PACKING PUNCH

DefInsights VOL.1 ISSUE 4 ~ SEPTEMBER 2017

A SUGOSHA PRESENTATION

PACKING PUNCH Exciting race in the offing for India’s P75I submarines

on the cusp of defence sector revolution

CONTENTS THE LEADERSHIP

15

DEFENCE MINISTER:

wOMaN’S POWER IS NATION’S POWER

POLICY ANALYSIS

05

STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS FOR INCLUSIVE INDIA

POLICY ANALYSIS

09

ON THE CUSP OF DEFENCE SECTOR REVOLUTION

PROGRAMME UPDATE

EXCITING RACE IN THE OFFING: PROJECT 75i

IDEAS FOR ACTION

19

TIME TO REPLACE COMBAT PLANES WITH ARMED UAVS?

12 EDITOR’S NOTE EVENTS OPPORTUNITIES

Editor’s Note

What to watch out for in the coming months India has a new Minister of Defence in Mrs. Nirmala Sitharaman. As is mentioned in this edition of DefInsights, she is probably the first woman Defence Minister of India to be holding full-charge of a key portfolio that empowers her to sit at the high table called the Cabinet Committee on Security chaired by none other than Prime Minister Narendra Modi. This empowerment brings along with it huge responsibilities. One such responsibility, under the umbrella duty of militarily defending India from external aggression and sometimes internal troubles of the militant nature, is to equip India’s 1.4-million-strong armed forces of the best arms, ammunition and defence systems that will enable them to perform their role effectively. With Mrs Sitharaman herself spelling out her Key Result Areas to include arming the Indian military personnel with the best equipment, it is high-time to see what the world and the industry should watch out for in terms of what India could be procuring for its armed forces in the next few years to come. We present you five of those big-ticket procurement cases that might be of immediate interest, all of which could be under the new Strategic Partnership policy of the Defence Procurement Procedure of 2016, aimed at building a robust, domestic defence industrial base. Single Engine Combat Planes (estimated $12 billion) India has already done most of its initial preparations to go ahead with the process of procuring 100-odd single-engine fighter aircraft from a foreign source for the Indian Air Force, which has been staring at a depleting strength of its combat fleet. The American major Lockheed Martin is ready to offer its latest variant of the F-16, Swedish company Saab is keen to present its latest variant of Gripen. The Request for Information (RFI), under the Strategic Partnership policy, is expected to be issued to the two companies, anytime from now to the end of this year. The new policy aims to bring defence production of the single-engine combat planes to India through this procurement. In anticipation of the RFI, Lockheed Martin has signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Indian company, Tata Advanced Systems Limited, to produce F-16 Block 70 at a facility in India through a transfer of technology. Saab too has announced its intent to work with Adani Group as its Indian partner on similar lines. The Indian tie-ups that the two companies have made with prospective Strategic Partners really don’t make much sense now, unless it becomes clear who the Indian government selects for producing the single-engine combat planes. Twin Engine Combat Planes (estimated $15 billion) India has already bought 36 Rafale twin-engine combat planes of the French company Dassault Aviation for the Air Force to meet its Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft needs. There are already reports that India may go in for more Rafales for its fleet, under a new procurement process. However, none can September 2017 | DefInsights | 3

deny the fact that the Air Force requires another 100-odd twin-engine fighters, now that the original MMRCA tender for 126 planes had been shelved in 2015. Former IAF chief Air Chief Marshal Arup Raha has already spelt out that the Air Force would need more twin-engine fighter aircraft and that the process of procuring them would have to be gone through again, as the 36 Rafales would not be enough to meet the combat fleet strength plans of the force. A re-run of the 2007 MMRCA race and global interest for this requirement can be witnessed only if it becomes clear that India would go for a tender instead of going in for more Rafales. Naval Combat Planes (estimated $12 billion) The Indian Navy has already issued a RFI in January 2017 for procuring 57 carrier-borne combat planes to operate from the flight deck of its Indigenous Aircraft Carrier, after it became clear that the Naval Light Combat Aircraft from the Defence Research and Development Organisation stable was not yet ready or suitable for such operations. This RFI has generated much interest in a few global manufacturers, such as American Boeing for its F/A-18, Russian MiG for its MiG-29K and Saab for its Gripen Maritime plane. These companies are keen to participate in the Request for Proposals and have already begun their campaign in India through several presentations to the Indian Navy and the media on their offerings. With the Strategic Partnership policy now in place, it is to be seen if the Navy would go ahead with the January RFI and continue with the process of procurement or would re-issue the RFI under the new policy. But one thing is clear, the Navy LCA has a lot of work on it to be completed before it can be considered as the future carrier-borne aircraft, as the Indigenous Aircraft Carrier nearing completion at the Cochin Shipyard in southwestern part of India would be have a ski-jump flight deck, and this would mean the chosen aircraft should be able to fly off the other Indian aircraft carrier, INS Vikramaditya. Next Generation Submarines (estimated 12 billion) Indian Navy became the first of the three Indian armed forces to come out with a procurement programme under the new Strategic Partners policy through its RFI for building six next-generation conventional diesel-electric submarines. The new submarines project would go to an Indian private shipyard and the contest, as it seems today, would be between Larsen and Toubro and Reliance Defence. The new submarines would come with Air Independent Propulsion technology, which would allow it to be under water for longer periods than the existing submarines in the Indian fleet or even the new ones under the Scorpene project, under which the first of the six vessels is to be inducted into the Navy this year. The Indian Navy has issued the RFI, a restricted one, to six global submarines builders - Naval Group (formerly DCNS) of France, Navantia of Spain, Thyssenkrupp Marine Systems of Germany, Saab (Kockums) of Sweden, Rubin of Russia and Mitsubishi-Kawasaki Heavy Industries, a surprise inclusion from Japan. These submarine-builders have now been given a time extension to respond to the RFI by October 16, 2017, instead of September 15. Following their responses reaching on time, the Indian Navy will scrutinise and decide on the parameters to be included in the RFP that would be expected in six months from then. Naval Helicopters (estimated $10 billion) In late August this year, the Indian Navy again issued two RFIs for procurement of a total of 234 helicopters to boost its anti-submarine warfare and logistics capabilities. The Navy’s RFIs seek to procure 111 Naval Utility Helicopters and another 123 Naval Multi-Role Helicopters. The global naval helicopter manufacturers have been asked to respond to the RFIs by the first week of October this year. The Navy has been pressing the government to procure these helicopters to replace its ageing fleet, though the acquisition of these flying machines has seen long delays owing to problems with procurement processes. The previous tenders of these helicopters now stand canceled, increasing the trepidation in the Navy over its diminishing capabilities. -- N C Bipindra

4 | DefInsights | September 2017

Policy Analysis

Strategic Partnerships for Inclusive India S By Colonel K V Kuber

ince the industrial revolution, no country has become a major power without becoming an Industrial Power. Japan and Germany emerged from the ravages of the Second World War, at the back of a vibrant manufacturing sector. China’s ascendancy to being the world’s second superpower is a result of its colossal manufacturing prowess. The decline of manufacturing in the United States is its biggest concern and has been at the root of the political upheaval in the world’s most powerful democracy. The ‘Make in India’ initiative, launched by the Prime Minister in 2014, brought a new squall of energy and excitement across multiple industrial sectors, which had been languishing at the sidelines for years. One of those sector and perhaps the most critical was Defence manufacturing. Defence Manufacturing is being looked at as one of the most thrilling sectors in India. Companies, large and small, have announced plans or have already entered into the sector. Keeping India’s aspiration in the region in mind, it is an obvious need of the hour. An emerging global power like India cannot stay an arms importer for long, with only a public sector establishment for all of its requirements. Indigenous design, development and manufacturing, and the inclusion of the Indian private sector had to be given a new lease of life. The Government, in the past 36 months, has played a key role in reinvigorating the sector with a slew of reforms and policies. Mr. Manohar Parrikar, as the Defence Minister, put his heart and soul to align the ministry’s policies and procedures with Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s vision. Thus came about a number of policy reforms, including the Defence Procurement Procedure-2016, online clearance for exports through no-objection certificates, relaxation in the procedure for Industrial Licensing, making Defence Offsets implementation more effective, focus on Micro-Small-and-Medium-Enterprises (MSMEs) in integration with main Defence business and others.

However, the major path changing reform was the introduction of ‘Strategic Partnership’ (SP) model for procurement of strategic platforms for the armed forces. The model was proposed by the Experts Committee headed by Mr Dhirendra Singh, former Home Secretary, in 2015. In a long musing of two years, the SP policy was formally announced by the government only in May 2017. Strategic Partnerships – Grand Vision The government has long realised that if India were to follow the traditional methods of defence procurement and remain dependent on the Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs), as the nation has been doing thus far, the country is not likely to encounter any new results. Ambitions of the political leadership to institute corrective mechanism and the vision of the government could only be matched if we adopt new and innovative methods, while also embracing the private sector. Hence, the government introduced the concept of Strategic Partnership where private industry could be a partner to the armed forces to develop sustainable long-term design, development and manufacturing capabilities, to address the strategic requirements of the Indian armed forces. Strategic Partnerships hold the key, with a hope for the armed forces to get the procurement executive to act in an atmosphere conducive to near-hassle free and expedited induction. Moving away from an archaic government-vendor relationship and recognising the private industry as partners will help reduce the trust deficit. In the SP model, the government has provided a strengthening balance to the sector. It is about a holistic development of capabilities, infrastructure, and create jobs. The idea is to create an avenue for the private industries to engage with complex technologies and build strategic systems in a long-term partnership with the government, under the umbrella of a well-defined protocol. September 2017 | DefInsights | 5

Policy Analysis

In concept, while the selection of the foreign platform and the foreign Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) needs ‘Exclusivity’, the selection of the potential SPs demands ‘Inclusivity’ as a mandate for exercising formidable options.

potential SPs from the domestic private industry. Towards this, the selection criterion needs to be flexible, adaptable and inclusive to bring about healthy options for the process to proceed. There is energy in the industry like never before.

Inclusivity: key to success of Strategic Partnerships

The entire concept of bringing in the private sector into the realm of main stream defence business was to break the monopolistic situation enjoyed by the Ordnance Factory Board and the Defence PSUs club. Now, India cannot afford to create another exclusive club of established companies like Tatas, Mahindras, and L&T in the private sector with an antediluvian approach with something like the segment specific criteria that have been specified in the policy document.

The experts committee report indicated, “the selection procedure for such Strategic Partners is the most crucial element in operationalising the idea. The entire scheme rests on it.” The government set up a Task Force for recommending the selection process for Strategic Partners under the leadership of Dr. V. K. Aatre, a former Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) chief. The report submitted by it was nothing short of reminiscent of the ‘License Raj’ era, which had stymied India’s growth for almost 40 years. The nation should not forget that a similar model has been heard of before, in the form of Raksha Udyog Ratnas (RURs); then it was proposed as an ‘Exclusive Club’ of few private companies, who would obtain the status of Ratna and hence, be enjoying the privileges accorded to the Defence PSUs. The model simply never took off. Do we intend to repeat this error again? The spirit of the policy has been and should continue to be based on the principle of ‘Inclusivity’. Broadbased selection is the key to create a large pool of 6 | DefInsights | September 2017

There were questions in the policy document like, (i) Do you have experience in production of aircraft/ helicopters or components?; (ii) Do you have special machining capabilities and composites manufacturing?; (iii) Do you have hangars exclusively available for production, testing and assembly of aircraft? Do such questions require an answer? It is an obvious ‘No’. Rather, the Ministry of Defence would do well to make a selection on the basis of overall capabilities, as indicated in the general criteria and a realistic assessment of the ability to be able to bring such capabilities to ground in the time-frame required. The

Policy Analysis

general criteria should include ability to setup a supply chain and collaborate with large set of partners. Had someone asked this question to Mukesh Ambani’s Jio venture, and stopped him; we as ordinary citizens would continue to pay heavy bills to the rocking satisfaction of the established players, blissfully unaware that it could have been a lot cheaper and efficient. So was the case with Capt. G. R. Gopinath of the once famous Air Deccan, which revolutionised costs in air travel; other established players just followed suit. Defence is a costly business, needs cost reforms like never-before, new minds, new mindset and innovative approach hold the key. The SP model cannot be based on the principle of elimination on stated parameters, rather it should be on the sound principles of ‘Inclusion’ and deep selection. The fundamental idea in creation of SP model was based on the principle of breaking the ‘Exclusive Club’ mentality prevalent with the OFB, Defence PSUs and few private sector companies dominating the scene for last two-three decades. We cannot afford now have a repeat performance here, by reserving the SP space to few established companies in the domain, because if they could have they would have delivered in the past. A broad-based selection, with an inclusive approach allowing as many possible contenders without any fear of favour, is the call of the hour.

Parting Shot The SP model has the potential to create a complete eco-system in the country, provided it is executed using the inclusive framework. New entrants will harness the strength in the existing system, apply innovative methods, work with a differentiated framework and bring new culture in sync with their global partners, and venture to create ‘Development Partners’ in consonance with their philosophy. Large conglomerates, like Reliance, Adani, and Aditya Birla, who have proven their mettle in other industries, should be allowed to participate alongside Tatas, Mahindras and L&T to create depth in the sector. May the most efficient private player help the nation in its journey to become a global power. New geographies will emerge, new opportunities will fuel expectations and growth. Small industries will have a greater chance in innovations and development programmes. Industrial growth is an automatic result. New technologies will have a chance to proliferate and new entrants would romance them better (they come without a baggage), while new markets will emerge in a quest for exports. A new India, industrially strong India, a regional superpower, with home-grown military might, is waiting to happen. September 2017 | DefInsights | 7

MISCELLANY

Kalyani-Rafael JV opens Hyderabad facility Kalyani Rafael Advanced Systems (KRAS), a joint venture between Kalyani Strategic Systems Limited and Rafael Advanced Defense Systems Limited of Israel, inaugurated their state-of-the-art facility at Hyderabad on August 3 this year. In line with the Indian government’s ‘Make in India’ initiative, the joint venture will invest in high-end technology and advanced manufacturing techniques to design, develop and manufacture state-of-the-art weapon systems for the Indian armed forces. This green field JV envisages creation of significant direct and indirect employment opportunities, import substitution and foreign direct investments into the country. KRAS would be India’s first private sector advanced defence sub-systems manufacturing entity. Spread across an area of 24,000 sq.ft., the facility will enable production of high-end technology systems for Indian armed forces. It will be engaged in development of a wide range of advanced capabilities like Command Control and Guidance, Electro-Optics, Remote Weapon Systems, Precision Guided Munitions and System Engineering for System Integration. The facility will also target to export products to other countries.

Telengana Minister for Industries and Commerce Kalvakuntla Taraka Rama Rao speaking at the KRAS facility inauguration in the presence of Israeli Ambassador to India Daniel Carmon, Telengana Minister for Transport Patnam Mahendra Reddy and Kalyani Group Chairman Baba N. Kalyani in Hyderabad on August 3, 2017.

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DefInsights 8 | DefInsights | September 2017

Policy Analysis

on the cusp of defence sector revolution O

ne of the most awaited policy additions to the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) has been the Strategic Partnerships (SP) policy. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) approved and released the policy on Strategic Partnerships as Chapter VII of the DPP-2016 in May this year. Background

By Sohil Patel

It might not come as a surprise to us that the idea of self-reliance and development of defence manufacturing has long been advocated by many accomplished and credible individuals within the armed forces and the industry. While we have established the Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs), Ordnance Factories (OFs) and Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) to support the armed forces and develop strategic technologies, there is still a huge ask from the MoD year-on-year in terms of technology development and supply of equipment. To this effect an Expert Committee was formed under the leadership of Mr. Dhirendra Singh, a former Home Secretary, by the MoD for the purposes of evolving a policy framework to facilitate ‘Make in India’, align it with the DPP and suggest requisite amendments in DPP-2013. The Expert Committee submitted its report in July 2015. Subsequently, the MoD constituted a ‘Task Force’ under the Chairmanship of Dr. V.K. Aatre, a former DRDO chief, with experts from various fields as members, to recommend criteria in detail for the selection of Strategic Partners, which include the generic criteria and the specific criteria for the platforms identified by the Dhirendra Singh Committee, after studying the best practices. The Aatre committee submitted its recommendations in December 2015 to the MoD, detailing the selection procedures and criteria for Strategic Partners, while being fully aware that the Strategic Partnerships would not only be long-term relationships between an Indian private sector entity and the MoD,

but would also be critical from the perspective of achieving self-reliance in respect of national security and defence production apparatus of the country. Policy The preamble set forth earlier by the Aatre-led Task Force, which followed the Dhirendra Singh committee, remain the same which is self-reliance in defence equipment manufacturing in India. The foremost objectives of the policy are to: Reduce the burden of defence Imports on the nation Bolster defence manufacturing in India through indigenous private defence firms. Chapter VII provides the broad contours of the policy and the finer details will emerge as it is developed further. The SP model will cover four segments to begin with: Fighter Aircraft, Helicopters, Submarines, and Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFV)/Main Battle Tanks (MBT). While the initial recommendations of the Task Force covered other segments like weapons, networks and materials, the current scope of the policy covers only four segments stated above. The MoD has already released the RFIs for Submarines and Naval Helicopters as part of this policy to selective the Foreign Original Equipment Manufacturers (FOEMs), who would act as the technology providers. The Strategic Partner selected by the MoD will be an Indian company with minimum 51 per cent Indian ownership, apart from ensuring long-term investments in manufacturing infrastructure, eco-system of suppliers, skilled human resources, Research and Development for the modernisation and upgrades. The SP is expected to play the role of a System Integrator by building an extensive eco-system, comprising of development partners, specialised vendors and suppliers, in particular, those from the Micro-Small-and-Medium-Enterprises (MSME) sector. The model entails selection of an Indian Strategic Partner and in parallel shortlist potential technology partners, the OEMs. September 2017 | DefInsights | 9

Policy Analysis * Expression of Interest (EOI) will be released to the Indian private sector for evaluations and shortlisting for all segment as the potential SPs.

While these criteria remain as benchmarks, the actual policy published in DPP-2016 is highlighted below.

* In parallel, RFIs will be issued to potential OEMs in each segment who will be the technology partners to the SP. The MoD will shortlist one or more OEMs in each segment based on the evaluation criteria.

Shortlisting Potential Strategic Partners

* The next phase would see the potential SPs collaborate with shortlisted OEMs to bid for the segment specific Request for Proposals (RFPs).

Technical Gate

* Based on RFP evaluation, which includes field trials to assess whether the equipment meets the Services Staff Qualitative Requirements (SQRs) and financial bid evaluation, the segment specific SP will be selected.

The Indian companies vying to be Strategic Partners to the MoD will undergo two stages of evaluation, mainly:

While the details of what the technical evaluation criteria are not mentioned in the policy, it has been made evident that the applicant should have “demonstrated capability of integration of complex systems”. Which stresses on the fact that the MoD is looking for a Systems of Systems integrator and not just manufacturing capabilities. Financial Gate Again, the MoD has provided minimal information as to what the financial criteria would be, except that they would look at Consolidated Turnover, Net worth and Credit Rating for evaluation. The Aatre-led Task Force, on the other hand, had provided detailed evaluation criteria for both technical as well as financial gates.

Evaluation Criteria The Expert Committee, in its original report submitted in July 2015, had suggested broad parameters on which the selection criteria could be based, which are as follows: (a) Financial Capability: Annual turnover, Profitability, Net worth, Risk Appetite, appropriate ratio of program size to annual revenues; (b) Financial Prudence: Credit ratings, quality of disclosures, No CDR status; (c) Technical Capability: Domain specific capabilities (range and depth), organisational processes, outside domain large programme capability, global reach and network; (d) R&D Capability: Track record in development of technologies and products, R & D investments over past five years, R&D centre certification and accreditations;

In addition, there will also be Segment Specific Criteria which would be evaluated by the MoD. (Appendix B to Chapter VII of DPP-2016) The policy asks for capabilities in each of the four segments to understand the existing infrastructure and capabilities of the applicants in terms of their ability to manufacture and support any of these platforms. Shortlisting of OEMs As mentioned earlier, shortlisting of OEMs will be done in parallel to the process of shortlisting potential SPs to reduce the overall timeframe for implementation. The process will be initiated by issue of Request for Information (RFI) to potential OEMs by the MoD, followed by issuance of EOI based on the SQRs. This will be followed by an evaluation from the Technical Evaluation Committee (TEC) to shortlist OEMs for each segment. The main criteria to shortlist the OEMs mentioned in DPP are as follows:

(e) Capacity / Infrastructure: quality of infrastructure with regard to global benchmarks;

* Range, depth and scope of technology transfer offered in identified areas.

(f) Executive Track Record: Delivery Track Record

* Extent of indigenous content proposed.

(g) Ownership Structure: Public / Private, Family / Professional, Promoter driven / widely held.

* Extent of eco-system of Indian vendors/manufacturers proposed.


Policy Analysis

* Measures to support SP in establishing system for integration of platforms. * Plans to train skilled manpower. * Extent of future R&D planned in India. Indigenisation Roadmap It is noteworthy that the policy emphasizes on the role of the SP in terms of indigenisation of the platforms they are selected for. It is mandated that the SP provide a comprehensive roadmap in terms of future development including Performance Based logistics (PBL), upgrades etc. regarding: * Plan to indigenise the production and manufacturing of the platform * And most importantly commit to developing an eco-system of domestic manufacturers. It shall do so by entering into teaming arrangements and development partnerships with MSMEs, DPSUs, OFs, DRDO and foreign companies.

Conclusion The SP policy once implemented provides a tremendous opportunity for the Indian private industry to develop self-reliance in Defence manufacturing. From large corporations like Adani, Reliance Mahindra and L&T to DPSUs to Tier1 companies to MSMEs, all have a role to play in building the manufacturing eco-system in the country. While the SPs are expected to play the role of system integrators, it is the supply chain (specially the MSME sector), which will have to evolve and establish themselves in areas of design, manufacturing and R&D. The onus is on the private sector to pursue the opportunity in the spirit with which the SP model has been envisioned. It would be of foremost importance that the SP realises this as a nation building exercise apart from just being a large business opportunity. We are on the cusp of an industrial revolution similar to the economic reform in 1991 which we as a nation and manufacturing industry must ensure ‘Make in India’ fructifies. September 2017 | DefInsights | 11

programme update

Exciting race in the offing for India’s P75I submarines By Narashimha Chari

The recently conducted Malabar exercise - among Indian, Japan and USA - is a symptomatic reflection of the geostrategic demonstration between friendly nations, towards their common adversaries. The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is an important maritime route, and pertinent to India’s concern is the seemingly Chinese attempt to encircle India, what’s now known as the ‘String-of-Pearls’ strategy and China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). ACT EAST POLICY The ‘Look East Policy’, launched in 1991, was for more economic reasons than for any impactful geostrategic purpose. Back then, India was limping from dire economic crisis and the objective was to regionally integrate India with the ASEAN countries, by leveraging the cultural influence across the region, to get the maximum benefit from economic liberalisation policy. India’s ‘Act-East Policy’, being currently pursued, is a more assertive and aggressive approach of the ‘Look East Policy’. The stakes have increased with the ‘Act East Policy’, and so has India’s success and stature, in the global geo-political arena. The recent diffusion of tension at Doklam at the tri-junction among India, Bhutan and China; mention of Pakistan sponsored terrorism in the BRICS joint statement, or the announcement Asian-African-Growth-Corridor (AAGC) – to counter China’s ‘One Belt-One Road’ (OBOR) plane - are testimony to India’s military victory at guarding its boarders, and geo-political stature across the region. Sometimes, the impact of such regional and extended geopolitical influence and partnerships, can be felt on important strategic defence procurements too. STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP POLICY With the induction of Chapter VII, on the Strategic Partnership (SP) model, the intent of the Indian Ministry of Defence (MoD) was made clear on the big ticket purchases. To begin with, four sectors


were identified – submarines, helicopters, single engine fighter aircraft and armoured fighting vehicles – with a cumulative budget estimated to be over Rs. 2 lakh crore. The benefits envisaged in the SP model such as self-reliance, a strong ecosystem, competition (with the DPSU’s included), transparency, dynamism, skill development, optimum use of technology, to mention a few, makes it a promising and an inclusive policy, which will change the dynamics of the Defence and Aerospace industry in the country. PROJECT 75I Currently, under the Project 75 programme, six Scorpene submarines are being built at the Mumbai-based Mazagon Docks, in collaboration with the Naval Group (formerly DCNS) of France. The Indian Navy is not keen on going in for more of the Project 75 Scorpène/Kalavari class submarines. Hence, the current Request for Information (RFI) has been issued for Project 75I class of submarines, which is not a follow-on of the Scorpene project, but a entirely new production line. The Qualitative Requirements (QR) have been altered, it seems, and the Project 75I requirement would include the Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) system to enable sustenance under water for longer duration. In addition, there will be advanced detection range and combat management system, besides better sensors for optimum performance. The weapon system would be a mix of torpedoes and missiles. The other key differentiators of the Project 75I, over its predecessor project, are its bigger size, yet the stealth and enhanced use of sensors. Transfer of Technology (ToT), and transferring important know-how, which are intrinsic parameters to the Strategic Partnership policy, will be determinant parameters for awarding the project to a Foreign Original Equipment Manufacterer (FOEM). The following are the salient points of Project 75I: * Since the project is being done through the Stra-

programme industry review update

tegic Partnership model, it complements the ‘Make in India’ intiative of the present Indian government. * It has VLS (Vertical Launch System) to allow the fitment of the submarine with multiple BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles. * Air Independent Propulsion, an important feature which allows the submarine to stay under water for prolonged periods. * Enhanced and optimum use of sensors, giving the submarines a better situational awareness. * Advanced detection system for tracing and tracking enemy submarines and warships.

marines, which are currently in service or undergoing sea trials. The proposed submarine should be capable of operating in open ocean and littoral-cum-shallow waters in dense Anti-Submarine Warfare and Electronic Warfare environment. The submarine offered should be able to undertake the following missions: * Anti-surface and anti-submarine warfare. * Supporting operations ashore. * Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions. * Special force and mining operations. FOEM CONTENDERS

* Reduced weight of submarine, which means better speed and manoeuvrability.

The following are the six manufacturers shortlisted for the Project 75I, and to whom the RFI have been sent:

RFI DETAILS

Naval Group (France), Navantia (Spain), Rubin Design Bureau-Amur Shipyard (Russia and Italy), Saab (Sweden), ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (Germany) and Mitsubishi-Kawasaki Heavy Industries (Japan)

The Indian Navy requested information from shipbuilders, who had independently designed and constructed a complete modern conventional sub-

September 2017 | DefInsights | 13

programme update

Mitsubishi and Kawasaki build the Soryu-class submarines, which are among the most advanced AIP-equipped diesel-electric submarine, which has a submerged displacement in excess of 4,200 tons. The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force has operated its fleet of?—?so far?—?eight Soryus for seven years now. The Soryu-class was one of the pitches made for the Australian requirement for replacement of the Collins-class submarines. But the bids were unsuccessful. The Amur-class submarine (named for the Amur River), is one of the latest Russian submarine designs. It is advertised as an export version of the Lada-class, a modernised version of the Kilo-class submarine with improved acoustic stealth, new combat systems, and an option for AIP. The new vessels are the fourth generation of the Kilo submarine family, with two models developed. As advertised, the Amur-1650 is larger and intended for longer missions. The Amur-950 is armed with a VLS missile system capable of salvo-fire at multiple pre-designated targets. Sonar signatures of these submarines are several times lower than the older Kilo-class submarines. The Type 214 from Germany is a diesel-electric submarine developed by Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft GmbH (HDW). With diesel propulsion and AIP system features, the submarine is derived from the Type 212. Type 214 was also offered to meet the Australian requirement, but without success. The Kockums A26 Submarine, from SAAB Sweden, has enhanced AIP performance, supporting long distance missions and securing control littoral zones and claimed to be a silent vessel, leaving no thermal (IR) signature. It is compact and modularly designed, making the submarine crew friendly and cost effective. With provision for carrying on-board spares, it allows the crew to maintain and repair the vessel even during mission operations. 14 | DefInsights | August 2017

The S-80 Plus class also known the Isaac Peral Class submarines from the Spanish company Navantia is an AIP submarine with multiple target acquisition capabilities, with low noise & radar, and magnetic & infrared signatures helps in minimising detection. Advanced open architecture design for fire control suites, allows the support of indigenous weapon systems to be fitted in easily and a tie-up between Navantia and Lockheed Martin, for missiles and torpedoes will also mean India can source them from the later, to arm the submarines. POTENTIAL INDIAN SPs Reliance Shipyard just rolled out two Offshore Patrol Vessels and is evenly poised, and so is L&T Shipyard, which has worked on the indigenous nuclear submarine Arihant and is working on the Landing Docks for warship repair. These are their claim to fame and are also well poised. Cochin Shipyard is a probable, though presently busy with the Indigenous Aircraft Carier-I, already christened as Vikrant. There could be other contenders too among the many private and public sector shipyard, and will depend on the Expression of Interest (EOI) that would define the domestic landscape. The EOI is expected to go out soon, may be before the end of September 2017. CONCLUSION Mitsubishi-Kawasaki participating in this opportunity is a pleasant surprise. Firstly, Japan just about began allowing its defence companies to export its defence hardware to friendly foreign countries. More importantly, such synergy to counter China will augur well for the broader strategic relationship between India and Japan. However, though geopolitics may have an overarching influence in defence purchases, it is the SP model that should be nourished and allowed to evolve, for all its advantages. With the new full-time defence minister in place, we can expect these procurement activities to go by the book and with clock work precision.

the leadership

Woman’s Power is Nation’s Power: Nirmala Sitharaman O

n September 3 this year, India created history with Prime Minister Narendra Modi appointing the first-ever full-time defence minister in his party colleague and former Commerce and Industry Minister Nirmala Sitharaman. This is a move by Modi to speed up military acquisitions, even as his government plans to spend $250 billion till 2025 to build up the defences against archrivals, China and Pakistan, whose simultaneous war against India is viewed as a clear possibility in the foreseeable future. Nirmala Sitharaman’s appointment came during a reshuffle of the council of ministers that Modi carried out to spruce up governance as his government is less than two years away from facing the 2019 general elections in India when it hopes to return to power. This is aimed at spurring flagging growth and soothing social tensions before state elections due by January 2018, even as it struggles to explain how economic growth slowed to just 5.7 percent last quarter, the least since Modi was elected in 2014. Nirmala Sitharaman, a former Senior Manager (Research and Analysis) with Price Waterhouse in London, is only the second woman defence minister of India, though the first, Indira Gandhi, held the portfolio as an additional charge when she was the prime minister of the country. In past, then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had held the defence portfolio twice - from December 1 to December 21 in 1975, and January 14, 1980 to January 15, 1982. Nirmala Sitharaman took over from her predecessor, Arun Jaitley, who too was holding charge of Defence portfolio in addition to his primary responsibility as the nation’s finance minister ever since former minister Manohar Parrikar became chief minister of the western state of Goa. The appointment gives India -- a country faced with pressing security challenges and aging Soviet-era military equipment -- a dedicated minister who may be able to speed up a defence procurement process plagued by bureaucratic delays. The need for a change in the status quo was particularly acute for

defence. Some in India’s defence sector had grumbled about having a part-time minister, particularly given the recent military stand-off with China at Doklam that only eased after the two sides withdrew their forces. Modi can ill afford to relax his focus on security given his army chief has warned such encounters are likely to increase. Soon after assuming charge as the Defence Minister on September 7, Nirmala Sitharaman said preparedness of the armed forces will be a priority, along with pushing indigenous defence production and welfare of soldiers. “It is important that the Indian armed forces receive all attention in terms of giving them every necessary endowment and equipment to perform their duty with the best of equipment available.” The minister also said India is one of the biggest defence equipment buyer, and that with technology coming into the country, domestic defence production shall get a boost “so that we benefit from what is manufactured in India and eventually those capacities, the production that happens in India also find an international place”. She said, ‘Make in India’ will be a priority and will ensure that the flagship programme of Prime Minister is given full play for defence production. “I shall attend to all the long pending issues, and in consultation with the Prime Minister and Cabinet... the September 2017 | DefInsights | 15

the leadership

New Defence Minister can achieve big Elevation of Mrs. Nirmala Sitharaman to the post of the Defence Minister is a master stroke in Modi’s strategy. Defence industry in India is the major ailment the defence sector suffers in its road to progress. The synergy between the Ministry of External Affairs, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and the Defence Ministry would ensure harmony in international relationships and a show of strength on the military diplomacy. For a democracy, it is essential to optimise international relationships with an element of military diplomacy and that’s exactly what the Modi government is doing. We cannot but appreciate the choice of the Defence Minister now, when many programmes are held up and the newly announced Strategic Partnerships policy is ailing. The path to success will be pinned on the initiatives from Mrs. Nirmala Sitharaman to push the strategic partnerships towards logical conclusion and conclude the con-

tracts before October 2018. Major programmes and inviting of Foreign Direct Investment into the defence sector is one of the key areas that the Prime Minister was looking at. This can be achieved if at all, only by Mrs. Nirmala Sitharaman. We are in for good times and interesting times. – Colonel K. V. Kuber, Founder and CEO of Sugosha Advisory

CCS... ensure that those issues get resolved. Very important to India’s defence capabilities, is the need to have a big plane of ‘make in India’ in defence production. That is something that will be of great importance to us.”

her schooling and graduation in Economics from Seethalakshmi Ramaswamy College in Tiruchirapalli. She went on to do her Masters in Economics from Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Indo-European Textile Trade was the focus of her draft Ph.D thesis.

Nirmala Sitharaman held a number of meetings with senior officials to familiarise with the activities and functioning of the Ministry of Defence and gave clear directions on critical issues. Special emphasis was laid by the minister on the need to step up the pace of acquisition proposals. Towards ensuring time bound and speedy disposal, it has been decided to hold Defence Acquisition Council meetings on a fortnightly basis.

The minister has previously served as an assistant to Economist in the Agricultural Engineers Association, United Kingdom in London. She subsequently worked as Senior Manager (Research and Analysis) with Price Waterhouse, London. During this time, she also briefly worked with BBC World Service.

A whole range of meetings have been scheduled with the three armed forces chiefs to review defence preparedness and allied issues of strategic interests. Daily morning meetings with the three chiefs and a separate daily meeting with the Defence Secretary have been formatted as a new practice for quick decision making. Other areas of focus would be settling all outstanding land related issues for infrastructure projects and matters relating to welfare of defence personnel and their families. Profile Nirmala Sitharaman was born on August 18, 1959 in the temple town of Madurai in Tamil Nadu. She did 16 | DefInsights | September 2017

On her return to India, she served as Deputy Director of the Centre for Public Policy Studies at Hyderabad. Her interest in education led her to lay the foundation of ‘Parnava’, a reputed school in Hyderabad. She was a member of the National Commission for Women from 2003-2005 and instrumental in voicing various issues of women empowerment. Nirmala Sitharaman joined the Bharatiya Janata Party, a national political party of India, in 2008, and was made a member of the National Executive. She was nominated as party spokesperson in March 2010, from when she has been a full-time party worker. Nirmala Sitharaman was inducted in the Union of India’s Council of Ministers in the government-led by Modi on May 26, 2014 as the Minister of State (Independent Charge) for Commerce and Industry.

POLICY ANALYSIS

13th FIVE-Year Defence Plan: re-run of the past T

he 13th five-year defence plan (2017-22) envisages an allocation of Rs. 26,83,924 crore for the armed forces. This includes Rs. 13,95,271 crore under the revenue segment and the remainder for defraying the capital expenditure. Given the secrecy surrounding the plans, it is unlikely that much will be known about the outcomes intended to be achieved.

By Amit Cowshish

Although other stakeholders were apparently consulted while preparing the plan, probably this projection does not include the requirements of the Defence Research and Development Organisation, Ordnance Factories, Coast Guard, Border Roads Organisation, and many other organisations as well as activities carried out under the administrative control of the Ministry of Defence (MoD). It certainly does not include the money required for defence pensions. The total allocation for these aforesaid organisations, activities and defence pensions adds up to Rs. 1,36,746.10 crore for the year 2017-18, with defence pensions alone accounting for Rs. 85,737.31 crore. Without factoring in any increase in the coming years, the requirement on this count for the plan period will work out to Rs. 6,83,730.50 crore. If the requirement has been worked out based on immaculate costing and there will be no cost overruns or additional requirements, the total requirement of the armed forces, other organisations and defence pensions would thus add up to Rs. 33,67,654.50 crore. Since the current financial year happens to be the first year of the 13th five-year plan and a total sum of Rs. 3,59,851.43 crore already stands allocated for the current year, a sum of Rs. 29,07,803.07 crore will be required for the remaining four years at an annual average of Rs. 7,26,950.76 crore. This figure may undergo some minor change if additional sums are allocated, or the allocation reduced, at the Revised Estimate (RE) stage.

Achieving the intended outcomes of the plan, therefore, is critically dependent on the ability of the Ministry of Finance (MoF) to increase the budget by at least 100 per cent from next year onward, pushing it to around three per cent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This is considered by many to be an ideal level of funding. It is, therefore, possible that the plan is based on the assumption that allocations totalling three per cent of the GDP will be made available for defence during the 13th defence plan period. It is not known whether the MoF was asked about the possible level of funding before commencing the planning process. In any case, meeting the projected requirement will require the MoF to revisit its Midterm Fiscal Policy of 2016-17, which estimated the defence expenditure, including its capital component, to be about 1.6 per cent of GDP in both 2017-18 and 2018-19. It will also have to make serious efforts to raise more revenue in the coming years to be able to meet the requirement. From now on, the discourse on the 13th defence plan will follow a familiar course. To begin with, there is bound to be clamour for an early ‘approval’ of the plan. Though there is no procedural or statutory requirement of seeking the approval of any authority outside the MoD, the expectation will be that the plan will be brought before the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) for immediate approval. For the record, only three of the 12 five-year plans so far have been approved by a cabinet committee. The sixth and seventh plans for the periods 198085 and 1985-90 were approved by the Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs (CCPA), and the ninth plan for the period 1997-2002 was approved by the CCS. Stung by protracted deliberations with the MoF on the size of the 11th defence plan, which led nowhere and forced it to abandon the idea of seeking CCS approval, the MoD decided to let matters September 2017 | DefInsights | 17

POLICY ANALYSIS

rest after the 12th five-year plan was approved by the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) within the ministry on April 2, 2012. But the view that defence plans must be approved by the CCS continues to find strong support in the public discourse, although hardly any information is available on the impact of such approvals on the achievement of the intended outcomes of the plans in the past or, conversely, the impact of non-approval on defence preparedness. The general view is that CCS approval would make it binding on the government to make the projected funds available for spending during the plan period. The clamour for seeking CCS approval, with strong prodding from Parliament’s Standing Committee on Defence (SCoD), may force the MoD to abandon the precedent set in 2012 and seek CCS approval. This will lead to the re-emergence of the problem, which had led the MoD in the first place to abandon the idea of seeking CCS approval for the 11th plan and instead deciding to approve it within the ministry. According to the laid down procedure, MoD will need to first consult the MoF on putting up the 13th defence plan for CCS approval. The expectation implicit in this process is that the government will ‘commit’ itself to the projected level of funding, irrespective of any other developments which may have a bearing on its ability to generate additional revenues to meet the commitment. While nothing is impossible, this seems improbable and, consequently, so does the possibility of obtaining CCS approval any time soon, causing disappointment all around. This might also lead to some feeble questioning of the utility of basing five year or other plans on unrealistic assumptions about how much money is 18 | DefInsights | September 2017

likely to be available for achieving the desired objectives. It does not help either that the plans are not overarching in so far as they do not encompass other organisations, which must necessarily play a complementary or supplementary role in achieving the overall objectives. Defence planning was synchronised with national plans only in 1980 when the sixth defence plan for the period 1980-85 was made coterminous with the sixth national plan covering the same period. It is not clear what purpose was served by this, as there has never been any direct linkage between the two. While there is no question that planning is an important facet of defence management, the question whether objectives can be achieved only be persisting with the concept of five-year defence plans as a part of the three-tiered structure of defence planning is moot. The entire gamut of defence planning needs to be revisited against the backdrop of the dismantling of the national five-year centralised planning regime and the Niti Aayog – successor of the Planning Commission – vowing to venture into defence. There is no indication that the proposed 13th defence plan considers the Niti Aayog’s vision for defence. A financially pragmatic and outcome oriented plan covering a compressed time span has a better chance of showing results in the short run and setting the stage for a long haul towards achieving the highest level of defence preparedness. It is time that financial viability, including the ways and means of augmenting financial resources, is recognised as an inalienable factor in planning, however abhorrent that idea may be. (The writer is a former Financial Advisor (Acquisition), Ministry of Defence. The article was first published by New Delhi-based IDSA)

IDEAS FOR ACTION

Time to Replace Combat PLANES WITH Armed UAVs? By Kishore Kumar Khera

The F-35 should be, and almost certainly will be, the last manned strike fighter aircraft the Department of the Navy will ever buy or fly. – Ray Mabus, US Secretary of the Navy

along with better computation and communication allowed transmission of real time data in various electromagnetic bands, a boon for a military commander.

Aviation, which started with the Wright Brothers’ first controlled flight of a heavier than air machine on 17 December 1903, has come a long way in the last 114 years. As is true for many technological developments, aviation too quickly acquired a niche for itself in the military matrix.

UAVs scored substantially over manned aircraft in this role owing to their longer endurance. Coupled with satellite imagery capabilities, UAVs have practically driven out manned aircraft from the reconnaissance role except in a very few critical cases, where their low speed remains an operational impediment. However, UAVs have been able to overcome their speed limitation to a certain extent by their low Radar Cross Section (RCS), making it difficult to detect and engage them.

Manned aircraft were first inducted in warfare as high ground observatories to monitor enemy troop movement. Aerial reconnaissance with an observation by the pilot and later with a still camera was the first operational role of aircraft. The next step involved aircrew carrying small bombs and dropping them manually from the cockpit. Thus was born the role of ground attack. In the next phase, aircraft were equipped with guns to engage enemy aircraft in the air and this commenced the aerial combat role. Besides these, the development of bigger airframes and powerful engines enabled the development of transport aircraft, which were subsequently modified with the fitment of radars, jammers and fuel tanks for surveillance, electronic warfare and inflight refuelling, respectively. These roles are being performed by manned aircraft albeit with much better technology and accuracy than was possible during the 20th century. Technological advancement in computing and communication facilitated the development of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV). Controlled from a ground station, the UAV either flies a pre-planned path or can be dynamically controlled. As was the case with manned aircraft about a century ago, the operational roles of UAVs are following a similar trajectory. Besides being used as a weapon, the first operational role for UAVs was of aerial reconnaissance wherein the UAV was fitted with optical cameras. The development of sensor technology and its miniaturisation

Going by the precedent of manned aircraft, the next role UAVs were assigned was of ground attack. This required more powerful engines and larger airframes for enabling the UAV to carry weapons. Here too, technology played a pivotal role in enhancing weapons delivery accuracy thus reducing the weapon size required for the same extent of impact on the target. This role by UAVs is being carried out successfully in Afghanistan with Hellfire missiles from USAF MQ9. The UAV’s long endurance allows a high success rate for search and strike missions as compared to a manned fighter aircraft with comparatively limited endurance. The success rate of UAV ground attack missions is to a large extent dependent on their operation in a benign air defence environment. The full development and employment of UAVs in an air defence role is still some distance away owing to prevailing technological challenges. In the same vein, switching to unmanned transport aircraft may also take a few decades. While the roles of UAVs are gradually increasing in the civil sector, ranging from the delivery of packages to the shooting of high-quality aerial films, a debate is on about the end of an era for manned aircraft for operational missions. There are three critical components involved in the employment of UAVs instead of manned aircraft in combat, namely, basic flying September 2017 | DefInsights | 19

IDEAS FOR ACTION

(take off, landing and planned navigation), tactical flying (situation appreciation and changing the plan midway) and weapon delivery (correct and timely targeting). While progress has been made in all three verticals, it is yet to reach a level that would enable the complete replacement of manned aircraft. Factors that need to be considered in this debate are: Sensors and Dynamic Situation Processing: In a benign air defence environment and uncontested air space, UAVs are efficient in mission accomplishment. When decision-making autonomy is required or there are rules of engagement or a developing air situation that cannot be explicitly expressed mathematically, a human is essential. The current generation of sensors do not have the capacity to replicate the appreciation by a human eye and pose a limitation in operations because the UAV operator is not situationally aware. The major drawback of the current generation systems is their inability to capture high fidelity data, process, encrypt and transmit it and, based on directions from the ground station, receive, decrypt and process it to execute a command. Based on the type of processor and communication systems, this process may take anywhere from 600 milliseconds to three seconds – a very long duration in combat operations. The development of Artificial Intelligence will overcome this deficiency and provide the requisite autonomy to the UAV. 20 | DefInsights | September 2017

Speed and Manoeuvrability: UAVs are generally characterised by their low speed and consequent low manoeuvrability as compared to manned fighter aircraft and this makes them vulnerable. At the same time, however, a low RCS and greater endurance are design features that assist UAVs in mission accomplishment. Weapon Carrying Capacity: Owing to their power, UAVs are capable of carrying low calibre/low weight weapons in limited numbers as compared to manned aircraft. But this limitation can be overcome by converting fighter aircraft into UAVs or through the use of special weapons with high accuracy to reduce Over Target Requirement (OTR) in terms of number and size of weapons. Quantity and Costs: UAVs do not need some of the safety and operating systems that manned aircraft need and thus enjoy better cost efficiency. This normally translates into greater numbers of UAVs for the same cost as compared to a combat aircraft. However, autonomous aviation technology is yet to mature, which can be assessed from the fact that UAV accident rates are four to five times higher than that of manned aircraft. This negates the cost effectiveness partially as of now, but is likely to improve with better technology. Endurance and Risks: UAVs practically eliminate human endurance as a factor for mission duration. Autonomous inflight refuelling could keep the UAV in the air for days. Risk to life and risk of capture of operators is fully eliminated. However, the control of UAV is heavily dependent on electromagnetic waves,

IDEAS FOR ACTION

which are susceptible to interference/jamming/technical malfunctions. Any delay in the transmission of critical commands could be lethal. Another aspect of the absence of an aircrew in UAVs is the limited ability of on board systems to diagnose any system malfunction especially owing to an external factor. An aircrew can diagnose an instrument failure and react to save the aircraft, but an UAV with instrument failure will most probably be lost. Trends: With effect from 2010, the induction of UAVs has outnumbered induction of manned aircraft in the US armed forces. And since 2011, the US Air Force has trained more UAV pilots than fighter/ bomber pilots. But most of the financial allocations the world over including in the US are still being made for manned aircraft development and procurement. This will change once better processing power, artificial intelligence and communication equipment are developed and incorporated in UAVs. Technology involving a swarm of UAVs operating in a group and being mutually supportive is at an advanced stage of development and will assist UAVs in garnering a greater share of operational missions. Efficacy: The conversion of fighter aircraft to UAVs for undertaking training missions has been tried and tested in the cases of the F4 and F16 in the US Air Force and the F6 in the People’s Liberation Army Air Force. The same could be developed further for undertaking operational missions with high risk.

Suitable Missions: In the foreseeable future, an optimal solution is a mix of manned aircraft and UAVs till technology can support a better appreciation of situational awareness and command and control aspects. Currently, the most suitable missions for UAVs are the five Ds – Detect, Designate, Dirty, Destructive and Dangerous. Detect missions require long endurance and are preplanned and repetitive in nature like surveillance over a large area for a prolonged duration to detect a possible development. Designate either in conjunction with Detect or stand-alone missions designate a target system/sub system using laser designators for an attack by an armed aircraft/UAV. Dirty missions are undertaken in an NBC (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical) environment in order to negate the risk to human life. Destructive missions are when the UAV is equipped with explosives and is used as a weapon And Dangerous missions involve those against a heavily defended target to either attack the defences or force the adversary to expend missiles on UAVs. Indian Scenario While Israel and US are leaders in UAV technology and operations, the Indian UAV programme is in its infancy. Going by the example of the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), the production of an Indian combat mission capable UAV is at least a couple of decades away. India will have to depend on imports or joint ventures for ‘Make in India’ in the interim, as UAVs are essential in any operational matrix. September 2017 | DefInsights | 21

IDEAS FOR ACTION

Till a requisite number of mission capable UAVs are inducted in India, some of the operational missions will have to be carried out by manned aircraft, albeit in a sub-optimal way. The induction of Su30MKI, LCA and Rafale will continue till 2022 and these aircraft with an average calendar life of 25 years or more will be in service well beyond 2050. By that time, for operational effectiveness, at least 50 per cent of combat missions would be designated to UAVs and that would require a large fleet of various types of UAVs. To meet that challenge, it would be prudent to establish a joint venture for the production of UAVs in India under the Strategic Partnership programme. Sum Up With the current state of technology, UAVs are the best bet for operations in an uncontested air space for surveillance and search and strike missions with 22 | DefInsights | September 2017

low calibre high accuracy guided weapons. However, operations in a moderate to dense air defence environment will need manned aircraft to react appropriately, although UAVs can be of great value in reducing the risk to manned aircraft by saturating the air space and attacking air defence systems thus compelling an adversary to expend his missiles. UAVs are essential ingredients of a combat force and their role will continue to increase along with their capability. A quantum jump in the operational role of UAVs can be expected only with a breakthrough in Artificial Intelligence. Until that happens, the role of UAVs will increase gradually to reach about 50 per cent of combat operations over the course of the next three decades. (Group Captain Kishore Kumar Khera is Research Fellow at the New Delhi-based Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), which published the article first)

NEWS YOU CAN USE

EVENTS 12th International Conference on Energising Indian Aerospace Industry Start Date: Sep 07, 2017, End Date: Sep 08, 2017 Venue: India Habitat Centre, Gulmohar Hall, Lodhi Road, New Delhi.

14th CII Global MSME Business Summit 2017

“Promoting Global Co-operation through SME Partnerships” 19-20 September 2017: India Habitat Centre, New Delhi, India.

Conference on ‘Smart Border Management’

Addressing the emerging challenges faced by India post Uri attack Date and Place: Sept 18-19, 2017 Organisers: India Foundation and FICCI

Sugosha Advisory CEO Col. K V Kuber (extreme left) sharing stage with other dignitaries including India’s Civil Aviation Minister Mr. P. Ashok Gajapathi Raju at AeroIndia 2017 in Bengaluru.

OPPORTUNITIES SL. No.

TENDER DESCRIPTION

CLOSING DATE

TENDER NUMBER

1. 2.

Purchase of spares of Tank T-72 Supply of Articulated Optical Fiberscope Supply of Advance Night Vision Device for INSAS LMG To develop 120 nos of Cock Wind Shield Wiper Assy and 150 nos of Thermiforce Actuator with Rod of OSA-AK To develop 50 nos of Pre Regulator Assy and Pre Plate Clutch of OSA-AK Procurement of spares for MIG-29 Aircraft Procurement of spares for MI-17 Helicopters Procurement of 05 nos. Drishti MK II Data Acquisition system Procurement of spares for MIG-29

5th Oct 2017 7th Oct 2017

2017_IHQ_245107_1 PC 28706/ACSFP/AOF/A/ARTY

7th Oct 2017

2017_IHQ_244753_1

16th Nov 2017

4004/DOI/ICV/FDL(16-17)/ Y3/ DMD/0217081

16th Nov 2017

4004/DOI/ICV/FDL(16-17) / DMD/Y3/0217086 AIR HQ/D PROC/R1726519/ PUR AIR HQ/D PROC/R1425512/ R1525549/PUR 2017_NAVY_239757_1

3. 4.

5. 6. 7. 8.

30th Oct 2017 25th Oct 2017 6th Oct 2017

For more comprehensive list of opportunities please reach Sugosha Advisory at [email protected] September 2017 | DefInsights | 23

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