; James A . Robinson, ' Crisis : A n Appraisal of Concepts and Theories ', in : Charles F. Hermann (ed.), Contemporary Research in International Crisis, N e w York, T h e Free Press (in press); Kent Miller and Ira Iscoe, 'The Concept of Crisis: Current Status and Mental Health Implications', Human Organization, Vol. XXII, 1963, p. 195-201.
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the model of the omniscient official.1 It does, however, give us a check-list against which w e can evaluate the probable consequences of stress o n aspects of h u m a n performance relevant to foreign policy decisions. The most important aspect of crises for our purposes is that these situations are characterized by high stress for the individuals and organizations involved. That a threat to important values is stress-inducing requires little elaboration. T h e element of surprise is also a contributing factor; there is evidence that unanticipated and novel situations are generally viewed as m o r e threatening.2 Finally, crises are often marked by almost around-theclock work schedules, owing to both the severity of the situation and the absence of extended decision time. During the C u b a n missile confrontation, for instance, m a n y American officials slept in their office for the duration of the crisis: ' W e had to go on a twenty-four hour basis here in the Department of State.'3 Premier Khrushchev also appears to have had little sleep during that week: 'I must confess that I slept one night in m y studio fully dressed on the sofa. I did not want to be in the position of one Western diplomat w h o , during the Suez crisis, rushed to the telephone without his trousers.'4 Even during the m u c h less intense Middle East situation created by the 'Six D a y W a r ' in 1967, the Soviet Politburo had at least one all night meeting.5 Lack of rest and excessively long working hours are likely to magnify the stresses inherent in the situation.
Stress and performance: the evidence from psychology T h e central concern of this article is to explore the possible consequences of crisis-induced stress on those aspects of individual and organizational performance that are most likely to affect the processes and outcomes of foreign policy-making. A s a starting point w e shall turn to the rich and voluminous body of theory and evidence from experimental psychology. The advantages of precise measurement, easy replication, and tight control over the experimental variables have permitted psychologists to probe m a n y aspects of h u m a n performance in various types of situations. S o m e emphasis will be placed o n the consequences of stress for the identification of alternatives
1.
2. 3. 4. 5.
For a much more demanding list, see J. David Singer and Paul Ray, 'Decision-making in Conflict: From Inter-personal to Inter-national Relations', Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, Vol. X X X , 1966, p. 303. The literature on the limits of rationality in decision-making is extensive. See, for example: Herbert A . Simon, Administrative Behavior, N e w York, Macmillan, 1957; James G . March and Herbert A . Simon, Organizations, N e w York, John Wiley & Sons, 1958; Richard Snyder, H . W . Brück and Burton Sapin, Foreign Policy Decision Making, N e w York, The Free Press, 1962. Sheldon J. Korchin and Seymour Levine, 'Anxiety and Verbal Learning', Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, Vol. LIV, 1957, p. 238. Dean Rusk, 'Interview of Secretary Rusk by David Schoenbrun of C B S News', in: David Larson, The 'Cuban Crisis' of 1962, p. 268, Boston, Mass., Houghton Mifflin, 1963. New York Times, 27 June 1967. San Francisco Chronicle, 9 June 1967.
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and processes of choosing from a m o n g them, assessments of time factors and patterns of communication. W e shall also consider h o w time pressure, alternatives and communications m a y effect the level of stress in a situation, as well as other relationships between these variables—for example, between patterns of communications and identification of alternatives. S o m e degree of stress1 is an integral and necessary pre-condition for individual or organizational problem-solving; in its absence w e lack any motivation to act. L o w levels of pressure alert us to the presence of a situation requiring our attention, increase our vigilance, and our preparedness and ability to cope with it. Increasing stress to moderate levels m a y heighten our propensity and ability to find a satisfactory solution to the problem. A study of research scientists revealed, for example, that an environment of moderate stress, characterized by 'uncertainty without anxiety', is the most conducive to creative work. 2 Indeed, for some elementary tasks a rather high degree of pressure m a y increase performance, at least for limited periods of time. If the problem is qualitatively simple and performance is measured by quantitative criteria, stress can increase output. A crisis period of limited duration might result in improved performance by the foreign office clerical staff. O u r present concern, however, is with the effects of crisis o n top-ranking foreign policy officials. Under the best of circumstances foreign policy issues tend to be marked by complexity, ambiguity and the absence of stability; they usually d e m a n d responses which are judged by qualitative rather than quantitative criteria. It is precisely these qualitative aspects of performance that are most likely to suffer under high stress.3 M o s t research findings indicate a curvilinear relationship between stress and the performance of individuals and groups. A t moderate levels, anxiety can be facilitating, but at higher levels it disrupts decision processes.4 O n the 1.
2.
3.
4.
It should be noted that there is a lack of consensus on definitions of stress a m o n g psychologists. For example, some define it as the stimulus (e.g. a severe threat), whereas others view it as the perceptual and behavioural responses to threat. For a further discussion, see: Raym o n d B . Cattell and Ivan H . Scheier, 'Stimuli Related to Stress, Neuroticism, Excitation, and Anxiety Response Patterns', Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, Vol. L X , 1960, p. 195-204; Richard S. Lazarus, Psychological Stress and the Coping Process, N e w York, McGraw-Hill, 1966; Margaret G . H e r m a n n , 'Testing a Model of Psychological Stress', Journal of Personality, Vol. X X X I V , 1966, p. 381-96. Cited in Kurt Back, 'Decisions Under Uncertainty: Rational, Irrational, and Non-rational', American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. IV, February 1961, p. 14-19. Unless a specific study is cited, I have relied on two extensive reviews of the literature: Richard S. Lazarus, James Deese and Sonia F . Osler, 'The Effects of Psychological Stress U p o n Performance', Psychological Bulletin, Vol. IL, 1952, p. 293-317; F . E . Horvath, 'Psychological Stress: A Review of Definitions and Experimental Research', in: L . von Bertalanffy and Anatol Rapoport, (eds.), General Systems Yearbook, Vol. IV, A n n Arbor, Mich., Society for General Systems Research, 1959. Alfred L o w e , 'Individual Differences in Reaction to Failure : Modes of Coping with Anxiety and Interference Proneness', Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, Vol. LXII, 1961, p. 303-8; Sara B . Kiesler, 'Stress, Affiliation and Performance', Journal of Experimental Research in Personality, Vol. I, 1966, p. 227-35. S. J. Korchin et al., 'Visual Discrimination and the Decision Process in Anxiety', A . M . A . Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry, Vol. L X X V I I I , 1957, p. 424-38; Robert E . M u r p h y , 'Effects of Threat of Shock, Distraction, and Task Design on Performance', Journal of Experimental Psychology, Vol. LVIII, 1959, p. 134-41.
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basis of a series of experiments, Birch determined that intermediate—rather than high or low motivation—was most conducive to efficient solution of both insightful and non-insightful problems. These results are supported by other studies.1 Lanzetta, in an analysis of group behaviour, found that 'under increased stress there was a decrease in initiating behaviors, mainly in terms of "diagnoses situation, makes interpretation" kinds of behavior; and an increase in more "general discussions of the task" kind of behavior'.2 Following their analysis of the effects of stress on perception, Postman and Bruner concluded: 'Perceptual behaviour is disrupted, becomes less well controlled than under normal conditions, and hence is less adaptive. T h e major dimensions of perceptual function are affected: selection of percepts from a complex field becomes less adequate and sense is less well differentiated from nonsense; there is maladaptive accentuation in the direction of aggression and escape; untested hypotheses arefixatedrecklessly.'3 Other effects of stress which have been found in experimental research include: increased random behaviour; deterioration of verbal performance; increased rate of error; regression to simpler and more primitive m o d e s of response; problem-solving rigidity; diminished tolerance for ambiguity; reduction in the focus of attention, both across time and space; reduced ability to discriminate the dangerous from the trivial; diminished scope of complex perceptual activity; loss of abstract ability; and disorientation of visual-motor co-ordination.4 A finding of special relevance for international crises is that toleration for ambiguity is reduced under high stress. Under these conditions individuals m a d e decisions before adequate information was available, with the result that they performed m u c h less capably than those working under normal conditions. T h e combination of stress and uncertainty leads some persons to feel that 'the worst would be better than this'.6 In summary, in situations of high stress 'there is a narrowing of the cognitive organization at the m o m e n t ; the individual loses broader perspective,
1.
2. 3. 4.
5.
Herbert G . Birch, 'Motivational Factors in Insightful Problem-Solving', Journal of Comparative Psychology, Vol. X X X V I I , 1945, p. 295-317; R . M . Yerkes, 'Modes of Behavioral Adaptation in Chimpanzees to Multiple Choice Problems', Comparative Psychological Monographs, Vol. X , 1934, p. 1-108. JohnT. Lanzetta, 'Group Behavior under Stress', Human Relations, Vol. VIII, 1955, p. 47-8. Leo Postman and Jerome S. Bruner, 'Perception under Stress', Psychological Review, Vol. L V , 1948, p. 322. E . Paul Torrance, 'The Behavior of Small Groups under the Stress Conditions of "Survival" ', American Sociological Review, Vol. X I X , 1954, p. 751-5; Sheldon J. Korchin, 'Anxiety and Cognition', in: Constance Sheerer (ed.), Cognition: Theory, Research, Promise, p. 67, N e w York, Harper & R o w , 1964; H . K o h n , cited in Enoch Callaway and Donald D e m b o , 'Narrowed Attention', A . M . A . Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry, Vol. L X X I X , 1958, p. 85 ; L . T . Katchmas, S. Ross and T . G . Andrews, 'The Effects of Stress and Anxiety on Performance of a Complex Verbal-Coding Task', Journal of Experimental Psychology, Vol. L X X X V , 1958, p. 562; Ernst G . Beier, 'The Effects of Induced Anxiety on Flexibility of Intellectual Functioning', Psychological Monographs, Vol. L X V , 1951, N o . 326, p. 19. C . D . Smock, 'The Influence of Psychological Stress on the "Intolerance of Ambiguity" ', Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, Vol. L , 1955, p. 177-82; B . B. Hudson, quoted in Stephen B . Whithey, 'Reaction to Uncertain Threat', in: George W . Baker and Dwight W . Chapman (eds.), Man and Society in Disaster, p. 118, N e w York, Basic Books, 1962.
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he is n o longer able to "see" essential aspects of the situation and his behavior becomes, consequently, less adaptive'.1 S o m e experimental studies have been criticized on both conceptual and methodological grounds, but the general conclusion that high stress inhibits rather than facilitates most aspects of h u m a n performance appears to be unassailable. Moreover, the capabilities which m a y be enhanced by moderate-tohigh stress tend to have limited relevance in formulating foreign policy, whereas those which are inhibited under these conditions are usually crucial for such complex tasks. A related aspect of international crises is the existence of time pressures which m a y become accentuated if either party believes that there are advantages to actingfirst.It should be pointed out that time pressure is not only a matter of clock time, but also of the task to be accomplished. Given five minutes within which to choose between playing golf or m o w i n g the lawn on Sunday a person m a y feel n o particular pressure, but a five-week deadline for deciding whether to change jobs m a y give rise to intense feelings of short decision time. Moreover, it is apparently the perceptions of time that are crucial: 'The effects of a time limit appear to be due to perceived pressure rather than actual pressure brought o n by an impossible time limit.'2 Time perspectives are affected by high stress. For example, the ability to judge time is impaired in situations which increase anxiety.3 Thus there appears to be a two-way relationship between time and stress. O n the one hand the c o m m o n use during crisis of such techniques as ultimatums and threats with built-in deadlines is likely to increase the stress under which the recipient must operate. O n the other hand, increasing levels of stress tend to heighten the salience of time and to distort judgements about it. The expression that 'a watched pot never boils' is a c o m m o n way of stating the relationship between stress and distorted time perspective. It has been found in 'real-life' crisis situations as well as experimentally that as danger increases there is a significant over-estimation of h o w fast time is passing.4 This suggests not only that short decision time distinguishes crises from other types of situations,5 but also that increasing stress will further heighten the perceived salience of time. Foreign policy issues are rarely, if ever, analogous to the familiar multiplechoice question in which the universe of options is neatly outlined. The theoretically possible choices far exceed the n u m b e r that can or will be considered. 1. 2.
3. 4.
5.
D . Krech and R . S. Crutchfield, quoted in Korchin, op. cit., p. 63. Roland L . Frye and Thomas M . Stritch, 'Effects of Timed vs. Nontimed Discussion U p o n Measures of Influence and Change in Small Groups', Journal of Social Psychology, Vol. LXIII, 1964, p. 139-43. For an intriguing discussion of'subjective time', see John Cohen, 'Psychological Time', Scientific American, November 1964, p. 116-24. Samuel I. Cohen and A . G . Mezey, 'The Effects of Anxiety on Time Judgment and Time Experience in Normal Persons', J. Neurol. Neurosurg. Psychiatry, Vol. X X I V , 1961, p. 266-8. Harry B . Williams and Jeannette F. Rayner, 'Emergency Medical Services in Disaster', Medical Annals of the District of Columbia, Vol. X X V , 1956, p. 661; Jonas Langer, Seymour Wapner and Heinz Werner, 'The Effects of Danger U p o n The Experience of Time', American Journal of Psychology, Vol. L X X I V , 1961, p. 94-7. See the definition of 'crisis' on page 55.
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Especially in unanticipated situations such as crises it is necessary to search out and perhaps create alternatives. Perceived time pressure affects the search for alternatives in several ways. A number of studies indicate that some time pressure can enhance creativity as well as the rate of performance, but most of the evidence suggests that beyond a moderate level it has adverse effects. Because complex tasks requiring feats of m e m o r y and inference suffer m o r e from time pressure,1 its effects o n foreign policy decisions—which are usually marked by complexity—are likely to be particularly harmful. In such situations there is a tendency tofixu p o n a single approach to problem-solving and to continue using it whether or not it proves effective.2 Experimental research has shown that under severe time pressure, normal subjects produce a schizophrenic-like type of error. Another study revealed that, although a moderate increase in time pressure can increase group productivity, an increase from low to high pressure has an adverse effect. Mackworth and Mackworth report that increasing the n u m b e r of decisions required in a given period of time by a factor offiveled to afifteenfoldrise in decision errors. There is, in addition, evidence that time pressure increases the propensity to rely upon stereotypes, disrupts both individual and group problemsolving, narrows the focus of attention and impedes the use of available information. Finally, short decision time tends to create early group agreement, thereby reducing incentives to search for and weigh other options.3 W h e n decision time is short, the ability to estimate the range of possible consequences arising from a particular policy choice is likely to be impaired. Both experimental andfieldresearch indicate that stress produces a constricted future outlook.4 There are several reasons w h y severe stress is likely to give rise to almost undivided concern for the present and immediate future at the sacrifice of attention to longer-range considerations. The uncertainties attending severe crisis m a k e it exceptionally difficult to follow outcomes from a sequence of actions and responses very far into the future. T h e tendency of increasing stress to narrow the focus of attention also limits perceptions of time to the m o r e immediate future. During the Korean W a r , for instance, it was observed that combat troops 'cannot exercise complex functions involving 1. 2. 3.
4.
Jerome Bruner, Jacqueline J. Goodnow and George A . Austin, A Study of Thinking, p. 147, N e w York, John Wiley & Sons, 1956. Abraham S. Luchins, 'Mechanization in Problem-Solving', Psychological Monographs, Vol. LIV, N o . 248, 1942. George Usdansky and Loren J. Chapman, 'Schizophrenic-like Response in Normal Subjects under Time Pressure', Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, Vol. L X , 1960, p. 143-6; Pauline N . Pepinsky, Harold B . Pepinsky and William B . Pavlik, 'The Effects of Task Complexity and Time Pressure Upon Team Productivity', Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. XLIV, 1960, p. 34-8; N . H . Mackworth and J. F. Mackworth, 'Visual Search for Successive Decisions', British Journal of Psychology, Vol. IL, 1958, p. 210-21 ; Birch, op. cit.; Bruner et al, op. cit.; Peter Dubno, 'Decision Time Characteristics of Leaders and Group Problem Solving Behavior', Journal of Social Psychology, Vol. LIX, 1963, p. 259-82; Horvath, op. cit.; Donald R . Hoffeld and S. Carolyn Kent, 'Decision Time and Information Use in Choice Situations', Psychological Reports, Vol. XII, 1963, p. 68-70; Frye and Stritch, op. cit. Robert J. Albers, 'Anxiety and Time Perspectives', Dissertation Abstracts, Vol. X X V I , 1966, p. 4848; James D . Thompson and Robert W . Hawkes, 'Disaster, Community Organization, and Administrative Process', in: Baker and Chapman (eds.), op. cit., p. 283.
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the scanning of a large number of factors or long-term foresight because the stress is too massive and time too short for anything but the immediately relevant'.1 Moreover, if the present situation is perceived as extremely dangerous, the more distant future m a y appear to have little or n o relevance unless a satisfactory solution can be found for the immediate problems. This m a y well be true and placing a priority on the immediate often makes sense. After a drowning m a n has been pulled out of icy waters it would be foolish to take medical steps directed at warding off the longer-range dangers of pneumonia before giving artificial respiration to revive the victim. There are also potential difficulties, however, in a n over-developed sense of concern for the immediate. Present actions alter future options and decisions which provide immediate advantages m a y carry with them unduly heavy costs later. The price m a y be worth paying but the balance sheet can scarcely be evaluated effectively if attention is fixed solely o n the short-run benefits. There is also something seductively appealing about the belief that 'if I can just solve the problem of the m o m e n t the future will take care of itself. This reasoning appears to have contributed to both Neville Chamberlain's actions during the Czech crisis of 1938 and to Lyndon Johnson's policies during the war in Viet-Nam. Sustained time pressure m a y also give rise to significant changes in goals. The authors of a bargaining experiment concluded that: 'The meaning of time changed as time passed without the bargainers reaching an agreement. Initially the passage of time seemed to place the players under pressure to c o m e to an agreement before their costs mounted sufficiently to destroy their profit. With the continued passage of time, however, their mounting losses strengthened their resolution not to yield to the other player. They comment: "I've lost so m u c h I'll be damned if I give in n o w . A t least I'll have the satisfaction of doing better than he does." ' 2 This c o m m e n t and its underlying rationale are remarkably similar to one of Kaiser Wilhelm's marginal notes when hefinallyrecognized that his hopes of British neutrality in the rapidly approaching war were a delusion: 'If w e are to bleed to death, England shall at least lose India.'3 The rate of search for satisfactory solutions to a problem depends in part o n the belief that the environment is benign and that such options in fact exist. But it is in the nature of crisis that most, if not all, policy alternatives are likely to be perceived as undesirable. The frying pan and the fire rather than Burian's ass (who starved to death when unable to choose between equally delectable bales of hay) is the proper metaphor for choices in an international crisis. A s noted earlier, when stress increases problem-solving tends to become more rigid: the ability to improvise declines, previously established decision rules are adhered to more tenaciously, and 1. 2. 3.
David Rioch, quoted in Korchin, op. cit., p. 63. Morton Deutsch and Robert M . Krauss, 'The Effects of Threat U p o n Interpersonal Bargaining', Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, Vol. L X I , 1960, p. 189. M a x Montgelas and Walther Schücking (eds.), Outbreak of the World War, German Documents Collected by Karl Kautsky, N o . 401, N e w York, Oxford University Press, 1924.
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the ability to 'resist the pull of closure' is reduced.1 These findings suggest the paradox that an increasingly severe crisis tends to m a k e creative policymaking both m o r e important and less likely. Identification of alternatives can also be related to the element of surprise in crises. Snyder has suggested that more options will be considered when the decision is anticipated rather than occasioned by the environment. 2 By the definition used here, crises are unanticipated, for at least one of the parties. T h u s this attribute of the situation will itself restrict inquiry and, as the crisis deepens and stress increases, the search for options is likely to be further constricted. In a situation such as existed after the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 one would not expect a lengthy review of potential responses by decision-makers. Even in the Korean crisis of 1950, in which the situation was somewhat more ambiguous, only a single alternative course of action w a s considered: '. . . the decision-making process in the Korean case was not characterized by the consideration of multiple alternatives at each stage. Rather a single proposed course of action emerged from the definition of the situation.'3 The extreme situation occurs when only a single option is perceived and the policy-making process is reduced to resigning oneself to the inevitable. If decision-makers perceive that their options are reduced to only those with potentially high penalties—for example, ' W e have n o alternative but to go to war'—considerable dissonance m a y be generated. The dissonance between what the decision-maker does (pursues policies that are k n o w n to carry a high risk of war) and what he knows (that war can lead to disaster) can be reduced by absolving himself from responsibility for the decision. This solution has been described by Festinger: 'It is possible, however, to reduce or even eliminate the dissonance by revoking the decision psychologically. This would consist of admitting to having m a d e the wrong choice or insisting that really no choice had been made for which the person had any responsibility. Thus, a person w h o has just accepted a new job might i m m e diately feel he had done the wrong thing and, if he had it to d o over again, might do something different. O r he might persuade himself that the choice had not been his; circumstances and his boss conspired to force the action on him.'* This process m a y also be related to the widespread inability to perceive and appreciate the dilemmas and difficulties of others: 'The grass is always 1.
2. 3.
4.
Korchin, op. cit., p. 65-7; J. W . Moffitt and Ross Stagner, 'Perceptual Rigidity and Closure as a Function of Anxiety', Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, Vol. LII, 1956, p. 355; S. Pally, 'Cognitive Rigidity as a Function of Threat', Journal of Personality, Vol. XXIII, 1955, p. 346-55; Sheldon J. Korchin and Harold Basowitz, Journal of Psychology, Vol. XXXVIII, 1954, p. 501. Richard C . Snyder, Deterrence, Weapons and Decision-Making, p. 80, China Lake, Calif., U . S . Naval Ordnance Test Station, 1961. Richard C . Snyder and Glenn D . Paige, 'The United Nations Decision to Resist Aggression in Korea: The Application of an Analytical Scheme', Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. Ill, 1958, p. 245; Glenn D . Paige, The Korean Decision, N e w York, T h e Free Press, 1968. See also March and Simon, op. cit., p. 154 ff. Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, p. 43-4, Evanston, 111., R o w , Peterson & Co., 1957. Italics added.
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greener on the other side of the fence.' This has been noted with respect to the motives, general capabilities, and military strength ascribed to the adversary.1 O n e method of dissonance reduction is to believe that the only options which offer a w a y out of the dilemma rest with the enemy—only the other side can prevent the impending disaster. For example, during the frantic last-minute correspondence between the G e r m a n Kaiser and the Russian Tsar in July 1914, Wilhelm wrote: 'The responsibility for the disaster which is n o w threatening the whole civilized world will not be laid at m y door. In this m o m e n t it still lies in your [Nicholas] power to avert it.'2 Although it m a y at times be difficult to appreciate fully the dilemmas and difficulties of friends3 there is likely to be greater empathy with allies than with enemies. In summary, then, a likely means of coping with dissonance is to persuade oneself that the enemy is free from the very situational constraints which restrict the options available to self and allies. W h a t , finally, is the relationship between crisis-induced stress, c o m m u n i cation and policy-making? The adequacy of communication both in the physical sense of open channels of communication and in the sense of 'pragmatics'—the correspondence between the sender's intent and the recipient's decoding—has been a major concern in decision-making studies. In this respect Heise and Miller have found that 'the performance of a small group depends upon the channels of communication open to its members, the task which the group must handle, and the stress under which they w o r k ' . 4 Inadequate communications have received the greatest share of attention in crisis studies, with less concern for the effects of information overload.5 Study of the latter appears to have been confined to the laboratory rather than to historical situations. Yet information overload does appear to be an important consideration. The inception of crisis usually gives rise to a sharply increased pace of individual and bureaucratic activities, virtually all of which are likely to increase the volume of diplomatic communication. 1.
2. 3. 4. 5.
See, for example: Kenneth Boulding, 'National Images and International Systems', The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. Ill, 1959, p. 120-31 ; Charles E . Osgood, 'Suggestions for Winning the Real W a r with C o m m u n i s m ' , The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. Ill, 1959, p. 295-325; R a y m o n d A . Bauer, 'Problems of Perception and the Relations Between the United States and the Soviet Union', The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. V , 1961, p. 2239; Samuel F . Huntington, 'Arms Races', in: Carl Friedrich and Seymour Harris (eds.), Public Policy, 1958, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1958. Montgelas and Schiicking, op. cit., N o . 480. Ole R . Holsti and Robert C . North, 'The History of H u m a n Conflict', in: Elton B . McNeil (ed.), The Nature of Human Conflict, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1965, p. 165-6. George A . Heise and George A . Miller, 'Problem Solving by Small Groups Using Various Communication Nets', Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, Vol. X L V I , 1951, p. 335. For exceptions, see : Charles F . Hermann, 'Some Consequences of Crisis' and James G . Miller, 'Information Input Overload', Self Organizing Systems—1962, n.p. ; James G . Miller, 'Information Input Overload and Psychopathology', The American Journal of Psychiatry, Vol. C X V I , 1960, p. 695-704; Harry B . Williams, 'Some Functions of Communication in Crisis Behavior', Human Organization, Vol. X V I , 1957, p. 15-19; Richard L . Meier, 'Information Input Overload and Features of Growth in Communication-Oriented Institutions', in: Fred Massarik and Philburn Ratoosh (eds.), Mathematical Explorations in Behavioral Science, H o m e w o o d , 111., Irwin-Dorsey, 1965.
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W e noted earlier that high-stress situations tend to increase selective perception and to impair the ability to discriminate between sense and nonsense, the relevant and the irrelevant. Aside from the effects of stress, there are limits o n our ability to process information.1 A s the volume of information directed at policy-makers rises, the search for information within the c o m m u nication system will tend to become less thorough, and selectivity in what is read, believed and retained takes o n increasing importance. Unpleasant information and that which does not support preconceived beliefs is most likely to fall by the wayside. The experimental finding that selective filtering is often used at levels ranging from cells to h u m a n groups to cope with an unmanageable amount of information2 is apparently also valid for governmental organizations: 'All Presidents, at least in modern times, have complained about their reading pile, and few have been able to cope with it. There is a temptation, consequently, to cut out all that is unpleasant.'3 Thus, m o r e communication m a y in fact result in less useful and valid information available to policy-makers. Although the volume of communication m a y rise during crises, the increase is likely to be uneven; there m a y be considerable disruption of communication with potential adversaries. In a simulation study, Brody found that as perceived threat rose, the proportion of intra-alliance communication—as compared to inter-alliance messages—increased.4 A t the same time, both incoming and outgoing messages are likely to reflect increasingly simple and stereotyped assessments of the situation. If these expectations regarding changes, patterns and content of communication in crisis are valid, the number of options which decision-makers will consider is correspondingly restricted. Certain other aspects of communications in a crisis m a y restrict the search for alternatives. There is a general tendency for a reduction in size of decision-making groups in such situations.5 Technological and other factors have reduced decision time to a point where broad consultation with legislatures and other important groups m a y be virtually impossible. The limited membership of the " E x c o m " , in which the decisions regarding missiles in C u b a
1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
George A . Miller, 'The Magical N u m b e r Seven Plus or Minus T w o : S o m e Limits o n O u r Capacity for Processing Information', Psychological Review, Vol. LXIII, 1956, p. 81-97. James G . Miller, 'Information Input Overload and Psychopathology', The American Journal of Psychiatry, Vol. C X V I , I960, p. 695-704. Sorensen, op. cit., p. 38. Richard A . Brody, 'Some Systemic Effects of the Spread of Nuclear Weapons Technology : A Study Through Simulation of a Multi-Nuclear Future', The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. VII, 1963, p. 663-753. This aspect of crisis m a y , however, actually improve certain aspects of decision processes: 'The greater the emergency, the more likely is decision-making to be concentrated a m o n g high officials whose commitments are to the over-all system. Thus it m a y be, paradoxically, that the model of means-ends rationality will be more closely approximated in an emergency when the time for careful deliberation is limited. Though fewer alternatives will be considered the values invoked during the decision period will tend to be fewer and more consistent, and decisions will less likely be the result of bargaining within a coalition.' Sidney Verba, 'Assumptions of Rationality and Non-rationality in Models of the International System', World Politics, Vol. X I V , 1961, p. 115.
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were made, is a case in point. Decision bodies in the crises concerning Korea in 1950, Indo-China in 1954, and others, were similarly limited in size.1 There m a y be, moreovei, a tendency to consult others less as the pressure of time increases, as well as to rely more heavily upon those w h o reinforce pre-existing stereotypes. In his study of a governmental department, Pruitt found a significant reduction in the number of people consulted by persons responsible for solving problems when time pressure increased.2 O n e of the crucial decisions in the crisis leading u p to the First World War—the G e r m a n decision to grant Vienna a 'blank cheque' in support of the plan to punish Serbia—was made without any extended consultation. ' O n 5 July the Kaiser went for a stroll in the park at Potsdam with his chancellor, that bearded, sad-eyed giant Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, w h o m irreverent young officers called "Lanky Theobald", and Under-Secretary Z i m m e r m a n n of the Foreign Office. By the time the walk was over, the Kaiser had made up his mind. 'Not another m a n had been consulted. The Foreign Minister was on his honeymoon and had not been recalled. The experienced, too subtle, too slippery ex-chancellor Bernhard von Bülow had not been called in. There in the park with Bethmann-Hollweg, whose judgment he despised, and Zimmerm a n n , an official, the Kaiser reached his decision. H e told the Austrian ambassador in Berlin that Germany would cover Austria should Russia intervene.'3 Similarly, during the Suez crisis of 1956, John Foster Dulles m a d e the crucial decision to cancel a loan for the Aswan D a m virtually on his o w n . H e refused to consult with, much less accept the advice of the American Ambassador to Egypt, Henry Byroade, whose assessment of the situation—a correct one as it turned out—did not correspond to his o w n . A more recent example is President Nixon's decision to send American troops into Cambodia, a project which appears to have been undertaken without the counsel of m a n y top-ranking foreign-policy advisers. Increasing stress m a y produce one potentially counteracting change in communication. In his studies of information overload, Miller found that one of the widely used coping mechanisms is the use of parallel channels of communication, particularly in higher-level systems such as groups or organizations, as opposed to cells, organs, or individuals.4 Decision-makers m a y seek to bypass both the effects of information input overload and of distortion of content in transmission by the use of improvised ad hoc channels of communication. These may take m a n y forms, including direct c o m m u n i 1.
2. 3. 4.
Richard C . Snyder and Glenn D . Paige, 'The United States Decision to Resist Aggression in Korea: Application of an Analytical Scheme', Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. Ill, 1958, p. 341-78; Glenn D . Paige, The Korean Decision, N e w York, The Free Press, 1968; C . M . Roberts, 'The Day W e Didn't G o to W a r ' , The Reporter, 14 September 1954. Dean G . Pruitt, 'Problem Solving in the Department of State', Northwestern University, 1961 (unpublished paper, cited in Charles F . Hermann, 'Some Consequences of Crisis', op. cit.). George M . Thomson, The Twelve Days: July 24 to August 4, 1914, p. 44-5, N e w York, G . P. Putnam's Sons, 1964. James G . Miller, op. cit.
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cation between heads of governments and employment of special emissaries, or mediators. It has been noted at various points that the rate of diplomatic and other activities tends to increase sharply during a crisis.1 It remains to consider whether high stress increases risk-taking, aggressiveness and related aspects of foreign policy. Axe w e led to a position closely akin to the frustrationaggression hypotheses? T h e evidence is mixed. In some instances stress has resulted in higher risk-taking; in other cases persons in such situations have become more cautious because they demanded greater certainty before c o m mitting themselves.2 Assessments of what constitutes high and low risk m a y , however, change in circumstances of severe stress. Consider British foreign policy during 1938-39. W h a t n o doubt appeared as the low-risk strategy (at least in the short run) scarcely contributed to stability and peace. O r , to cite a more recent example, D e a n Acheson, William Fulbright and Richard Russell argued in October 1962 that President Kennedy's decision to blockade C u b a represented a far higher risk than their preferred strategy of bombing or invading to remove the Soviet missiles. Thus, high stress situations m a y result in m o r e aggressive policy choices, but the evidence presented here suggests a somewhat more complex process: crisis-induced stress gives rise to certain changes in perceptions of time, definition of alternatives and patterns of communication. These, in turn, m a y reduce the effectiveness of both decision-making processes and the consequent policy choices, but not necessarily in the direction of higher risk-taking.
Conclusion In summary, then, the evidence suggests that policy-making under circumstances of crisis-induced stress is likely to differ in a number of respects from decision-making processes in other situations. M o r e important, to the extent that such differences exist they are likely to inhibit rather than facilitate the performance of those engaged in the complex tasks of making foreign-policy choices.3 Certainly this conclusion is consistent with the findings from experimental research. 1. 2.
3.
Paul Smoker, 'Sino-Indian Relations: A Study of Trade, Communication and Defence', Journal of Peace Research, N o . 2, 1964, p. 65-76. Amia Lieblich, 'Effects of Stress on Risk Taking', Psychon. Sei., Vol. X , 1968, p. 303-4; Korchin and Levine, op. cit., p. 238 ; Leonard Berkowitz, 'Repeated Frustration and Expectations in Hostility Arousal', Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, Vol. X L , 1960, p. 422-9; Bruce Dohrenwend, 'The Social Psychological Nature of Stress', Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, Vol. LXII, 1961, p. 294-302. A n alternative view is that 'decision-makers do not perceive or behave differently in a crisis', that is, 'they do not perceive hostility where none exists, and they express hostility directly in terms of their perception of hostility'. Dina A . Zinnes, Joseph Zinnes and R . D . McClure, 'Hostility in Diplomatic Communication: A Study of the 1914 Crisis', in: Charles F . Herm a n n (ed.), Contemporary Research in International Crisis, N e w York, T h e Free Press (in press). This does not demonstrate, however, that m a n y other aspects of perception and behaviour m a y not change in crisis situations. Moreover, their conclusion does not rule out the possibility that mutual perceptions of hostility m a y be sustained and magnified beyond their original causes.
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While this literature is not lacking in empirical and quantitative findings, it is not wholly free from conceptual and operational problems. It cannot merely be assumed, for example, that results obtained with student subjects are necessarily valid for persons of different age, culture, experience and the like.1 N o r is the usual experimental technique of asking subjects to find the best answer to a problem or puzzle quite analogous to the task of the policy-maker w h o m a y be confronted with a situation in which there is n o single, correct answer. Perhaps an even more important question might be raised about the experimenter's ability to create a truly credible situation of high stress.2 W h e n h u m a n subjects are used, the stress situation in the laboratory must of necessity be relatively benign and of short duration. It is usually induced by leading the subject to believe that he has failed at his assigned task. In contrast, a foreign-policy official m a y perceive a crisis situation as a genuine threat to the continued existence of self, family, nation, or even mankind. Clearly, the ethical experimenter cannot create an identical situation in the laboratory. In short, these experimental findings suggest some questions about the 'conventional wisdom' underlying several aspects of strategy and diplomacy in crises. But the answers can only be found in the real world of international crises, not in the laboratory. Research along these lines has begun and there are strong indications of significant convergences between findings derived from laboratory experiments, simulations, and historical analyses.3 1. 2. 3.
Nor, of course, can it be assumed that they are not valid, or that the converse of the experimental findings are true. For a further development of this point, see Horvath, op. cit. See, for example: Charles F . Hermann, Crises in Foreign Policy, Indianapolis, Ind., BobbsMerrill, 1969; Charles F . Hermann (ed.), Contemporary Research in International Crisis, N e w York, T h e Free Press (in press); and m y Crisis, Escalation and War (in press).
From 1962 to 1967 Ole R . Holsti was an instructor and assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at Stanford University and was at the same time Research Co-ordinator and Associate Director of the project on Studies in International Conflict and Integration. He is at present associate professor at the University of British Columbia. Professor Holsti is Associate Editor of T h e Journal of Conflict Resolution and the Western Political Quarterly and is the author of numerous articles and publications on content analysis, conflict and crisis, among the more recent being Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities (1969), and 'Political Processes and Foreign Policy: Decision-Making in Crisis and Non-Crisis Situations', in: L. E. Graymer (ed.), Patterns of International Relations and Foreign Policy Decision-Making (in press). He was the co-author of an earlier contribution to this Journal ( Vol. XVII, No. 3, 1965), entitled 'International Relations as a Social Science: A Research Approach'.
N . A . Kovalsky
Social aspects of international aggression
W e live in an age that has seen a sharp rise in h u m a n losses from war. Over the previous three centuries warfare accounted for some 25 million lives, but in the ten years covered by the two world wars of the twentieth century, 65 million people were killed; and this is quite apart from the enormous material losses. W h e n w e consider that the twenty-five years elapsed since the Second World W a r have had more than their share of wars of aggression and international conflicts, w e can see w h y greater attention is being given to a scientific study of the causes of aggression. In recent years there has been an increase in the number of scientists investigating these problems as well as in the quantity of books, pamphlets and articles they have produced. If w e take the proceedings of the numerous meetings devoted to questions of war and peace, and analyse the relevant literature, w e can distinguish a number of basic spheres in which, to use the terminology of Western experts, the perpetration of aggression is possible.
Spheres in which aggression develops All the examples of aggression given by these specialists fall into one of three groups, which m a y be conventionally designated as follows: (a) individual aggression; (b) aggression within the context of a national or State community; and (c) aggression as an instrument of foreign policy. A s can be seen, this classification is based o n quantitive factors—the scale of the aggression and the number of individuals involved in it. The term 'individual aggression' usually applies to infringements by individual persons of legislative (primarily penal) provisions. In addition, a number of scientists are inclined to qualify as manifestations of aggressiveness such occurrences as family quarrels, motor accidents, etc. 'Aggression within the context of a national or State community' is regarded by m a n y Western experts as covering various kinds of mass social and political action: anti-war marches, strikes and stoppages, the struggle against racial discrimination, demonstrations by young people and students and so on. Although examples coming under groups (a) and (b) are qualified by m a n y Western authorities as aggression, this does not seem legitimate. The writer's
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view is that examples under (a) can in a number of cases be regarded as protection or defence. It is even less legitimate to pin the label of aggression on the events covered by (b). Far from being a manifestation of aggressiveness on the part of workers, young people, Negroes and others, strikes, antiracialist and youth action, and the like, are protection against the perceived injustices of the corresponding social system. It is quite obvious that so-called aggression, individual or mass, within a small social group or the context of an entire country—groups (a) and (b)—is the outcome of specific social and economic conditions linked in a number of cases to political factors. A s to the third variety of aggression (c)—and here surely the word is used correctly—the writer takes it to cover, above all, any case in which a State is thefirstto employ armed force against another State, contrary to the United Nations Charter. Aggression is also understood to cover any case in which a State is thefirstto declare war against another State. Clearly there is aggression when a State is thefirstto use nuclear, bacteriological, chemical or any other weapons of mass destruction, w h e n it b o m b s orfireso n the territory and population of another State or attacks its land, sea or air forces, w h e n its armed forces invade or attack the territory of another State or a part of it, or w h e n it blockades coast-lines or ports. Then there is indirect armed aggression, by which is meant the use of armed force by a State through dispatch to the territory of another State of armed bands, mercenaries, terrorists and saboteurs, and other forms of subversive activity connected with the use of armed force to bring about an internal upheaval in another State or a drastic change in its policies so as to serve the interests of the aggressor. The word 'aggression' obviously does not apply to the use of force by dependent peoples to secure,their inalienable right to self-determination. There are also other definitions of aggression in the international arena. S o m e of them are more simplified and schematic while others lay emphasis on qualitatively different factors. Certain definitions are manifestly used to justify aggression. Nevertheless scarcely anyone will deny that armed aggression involving an entire State—its preparation, planning and unleashing—is a crime against humanity. It carries in its wake the threat of world war with death or privation for countless numbers of people. It has a disastrous effect o n all areas of the life of the overwhelming majority of the population both of the State sustaining the attack and of the aggressor State. In other words, international armed aggression is fraught with disastrous social consequences for the working sections of the population. It leads to a disruption of the normal life of society and, in particular, draws off considerable numbers of people from the labour force into the army, it breaks u p family life, it aggravates the problems of the growing generation, it lowers the standard of living and so on. Although this enumeration is far from complete, it is manifestly sufficient to show that the learned community's prime concern should be to study the various aspects of international armed aggression and find ways of creating conditions that will curb aggression and tie the hands of the aggressor. The first thing to d o then is to determine w h y aggression arises.
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M o d e r n theories on the origin of armed aggression as an instrument of foreign policy The origins of international aggression have been sought in a whole range of theories which approach the matter from various ideological and class standpoints and represent m a n y distinct schools of thought and trends. A m o n g these w e can distinguish a number of basic trends. The largest group probably consists of the various kinds of theory ascribing international aggression to biological factors. These ideas, the vast majority of which postulate the consonance of the animal world and h u m a n society, are nothing new. In substance, they are a revival of the theory of social Darwinism, which m a d e its appearance in the last century under the influence of Charles Darwin's studies on the origin of species. Social Darwinism, which of course was relatively widespread in that epoch, underwent a transformation in the middle of the twentieth century, having borrowed some elements of Freudianism. A recognized authority nowadays in thisfieldis Konrad Lorenz, w h o is readily quoted and referred to in the West. Lorenz looks upon aggression as 'the fighting instinct in beast and m a n which is directed against members of the same species'.1 The representatives of this trend see no essential difference between people and animals, and they settle the problem of aggression in h u m a n society by analogy with the processes inherent in the animal world. Thus Lorenz believes that 'man's social organization is very similar to that of rats, which, like humans, are social and peaceful beings within their clans, but veritable devils toward all fellow members of their species not belonging to their o w n community'. 2 The followers of this school of thought often argue that m a n has not evolved or has evolved but little biologically and physically, so that he is still an animal. In the writer's opinion, this overlooks the immense evolution that has taken place in m a n ' s higher nervous system, which has become qualitatively and quantitatively more complex with the institution and subsequent perfection of the labour process. T o touch on only one aspect of this problem, mention must be m a d e of the generally accepted and wellattested argument that the brain of modern m a n is two or three times greater in volume than the brain of primitive m a n . The adherents of one of the schools holding that aggression is biological in origin consider that its initial cause is the action of sex hormones. Thus some of them link the presence of an abnormally large amount of testosterone in the organism of the mother to the manifestation of aggressiveness in her offspring, and consider that an artificial reduction in the testosterone content will prevent the appearance of potential Hitlers and Genghis Khans. Another specialist in these matters also believes that war, as a manifestation of 'corporate aggressiveness', is the outcome of characteristics inherent only in the male organism. The weakness in the arguments of this school of thought seems 1. 2.
K . Lorenz, On Aggression, p. 9, N e w York, 1967. ibid., p. 229.
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to be that it disregards the social reasons for international aggression, forgetting that wars c o m e about as a result of a whole range of social, economic and political factors, and not at the will of any individual, be he Hitler or Genghis K h a n , nor as the consequence of any supposed innate propensity o n the part of the male half of the planet to c o m e to blows at all costs. The tendency of some research workers to ascribe aggressive drives to certain peoples o n the strength of biological factors seems highly dangerous. It is as if grounds were being given w h y aggression must inevitably be committed by a State m a d e up of such a people, stamped as it is with the mark of Cain. Outbursts of chauvinistic, militarist sentiments o n the part of one or another nation at a particular point of history are regarded by these research workers not as resulting from education of the broad masses of the people in the spirit of chauvinism, militarism and revanchism, and from a whole range of social factors, but as imminent traits of the nation in question. There are a number of theories o n the origin of international aggression which are situated somewhere on the boundary between biology and geopolitics. Thus a number of authors allege the existence of a biological instinct of rapine or protection of one's o w n territory c o m m o n to the animal world and h u m a n society alike. The varieties of this theory are set out, in particular, in the work of N o r m a n Z . Alcock 1 and, again, K . Lorenz. T h e followers of this school, as a matter of fact, use (though perhaps unwittingly) the biological basis of the Lebensraum theory, of unhappy m e m o r y , which in its time was put to the service of the Fascist aggressors. This school of thought is closely tied up with the view that international aggression is the outcome of a whole range of demographic factors, the foremost being population density. It is characteristic that this problem too is lent a biological basis. Thus a population explosion under modern conditions is viewed by analogy with similar phenomena in animal populations, particularly a m o n g rats. According to these authors, the only difference is that in rat populations there is automatic regulation of reproduction which prevents a critical mass being reached, while m a n does not have this capacity. P . Leyhausen accordingly regards a population explosion as a greater threat to mankind than an atomic war. 2 The assertions of the authors of these theories that a population explosion represents a danger to mankind for two main reasons—first, the lag of increased food production behind population growth; second, a reduction in areas for settlement as the h u m a n population increases—seem unconvincing. O n the first argument, United Nations data indicate that our planet has sufficient resources to feed the earth's population for a very long time yet, even if it continues to grow at current rates. Here it is in place to recall the words of the Russian natural scientist K . A . Timiryazev, w h o a few decades ago declared, on the basis of his calculations, that even if there came a time 1. 2.
See Science Forum, Vol. 1, N o . 6, December 1968. In the 'Unesco Courier', August-September 1970, p. 32, P . Leyhausen writes: 'At present most people seem paralysed by fear of The B o m b , but the b o m b in itself is no danger. The only real danger to M a n is men, too many men.'
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w h e n there were so m a n y people o n the earth that they lived o n rafts, there would still be sufficient resources in the world to feed them all. T o the second argument it can be replied that science will probably be able in time to find a solution to the problem; in particular it can be supposed that mankind will sooner or later open u p other planets, so that the problem of areas for settlement will be automatically solved. Furthermore, by no means all specialists are agreed over the possibility of the earth's population constantly increasing at the same rate as n o w ; m a n y experts consider that the growth rate will decline. Thus there seems n o serious reason to believe that a population explosion will entail increased aggressiveness in individuals and bring about the necessary conditions for armed clashes between States. W h e n the biological aspects of the problem of population growth are given absolute importance, this leads to the affirmation that the 'explosion' is the reason for the deepening rift between the national wealth of the 'rich' and of the 'poor' nations, it being implied that the potential aggressors are the 'poor' countries. In this way, aspersions are cast on the foreign policies of the young national States which have not yet consolidated their economies. Incidentally, there is nothing new about theories that differing levels of economic development are responsible for aggression. Back in the period between the two world wars there was a theory in circulation about the division of all peoples into 'proletarian' and 'bourgeois' nations, and this theory was one of the weapons used by the Fascist aggressors in their ideological preparation for the Second World W a r . In addition to the biological and bio-geopolitical theories as to the origins of aggression, there are a number of geopolitical theories. This trend flourished particularly in the 1930s, when the G e r m a n geopoliticians, headed by Haushofer, attempted to justify the land-grabbing of Hitlerite Germany. It has to be noted, however, that Haushofer only developed the m a n y arguments contained in the works of Sir Halford Mackinder in the 1920s, advocating that account be taken of 'geographical reality'. The gist of Mackinder's theory was that, to use his terminology, the mastery of Eastern Europe secured power over the heartland, and this in turn led to domination of the world island and, consequently, of the entire planet. A measure of the diffusion of Mackinder's ideas is the fact that his books were reprinted after the Second World W a r , and a recent issue of the Geographical Magazine contains an article in which use is made of Mackinder's arguments in analysing the causes of international tensions. O n e theory that stands out a m o n g the sociological theories of aggression is the theory of violence, according to which h u m a n society develops only thanks to wars. This theory is based o n the work of E . Dühring, F . Nietzsche and O . Spengler, and it has its followers nowadays as well. In their view, the absence of armed aggression would m e a n the decay of mankind since, without aggression, they hold that there can be n o progressive development. However, with the growing aspiration of world public opinion to give practical effect to the ideals of international peace and peaceful coexistence a m o n g
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nations, the adherents of the theory of violence are obliged to be o n their guard and it is by no m e a n s always that they openly state their opinions. Prominent in the same group of sociological theories are the various theories ascribing acts of aggression as instruments of foreign policy to subjective and fortuitous factors, such as the personality of the politician or the statesman w h o has provoked aggression, his ill-will—-in short, the totality of his personal qualities. Such events as an unpremeditated insult to a country's flag or the involuntary violation of a frontier are also held responsible for aggression. In the writer's view, however, they are more of an excuse than a reason for aggression. The main groups of theories on the origin of aggression appear to suffer from a one-sided approach to the problem, giving prominence, often quite arbitrarily, to one particular factor and sometimes even putting a wrong interpretation o n it. Their chief shortcoming, however, is that their authors ignore or underestimate the social, economic and political factors, and if they d o refer to them, their approach is subjective.
- International aggression—the outcome of complex social, economic and political processes International armed aggression as an instrument of foreign policy is, in the writer's view, a social and historical phenomenon peculiar to antagonistic social and economic structures. Analysis of the abundant evidence of material culture and of historical documents shows that organized aggression as an instrument of foreign policy occurs at a specific stage in the evolution of m a n kind, with the rise of private ownership of the means of production and the existence of mutually antagonistic classes and States.1 Therefore, it seems that the term 'aggression' cannot properly be used in the case of primitive communities, where conflicts between individuals, clans, tribes or groups of tribes did not necessarily stem from the existing social order and production system. The term is fully applicable, however, to subsequent structures. Thus, in societies featuring slavery, the purpose of aggression w a s to seize slaves and to extend the territorial dominion of States and empires which were based upon slavery; under feudalism it was to seize land, subdue peasants and so • on. A s the forms of social life became increasingly complex, these basic motives for aggression were overlaid by all kinds of religious, political, ideological and cultural factors, producing a kaleidoscope of international policy which is not easy to understand. Yet for m a n y decades science has had at its disposal more than sufficient 'empirical data'. Research shows that between 3600 B . C . and the present day there have been only 292 years of peace, and that since that date 14,531 major 1.
F . Engels, Proishoîdenie sem'i, ëastnoj sobstvennosti i gosudarstva [Origin of the family, private property and State], M o s c o w , 1948.
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or minor wars have occurred, in the course of which 3,600 million people have been killed or have perished of famine or in epidemics, i.e. more than the total population of the world in the middle of the twentieth century.1 Scientific analysis of the various manifestations of aggression, even in the early stages of h u m a n history, has shown that aggression, as one of the manifestations of foreign policy, is closely tied up with internal policy which is determined by the nature of the existing system of production, the relationship between class forces within the country and the social structure of society. This has been confirmed by the experience of later historical periods. A s a rule, wars of aggression have been waged by States in which militaristic institutions and traditions haveflourishedand become supremely important because they enjoyed the support of the political power. O n e of the principal manifestations of aggression, apart from foreign expansion, has been the resistance put u p by the old order of things to revolutionary measures for the transformation of society. In order to keep aloft the banner bearing the proud words: 'Liberty, Equality, Fraternity' the defenders of the great French Revolution were obliged to ward off the armed invasion of the whole of monarchist Europe. History has witnessed m a n y attempts to introduce this form of aggression into the normal practice of international life. T h e 'Holy Alliance' sought, by means of its dictates enforced by arms, to control the destinies of various peoples. The Spanish Revolution failed because of it, and it nurtured plans for armed aggression against the young republics of Latin America which had w o n their independence. The triumph of the capitalist over the feudal method of production o n the international scale w a s accompanied by the Industrial Revolution, the rapid development of the productive forces and the emergence of new technical methods. T h e change in production conditions and in the forms of social structure affected the scale of international aggression and the forms it took, and led to the emergence of new motives for aggression, in addition to the traditional ones: the search for sources of cheap raw materials, the struggle for n e w markets which could absorb industrial products, the attempt to find spheres for profitable capital investment in overseas territories and so on. The new technical media have n o w m a d e aggression possible everywhere, even in the remotest corners of the earth. O n e of the consequences of the formation, at the beginning of the twentieth century, of a new world economic system including all the States and peoples of the world in their various forms w a s a change in the character of wars. A n y war starting as a result of aggression, in any part of the world, tended to be quickly transformed into a world war. 2 If w e take the last hundred years, w e shall see that the basic character of aggression has been different at different stages of development. During the second half of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, 1. 2.
O . Rjule, Hieb dlja Sesti milliardov [Bread for six thousand million], p . 261, M o s c o w , 1965. Sociologiâskie problemy me ïdunarodnyh OtnoSenij [Sociological problems of international relations], Moscow, 1970.
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its most characteristic form w a s colonial aggression, i.e. aggression for the purpose of acquiring colonies. At the time of the First World W a r , aggression was the outcome of the struggle to divide up the world anew. Subsequently, the rise of thefirstsocialist State in the world led to the emergence of a new kind of international aggression in new social conditions, one similar to that existing at the end of the eighteenth century, at the time of the French Revolution. Soviet Russia was obliged to repulse the onslaught of foreign interventionist forces from the north, south, west and east. In the 1930s and 1940s, the main centre of aggression was the Fascist powers, with their fantastic plans for world domination. Finally, the 1950s and 1960s saw the collapse of colonialism, after which the liberated peoples were able to choose between the socialist and the capitalist pattern of development; and the world witnessed m a n y examples of armed aggression against the newly independent States of the Third World that were struggling to defend their independence. International life today is characterized by the existence in the world of two different social and economic systems. A t the same time there are, as w e k n o w , quantities of rockets and nuclear weapons in the world—sufficient, m a n y scientists say, to destroy all life on the earth. A s to the relation between international aggression and socialism, it should be noted that the system of production under socialism, providing as it does for the planned development of the economy, creates an objective basis for a peaceful foreign policy. A s statistics show, international peace provides the best conditions for the development of production under socialism. In keeping with this, one of thefirstdecrees signed by the leader of the Soviet State, V . I. Lenin, was a decree on peace, stating that the peaceful coexistence of the two types of social system was an objective necessity. In the present conditions, the only possible course is to renounce aggression as a means of solving international conflicts, and to accept and apply the principle of peaceful coexistence. If w e analyse the instances of aggression perpetrated in our century, w e can m a k e out definite trends in their preparation, as well as the basic conditions that m a k e them possible. Thus if w e consider the policies of aggressors in the preparatory stages of aggression, w e m a y conclude that they developed in four main directions: political, military, economic and social. In the politicalfieldw e can, in turn, distinguish two spheres of activity. In that of foreign policy, growing diplomatic activity is observed in the period of preparation for aggression, accompanied by a heightened quest for allies (an example being the signing of the anti-Comintern pact shortly before the Second World W a r ) , attempts to secure the neutrality of as m a n y States as possible and lull the watchfulness of the future victims of aggression, and the conduct, if possible, of various kinds of subversive activity on their territory. In domestic politics preparation for aggression entails, in the aggressor country, an offensive against democratic ways of life in order gradually to substitute a totalitarian régime with a dictatorial form of rule. Then there is an endeavour to eliminate the opposition parties—beginning with the C o m munist party and all democratic organizations. The most reactionary section
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of the ruling classes enters the political arena, particularly the representatives of the arms and munitions industry and right extremists. T h e role of reactionary political parties and organizations increases, and the influence of the military on the State's political life grows. In the military domain there is a strengthening of the army, with an increase in its numbers and technical equipment, comprehensive planning of the military aspects of aggression and so o n . In the economic field there is a race for m a x i m u m development of the war-economy potential, particularly the arms and munitions industry, economic consolidation o n the h o m e front and so forth. Simultaneously with these three trends, aggressor States in the twentieth century have given ever greater attention to paving the way socially to aggression. This field of policy increased in importance as more and more of the population came to be called u p in the event of war. 1 In addition, the Second World W a r demonstrated the unprecedented increase in the importance of the h o m e front, as a result of which the war itself becomes a total one. In this way the ruling circles of the aggressor State endeavour to involve the overwhelming majority of the population of their country in the aggression. In this connexion, great weight is attached to such social matters as reorganization of the whole educational system to suit it as far as possible to the aggression under preparation. Thus in Hitlerite Germany, school textbooks were rewritten so as to inculcate in the future front-line soldiers and those on the h o m e front ideas justifying the aggression ahead. Teaching methods were also changed accordingly. O n account of the high degree of mechanization in warfare, a campaign was conducted in G e r m a n y to raise the level of technical knowledge a m o n g the population; the industrial training system was geared to the forthcoming hostilities and so on. Considerable attention in the course of preparation for aggression is given to working o n the population ideologically, for which purpose the mass information media are turned over to propaganda for aggression. Wide publicity is given to the glorification of violence, and the cult of force is raised to the rank of national symbol. A t the same time, propaganda is conducted in favour of militarism and revanchism under the cover of various hypocritical slogans. A n effort is m a d e to implant in the population the spirit of chauvinism, nationalism and racial or national exclusiveness. The ideologists of aggression are entrusted with the elaboration of theories which might lend some semblance of legality to the attack o n the victim of aggression. Population policy emphasizes the necessity of increasing the birth-rate since the aggressor State plans ahead for the need to m a k e good the losses to be occasioned by aggression.
1.
Under feudalism the army accounted for 2.5 to 3 per cent of the population, while in the late nineteenth century capitalist States might conscript between 10 and 15 per cent of the population. In the Second World W a r Fascist Germany called up 17 million out of a population of 80 million, or roughly 20 per cent. (See N . V . Pukhovsky, O mire i vojne, p. 37, M o s cow, Izdatel'stvo 'Mysl' ', 1965.)
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T h e public health service is reorganized to bring it in line with the requirements of the aggression under preparation. Social measures are taken to m a k e workers, peasants, the intelligentsia and the middle classes as far as possible parties to the aggression. Here special attention is given to social policy in regard to young people. W e could of course go o n adding further examples to this list of the social measures taken by the aggressor country in anticipation of aggression. However, what has already been said affords sufficiently eloquent testimony as to the great importance the aggressor is obliged to attach to the development of social policy during preparation for the launching of the attack. F r o m all the basic trends in preparation for aggression w e can conclude that it does not arise spontaneously and automatically but needs careful, comprehensive preparation. Under what concrete historical conditions does aggression become possible? T h e answer is primarily w h e n in the sphere of international relations there are powers which conduct a policy of toleration in regard to the aggressor and encourage him in the hope of turning his aspirations to their o w n account. In this situation the aggressor becomes fully convinced he has nothing to fear. A classic example of the policy of encouraging the aggressor is the M u n i c h agreement in 1938. A n important prerequisite for the perpetration of aggression is the weakness of democratic forces in the aggressor State and disunity of the parties representing the working class. Just such a situation did exist in G e r m a n y in the early 1930s, w h e n the struggle of the Communists against Fascism did not get the necessary aid from the Social Democrats and other forces which together could have defeated Fascism. T h e third prerequisite for aggression as an instrument of foreign policy is the existence in the country of social forces with a vested material or political interest in aggression, as well as the means by which they can guide or exert a decisive influence o n the country's political course. N o w a d a y s m u c h attention is being given to the increasing role of the p h e n o m e n o n k n o w n as the military industrial complex. A brief review of the factors connected with the perpetration of armed aggression in the international arena indicates that it does not bear the impress of inevitability but is the outcome of specific historical circumstances. Accordingly, there is nothing hopeless about the struggle against aggression since it can be averted.
W a y s of averting armed aggression in the international arena Aggression can only be fully eradicated from h u m a n experience if its cause, societies with antagonistic classes, becomes a thing of the past. Nevertheless, it can be averted even in circumstances where States with different social systems coexist.
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A n important factor in averting aggression is that all States, regardless of their social and economic structure, should observe the principles of peaceful coexistence. These principles, as w e k n o w , preclude war as a means of settling disputes between States and advocate recourse to negotiation. They also assume equality of rights, mutual understanding and trust between the States, respect for one another's interests, non-interference in domestic affairs, recognition of the right of each people to decide all its country's affairs independently, respect for the right of all peoples freely to choose their socio-economic and political structures, strict respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries, and the development of economic and cultural cooperation o n the basis of full equality and mutual benefit. A n o less important factor is the participation of broad sections of the population in the struggle for international peace, against aggression and for pursuit of a policy of peaceful coexistence in the international arena. The experience of the last two decades attests that resolute action by democratic forces in a position to exert a marked influence on international relations ties the hands of the aggressor or limits his freedom of action. N o r must w e overlook the potential role of international organizations, particularly the United Nations, in not allowing aggression to arise and in upholding international peace and security. A n important factor in averting aggression is strict observance by all States of the United Nations Charter, which contains provisions o n acts of aggression. Another factor would be success in the current disarmament talks under United Nations auspices. These have been just a few considerations connected with the study of ways of averting aggression in the international arena. This question seems to have been very little studied, and consequently scientists in m a n y disciplines have before them the noble task of making their contribution to the strengthening of international peace and of the struggle against aggression. [Translated from Russian]
N. A. Kovalsky is Vice-director of the Institute of the International Labour Movement of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. and Vice-president of the Social Sciences Committee of the U.S.S.R. National Commission for Unesco. He is the author of many studies dealing with international politics and organizations, including The Vatican in International Relations (1966, in Russian).
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Aggressiveness in the h u m a n life cycle within different socio-cultural settings
Introduction It is the aim of this article to highlight the role of socio-cultural factors in the manifestation of h u m a n aggression. T h e h u m a n cycle will be followed from infancy through childhood and adolescence to adulthood, and attempts will be m a d e to discover h o w closely related are observable aggressive traits and behaviour and analysable socio-cultural phenomena. Aggressive responses are determined by m a n y variables—social learning, perceptual, motivational, as well as genetic variables. N o single variable, including the gene, remains inviolable or unmodifiable. Recent trends in genetic psychiatry have shown that the gene is no longer inviolable and that ' m a n is not committed in detail by his biological constitution to any particular variety of behaviour'. By aggression w e mean—for the purposes of this article—an attack o n a person, object or self (which m a y or m a y not be violent, destructive), resulting in 'pain' to the object upon which the attack is m a d e . The word pain is put in inverted c o m m a s to point out that in certain psychological conditions (e.g. sado-masochism) pain which is inflicted upon another person or u p o n self gives rise to a psychological situation of sexual 'pleasure', that is, pain is actually enjoyed. Aggression, according to Freud and other investigators (Dollard et al, 1939, p . 140, 521), derives from frustration and unfulfilled instinctual needs. M a n y of these research workers, including Zander (1944), have conducted a number of experiments to demonstrate the frequency of aggression as a result of frustration. Frustration can be identified as a situation that hinders or impedes the path towards a goal, real or imagined, literally orfiguratively.While this frustration-aggression hypothesis is largely supported by experimental work, it is also k n o w n that aggression is not by any means the only response to frustration: there are several other possible responses, e.g. regression. According to Glover (1949), 'most analysts are ready to postulate a primary instinct of aggression which in addition to satisfying its o w n ends furthers the aims of other instincts, e.g. contributes the amount of aggressiveness necessary to effective love and reproduction and provides the destruc-
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tiveness necessary to self-preservation'. Other observers are of the opinion that aggressiveness is essentially a reactive p h e n o m e n o n called into existence by states of tension, e.g. by the frustration of any other instinct. According to Glover, these views are not mutually exclusive. 'Leaving these terminological issues aside,' he observes, 'the outstanding fact remains that tensions of aggressive instinct are amongst the most powerful to which the h u m a n being is subject.' Glover again observed that clinical investigation has shown that whether or not there is a primary instinct of aggression, the mind is radically influenced from the earliest days of life by aggressive impulses. It has also been pointed out by certain of these authors that the strength of aggression is directly related to the intensity of the frustrating situation. Although it is generally accepted that aggression is a fairly c o m m o n response to frustration (and conflict), it has also been proved that it is not the only response. Socio-cultural factors (e.g. learning) play a large part in determining the form and content of aggression. Learning, therefore, plays a very important role in determining what kind of behaviour will occur in response to frustration which can be produced by a variety of culture-bound situations.
Varieties and aims of aggression Aggression can take a variety of forms: it can be individual or c o m m u n a l ' direct and overt, physical or non-physical, displaced, redirected, sublimated, inhibited, modified; and in circumstances where a suitable target is not available or culturally prohibitive, aggression can take the form of fantasy. Cultural factors play a cardinal role in modifying, redirecting, and inhibiting aggressive drives. Lorenz employed the term 'cultural ritualization' to describe a method of achieving this 'difficult task of avoiding killing without destroying the important functions performed byfightingin the interest of the species'. H e concluded: 'All the culturally evolved norms of "fairfighting",from primitive chivalry to the Geneva Convention, are functionally analogous to phylogenetically ritualized combat in animals.' However, n o classification of aggressive impulses or expressions is satisfactory. M a n y experimental and real situations have been quoted to illustrate these features of aggression (Miller, 1948; Miller and Bugelski, 1948), especially displacement of aggression which is so well k n o w n in m o d e r n contemporary societies. Aggression is not infrequently displaced, that is, directed against defenceless targets or an innocent individual or group (social or cultural) not in any w a y connected with, or responsible for, the frustration. In spite of its varied nature and its susceptibility to cultural modification, it is k n o w n that 'the aims of aggression, namely, destruction or mastery, d o not modify'. According to this psychoanalytical theory, apparent modifications are due to the fact that the technique, the m o d e of expression as it were, varies with the associated libidinal interest. In his fascinating book, On Aggression, Lorenz (1966) asserts that: 'Aggression . . . is an instinct like any other, and in
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natural conditions it helps as m u c h as any other to ensure the survival of the individual and the species. . . .' In clinical practice it has been found that love and hate hardly exist in a pure state. Lorenz (1966) observes: 'Poet and psychoanalyst alike have long k n o w n h o w close love and hate are, and w e k n o w that in h u m a n beings also the object of love is nearly always, in an ambivalent way, an object of aggression too. The triumph ceremony of geese—and this cannot be stressed too often—is at most an extremely simplified model of h u m a n friendship, but it shows significantly h o w such an ambivalence can arise.' It is hardly conceivable that aggression consists of a single factor; it is the multiplicity of factors inherent in this form of interpersonal relationship that makes its measurement a difficult task. Another way of assessing the varieties of aggression is to determine its direction. In some cultures (e.g. parts of Western Europe) aggression is more frequently directed inwardly and, in another (e.g. North America), in both directions (inwardly and outwardly) and in yet another (e.g. m a n y parts of Black Africa) aggression is, in large measure, directed outwardly.
Infancy The findings of animal psychology, as a result of intensive direct observations and experiments, have opened the w a y to more refined theories of h u m a n behaviour. The concept of imprinting—a process by which experiences in very early life have a lasting and consequential effect on the behaviour of the individual—is directly relevant here. Harlow's studies o n the infant-maternal relationship and the reassessment of the evidence on the effects of deprivation of maternal care in the light of new research and new theoretical perspectives have all shown that in a child's early life, the mother is a very important person. This does not overlook the complexity of Bowlby's concept and the m a n y different antecedent and concomitant variables associated with maternal deprivation. In our studies of the development of the African child, w e have put special emphasis on the study of ego and drive integration: emergent ego structure and coping tendencies in successive stages of psychosexual development and stages in the development of aggression; influence of these o n motor resources, social interactions, object-relations and integration of selective identification. Coping patterns and defence mechanisms, especially the degree to which repression and aggression under different conditions are in the service of the ego, have also engaged our attention, but these cannot be dealt with in this article. O f greater relevance to the present subject is our observation of the impact o n the mother-child relation, of changes within the mother at different stages, and of changes in drives and ego development of the child, especially: increasing overt aggression and activity with the development of motor skills and drive; loss of intimacy and libidinal gratification on the part of the child
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with latency and departure to school; hostility and rivalry emerging with the birth of new siblings, etc. It would seem, therefore, appropriate to examine the origin of h u m a n aggressiveness in infancy. Allen (1949), in his clinical study of sado-masochism, observed that 'the aggressive instinct which is the root of all cruelty is present at birth'. H e continued : ' W e have seen that in the h u m a n child it is possible to arouse aggressive responses either at, or soon after, birth by restricting m o v e ment. . . .' It is therefore necessary to examine in a cursory manner the childrearing practices, especially the socialization processes, in certain major cultures and relate these to the frequency, intensity and pattern of aggressiveness in individuals or groups. A growing infant is active and this psychomotor activity m a y lead the child sooner or later to destroy and injure an object. Although this behaviour has n o hostile intent, it m a y nevertheless be judged by adults as being aggressive. Sears et al. (1953), have studied this aspect of aggression in schoolchildren and found, as one might expect, a high correlation between the general activity level and aggression. However, from their figures it was not easy to differentiate the cause from the effect: ' A n active child m a y stumble into aggressive acts; an aggressive child m a y become active in expressing his aggression.' T h e relation of aggression to activity, as manifested by the vigorous protests described in some infants, has been carefully studied by other investigators (Murphy, 1962). According to Lois M u r p h y , 'vigorously protesting infants will protest a taste they d o not like, will protest w h e n they are satiated, etc. In other words, they exercise active controls of the kind and quantity of stimulation which they are willing to accept'. She continues: 'Beyond this, s o m e of the infants even as young as four and eight weeks were very decisive and clear about postures which they would tolerate and those which they would not accept.' In spite of these observations, it is k n o w n that the kinds of aggression displayed by infants are simply 'obstacle-removing' activities which are not infrequently violent or vigorous, but not purposely oriented towards a goal response to inflict pain upon another person or object. In this connexion, Lois M u r p h y again observes: W e have seen that the degree of selectivity, vigour of choice, decisiveness, and general capacity to insist on having the opportunity to relate to the environment in the way in which the baby wants to relate to it are expressions of very young babies (as young as at least four weeks if not earlier), expressions which imply an active orientation to the environment. Occasionally one can see a baby during the neonatal period vigorously bat away covers encroaching on his face. Again, according to Lois M u r p h y , 'by the age of three, four, orfivemonths, w e often see some babies reaching for the bottle or the breast with a kind of avid vigour or force which could be called aggressive. Here activity, aggression, and oral vigour are part of the same response'. Thus, M u r p h y (1962) defined 'aggression' as 'almost anything from hostility to the vigour with which either constructive or destructive acts are carried out'.
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T h e experiences in infancy are multifactorial: the total ecology (social and physical). Since all infants in all cultures are exposed to frustrations or failures in varying degrees o n the part of the environment to satisfy their needs, a n d since s o m e protest or defend themselves in one w a y or another in response to 'intrusions or deprivations or failures or other rough treatment of the environment', there is n o doubt that the aggressive response develops 'typically' as part of the active interaction with the environment. In s o m e cultures other than that of the West, I observed (1960) certain significant cultural differences. The new-born infant, whose every need is anticipated and fulfilled by a confident mother before he is aware of needing anything, experiences an unbroken state of satisfaction without effort, such as doubtless exists in intra-uterine life. H e is born into a w a r m , affectionate and welcoming culture. In the early months he is inseparable from his mother w h o feeds him at the slightest whimper and enjoys all the emotional security of an extended family, including grandmothers w h o are notorious coddlers of children. The child enjoys varying degrees of comfort and security of reinforcing pressure. All these attentions are obligatory and this fact ensures its continuity and dependability. There is considerable maternal feeling, and in m a n y situations in which m a n y mothers outside the African culture would give evidence of annoyance, impatience, or frustration, they manifest supreme control of negatively charged feelings. The mother's sensitivity with regard to the needs of her child, her consistent pattern of behaviour and feelings towards the child and her freedom from anxiety are the direct results of the social and psychological attitudes towards having a child within this culture. The variation of patterns of maternal behaviour under comparable conditions is consistently negligible; maternal behaviour patterns are arranged along an ascending line of positive feelings: words (songs), smiles, laughter, cuddling, patting and stroking. W h e n all the patterns of maternal response to the infant are critically analysed, it will be found that the effect of this feeling is to sustain the woik involved in the care of the infant, intensify the relational behaviour in terms of interest and affection, and inhibit any potentially harmful impulse. For example, the work involved in breast-feeding can be measured in terms of persistency or continuity, which is also a measure of devotion to the task. In his study of cultural influences o n personality development a m o n g the southern Bantu group, Biesheuvel (1959) likewise observed: ' T h e African infant lives in a state of virtual symbiosis with its mother during the first eighteen m o n t h s of life, a state of blissful security w h e n all its needs are completely and promptly met.' K n a p e n (1958), writing o n the child-rearing practices a m o n g the Bacongo society, quoted one of her informants as saying: ' W e d o not insist that a child should g r o w up; w e wait until, according to the order of nature itself, the child arrives at conduct normal for its age.' In m y observation o n the mother-child relationship in certain major cultures of Africa, it w a s stated: Indigenous custcm prescribes breast-feeding for an almost indefinite period of time. The mother's supreme interest in the infant is evidence of her relatcdness: she is
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constantly aware of him regardless of distractions that m a y arise from boredom, states of fatigue, or painful or pleasurable body sensations. The infant sleeps with his mother until about the age of 3 years when he is transferred to the grandparents or his older brothers and sisters. This satisfies the feeling of communion with others and enhances his relatedness need. Toilet training is lax and flexible. In m y w o r k (1961) commenting o n the child-rearing pattern of the Y o r u b a tribe of Nigeria I noted: 'In fact there is n o training at all. The child can evacuate his bowels under any conditions and this act is usually m e t b y an expression of delight by the mother or the person caring for h i m . ' H a n k s (1949), writing o n 'The Quest for Individual A u t o n o m y in Burmese Personality', said that the details of child training in Burmese culture 'are casual and m a k e little burden to anyone'. H e observes that children in that culture are also neither encouraged to grow u p nor discouraged from it. H e says: 'Should a child wish to crawl or toddle, he is released and will be picked u p again w h e n he appeals to the proper adult.' T h e characteristic child-rearing features of some non-Western cultures would seem to emphasize a stable relationship between the parents, consistent mother-child relationships, and a situation which demonstrates efficiency, responsibility, acceptance, a n d is undemanding. Mothers' attitudes s h o w acceptance of bodily functions, and are free from excessive emphasis o n cleanliness, neatness and order. Tension-reduction in infancy is one of the m a i n psychological gains, while frustration-gratification ratio is unbalanced, with gratification predominating. In Benedict's (1952) attempt to explain the origin of the Japanese character, which from the Western point of view is full of contradictions, she says: The contradictions which all Westerners have described in Japanese character are intelligible from their child rearing. It produces a duality in their outlook on life, neither side of which can be ignored. From their experience of privilege and psychological ease in babyhood they retain through all the disciplines of later life the m e m o r y of an easier life when they did not know shame. They do not have to paint a Heaven in the future; they have it in their past. They rephrase their childhood in their doctrine of the innate goodness of m a n , of the benevolence of their gods and of the incomparable desirability of being a Japanese. . . . Gradually, after they are six or seven, responsibility for circumspection and knowing shame is put upon them and upheld by the most drastic of sanctions; that their o w n family will turn against them if they default. The pressure is not that of a Prussian discipline, but it is inescapable. In their early privileged period the ground has been prepared for this development both by the persistent inescapable training in nursery habits and posture, and by the parents' teasing which threatens the child with rejection. These early experiences prepare the child to accept great restraints upon himself when he is told that the world will laugh at him and reject him. H e clamps d o w n upon the impulses he expressed so freely in earlier life, not because they are evil but because they are n o w inappropriate. H e is n o w entering upon serious life. A s he is progressively denied the privileges of childhood he is granted the gratifications of greater and greater adulthood, but the experiences of that earlier
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period never truly fade out. In his philosophy of life he draws freely upon them. H e goes back to them in his permissiveness about human feelings. H e re-experiences them all through his adulthood in his free areas of life. In the light of these patterns of culture and their child-rearing practices, one is therefore bound to ask whether there would be any aggressive manifestation of a destructive kind in the children w h o in infancy have not been exposed to severe or consistent frustration. T h e answer, in the present state of our knowledge, is u n k n o w n . According to Hilgard (1962), '. . . the true motive for aggression develops late and is not directly correlated with the experiences of early infancy'. In our observational work on 8- to 10-year-old boys in Nigerian cities, as observed in the streets and in school settings, w e have found these children to be often friendly, but more provocative, teasing, belligerent and angered by picture-taking than children in Western cultures. This raises the question about differences in the developmental experience and relationships in the family as between the friendly ones and the m o r e aggressive ones (and also the shy and distrustful ones). In his study of Burmese culture, H a n k s (1949) has also called attention to the reputation of children for being particularly selfish and demanding: 'They have never had to learn to be givers.' O n e would like to emphasize the fact, however, that there is no consistent correlation between infant care and personality in all cultures studied so far.
Childhood If w e accept the theory of a slow development of the aggressive motive, w e might expect a correlation with later parental encouragement of, or punishment of, aggression. Davis and Dollard (1940, p. 141) studied the manifest behaviour of Black children raised in different social classes in the United States of America, and found that a m o n g most of these children aggressive behaviour was often rewarded by the parents. They also found that where the aggressive behaviour was often rewarded, the amount of aggression increased. Punishment of aggression also has its repercussions. Excessive punishment tends to harden the child and increases his wish to punish in return, possibly through reinforcement of imitating the behaviour of his parents' behaviour. This is also supported by the findings of a more recent survey of child-rearing practices (Sears, Maccoby and Levine, 1957, p. 91, 92, 94, 137) in the United States, in which 379 mothers were interviewed and were separated into two groups on the basis of h o w they managed their children's aggressive reaction or behaviour towards them or other members of their families. The mothers w h o were found to be most severely punitive had the most aggressive children. M u r p h y found that there were three other aspects of social relationships that began to appear during the pre-school years and which, though seemingly contradictory, appeared most strongly in the same individuals: sympathy,
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aggression and leadership. A s M u r p h y pointed out in her study of sympathy in young children, the child's motives might not be entirely pure, and his sympathy might contain elements of superiority, guilt, hostility, or other feelings. She observes: The relationships between sympathy and leadership and between leadership and aggressiveness are fairly obvious. That between sympathy and aggressiveness is more subtle. It seems likely that they occur together in individuals w h o have strong feelings, w h o are highly responsive to the feelings of others, and w h o are secure enough either to stand in opposition or to yield to others' feelings, as circumstances require. The correlation between sympathy and aggression is, of course, by no means perfect. Some children w h o feel or display little hostility are capable of considerable sympathy—most especially, perhaps, in situations where they themselves feel imperilled. Other children's aggressions m a y wholly lack the component of sympathy and appear quite heartless, or may even be expressive of profound psychological disorders.
Adolescence Since the problems of adolescence c o m m o n to all societies have their roots in cultural, psychological, sociological and biological factors, it would seem relevant to examine briefly the concept of adolescence within the traditional African cultures. There is, in practice, n o definable period of 'adolescence' in these cultures, where all adolescents undergo puberty and initiation rites. Immediately after these rites the initiate is automatically accepted by, and integrated into, the world of adults. This transition from the social and emotional world of the child to that of the adult promotes positive and healthy emotional relations and obviates the necessity for the development of defence mechanisms—aggression, rebellion, etc.—which h e might otherwise have developed had he been 'left in the cold' for an arbitrary period while being labelled 'adolescent'. In m a n y cultures, adolescents are caught u p in contemporary social change—social ferment and social disorganization. N e w reference cultures or subcultures, n e w norms and a n e w social awareness are arising. O n e of the most constant features of adolescents' activities in recent times is aggressiveness, violence, revolt, mass rebellion and negativism. This condition is endemic and has sporadic epidemic reactions. There is a widespread frustration in the world and a manifest incapacity of adults and governments to control events on which their well-being depends. There is anxiety and insecurity, lack of purpose and incompatibility of values. There have been little or n o changes in the institutions connected with socialization (and identification); the effective range of community participation in the life of individuals becomes increasingly narrowed. In our attempts to measure the trends of these 'distress reactions', w e have evaluated the psychosocial reactions not only by the incidence and prevalence of mental and psychosomatic disorders, but also by such indices
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as rate of crime, delinquency and group antisocial behaviour, alcoholism, prostitution, drug abuse, suicide, illegitimacy and other group psychopathological reactions.
Adulthood W e have attempted to show that in infancy and early childhood as in the later stages of life, emotional dynamics are the most significant indications of both normal and disordered functions. The main characteristic features of infantile life are: (a) immediacy of instinctual needs; and (b) rapidity of response to frustration. Hence if the balance of gratification and frustration is maintained, it will provide the child with opportunities to react effectively to potentially stressful and frustrating stimuli. A s a result of such psychological 'immunization' the vulnerability of the child in adult life is reduced. High sensitivity and ambivalent responses to stimulation and a low threshold for frustration m a y be due to accumulation of unresolved conflicts, frustrated feelings or unmanageable tension from childhood. Earliest forms of disturbed object relationship are not infrequently found in adults with immature and vulnerable ego w h o manifest severe aggressive behaviour. They tend to have reduced growth of internal conscience. Disturbances of or variation in the normal exercise of psychological functions are of utmost significance. Diagnosis in these cases can only be arrived at by a meticulous evaluation of k n o w n environmental conditions beginning with feeding, weaning and parental hostility to the severity or rigidity of moral, ethical and other social codes enforced. It also embraces individual, family and community factors.
BIBLIOGRAPHY A L L E N , C . A . 1949. The sexual perversions and abnormalities. Oxford Medical Publications. B E N E D I C T , R . 1952. Patterns of culture. London. BIESHEUVEL, S. 1959. Race, culture and personality. Johannesburg, South African Institute of Race Relations, 1959. (The Hoernle Memorial Lecture.) D A V I S , A . ; D O L L A R D , J. 1940. Children of bondage. Washington, D . C . , American Council on Education. D O L L A R D , J. et al. 1939. Frustration and aggression. N e w Haven, Conn., Yale University Press. G L O V E R , E . 1949. Psycho-analysis. London. H A N K S , L . M . 1949. The quest for individual autonomy in Burmese personality. Psychiatry, vol. 12, no. 3. H A R L O W , H . R . 1958. The nature of love. Am. Psychol, vol. 13, 1958, p. 673-85. H T L G A R D , E . R . 1962. Introduction to psychology. N e w York. K N A P E N , M . 1958. / . soc. Psychol, vol. 47, 1958, p . 223-9. L A M B O , T . A . 1960. Concept and practice of mental health in African cultures. East Afric. Med. J., vol. 37, 1960, p. 464. . 1961. Characteristic features of the psychology of the Nigerian. In: C . S. A . Annex 11, and West Afric. Med. J., vol. 9, 1960, p. 95-104. L O R E N Z , K . 1966. On aggression. London.
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M I L L E R , N . E . 1948. Studies of fear as an acquirable drive. I: Fear as motivation and fearreduction as reinforcement in the learning of n e w responses. / . exp. Psychol., vol. 38, 1948, p. 89-101. ; B U G E L S K I , R . 1948. Minor studies of aggression. II: The influence of frustrations imposed by the in-group on attitudes expressed toward out-groups. / . Psychol, vol. 25, 1948, p. 437-42. M U R P H Y , L . 1962. The widening world of childhood. N e w York. S E A R S , R . R . et al. 1953. S o m e child-rearing antecedents of aggression and dependency in young children. Psychol. Monogr. Ail, p. 135-234, see in particular p. 137, 140, 141. . 1957. Patterns of child rearing. Evanston, 111., R o w , Peterson. Z A N D E R , A . R . 1944. A study of experimental frustration. Psychol. Monogr., 56, p. 256-507.
T. Adeoye Lambo has been Professor of Psychiatry and Head of the Department of Psychiatry and Neurology of the University of Ibadan since 1963, and Vice-Chancellor of the University since 1968. He is a member of several international bodies, including the Expert Advisory Panel on Mental Health (WHO), the Executive Committee of the World Federation for Mental Health, and the West African Council for Medical Research; Professor Lambo is likewise Chairman of the United Nations Permanent Advisory Committee on Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders and the International College of Tropical Medicine, and Vice-chairman of the United Nations Advisory Committee on the Application of Science and Technology to Development. He is the author of numerous articles in medical and scientific journals as well as many monographs.
jane van Lawick-Goodall
S o m e aspects of aggressive i
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Introduction In 1960 I began a field study of the social behaviour of wild chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes [or satyrus] schweinfurtfyi) in the G o m b e National Park, Tanzania (East Africa). T h e park consists of a narrow stretch of rugged mountainous country running for some ten miles along the eastern shores of Lake Tanganyika and running inland three miles or so to the tops of the peaks of the rift escarpment. The area supports between 100 and 150 chimpanzees. Chimpanzees are nomadic within a fairly large h o m e range (which m a y be thirty square miles or more for an adult male) and they follow no regular routes in their daily wanderings in search of food. Moreover, unlike m a n y primate species, chimpanzees d o not m o v e about in stable, or fairly stable groups, but in small temporary associations, the membership of which constantly changes. The only stable association, over a period of years, is a mother and her younger offspring: such a sub-group freely joins up with and leaves other temporary associations. In 1963 I established a feeding area where chimpanzees could get bananas and, for thefirsttime, it became possible to make fairly regular observations on a number of individuals. B y 1964 some forty chimpanzees were visiting the feeding area, some regularly, others infrequently. I took on research assistants trained in m y observation methods and recording techniques. Since 1964 observations on the chimpanzees have been kept up on a daily basis. It is sometimes possible to follow a group of chimpanzees for hours as it wanders through the forest without observing a single aggressive incident. A t the artificial feeding area, however, where the chimpanzees compete for a favoured food which is in comparatively short supply, disputes, including fighting, occur more often, giving an opportunity to study the mechanics of aggressive behaviour.
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Threat and attack Before I discuss the sorts of situation in which chimpanzees most usually show aggressive behaviour, let m e briefly outline the more obvious sounds, gestures and postures which m a k e up the threat and attack repertoire of the species. Those aggressive behaviours which do not involve physical conflict, but which merely elicit submissive behaviour, avoidance or flight in the individual to w h o m they are directed m a y be termed threat; and chimpanzees, like most animals, solve more disputes by means of threat than by actualfighting.A dominant chimpanzee m a y fix his subordinate with an intent and prolonged stare, he m a y slightly jerk his chin upward whilst uttering a soft bark, he m a y raise his arm rapidly, or he m a y run towards an opponent in an upright position, waving his arms in the air whilst uttering loud yells. These patterns are of interest since they closely resemble some of the aggressive repertoire of m a n himself. T h e chimpanzee has other threat patterns too, of course, such as hitting out towards another with the back of the hand, swaggering and swaying from foot to foot in an upright position, and running towards another chimp stamping and slapping on the ground with feet and hands. W h e n actually attacking an opponent a male chimpanzee often tries to j u m p onto his victim's back and stamp hard with his feet. A small chimpanzee m a y be actually raised from the ground and slammed d o w n repeatedly, or it m a y be dragged along by one limb. Other attack patterns include biting, hitting, grappling, pulling out hair and scratching. Female chimpanzees are more likely to clinch, rolling over and over o n the ground together, or to pull out each others' hair or to scratch. Most attacks last no more than half a minute and even those which appear, to a h u m a n observer, to be extremely vicious, seldom result in injury to either the aggressor or his victim—other than the loss of a handful of hair perhaps, or a slight scratch. Most adult male chimpanzees hurl rocks or branches, usually at random, during their 'charging displays'. (These displays (see Plate 1) are usually performed o n arrival at a food source, when two groups meet up, at the onset of heavy rain and so on.) However, in addition to this random throwing, m a n y male chimpanzees and some females deliberately use objects as weapons in aggressive contexts. Most of our adult males, for instance, throw rocks or other objects at baboons during competition for bananas at the feeding area. Chimpanzees sometimes hurl things at each other and sometimes at h u m a n observers (Plate 2). However, whilst some individuals carefully select large and potentially harmful missiles, others throw anything that happens to be close by, including such inappropriate objects as handfuls of bananas! Moreover, whilst most chimpanzees aim quite well, they seldom score hits unless the targets are less than five or six feet away. These chimpanzees also occasionally use sticks as clubs to hit each other, baboons or other objects (Plate 3). Usually, however, whilst a large stick m a y be wielded forcefully, the chimpanzee then throws or drops his weapon prior to contact with his target.
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Response of chimpanzee w h o is threatened or attacked The response of a chimpanzee w h o is threatened or attacked varies with respect to the relative social status of the two concerned, the relationship between them, the cause of the dispute, and the violence of the aggressive act. Thus if one chimpanzee mildly threatens another of only slightly lower rank than himself w h o , for instance, approaches his food too closely, the recipient of the gesture m a y seem to ignore the threat or, at most, slightly withdraw. If the threatened chimpanzee is m u c h lower in status, the same gesture m a y elicit rapid withdrawal, loud screaming, submissive behaviour—or all of these behaviours. A chimpanzee is likely to direct a more violent form of threat at another w h o tries to take away some of his share of bananas than at one w h o merely wants to sneak off with a discarded peel, and the more vigorous the threat, the more frightened or submissive the recipient is likely to be. Once a subordinate has been attacked it m a y either crouch to the ground screaming until the attack is over, or it m a y struggle to escape and rush away. The closer the social status of the victim to the aggressor, the more likely it is that the former will turn and attack in self-defence.
S o m e contexts in which aggression is likely to occur S o m e major causes of aggression amongst our chimpanzees are as follows: At the artificial feeding area the most frequently observed cause of aggressive incidents was, of course, competition for bananas (Plates 4 and 5). Under more normal conditions, however, aggression over food is comparatively rare since most chimpanzee foods are present in abundance. If a chimpanzee is frustrated in achieving some goal—if, for instance, he cannot open a box to get at the bananas inside, or if he is attacked or threatened by a higher-ranking individual and dare not reciprocate, he frequently redirects his aggression at a lower-ranking animal. Alternatively he m a y rush off in a charging display, which includes m a n y seemingly aggressive acts such as stamping, shaking branches, hurling rocks and so forth. Such a display often seems to calm a frustrated chimpanzee: afterwards he appears relaxed and at ease. Sometimes a chimpanzee threatens or attacks a subordinate w h o has failed to respond correctly to some social signal. For instance, sometimes a male 'forces' a female to follow him about: if she does not hurry to his side w h e n he shakes branches at her, he m a y then actually attack her. O n e male threatened another w h o went to sleep instead of reciprocating during a social grooming session. At times adults appear to be 'irritated' by noisy inferiors. O n e submissive pattern involves the lower-ranking individual bobbing up and d o w n and
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uttering loud grunts in front of his superior, often actually getting in the way, and sometimes this resulted in a n attack from the dominant individual. Pain sometimes seems to m a k e a chimpanzee irritable: thus one male with a newly broken toe charged several times at a group of youngsters playing nearby w h e n the game became noisy. Strong bonds of affection or friendships m a y develop between pairs of chimpanzees, particularly between mothers and their offspring (including adult offspring), and siblings. A s would be expected, a mother will rush to the defence of her infant, often threatening or attacking the chimpanzee responsible for hurting or frightening her child. She m a y d o the same for her offspring w h e n he is a fully mature male, and he will hurry to her defence in the same way. Sometimes female chimpanzees join together to threaten, attack or chase away a female from a different area if she arrives at the feeding area. Males have not been observed to show this sort of deliberate aggression towards 'strangers' of either sex. It sometimes happens that when one individual is attacked, other chimpanzees w h o were not apparently involved in the original dispute hurry over to join in, attacking the victim w h e n it escapes from the original aggressor. Fear sometimes seems to spark off aggression. W h e n a paralytic disease (probably poliomyelitis) swept through the area, some chimpanzees became paralysed in one or more limbs. If this resulted in abnormal locomotion, when other chimpanzees saw the stricken chimpanzee for thefirsttime, they initially showed fearful responses (screaming, embracing one another and so forth) and subsequently displayed aggressive behaviour towards or actually attacked their injured companions. A good deal of aggression occurred during interactions between two individuals which I have termed 'dominance fights' although, in fact, such encounters only rarely involved actual attack. T w o young males, for instance, each holding an approximately equal position in the dominance hierarchy, m a y commence to show off in a vigorous manner, swaggering about in an upright position and violently swaying branches at each other. Such incidents are sometimes sparked off by causes which m a y not be at all clear-cut to the h u m a n observer. It is in connexion with the dominance status of a male that his charging display appears to play a vital role: in principle, the more frequently and the more vigorously he displays, the higher in the social ladder he is liable to climb. I shall return to the importance of this display below. Chimpanzees of the G o m b e Stream area are, at times, active hunters and prey upon young baboons, monkeys, young bushbucks and so on. H o w ever, the behaviour of a predator towards its prey cannot necessarily be considered as aggressive. After all, a m a n m a y catch afishfor his supper without feeling any more aggressive towards the fish than to the apples he m a y pick off a tree to eat or the meat he buys in a butcher's shop. O n the other hand, if he shoots a buffalo for meat and the buffalo charges him, then aggression, in the usual sense of the word, will certainly
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be roused. W h e n chimpanzees hunt young baboons, the adult baboons often threaten or attack the hunters: the chimpanzees then become aggressive towards the baboons. Finally, it m a y well be that, during a hunting episode, particularly the actual killing, the physiological processes m a y be similar to those involved in other types of aggressive behaviour.
Submissive and reassurance behaviour After being threatened or attacked, a subordinate then often approaches the aggressor and directs towards him submissive, or appeasing behaviour. This includes such gestures and postures as turning the r u m p towards the aggressor, crouching on the ground in front of him, holding out a hand towards him, touching or kissing him. T h e dominant chimpanzee, in m a n y cases, responds by gestures such as reaching out to touch the subordinate, holding its hand, patting it gently on the head, back or other part of the body (Plate 6), kissing it, briefly grooming or embracing it. Such behaviour, on the part of the aggressor, serves to reassure the subordinate: a youngster w h o crouches screaming and tense on the ground gradually relaxes and quietens under the soft patting of a male w h o , a few moments before, was pounding him u p and d o w n on the ground. S o m e individuals, particularly juvenile and young adolescent males, show a definite need for such reassurance: if the aggressor ignores their approach and submission they m a y maintain their appeasing gestures and postures, whilst screaming and whimpering, until he does respond. O n e youngster used to throw temper tantrums, screaming and hurling himself about on the ground, if his submissive behaviour was ignored. The need for such contact sometimes results in an obvious conflict situation: thus after a violent attack an adolescent male showed a tendency to approach the aggressor which was counteracted by a tendency to flee, so that he approached in a series of zig-zags as he alternately approached and turned from the big male. Reassurance behaviour is undoubtedly of great importance in maintaining the relaxed relationships which are normally apparent between most of the different individuals of a wild chimpanzee group. It is of interest that so m a n y of the gestures and postures involved in chimpanzee submissive and reassurance behaviour so closely resemble our o w n , not only in appearance but, more importantly, the contexts in which they occur.
Aggression and the rise to dominance A s I have already mentioned, the charging display of the male chimpanzee plays an important role in bettering, or at least maintaining his social status. Whilst most displays are not deliberately directed towards another individual, they do, nevertheless, serve to impress other chimpanzees present. Even m u c h older individuals sometimes hurry out of the w a y of an adolescent male when he rushes close by during a vigorous charging display.
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The best example of the apparent significance of the male charging display relates to the sudden rise in status of the mature male, Mike. Mike was fully mature when I first got to k n o w him in 1962. H e was then a m o n g the lowest ranking of all the socially mature males, and at times was threatened and even attacked by nearly all the others. Early in 1964 Mike, during one of his charging displays, seized hold of an empty four-gallon kerosene can that was lying in his w a y and dragged it behind him as he ran. The can m a d e a loud noise as it b u m p e d along the ground and the other chimps present at the feeding area rushed out of the way. After this, Mike began to use cans more and more frequently during his displays (Plate 7). Other males had also dragged or hit paraffine cans during their charging displays, but only Mike, it seemed, was able to take advantage of such artificial props. After displaying several times with them, presumably because they simply happened to be to hand, Mike began to hunt deliberately for the cans prior to displaying. After a few weeks he learned to keep up to three of them ahead of him, hitting or kicking them, whilst rushing at top speed across the ground. H e m a d e a tremendous noise in this way, and the other males became increasingly fearful. A n example will serve to illustrate Mike's tactics. O n e morning Mike was sitting by himself, staring at a nearby group of males. T h e other males were engaged in a social grooming session. After a while Mike got up and walked very calmly over to m y tent, selected two kerosene cans, and returned to his place. H e continued to stare at the group and then began to rock to and fro, almost imperceptibly (a sign of frustration or unease in a chimpanzee). A s his rocking became more vigorous, so his hair gradually began to stand on end (autonomic behaviour associated with almost any violent emotion in a chimpanzee). Finally he began the series of hooting calls which typically precede and accompany a charging display, and then he charged straight towards the other males, each of w h o m fled. Mike and the cans vanished d o w n a track and, after a m o m e n t , the group reassembled and recommenced grooming. A couple of minutes later, however, Mike's hooting began again and he reappeared, charging towards the group, hitting and kicking his cans. Again the group fled. After displaying thus for a third time Mike stopped and sat, breathing hard, his hair still erect, in the spot where the males had been grooming earlier. O n e by one the others approached, grunting nervously, reaching to touch or kiss him in submission. Eventually Mike was the centre of the grooming group. Four months after hisfirstdisplay with a kerosene can Mike had achieved a top-ranking position in the group, usurping the position of the former dominant male, Goliath. Shortly after this w e hid all the cans, for not only did w e dislike the noise but w e were sometimes hit by one of them during a display. B y then, however, Mike's position was assured. For almost a year Mike himself nevertheless seemed uneasy in his top-ranking position. H e displayed very frequently and very vigorously, and he was constantly attacking his subordinates, particularly the females. Often it seemed he attacked another over the merest trifle, or for no obvious reason at all.
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Several times during the months subsequent to Mike's new position w e observed spectacular 'dominance fights' between him and the previous topranking male, Goliath. A t n o time did w e see either male actually touch the other during such an encounter, save occasionally with the ends of the branches which they swayed vigorously at each other. Each time it seemed that after a while Goliath's nerve suddenly broke, and he thereupon hurried towards Mike with submissive gestures. The two then engaged in long social grooming sessions which served to calm the tensions that had built up between them. During thosefirstuneasy months of Mike's supremacy, w e twice observed groups offiveadult males 'gang u p ' on Mike; but though he rushed away screaming atfirst,when he w a sfinallycornered up a tree he turned and displayed: his aggressors broke ranks and fled. A s Mike became more secure in his position be became increasingly less aggressive and more and more tolerant of his subordinates. H e is still topranking male today, although two young males, both of w h o m often ignore Mike's charging displays instead of running out of the way, are obviously giving the old male cause for concern.
Discussion The chimpanzee is very close to m a n in m a n y ways. Recent biochemical research suggests that, in some respects, the chimpanzee is biochemically as close, or closer, to m a n than he is to the gorilla. Again the communication patterns of chimp and m a n , o n the emotional non-verbal level, together with the contexts in which they m a y occur, are often remarkably similar (Plate 8). Thus an understanding of the aggressive behaviour of chimpanzees m a y be of help in understanding some of our o w n . In the chimpanzee, actualfighting,as compared with the use of threat and bluff is, under normal circumstances, relatively infrequent. W h e n w e introduced an artificial element into the life of the G o m b e chimpanzees, namely a feeding area (where m a n y chimps gathered together more regularly than they would have done otherwise and where they competed for a food in relatively short supply), this resulted in an increase of all types of aggression, including physical attack. Even so, whilst some fights looked vicious, they seldom resulted in serious injuries to either aggressor or victim, and n o chimpanzee has been observed to kill another. H u m a n s , for the most part, also m a k e use of threat and bluff, including verbal aggression, far more than physical fighting. However, when people do fight they are far more likely to harm one another than are chimps. This, of course, is principally because m e n so often use weapons: it is ironical, in a way, that the forms of attack most likely to kill involve the least strenuous physical exertion—such as shooting. It would almost seem that, in the evolutionary sense, m a n has not yet adjusted behaviourally to the comparatively recent acquisition of weapon use in intra-specific fighting. Sometimes the causes of aggression seem quite similar in m a n and chimp. A mother, whether chimp or h u m a n , is likely to feel aggressive towards anyone
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or anything which threatens to harm or does harm her baby. T w o individuals, whether chimp or h u m a n , m a y become aggressive when competing for a particular object which each wants, whether this be a bunch of bananas in the case of chimps, or an attractive girl in the case of humans. Also m a n y chimpanzees, like m a n y humans, are constantly alert for a chance to better their social position, and sometimes this leads to aggression in both species. However, whilst the biological roots of aggression m a y not be too dissimilar in m a n and chimp, the expression and causes of ill-feeling and anger in m a n have been immeasurably complicated by his development of selfesteem and pride, the acquisition of moral values, the hunger for material possessions and the development of a spoken language. Chimpanzees usually settle a dispute immediately. The subordinate simply approaches his superior with appeasing gestures, irrespective of whether or not he was attacked for some misbehaviour. The aggressor responds with reassurance gestures and the victim is calmed. This does not mean that, even when a dispute appears to be over, the subordinate m a y not try and retaliate subsequently, if he sees a good chance. But it does m e a n that, for the most part, high- and low-ranking individuals are able to coexist peacefully and enjoy relaxed relationships with each other for m u c h of the time. There are no individuals, so far as w e k n o w , w h o live in constant terror of retribution at every turn. H u m a n relationships, however, are necessarily far more complex. Often pride prevents a person from making an apology after a dispute, even when he knows he was in the wrong. Thus two individuals, normally friends' m a y avoid each other for days: indeed, some quarrels are never m a d e up. Sometimes differences of opinion over a moral or religious matter can only be solved by the persons concerned shaking hands and 'agreeing to differ'; but only too often they do n o such thing and part with feelings of animosity, each feeling certain that he is 'right'. The development of m a n ' s superior intellect has complicated his patterns of inter-individual communication in all respects, and this is, of course, particularly true of the development of a verbal language. In so m a n y h u m a n interactions words have largely taken over from gestures. W o r d s are a fairly recent acquisition in the evolution of our species, and they can so easily be misinterpreted. W h e n one chimpanzee gestures to another, and if the individuals belong to the same community, there is no misunderstanding: the recipient of the signal interprets the message correctly. In most cases, no doubt, even chimpanzees from different areas would have no difficulty in understanding each other's signals. Indeed, some chimpanzee gestures, particularly those relating to threat and submission, can be correctly interpreted even by naïve h u m a n observers and by baboons. W h e n we turn to humans, however, there m a y be misunderstandings even at the family level as to the meaning of verbal signals, let alone when people of different nations and different cultures are trying to communicate. H o w m u c h h u m a n aggression, I wonder, is the result of simple misinterpretation: h o w often do words serve to rouse aggression in m a n when the speaker means to do no such thing? Conversely,
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Plate 1 Y o u n g mature male during 'charging display'. Photographs: Baron Hugo van Lawick. © National Geographic Society.
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Plate 2 Male infant, about 3 years old, preparing to throw stone at photographer.
Plate 3 Adult male preparing to hit a strange object—his reflection in a mirror.
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Plate 6 Adolescent male, w h o was crouchedflaton the ground screaming, beginning to relax as a consequence of reassurance gesture by dominant male.
Plate 7 Male chimpanzee named Mike using kerosene can to enhance 'charging display'. Note chimpanzee hurriedly climbing up tree to get out of his way.
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