Energy Retail Market: Additional Fees and Charges

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Disclaimer** The$ fee$ and$ bill$ calculations$ presented$ in$ this$ report$ should$ be$ used$ as$ a$ general$ guide$ only.$ The$ information$ presented$ in$ this$ report$ is$ not$ provided$ as$ financial$ advice.$ While$ we$ have$ taken$ great$ care$ to$ ensure$ accuracy$ of$ the$ information$ provided$ in$ this$ report,$ we$ do$ not$ accept$ any$ legal$ responsibility$ for$ errors$ or$ inaccuracies.$ The$ St$ Vincent$ de$ Paul$ Society$ and$ Alviss$ Consulting$ Pty$ Ltd$ do$ not$ accept$liability$for$any$action$taken$based$on$the$information$provided$in$this$report$ or$ for$ any$ loss,$ economic$ or$ otherwise,$ suffered$ as$ a$ result$ of$ reliance$ on$ the$ information$presented.$ $ * * * * * * ! ! ! ! ! Energy!Retail!Market:!Additional!Fees!and!Charges!! $ May$Mauseth$Johnston,$Alviss$Consulting$ Melbourne,*May*2014* * * * * ©*St*Vincent*de*Paul*Society*and*Alviss*Consulting*Pty*Ltd* This$work$is$copyright.$Apart$from$any$use$permitted$under$the$Copyright$Act$1968$ (Ctw),$no$parts$may$be$adapted,$reproduced,$copied,$stored,$distributed,$published$ or$ put$ to$ commercial$ use$ without$ prior$ written$ permission$ from$ the$ St$ Vincent$ de$ Paul$Society.$$$ * ! ! ! ! Contact:*Gavin*Dufty** Manager,$Social$Policy$Unit$Victoria$$ Phone:$(03)$98955816$or$0439$357$129* $ St$Vincent$de$Paul$Society$ Locked$Bag$4800,$Box$Hill,$VIC$3128$$ www.vinnies.org.au$

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Table*of*content* *

Acknowledgements$ * Executive*Summary* * 1.*About*this*project*

2* * 3* * 7* 7$ 9* 10* 10$ 10$ 11$ 13$ 14$ 14$ 15$ 15$ 15$ 20$ 20$ 20$ 21$ 23$ 23$ 23$ 26* 26$ 28$ 32$ 32$ 35* * 36*

1.1$Scope$and$methodology$

2.*Consumer*implications*of*additional*fees*and*charges* 3.*Retail*fees*and*charges* 3.1$Early$Termination$Fees$ 3.1.1$Regulatory$provisions$and$jurisdictional$differences$ 3.1.2$The$cost$of$early$termination$fees$to$consumers$ 3.2$Late$Payment$Fees$ 3.2.1$Regulatory$provisions$and$jurisdictional$differences$ 3.2.2$The$cost$of$late$payment$fees$to$consumers* 3.3$Dishonoured$Payment$Fees$ 3.3.1$Regulatory$provisions$and$jurisdictional$differences$ 3.3.2$The$cost$of$dishonoured$payment$fees$to$consumers* 3.4$Payment$Processing$Fees$ 3.4.1$Regulatory$provisions$and$jurisdictional$differences$ 3.4.2$The$cost$of$payment$processing$fees$to$consumers* $$$$$3.5$Other$charges* $$$$$3.6$Network$related$service$charges* $$$$$$$$$$$3.6.1$Regulatory$provisions$and$jurisdictional$differences$ $$$$$$$$$$$3.6.2$Ambiguous$retailer$statements*

4.*Regulatory*measures$ 4.1$Market$offers$vs.$standing$offers/standard$contracts$ $$$$$4.2$Disclosure$regulation$and$retailer$disclosure$ $$$$$4.3$Implications$for$market$comparability$and$competition$ 4.4$Better$regulation$

5.*Recommendations* * Bibliography* *

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Acknowledgements*$ The$Society$of$St$Vincent$de$Paul$Victoria$is$grateful$for$the$funding$provided$by$the$ National*Consumer*Advocacy*Panel$to$undertake$this$project.$$ $ The$views$expressed$in$this$document$do$not$necessarily$reflect$the$views$of$the$ Consumer$Advocacy$Panel$or$the$Australian$Energy$Market$Commission.* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

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Executive*Summary* $ This$study$into$retailers’$use$of$additional$fees$and$charges$in$the$National$Electricity$ Market$(NEM)$has$found$that:$ $ • Retailers$impose$various$additional$fees$and$charges$on$residential$energy$ customers.$These$include$the$better_known$fees$such$as$early$termination$fees$ and$late$payment$fees,$as$well$as$the$lesser_known$dishonoured$payment$fee,$ payment$processing$fee$and$a$service$or$administration$fee$for$network_related$ services.$ $ • The$amounts$charged$vary$significantly$from$retailer$to$retailer,$even$when$the$ fees$relate$to$the$recovery$of$costs$incurred$by$the$retailers$(such$as$a$merchant$ fee$for$processing$credit$card$payments$or$rejected$direct$debit$payment).$$$ $ • Many$retailers$provide$ambiguous$information$about$what$additional$fees$and$ charges$they$may$or$may$not$apply.$ $ • Many$retailers$do$not$provide$information$about$some$fees$and$charges$prior$to$ a$final$contract$being$issued$(that$is$the$last$step$in$consumers’$search$process).$ $ • One$retailer$appears$to$make$incorrect$statements$about$costs$being$a$pass$ through$from$the$distribution$business.$ $ The$consumer$problem$ $ Additional$ fees$ and$ charges$ can$ make$ up$ a$ substantial$ proportion$ of$ many$ households’$ energy$ costs,$ particularly$ for$ low$ consumption$ households.$ This$ is$ problematic$ in$ a$ reform$ environment$ based$ on$ demand$ side$ participation$ where$ consumers$are$expected$to$take$greater$responsibility$to$reduce$their$energy$costs.$$ $ Furthermore,$ additional$ fees$ and$ charges$ increase$ product$ complexity$ and$ the$ chance$of$consumers$making$poor$decisions.$Energy$contracts$are$already$complex$ products$as$consumers$need$to$understand$their$usage$and$needs$when$comparing$ offers.$ Additional$ fees$ and$ charges$ add$ another$ layer$ of$ complexity$ to$ this$ process$ and$ as$ some$ fees$ are$ linked$ to$ consumer$ behavior$ or$ future$ decisions$ (e.g.$ late$ payment$fees$and$early$termination$fees)$it$can$be$almost$impossible$to$determine$ what$ offers$ are$ most$ suitable$ in$ the$ long$ run.$ Linked$ to$ this,$ lack$ of$ market$ transparency$ and$ comparability$ impact$ on$ consumer$ confidence$ and$ market$ participation.$ This$ can$ cause$ consumer$ detriment$ in$ the$ longer$ term$ if$ it$ lessens$ competition.$ $ Finally,$retailers$may$respond$strategically$and$charge$excessive$and/or$unfair$fees$to$ the$cost$of$consumers$and$it$is$difficult,$as$well$as$resource_intensive$and$costly,$to$ adequately$monitor$and$enforce$disclosure$regulation.$$ $

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Relying$on$disclosure$regulation$ $ We$ have$ assessed$ the$ various$ regulatory$ provisions$ that$ relate$ to$ retailer$ imposed$ fees$ and$ charges$ in$ the$ NEM.$ Both$ the$ national$ framework$ and$ jurisdictional$ regulation$ rely$ heavily$ on$ disclosure$ regulation$ when$ it$ comes$ to$ fees$ and$ charges$ being$imposed$on$customers$in$the$competitive$retail$markets.$Disclosure$regulation$ requires$retailers$to$disclose$all$fees$and$charges,$as$well$as$obtain$explicit$informed$ consent$from$customers$accepting$offers.$ $ However,$ as$ documented$ in$ this$ report,$ disclosure$ regulation$ is$ more$ effective$ in$ theory$than$practise.$Retailers$appear$to$be$unable$or$unwilling$to$adequately$inform$ consumers$ through$ accessible$ documents$ and$ this$ makes$ disclosure$ regulation$ ineffective.$Broken$web$links,$inaccurate$or$ambiguous$wording,$inadequate$levels$of$ detail$ in$ the$ information$ provided$ etc.$ are$ issues$ the$ regulator$ needs$ to$ assess$ in$ order$ to$ ensure$ compliance.$ This$ is$ an$ enormous$ task$ considering$ the$ number$ of$ energy$retail$offers$available.$$ $ We$have$to$ask$what$the$benefit$of$this$regulatory$approach$is?$The$benefit$appears$ to$be$that$we$allow$energy$retailers$to$be$innovative$when$deciding$what$additional$ fees$and$charges$they$can$apply$while$still$managing$to$retain$or$attract$customers.$ We$question$whether$this$benefit$outweighs$the$cost$of$this$approach.$ $ We$ believe$ that$ some$ of$ the$ fees$ and$ charges$ currently$ allowed$ for$ market$ offer$ contracts$ are$ simply$ “legacy_fees”$ from$ a$ time$ when$ regulators$ determined$ retail$ prices$ for$ the$ majority$ of$ residential$ customers.$ Regulators$ have$ to$ take$ various$ retail$costs$into$account$in$order$to$determine$what$the$appropriate$price$should$be.$ Assessing$the$cost$of$servicing$is$thus$part$of$this$process$and$retailers$would$have$an$ incentive$ to$ demonstrate$ all$ the$ additional$ costs$ they$ incur$ due$ to$ late$ payers,$ dishonoured$ payments,$ reminder$ notices$ etc.$ In$ today’s$ market$ the$ majority$ of$ residential$ customers$ are$ on$ market$ contracts$ (although$ the$ numbers$ vary$ significantly$from$jurisdiction$to$jurisdiction),$meaning$that$the$retailers$set$the$price$ themselves.1$$As$a$result$retailers$are$free$to$factor$in$the$cost$of$late$payment$fees,$ dishonoured$payments,$reminder$notices$etc.$when$determining$their$own$price.$In$ fact,$removing$the$use$of$additional$retail$fees$and$charges$may$improve$innovation$ amongst$retailers$as$they$would$have$an$incentive$to$find$more$cost$effective$ways$ to$communicate$and$serve$their$customers$in$order$to$protect$the$bottom$line.$ $ Better$regulation$ $ We$agree$that$a$competitive$market$is$the$best$place$for$product$innovation$to$occur$ but$the$important$product$innovation$is$in$regards$to$the$energy$component$of$the$ product$ rather$ than$ strategic$ earning$ potentials$ from$ additional$ fees$ and$ charges.$ !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 1

$In$South$Australia$81%$of$customers$are$on$a$market$contract,$75%$in$Victoria,$60%$in$NSW,$46%$on$ Queensland$(but$70%$in$South$East$Queensland)$and$19%$in$the$ACT.$See$AER,$State$of$the$Energy$ Market$2013,$p$126$

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We$ believe$ there$ is$ a$ risk$ that$ when$ a$ regulatory$ framework$ allows$ for$ too$ much$ innovation$this$can$result$in$firms$lacking$incentives$to$innovate$in$the$areas$where$ innovation$is$most$needed$(i.e.$tariff$design,$demand$side$participation,$new$forms$ of$customer$communications).$$ $ In$our$view,$better$regulation$in$the$retail$market$would$be$an$approach$that$limits,$ or$ simply$ bans,$ retailers$ from$ charging$ additional$ fees$ and$ charges.$ This$ type$ of$ regulation$would$allow$energy$retailers$to$focus$on$their$main$function$in$the$energy$ supply$ chain,$ which$ is$ managing$ wholesale$ cost$ risks$ for$ end$ users$ and$ communicating$with$their$customers.$ $ If$there$is$no$willingness$to$ban$or$limit$the$use$of$additional$retail$fees$and$charges$ we$ believe$ the$ regulatory$ framework$ that$ enforces$ and$ reports$ on$ the$ use$ of$ additional$ fees$ and$ charges$ in$ energy$ retail$ contracts$ needs$ strengthening.$ This$ would,$however,$be$a$more$costly$approach$compared$to$simply$banning$them.$ $ $ $ $ $ $ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

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1.*About*this*project* $ This$project$was$partly$inspired$by$the$ongoing$court$cases$over$fees$in$the$banking$ sector.2$ In$ February$ 2014$ the$ Federal$ Court$ determined$ that$ late$ payment$ fees$ charged$in$the$banking$sector$(by$the$ANZ$bank)$were$penalties$and$that$consumers$ should$ receive$ compensation$ if$ they$ had$ been$ unfairly$ charged.3$ Furthermore,$ the$ ruling$states$that$the$fees$charged$by$the$ANZ$exceeded$the$true$cost$to$the$bank.4$$ Although$ our$ focus$ is$ not$ on$ customer$ compensation$ we$ do$ believe$ this$ case$ is$ relevant$ to$ understand$ the$ complex$ task$ faced$ by$ regulators$ in$ assessing$ and$ ensuring$that$fees$and$charges$imposed$by$energy$retailers$are$fair$and$reasonable.$$ $ This$project$documents$and$analyses$the$application$of$fees$and$charges$to$energy$ retail$contracts$and$assesses$the$impacts$on$residential$consumers$in$NSW,$Victoria,$ South$ Australia,$ Queensland,$ Tasmania$ and$ the$ ACT.$ The$ project$ has$ two$ key$ objectives:$$ $ • To$ document$ and$ analyse$ the$ fees$ and$ charges$ applicable$ to$ residential$ consumers$ in$ the$ National$ Electricity$ Market$ (NEM).$ $ This$ report$ discusses$ factors$ that$ influence$ the$ prevalence$ of$ fees$ and$ charges,$ their$ impacts$ on$ consumers,$and$policy$and$regulatory$responses$that$can$reduce$their$use.$$ $ • To$increase$consumer$awareness$of$energy$fees$and$charges,$and$to$advocate$ for$an$energy$market$with$minimal$use$of$fees$and$charges.$ $ 1.1$Scope$and$methodology$ $ The$analysis$and$discussion$presented$in$this$report$focuses$on$additional$retail$fees$ and$charges.$By$additional$we$mean$fees$and$charges$that$are$not$collected$through$ the$daily$supply$charge$or$the$consumption$charge$(e.g.$cents$per$kWh).$By$retail$we$ mean$ fees$ and$ charges$ that$ are$ retail$ revenue$ and$ we$ therefore$ exclude$ network$ costs$(such$as$connection/disconnection$charges,$meter$reads$etc.)$and$government$ charges$(e.g.$GST).$$That$said,$it$is$not$always$easy$to$determine$whether$there$is$a$ retail$ revenue$ component$ attached$ to$ a$ charge$ or$ how$ large$ the$ proportion$ is.$ In$ terms$of$network$charges$the$retailers$may$include$a$service/administration$fee$for$ market$offer$contracts$without$stipulating$the$exact$amount.$In$relation$to$payment$ processing$fees$and$dishonoured$payment$fees$the$retailer$may$incur$a$merchant$fee$ or$ a$ penalty$ fee$ from$ the$ relevant$ financial$ institution,$ and$ either$ pass$ these$ costs$ through$ to$ its$ customers$ or$ add$ a$ surcharge$ to$ the$ cost$ it$ incurs.$ These$ aspects$ of$ retail$fees$are$considered$in$this$report.$ $ !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 2

$See,$for$example,$ABC$News,$ANZ!class!action:!38,000!customers!take!bank!to!Federal!Court!over! fees$by$Amy$Bainbridge,$2$December$2013$ 3 $Maurice$Blackburn$Lawyers,$Banking!revolution!begins!with!landmark!Federal!Court!ruling,*Press$ Releases$and$Announcements,$5$February$2014$ 4 $Paciocco$v$Australia$and$New$Zealand$Banking$Group$Limited$[2014]$FCA$35$$

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The$ report$ focuses$ on$ residential$ electricity$ contracts$ but$ as$ the$ regulatory$ framework$ typically$ applies$ to$ gas$ as$ well$ (Queensland$ being$ an$ exemption)$ the$ findings$presented$and$issues$raised$are$relevant$for$residential$gas$customers$too.$ $ The$ regulatory$ frameworks$ considered$ by$ this$ report$ are$ the$ National$ Energy$ Customer$ Framework$ (NECF)$ that$ covers$ the$ ACT,$ South$ Australia,$ NSW$ and$ Tasmania,$the$Victorian$Retail$Code$and$Queensland’s$Electricity$Code.$The$findings$ and$ issues$ raised$ are$ thus$ relevant$ to$ residential$ energy$ customers$ in$ the$ National$ Electricity$Market$(NEM).$However,$as$we$have$documented$and$analysed$additional$ fees$ and$ charges$ that$ apply$ to$ retailers’$ market$ offers,$ and$ the$ only$ electricity$ market$offer$currently$available$in$Tasmania$is$a$prepayment$product,$we$have$not$ included$any$Tasmanian$offers$in$this$analysis.$$$$$$ $ To$collect$information$about*retailers’$additional$fees$and$charges$we$have$assessed$ publicly$ available$ information$ only.$ Such$ information$ sources$ include$ Energy$ Price$ Fact$ Sheets$ (or$ Price$ and$ Product$ Information$ Statements),$ Customer$ Charters,$ Contract$Terms$and$Conditions$as$well$as$online$information$about$fees$and$charges.$ The$ intention$ has$ thus$ been$ to$ assess$ and$ compare$ information$ available$ to$ consumers$ attempting$ to$ compare$ various$ market$ offers$ rather$ than$ assessing$ the$ information$ provided$ (and$ the$ level$ of$ regulatory$ compliance)$ in$ a$ final$ contract$ between$a$retailer$and$its$customer.$$This$is$an$important$distinction$to$note$as$some$ of$the$regulatory$provisions$stipulate$that$the$retailer$must$disclose$fees$and$charges$ in$the$contract$only.$ $ In$order$to$compare$and$calculate$the$cost$of$these$fees$and$charges$to$households$ (in$ section$ 3),$ we$ have$ used$ published$ electricity$ market$ offers$ as$ of$ January$ 2014$ for$Victoria,$and$July$2013$for$the$other$jurisdictions.$*** * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

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2.*Consumer*implications*of*additional*fees*and*charges$$ $ Additional$ fees$ and$ charges$ applied$ to$ energy$ contracts$ can$ cause$ consumer$ detriment$for$four$reasons:$$ $ 1)$ Additional$ fees$ and$ charges$ can$ make$ up$ a$ substantial$ proportion$ of$ many$ households’$ energy$ costs,$ particularly$ for$ low$ consumption$ households.$ This$ is$ problematic$ in$ a$ reform$ environment$ based$ on$ demand$ side$ participation$ where$ consumers$are$expected$to$take$greater$responsibility$to$reduce$their$energy$costs.$ Additional$fees$and$charges$are$a$cost$component$consumers$are$unable$to$respond$ to$ (by$ reducing/shifting$ demand)$ and$ the$ more$ retailers$ impose$ such$ charges$ the$ more$difficult$it$will$be$to$avoid$them.$ $ 2)$ Additional$ fees$ and$ charges$ increase$ product$ complexity$ and$ the$ chance$ of$ consumers$making$poor$decisions.$Energy$contracts$are$already$complex$products$as$ consumers$ need$ to$ understand$ their$ usage$ and$ needs$ when$ comparing$ offers.$ Additional$fees$and$charges$add$another$layer$of$complexity$to$this$process$and$as$ some$ fees$ are$ linked$ to$ consumer$ behavior$ or$ future$ decisions$ (e.g.$ late$ payment$ fees$ and$ early$ termination$ fees)$ it$ can$ be$ almost$ impossible$ to$ determine$ what$ offers$are$most$suitable$in$the$long$run.$ $ 3)$ Linked$ to$ the$ above,$ lack$ of$ market$ transparency$ and$ comparability$ impact$ on$ consumer$confidence$and$market$participation.$This$can$cause$consumer$detriment$ in$the$longer$term$if$it$lessens$competition.$ $ 4)$Retailers$may$seek$to$charge$excessive$and/or$unfair$fees$to$the$cost$of$consumers$ and$ it$ is$ difficult,$ as$ well$ as$ costly,$ to$ adequately$ monitor$ and$ enforce$ disclosure$ regulation.$Households$are$therefore$likely$to$end$up$paying$in$one$way$or$another.$$ $ $ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

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3.*Retail*fees*and*charges** $ This$report$focuses$on$additional$fees$and$charges$applied$by$the$electricity$retailers.$$ As$consumer$ability$to$compare$retail$offers$is$pivotal$to$a$competitive$market,$the$ use,$ as$ well$ as$ disclosure,$ of$ additional$ fees$ and$ charges$ in$ the$ electricity$ retail$ market$ is$ a$ key$ issue$ of$ concern.$ $ The$ network$ businesses$ apply$ various$ fees$ and$ charges$ as$ well,$ but$ as$ they$ are$ regulated$ monopolies$ we$ believe$ the$ market$ implications$of$those$fees$and$charges$are$less$problematic.$$$$$$ ! 3.1$Early$termination$fees$$ $

An$ early$ termination$ fee$ (ETF)$ is$ a$ fee$ charged$ to$ customers$ if$ they$ decide$ to$ terminate$a$fixed$term$contract.$ETFs$have$been$subject$to$substantial$debate,$both$ in$terms$of$the$size$of$the$fee$as$well$as$its$application$to$contracts$where$retailers$ can$freely$adjust$the$price.5$$ $ 3.1.1$Regulatory$provisions$and$jurisdictional$differences$ $

In$Victoria,$a$retailer$may$impose$an$ETF$if$“their$energy$contract$includes$details$of$ the$ amount$ or$ manner$ of$ calculating$ the$ early$ termination$ fee”.6$ The$ Victorian$ Energy$Retail$Code$stipulates$that$$20$(excluding$GST)$is$the$appropriate$amount$to$ recover:$$ • the$additional$costs$of$giving$effect$to$the$early$termination$of$the$contract,$$ final$billing$and$ceasing$to$be$responsible$for$the$supply$address;$and$$ $ • the$value$of$any$imbalance$in$the$retailer’s$electricity$or$gas$hedging$program$ to$the$extent$that$it$is$directly$attributable$to$that$breach$of$contract.7$$ $ However,$the$Code$also$allows$retailers$to$recover$the$“pro_rata$costs$of$procuring$ the$ customer$ to$ enter$ into$ the$ contract.”8$ As$ such,$ Victorian$ retailers$ may$ charge$ more$than$$20$if$they$demonstrate$the$pro_rata$cost$of$contract$incentives$such$as$a$ ‘welcome$credit’$or$gift$upon$contract$commencement.$$ $$$ In$Queensland,$customers$are$exempt$from$paying$an$ETF$if$the$retailer$increases$the$ market$electricity$rates$above$the$regulated$rates.9$$$$ $ Under$ the$ NECF,$ which$ currently$ applies$ to$ customers$ in$ the$ ACT,$ NSW,$ South$ Australia$and$Tasmania,$retailers$can$apply$an$ETF$to$fixed$period$contracts$but$the$ !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 5

$See,$for$example,$Gavin$Dufty$and$May$Mauseth$Johnston,$The!National!Energy!Market!–!in!a!bit!of!a! state?,$November$2012,$Consumer$Action$Law$Centre$and$Consumer$Utilities$Advocacy$Centre,$ Unilateral!Price!Variation!&!Market!Retail!Contracts!–!Rule!change!request!for!the!Australian!Energy! Market!Commission,!October!2013$and$IPART,$Early!Termination!Fees!–!Regulating!the!fees!charged!to! small!electricity!consumers!in!NSW,$Final$Decision,$December$2013.$$$ 6 $Victorian$Energy$Retail$Code,$Clause$24.1$(d)$ 7 $Victorian$Energy$Retail$Code,$Clause$31$(c)! 8 $Victorian$Energy$Retail$Code,$Clause$31$(c)! 9 $See$http://www.dews.qld.gov.au/energy_water_home/electricity/prices/contracts$

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fee$must$be$a$reasonable$estimate$of$the$costs$faced$by$the$retailer$due$to$an$early$ termination$of$contract.10$$ $

In$ NSW,$ however,$ the$ Independent$ Pricing$ and$ Regulatory$ Tribunal$ (IPART)$ introduced$a$maximum$cap$on$ETFs$in$December$2013$(note$that$the$fees$collected$ and$used$for$the$analysis$in$this$report$are$as$of$July$2013).11$The$cap$is$set$at$$130$ for$customers$terminating$within$12$months$of$signing$up$and$$45$if$they$terminate$ thereafter.$ $ The$ regulatory$ provisions$ regarding$ ETFs$ thus$ vary$ significantly$ between$ jurisdictions.$ In$ Queensland,$ the$ appropriateness$ of$ applying$ ETFs$ depends$ on$ the$ retailers’$ price$ increases.$ The$ NSW$ regulator$ believes$ fees$ as$ high$ as$ $130$ may$ be$ warranted$ while$ the$ Victorian$ regulator$ deems$ that$ $20$ (with$ exemptions)$ is$ an$ appropriate$amount.$The$NECF,$on$the$other$hand,$does$not$provide$any$indication$ of$what$the$appropriate$amount$would$be.$$ $ 3.1.2$The$cost$of$early$termination$fees$to$consumers$ $

Chart$ 1$ below$ shows$ that$ the$ size$ of$ the$ ETF$ varies$ significantly$ between$ jurisdictions,$ as$ well$ as$ retailers.12$ While$ the$ majority$ of$ the$ contracts$ charge$ between$$50_100$if$the$customer$terminates$the$contract$within$the$first$12$months,$ there$ are$ also$ exceptions$ such$ as$ Red$ Energy’s$ contract$ in$ NSW,$ which$ charges$ an$ early$termination$fee$of$$195.13$$ActewAGL’s$fee$in$the$ACT$can$easily$become$the$ most$ expensive$ contract$ to$ terminate.$ As$ ActewAGL’s$ offer$ is$ a$ bundling$ product$ (discounted$ electricity$ if$ the$ customer$ also$ signs$ up$ for$ other$ services$ such$ as$ telephone,$internet$etc)$and$the$ETF$is$$50$per$product/service,$a$customer$can$be$ charged$ up$ to$ $350$ if$ terminating$ a$ contract$ that$ includes$ the$ bundling$ of$ seven$ products/services.14$It$should$also$be$noted$that$some$retailers$choose$not$to$apply$ ETFs$and/or$stipulate$a$fixed$term$for$their$contracts.$ $ $ * * * * * * *

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$National$Energy$Retail$Rules$49(A)$$ $IPART,$Media$release,$Final!Report!on!early!termination!fees!for!electricity!contracts!for!small! customers,$16$December$2013$ 12 $These$are$the$maximum$early$termination$fees$applied$by$the$retailer$if$the$customer$terminates$ the$contract$within$the$first$12$months.$Based$on$published$electricity$market$offers$as$of$July$2013$ and,$for$Victoria,$January$2014.$ 13 $Note$that$these$fees$are$based$on$market$contracts$as$of$July$2013$and$thus$prior$to$IPARTs$ decision$regarding$maximum$ETFs.$ 14 $The$minimum$option$is$to$bundle$three$services$(in$exchange$for$a$3%$discount$on$the$electricity$ bill)$and$this$contract$option$would$thus$contain$an$early$termination$fee$of$$150$$ 11

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Chart*1$Fee$charged$for$early$termination$of$market$offer$contract$ Early!Termination!Fee!($)! 0!

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350!

400!

ACT!ActewAGL! NSW!Red! SA!Red! SA!Simply! ACT!EA! NSW!EA! QLD!EA! SA!EA! NSW!Qenergy! SA!Qenergy! VIC!Lumo! VIC!Simply! NSW!AGL! NSW!Momentum! NSW!Lumo! QLD!AGL! SA!AGL! SA!Lumo! VIC!AGL! NSW!Origin! QLD!Origin! SA!Origin! VIC!N'hood! NSW!Powerdirect! QLD!Powerdirect! SA!Powerdirect! VIC!Origin! VIC!EA! VIC!People!! VIC!Qenergy! VIC!Red! VIC!Powerdirect! VIC!Momentum!

$

$

$ As$some$of$the$fees$applied$to$Victorian$consumers$are$ well$ above$ the$ $22$ (including$ GST)$ stipulated$ in$ the$ Code,$ we$ can$ only$ assume$ that$ retailers$ such$ as$ AGL,$ Simply$and$Lumo$needed$to$recover$incentive$payments$ or$ gifts$ associated$ with$ these$ offers.$ That$ said,$ retailers$ may$ also$ over_charge$ customers.$ Australian$ Power$ and$ Gas$ (acquired$ by$ AGL$ in$ October$ 2013)$ was$ ordered$ by$ the$ Essential$ Services$ Commission$ (ESC)$ to$ reimburse$ over$ $754,000$ that$ they$ had$ unlawfully$ collected$ through$excess$ETFs$from$11,610$customers.15$Australian$ Power$and$Gas$explained$that$the$overcharging$occurred$

“Australian$Power$and$ Gas…$was$ordered$by$the$ Essential$Services$ Commission$(ESC)$to$ reimburse$over$$754,000$ that$they$had$unlawfully$ collected$through$excess$ ETFs$from$11,610$ customers”!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 15

$Herald$Sun,$Former!Australian!Power!&!Gas!customers!owed!refunds!in!power!blunder$by$Karen$ Collier,$12$January$2014$

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12!


because$of$“an$error$regarding$the$interpretation$of$allowable$charges”.16$Potential$ improvements$ to$ the$ regulatory$ measures$ in$ order$ to$ limit$ the$ risk$ of$ retailers’$ overcharging$are$discussed$in$section$4$below.$ $ Red$Energy’s$ETF$in$NSW$equates$to$10%$of$the$annual$bill$ that$ an$ average$ consumption$ household$ on$ this$ contract$ “Red$Energy’s$ETF$in$ NSW$equates$to$ would$receive.17$Energy$Australia’s$(EA)$ETF$would$equate$to$ 18 10%$of$the$annual$ 5%$ of$ a$ typical$ customer’s$ annual$ bill$ in$ the$ ACT. $ In$ Queensland,$NSW$and$South$Australia,$the$same$ETF$would$ bill$that$an$average$ consumption$ equate$ to$ 3.9%,$ 4.2%$ and$ 3.9%$ of$ a$ typical$ annual$ bill$ household$on $this$ respectively.19$ $ In$ Victoria,$ where$ Energy$ Australia’s$ ETF$ is$ contract$would$ $22$ (compared$ to$ $90$ in$ the$ other$ jurisdictions),$ the$ fee$ receive”! would$ equate$ to$ 1.7%$ of$ the$ annual$ bill$ for$ a$ typical$ consumption$Melbourne$household.20$$$ $

3.2$Late$payment$fees$$ $ Customers$may$be$charged$a$late$payment$fee$if$they$have$not$paid$their$bill$by$the$ due$date.$The$arguments$for$and$against$late$payment$fees$are$many$and$it$has$been$ extensively$ debated$ in$ NSW$ where$ IPART$ determines$ the$ fee$ for$ standard$ contracts/standing$ offers.$ During$ IPART’s$ review$ of$ regulated$ retail$ tariffs$ and$ charges$for$electricity$2010_2013$retailers$argued$that$the$current$fee$($7)$was$too$ low$compared$to$the$costs$incurred$by$retailers$while$consumer$groups$raised$that$ late$payment$fees$further$penalised$households$already$struggling$to$pay$their$bills.21$ In$ its$ decision,$ IPART$ argued$ that$ late$ payment$ fees$ are$ needed$ to$ incentivise$ customers$to$pay$their$bills$on$time:$ $ “We$decided$not$to$set$the$late$payment$fee$at$zero$because$in$our$view,$this$ approach$has$the$potential$to$lead$to$higher$late$payment$costs.$The$absence$ of$a$late$payment$fee$would$reduce$the$incentive$for$small$customers$to$pay$ their$bills$on$time,$and$therefore$could$result$in$retailers$having$to$send$more$ !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 16 $Ibid.! 17

$Based$on$an$annual$consumption$of$7,200kWh$(single$rate$in$Ausgrid’s$network$area)$producing$an$ annual$bill$of$approximately$$1,955$(as$of$July$2013,$includes$market$offer$discount$and$pay$on$time$ discount).$ 18 $Based$on$an$annual$consumption$of$8,000kWh$(single$rate)$producing$an$annual$bill$of$ approximately$$1,780$(as$of$July$2013,$includes$market$offer$discount/pay$on$time$discount).$ 19 $Queensland$is$based$on$an$annual$consumption$of$8,000kWh$(single$rate)$producing$an$annual$bill$ of$approximately$$2,325$(as$of$July$2013),$NSW$is$based$on$an$annual$consumption$of$7,200kWh$ (single$rate$in$Ausgrid’s$network$area)$producing$an$annual$bill$of$approximately$$2,115$(as$of$July$ 2013)$and$South$Australia$is$based$on$an$annual$consumption$of$6,000kWh$(single$rate)$producing$an$ annual$bill$of$approximately$$2,280$(as$of$July$2013).$$$ 20 $Based$on$an$annual$consumption$of$4,800kWh$(single$rate$in$Citipower’s$network$area)$producing$ an$annual$bill$of$approximately$$1,325$(as$of$January$2014)$ 21 $IPART,$Review!of!regulated!retail!tariffs!and!charges!for!electricity!2010T2013,$Final$report,$March$ 2010$$

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13!


reminder$ notices,$ experiencing$ longer$ delays$ between$ billing$ and$ payment,$ and$foregoing$more$interest.”22$$

$ The$St$Vincent$de$Paul$Society$has$observed$that$late$payment$fees$combined$with$ pay$on$time$discounts$means$that$NSW$households$can$be$significantly$penalised$for$ late$ payment.$ Or$ conversely,$ NSW$ households$ can$ be$ significantly$ rewarded$ for$ prompt$ payment.$ $ It$ does,$ however,$ highlight$ an$ issue$ that$ negatively$ impacts$ on$ households$with$cash_flow$problems.$23$$ $ 3.2.1$Regulatory$provisions$and$jurisdictional$differences$

$ In$ Victoria,$ The$ Electricity$ Industry$ Act$ prohibits$ the$ use$ of$ late$ payment$ fees$ for$ small$customer$contracts.24$ $$ Queensland$ has$ a$ similar$ regulatory$ arrangement$ to$ that$ of$ Victoria$ for$ standard$ contract/standing$ offers,$ but$ retailers’$ can,$ and$ do,$ charge$ late$ payment$ fees$ for$ market$contracts.$$ $ Under$the$NECF,$late$payment$fees$may$be$imposed$on$both$market$offer$contracts$ and$standard/standing$offer$contracts.$The$National$Energy$Retail$Law$states:$ (1)$A$retailer$may$impose$a$fee$for$late$payment$of$a$bill$for$a$customer$retail$ service.$$ (2)$However,$if$the$service$is$provided$under$a$customer$retail$contract$with$a$ small$customer—$$ (a)$ the$ fee$ must$ not$ exceed$ the$ reasonable$ costs$ of$ the$ retailer$ in$ recovering$an$overdue$amount;$and$$ (b)$if$the$customer$lodges$a$complaint$in$relation$to$the$bill$under$Part$ 4$of$the$National$Energy$Retail$Law$(South$Australia),$the$retailer$must$ not$take$steps$to$recover$a$fee$for$late$payment$while$the$complaint$is$ being$dealt$with$under$that$Part.25$$ $ 3.2.2$The$cost$of$Late$Payment$Fees$to$consumers$$

$ Chart$ 2$ below$ shows$ that$ the$ majority$ of$ 2nd$ tier$ retailers$ do$ not$ charge$ late$ payment$fees$but$it$should$be$noted$that$some$retailers$are$unclear$whether$they$do$ or$not.26$ActewAGL,$in$the$ACT,$has$the$highest$late$penalty$fee$at$$16$while$other$ retailers$charge$between$$12$and$$14.$$ $ $ !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 22 $Ibid,$p$194! 23

$St$Vincent$de$Paul$Society,$New!South!Wales!Energy!Prices!July!2011!–!July!2012,!An!Update!report! on!the!NSW!TariffTTracking!Project$by$May$Mauseth$Johnston,$August$2012$ 24 $Electricity$Industry$Act$2000,$Clause$40c$ 25 $National$Energy$Retail$Law,$Clause$24$ 26 $See,$for$example,$Simply$Energy,$Small!Customer!Market!Retail!Contract!Terms!and!Privacy!Policy$

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14!


Late!Payment!Fee!($)!

Chart*2$Fee$charged$for$late$payment$of$bill$(market$offers)$ 18! 16! 14! 12! 10! 8! 6! 4! 2! 0!

$ $ $ The$$16$fee$charged$by$ActewAGL$in$the$ACT$would$typically$ equate$ to$ approximately$ 3.5%$ of$ a$ customer’s$ quarterly$ “The$$16$fee$ electricity$ bill.27$ For$ a$ Queensland$ customer$ on$ Origin’s$ charged$by$ market$offer,$on$the$other$hand,$the$late$payment$fee$would$ ActewAGL$in$the$ typically$ equate$ to$ 0.5%$ of$ the$ quarterly$ bill.28$ $ That$ said,$ ACT$would$typically$ Origin’s$ market$ offer$ also$ includes$ a$ pay$ on$ time$ discount$ equate$to$ that$the$customer$foregoes$when$paying$late.$The$quarterly$ approximately$3.5%$ of$a$customer’s$ value$of$the$pay$on$time$discount$for$a$typical$consumption$ quarterly$electricity$ household$ in$ Queensland$ on$ this$ Origin$ offer$ is$ bill”! approximately$ $10$ and$ a$ late$ payment$ “fee”$ of$ $22$ (the$ value$of$the$pay$on$time$discount$and$the$late$payment$fee$ combined)$ means$ that$ the$ fee$ equates$ to$ approximately$ 3.5%$ of$ customers’$ quarterly$bill$(the$same$proportion$as$the$ACT).29$$In$NSW,$where$typical$electricity$ consumption$is$somewhat$lower$compared$to$the$ACT$and$Queensland,$a$customer$ on$Origin’s$market$offer$would$typically$pay$a$late$payment$fee$that$equates$to$2.3%$ of$ the$ quarterly$ bill$ (or$ 4%$ if$ we$ include$ the$ foregone$ value$ of$ the$ pay$ on$ time$ discount).30$$ $ $ $

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 27

$Based$on$an$annual$consumption$of$8,000kWh$(single$rate)$producing$an$annual$bill$of$ approximately$$1,880$(as$of$July$2013).$ 28 $Based$on$an$annual$consumption$of$8,000kWh$(single$rate)$producing$an$annual$bill$of$ approximately$$2,463$(as$of$July$2013$and$includes$market$offer$discount$but$not$pay$on$time$ discount).$ 29 $Ibid.$ 30 $Based$on$an$annual$consumption$of$7,200kWh$(single$rate$in$Ausgrid’s$network$area)$producing$an$ annual$bill$of$approximately$$2,066$(as$of$July$2013$and$includes$market$offer$discount$but$not$pay$on$ time$discount).$The$quarterly$value$of$the$pay$on$time$discount$is$approximately$$11.$

!

15!


3.3$Dishonoured$payment$fees$$ $ Customers$ may$ be$ charged$ dishonoured$ payment$ fees$ when$ there$ are$ insufficient$ funds$ to$ cover$ payments$ by$ cheque,$ direct$ debit$ or$ credit$ card.$ In$ the$ NSW$ price$ review$in$2010$IPART$recommended$that$dishonoured$cheque$fees$should$continue$ to$be$twice$the$amount$charged$by$the$financial$institutions$and$that$a$dishonoured$ payment$ fee$ should$ be$ allowed$ for$ non_cheque$ payment$ methods$ (due$ to$ the$ decline$ in$ cheque$ payments$ and$ rise$ in$ direct$ debit).31$ $ Industry$ (Energy$ Australia)$ proposed$ that$ retailers$ should$ be$ allowed$ to$ charge$ twice$ the$ amount$ of$ the$ financial$ institution’s$ fee$ for$ dishonoured$ direct$ debit$ payments$ but$ IPART$ noted$ that$ “[i]t$ is$ not$ necessarily$ appropriate$ to$ apply$ the$ same$ fee$ as$ for$ dishonoured$ cheques$to$non_cheque$payments.”32$$ $ 3.3.1$Regulatory$provisions$and$jurisdictional$differences$ $ In$Victoria,$a$retailer$may$recover$a$financial$institution’s$dishonoured$payment$fee$ and$ they$ may$ also$ charge$ more$ than$ the$ amount$ recovered$ under$ an$ “agreed$ damages$ term”.33$ This$ clause$ applies$ to$ both$ standing$ offer$ and$ market$ offer$ contracts.$$ $ In$Queensland,$the$Code$stipulates$that$the$amount$charged$as$an$additional$fee$for$ market$offer$contracts$“must$be$fair$and$reasonable$having$regard$to$related$costs$ incurred$by$the$retail!entity.”34$$ $ The$ NECF$ also$ allows$ for$ retailers$ to$ charge$ dishonored$ payment$ fees$ as$ long$ as$ these$fees$are$disclosed$in$the$market$contract.35$Furthermore,$the$National$Energy$ Retail$ Law$ tasks$ the$ AER$ to$ develop$ and$ maintain$ guidelines$ for$ how$ the$ retailers$ should$ inform$ customers$ about$ additional$ fees$ and$ charges.36$ $ The$ NECF$ does$ not$ allow$ retailers$ to$ charge$ standard$ contract/standing$ offer$ customers$ dishonored$ payment$fees.$$$$ * 3.3.2$The$cost$of$dishonoured$payment$fees$to$consumers$

$ The$idea$behind$allowing$retailers$to$charge$dishonoured$payment$fees$is$of$course$ to$let$them$recover$the$costs$incurred$directly$from$individual$consumers$rather$than$ through$ energy$ prices$ applied$ to$ the$ entire$ customer$ base.$ However$ the$ amount$ charged$varies$significantly$from$retailer$to$retailer$and$it$is$difficult$to$believe$that$ entities$such$as$Australia$Post$would$vary$their$dishonoured$cheque$fee$from$retailer$ to$retailer$(see$chart$5$below).$ !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 31

$IPART,$Review!of!regulated!retail!tariffs!and!charges!for!electricity!2010T2013,$Final$report,$March$ 2010$ 32 $Ibid,$p$196! 33 $Victorian$Energy$Retail$Code,$Clause$7.5$(a)$$ 34 $Queensland$Electricity$Industry$Code$Version$14,$Clause$4.13.5$(b)$ 35 $National$Energy$Retail$Rules$46$(2)$ 36!AER,!Retail!Pricing!Information!Guideline,!Version!3,!June!2012!

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16!


Furthermore,$ the$ disclosure$ of$ dishonoured$ payment$ fees$ varies$ significantly$ between$retailers$and$retailers$absent$from$the$charts$below$should$not$necessarily$ be$ interpreted$ as$ retailers$ not$ imposing$ dishonoured$ payment$ fees.37$ The$ issue$ of$ inadequate$disclosure$is$discussed$in$section$4.$$$$$ *

As$more$and$more$retailers$offer$additional$discounts$for$customers$paying$their$bills$ on$ time$ and/or$ by$ direct$ debit,$ the$ direct$ debit$ rejection$ fee$ is$ increasingly$ important.$$ $ Chart$3$below$shows$that$this$fee$varies$from$under$$3$to$more$than$$14,$depending$ on$the$retailer.$Interestingly,$AGL’s$direct$debit$rejection$fee$is$a$lot$lower$in$South$ Australia$ (where$ AGL$ is$ the$ only$ incumbent$ electricity$ retailer)$ compared$ to$ other$ jurisdictions.$The$$14.85$fee$charged$by$QEnergy$in$Victoria$would$typically$equate$ to$approximately$4.6%$of$a$customer’s$quarterly$electricity$bill.38$ $ Chart*3$Fee$charged$for$rejected$direct$debit$payment$(market$offers)$ Direct!Debit!Rejection!Fee!($)! 0!

2!

4!

6!

8!

10!

12!

14!

16!

NSW!Qenergy! SA!Qenergy! VIC!Qenergy! NSW!Dodo! Qld!Dodo! VIC!Dodo!! ACT!ActewAGL! NSW!AGL! QLD!AGL! VIC!AGL! NSW!Powerdirect! QLD!Powerdirect! SA!Powerdirect! VIC!Powerdirect! NSW!Red! SA!Red! VIC!Red! VIC!People! SA!AGL!

$

$ $

Chart$4$below$shows$dishonoured$cheque$fees$that$vary$from$approximately$$5$to$ $36,$depending$on$the$retailer.$The$$36$fee$charged$by$ActewAGL$in$the$ACT$would$ !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 37

$We$also$note$that$not$all$retailers$allow$customers$to$use$all$these$payment$methods$and$the$ dishonored$payment$fee$thus$may$not$be$applicable.$ 38 $Based$on$an$annual$consumption$of$4,800kWh$(single$rate)$in$Citipower’s$network$area$producing$ an$annual$bill$of$approximately$$1,304$(as$of$January$2014).$

!

17!


typically$ equate$ to$ approximately$ 7.6%$ of$ a$ customer’s$ quarterly$ electricity$ bill.39$ Furthermore,$if$Powerdirect’s$dishonoured$cheque$fee$is$cost$reflective$at$$5.50$this$ would$ mean$ that$ ActewAGL$ potentially$ earns$ over$ $30$ for$ each$ dishonoured$ cheque.$$$$ * Chart*4$Fee$charged$for$dishonoured$cheque$payment$(market$offers)$

Dishonoured!Cheque!Fee!($)! 0!

5!

10!

15!

20!

25!

30!

35!

40!

ACT!ActewAGL! VIC!People! NSW!Red! SA!Red! VIC!Red! NSW!AGL! QLD!AGL! VIC!AGL! SA!Origin! NSW!Qenergy! SA!Qenergy! VIC!Qenergy! NSW!Dodo! Qld!Dodo! SA!AGL! VIC!Dodo!! NSW!Powerdirect! QLD!Powerdirect! SA!Powerdirect! VIC!Powerdirect!

$

*

$ Chart$ 5$ below$ shows$ fees$ for$ dishonoured$ Australia$ Post$ cheques.$ Again$ the$ amount$ varies$ significantly$ between$ retailers,$ from$ approximately$ $10$ to$ $25.$ The$ $25$ fee$ charged$by$People$Energy$in$Victoria$would$typically$equate$ to$ approximately$ 7.8%$ of$ a$ customer’s$ quarterly$ electricity$ bill.40* * * * * * *

“[I]f$Powerdirect’s$ dishonoured$cheque$ fee$is$cost$reflective$ at$$5.50$this$would$ mean$that$ActewAGL$ potentially$earns$ over$$30$for$each$ dishonoured$cheque”!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 39

$Based$on$an$annual$consumption$of$8,000kWh$(single$rate)$producing$an$annual$bill$of$ approximately$$1,880$(as$of$July$2013).$ 40 $Based$on$an$annual$consumption$of$4,800kWh$(single$rate)$in$Citipower’s$network$area$producing$ an$annual$bill$of$approximately$$1,304$(as$of$January$2014)$$

!

18!


Chart*5$Fee$charged$for$dishonoured$Australian$Post$cheque$payment$(market$offers)$ Dishonoured!Australian!Post!Cheque!Fee!($)! 0!

5!

10!

15!

20!

25!

30!

VIC!People! NSW!Origin! QLD!Origin! VIC!Origin! NSW!Powerdirect! QLD!Powerdirect! SA!Powerdirect! VIC!Powerdirect! NSW!Dodo! Qld!Dodo! VIC!Dodo!!

$

$ *

Chart$6$below$shows$fees$for$rejected$credit$card$payments$and$ActewAGL$is$again$ the$ retailer$ that$ applies$ the$ highest$ fee$ at$ $36$ (which$ would$ typically$ equate$ to$ approximately$7.6%$of$a$customer’s$quarterly$electricity$bill).41* * * Chart*6$Fee$charged$for$rejected$credit$card$payment$(market$offers)$ Dishonoured!Credit!Card!Fee!($)! 0!

5!

10!

15!

20!

25!

30!

35!

40!

ACT!ActewAGL! NSW!Dodo! Qld!Dodo! VIC!Dodo!! NSW!Red! SA!Red! VIC!Red! VIC!People!

$ $ $ $ $

$

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 41

$Based$on$an$annual$consumption$of$8,000kWh$(single$rate)$producing$an$annual$bill$of$ approximately$$1,880$(as$of$July$2013).$

!

19!


3.4$Payment$processing$fees$$ $ The$most$common$type$of$payment$processing$fee$is$a$credit/debit$card$processing$ fee$ and$ it$ is$ being$ justified$ by$ the$ merchant$ fee$ retailers$ are$ charged$ when$ their$ customers$ use$ this$ payment$ method.$ $ Dodo$ is$ one$ retailer$ that$ does$ not$ charge$ a$ credit$card$processing$fee$but$does$charge$to$process$any$other$form$of$payment.42$ Dodo$charges$the$customer$$1.90$per$payment$if$they$chose$to$Bpay,$pay$by$direct$ debit$or$cheque.$If$a$customer$pays$Dodo$using$an$Australia$Post$cheque$the$fee$is$ $2.20.$$ $ 3.4.1$Regulatory$provisions$and$jurisdictional$differences$

$ In$Victoria,$a$retailer$may$only$recover$a$merchant$service$fee$through$a$processing$ fee$if$the$customer$is$on$a$market$contract.43$ $ Similarly$ in$ Queensland,$ the$ Code$ stipulates$ that$ the$ amount$ charged$ as$ an$ additional$fee$for$market$offer$contracts$“must$be$fair$and$reasonable$having$regard$ to$related$costs$incurred$by$the$retail!entity.”44$$ $ The$NECF$also$allows$for$retailers$to$charge$payment$processing$fees$as$long$as$these$ fees$are$disclosed$in$the$market$contract.45$The$National$Energy$Retail$Law,$tasks$the$ AER$ to$ develop$ and$ maintain$ guidelines$ for$ how$ the$ retailers$ should$ inform$ customers$about$additional$fees$and$charges.46$$The$NECF$does$not$allow$retailers$to$ charge$payment$processing$fees$for$standard/standing$offer$contracts.47$$ $ 3.4.2$The$cost$of$payment$processing$fees$to$consumers$

$ Retailers$ will$ typically$ pay$ a$ merchant$ fee$ for$ credit/debit$ card$ transactions$ and$ while$we$understand$that$some$retailers$may$be$able$to$negotiate$a$better$fee$than$ others$ (with$ lower$ processing$ numbers),$ we$ would$ question$ the$ differences$ we$ currently$see$in$regards$to$some$retailers’$fees.$Electricity$bills$are$often$substantial$ and$a$processing$fee$as$high$as$1.7%$can$result$in$a$significant$additional$cost$to$the$ consumer.$ Chart$ 7$ below$ shows$ that$ the$ majority$ of$ retailers$ charge$ a$ 0.6%$ credit/debit$card$processing$fee,$while$others$charge$0.75%,$1%$and$1.7%.$Again$we$ note$that$the$disclosure$of$these$fees$is$often$unclear$and$that$a$retailer’s$absence$ from$this$chart$does$not$necessarily$mean$that$it$does$not$charge$a$processing$fee.$$$$$$ $ $ * *

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 42

$Dodo$was$acquired$by$the$M2$Group$in$May$2013$$ $Victorian$Energy$Retail$Code,$Clause$7.5$(b)! 44 $Queensland$Electricity$Industry$Code$Version$14,$Clause$4.13.5$(b)$ 45 $National$Energy$Retail$Rules$46$(2)$ 46!AER,!Retail!Pricing!Information!Guideline,!Version!3,!June!2012! 47!National$Energy$Retail$Rules$32! 43

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20!


Chart*7$Fee$charged$for$processing$credit$card$payment$(market$offers)$ Credit!Card!Processing!Fee!(%!of!amount!paid)! 0.00%! 0.20%! 0.40%! 0.60%! 0.80%! 1.00%! 1.20%! 1.40%! 1.60%! 1.80%! NSW!Qenergy! SA!Qenergy! VIC!Qenergy! VIC!People! NSW!Powerdirect! QLD!Powerdirect! SA!Powerdirect! VIC!Powerdirect! VIC!Simply! VIC!Origin! VIC!AGL! SA!Simply! SA!Origin! SA!AGL! QLD!Origin! QLD!AGL! NSW!Origin! NSW!AGL!

$

$ $

QEnergy$is$the$retailer$that$has$the$highest$disclosed$processing$fee$for$credit$card$ payments$ (1.7%).$ In$ contrast$ Origin,$ AGL$ and$ Simply$ charge$ 0.6%.$ Average$ consumption$ QEnergy$ customers$ in$ NSW$ will$ typically$ pay$ just$ under$ $10$ for$ a$ quarterly$bill$in$processing$fees$if$they$choose$to$pay$by$credit/debit$card.48$On$the$ other$ hand,$ an$ AGL$ customer$ with$ the$ same$ consumption$ level$ would$ pay$ a$ “Average$consumption$QEnergy$ credit$ card$ processing$ fee$ of$ just$ under$ customers$in$NSW$will$typically$pay$just$ $3.49$ If$ we$ assume$ that$ 0.6%$ reflects$ a$ under$$10$for$a$quarterly$bill$in$ typical$ merchant$ fee,$ QEnergy$ could$ processing$fees$if$they$choose$to$pay$by$ potentially$ earn$ $7$ for$ each$ customer$ credit/debit$card”! payment$received$by$credit$or$debit$card.$ $

3.5$Other$charges$ $ The$previously$common$account!establishment!fee$is$becoming$rare$in$competitive$ retail$ markets.$ Clearly$ account$ establishment$ fees$ are$ difficult$ to$ “sell”$ in$ markets$ where$ retailers$ compete$ for$ customers$ to$ sign_up.$ ActewAGL$ in$ the$ ACT,$ however,$ still$ charges$ approximately$ $35$ to$ establish$ a$ new$ customer$ account.$ In$ South$ Australia,$AGL$(the$host$retailer)$charges$just$over$$41$for$account$establishment.$$ !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 48

$Based$on$an$annual$consumption$of$7,200kWh$(single$rate$in$Ausgrid’s$network$area)$producing$an$ annual$bill$of$approximately$$2,310$(as$of$July$2013$and$includes$market$offer$discount/pay$on$time$ discount).! 49!Based$on$an$annual$consumption$of$7,200kWh$(single$rate$in$Ausgrid’s$network$area)$producing$an$ annual$bill$of$approximately$$1,945$(as$of$July$2013$and$includes$market$offer$discount/pay$on$time$ discount).!

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$ A$newer$type$of$fee,$introduced$by$Dodo,$is$the$printed!bill!fee.$As$energy$retailing$is$ becoming$ more$ of$ an$ online$ business,$ Dodo$ decided$ to$ charge$ customers$ $2.20$ to$ receive$a$printed$bill.$ $ The$ more$ fees$ retailers$ introduce$ and$ the$ more$ they$ differentiate$ themselves$ from$ others$ by$ applying$ “Australian$energy$retail$ different$ fees$ or$ using$ different$ terminology,$ the$ more$ markets$becoming$ difficult$ it$ will$ be$ for$ consumers$ to$ accurately$ compare$ subject$to$“fee_creep”$is$ thus$a$real$concern”! energy$ offers.$ A$ Texan$ study$ demonstrates$ just$ how$ inventive$ retailers$ can$ be$ in$ regards$ to$ introducing$ additional$fees$and$charges$if$allowed$to$by$the$regulatory$framework.50$In$addition$ to$ the$ fees$ commonly$ used$ in$ Australian$ retail$ markets,$ i.e.$ early$ termination$ fee,$ late$ payment$ fee,$ payment$ processing$ fee$ and$ dishonoured$ payment$ fee,$ Texan$ consumers$may$also$be$charged$the$following$retail$fees:51$ $ • A$minimum$usage$fee$(if$consumption$is$below$a$set$amount)$ • Agent$assist$fee$$ • Document$processing$fee$ • Summary$bill$fee$ • Move_out$date$change$fee$ • Expedited$reconnection$fee$$ • Payment$plan$processing$fee$ • Payments$over$phone$fee$ • Priority$move_in$fee$ • Reconnect$after$tampering$fee$ • Meter$re_read$fee$ • Agent$assisted$payment$fee$ • E_billing$discount$forfeiture$fee$ • Service$charge$per$bill$ • Excessive$number$of$payments$to$account$fee$ • Credit$application$review$fee$ $ Furthermore,$the$study$found$that$more$Texan$retailers$were$charging$more$fees$in$ 2013$ compared$ to$ two$ years$ earlier$ and$ that$ the$ fees$ themselves$ had$ gone$ up.$ Australian$ energy$ retail$ markets$ becoming$ subject$ to$ “fee_creep”$ is$ thus$ a$ real$ concern.$$$ $ $ $ $ $ !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 50

$Carol$Biedrzycki,$Texas!Electricity!Consumers,!Beware!of!REP!Fees,$Texas$Ratepayers’$Organization$ to$Save$Energy,$August$2013$$ 51 $Ibid.$

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3.6$Network$related$service$charges$ $ The$least$transparent$retail$charges$of$them$all$are$so$called$network!service!charges$ or$ an$ administration! fee.$ These$ charges$ are$ retail$ fees$ added$ on$ to$ the$ amount$ networks$ charge$ customers$ (through$ their$ retailers)$ for$ network$ services.$ As$ network$ charges$ are$ recovered$ through$ retail$ bills,$ it$ is$ almost$ impossible$ for$ a$ customer$to$know$whether$there$are$additional$retail$charges$attached$to$a$network$ service$(e.g.$re_connection,$disconnection,$special$meter$read$etc.)$let$alone$the$size$ of$the$retailer’s$fee.$ $ 3.6.1!Regulatory$provisions$and$jurisdictional$differences$ ! In$Victoria$retailers$may$impose$additional$ fees$ and$ charges$ as$ long$ as$ the$ contract$ “The$least$transparent$retail$charges$of$ type$ is$ a$ market$ contract$ and$ the$ them$all$are$so$called$network!service! “amount$of$any$additional$retail$charge$is$ charges$or$an$administration!fee”! fair$ and$ reasonable,$ and$ have$ regard$ to$ the$related$cost$incurred$by$the$retailer.52$ * In$Queensland$retailers$are$not$allowed$to$charge$standard$contract/standing$offer$ customers$ additional$ service$ fees,$ but$ they$ can$ apply$ these$ to$ market$ offer$ contracts.$The$Code$stipulates:$$ * “If$a$small!customer!is$on$a$standard!retail!contract,$a$retail!entity!must$not$ charge$the$small!customer!any$administration$fees$or$surcharge$with$respect$ to$distribution!nonTnetwork!charges.”53$ $ Similarly,$the$NECF$allows$for$retailers$to$charge$additional$fees$as$long$as$these$fees$ are$disclosed$in$the$market$contract.54$The$National$Energy$Retail$Law,$tasks$the$AER$ to$ develop$ and$ maintain$ guidelines$ for$ how$ the$ retailers$ should$ inform$ customers$ about$additional$fees$and$charges.55$$$$ $ 3.6.2$Ambiguous$retailer$statements$

$ Due$ to$ the$ lack$ of$ transparent$ disclosure$ and$ ambiguous$ retailer$ statements$ in$ regards$ to$ these$ charges,$ we$ were$ unable$ to$ estimate$ the$ cost$ to$ consumers$ in$ a$ meaningful$ manner.$ This$ section$ thus$ presents$ examples$ of$ retailer$ statements$ regarding$additional$fees$for$network_related$services.$ $ In$Victoria,$for$example,$Simply$energy$will$charge$customers$an$administration$fee$ of$ $27.50$ if$ a$ customer$ moves$ home.$ In$ NSW,$ Origin$ charges$ a$ Network$ Service$ Charge$Administration$Fee$of$$2.75$while$for$other$jurisdictions$they$simply$state:$$ !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 52 $Victorian$Energy$Retail$Code,$Clause$30! 53 $Queensland$Electricity$Industry$Code$Version$14,$Clause$4.13.6$(b)! 54

$National$Energy$Retail$Rules$46$(2)$ $AER,$Retail$Pricing$Information$Guideline,$Version$3,$June$2012$

55

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“The$charges$for$network_related$services$may$include$our$reasonable$costs$ for$arranging$such$services.”56$$ $ Dodo’s$online$statement$about$additional$retail$charges$states:$ $ “A$ Service$ Order$ Administration$ Fee$ may$ be$ applied$ to$ your$ account$ to$ recover$ our$ associated$ administration$ costs$ if$ we$ pass$ through$ Distributor$ charges$to$you$for$activities$the$Distributor$undertakes$on$our$behalf$for$you,$ or$in$response$to$a$request$by$you.”57$$ $

Energy$ Australia$ lists$ the$ charges$ that$ applies$ to$ the$ following$ services$ for$ each$ of$ the$network$areas:$ • Moving$into$your$property$and$connecting$electricity$(reconnection$fee)$ • Vacating$your$property$and$disconnecting$electricity$(disconnection$fee)$ • Meter$ reading$ by$ technician$ upon$ request$ from$ customer$ (special$ meter$ read)$ • Replace$ meter$ to$ facilitate$ renewable$ energy$ installation$ (solar$ installation$ read)$ $ At$the$end$of$the$document$Energy$Australia$states:$ $ “The$charges$for$network_related$services$may$include$our$reasonable$costs$ for$arranging$such$services.”58$ $ Red$Energy’s$list$of$additional$service$charges$states:$ $ “All$fees$are$GST$inclusive$and$may$attract$a$Process$and$Handling$Charge.”59$ $ AGL’s$ document$ called$ “AGL$ Energy$ Plan$ Small$ Customer$ Market$ Contracts$ Fee$ Schedule”$ effective$ as$ of$ 1$ July$ 2013,$ lists$ most$ network$ related$ services$ as$ “Pass$ Through”.$In$relation$to$South$Australia,$however,$AGL$lists$the$actual$amount$of$the$ Reconnection$fee$as$$41.55.60$$ $ AGL’s$Energy$Price$Fact$Sheet$for$market$offers$in$South$Australia$(effective$1$August$ 2013)$confirms$this$amount$by$showing:61$ $ Reconnection$fee$ This$fee$is$charged$by$your$Distributor$and$passed$through$to$ you$by$AGL.$ Flat$rate$_$$41.55$inc.$GST$ $ !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 56

$From$Origin’s$website$information$about$additional$charges$as$of$17$January$2014$ $Dodo$Power$and$Gas,$Additional!retail!Charges,!Applicable!from!15!January!2014! 58 $www.energyaustralia.com.au/other_charges$(downloaded$17$January$2014)$ 59 $Red$Energy,$Additional!Service!Charges,$Effective$from$11$April$2013$ 60 $AGL,$AGL!Energy!Plan!Small!Customer!Market!Contract!Fee!Schedule,$Effective$1$August$2013$$ 61 $AGL,$Energy$Price$Fact$Sheet,$AGL$Select$8%$(AGL$7334MR)$ 57

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Powerdirect,$ which$ is$ owned$ by$ AGL,$ on$ the$ other$ hand,$ makes$ the$ following$ statement$on$its$Energy$Price$Fact$Sheet$(with$the$same$release$date$as$AGL):62$ $ Reconnection$fee$ This$fee$is$charged$by$your$Distributor$and$passed$through$to$ you$by$Powerdirect.$ Flat$rate$_$$35.20$inc.$GST$ $ Clearly$ the$ reconnection$ charge$ should$ be$ the$ same$ if$ both$ AGL$ and$ Powerdirect$ simply$ passes$ through$ the$ distributor’s$ charges$ and$ on$ the$ basis$ of$ Origin$ Energy’s$ reconnection$ fee$ in$ South$ Australia$ being$ the$ same$ as$ Powerdirect’s$ ($35.20)$ we$ believe$ AGL’s$ pass$ through$ statement$ is$ incorrect.63$ Furthermore,$ this$ leads$ us$ to$ question$the$use$of$“Pass$Through”$(rather$than$stipulating$the$charge)$in$AGL,$and$ other$retailers’,$documents.64$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 62

$Powerdirect,$Energy$Price$Fact$Sheet,$Powerdirect$12%$(POW$6811MR)$ $Origin,$SA$Residential$Energy$Fact$Sheet$(Effective$13$January$2014),$Daily$Saver$Plus$$ 64 $See,$for$example,$AGL,$AGL!Energy!Plan!Small!Customer!Market!Contract!Fee!Schedule,$Effective$1$ August$2013$$ 63

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4.*Regulatory*measures* $ This$ section$ summarises$ the$ regulatory$ arrangements$ in$ relation$ to$ retail$ fees$ and$ charges$ in$ the$ NEM,$ assesses$ how$ well$ current$ arrangements$ are$ working,$ and$ proposes$a$different$regulatory$approach$to$the$current$disclosure$framework.$$ $ 4.1$Market$offers$vs.$standing$offers/standard$contracts$ $ While$the$focus$of$the$analysis$presented$in$this$report$has$been$market$offers,$this$ section$ looks$ at$ the$ regulatory$ provisions$ for$ standard$ contract/standing$ offers$ compared$to$market$offers.$In$broad$terms,$the$regulation$relies$on$a$framework$of$ disclosure$by$retailers$and$explicit$informed$consent$from$consumers$for$additional$ fees$ and$ charges$ attached$ to$ market$ contracts.$ In$ relation$ to$ standard$ contracts/standing$offers,$the$regulation$tends$to$be$more$specific.$We$support$the$ disclosure/consent$framework$in$principle$but$there$is$a$case$for$more$prescriptive$ regulation$if$retailers$are$allowed$to$exploit$this$arrangement$and/or$market$offers$ become$so$complex$that$it$makes$it$impossible$for$consumers$to$compare.$$ $ We$ recognise$ the$ importance$ of$ market$ innovation$ in$ competitive$ markets$ but$ we$ question$whether$innovation$in$the$additional$fees$and$charges$sphere$is$something$ that$actually$benefits$competition$and$consumers$in$the$longer$term.$ $ Table$ 1$ below$ summarises$ the$ regulatory$ “[W]e$question$whether$ provisions$ for$ the$ use$ of$ additional$ charges$ in$ innovation$in$the$additional$fees$ relation$ to$ Victoria,$ Queensland$ and$ the$ NECF$ and$charges$sphere$is$something$ (which$ covers$ NSW,$ South$ Australia,$ Tasmania$ that$actually$benefits$ and$ the$ ACT),$ and$ it$ shows$ that$ there$ is$ some$ competition$and$consumers$in$ variation$ both$ in$ relation$ to$ standing$ the$longer$term”! offers/standard$ contracts$ and$ market$ offer$ ! contracts.$$ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

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Table*1$Regulatory$provisions$for$standard$contract/standing$offers$and$market$offers$in$ relation$to$additional$fees$and$charges$$ $ * Victoria* Queensland* NECF* * Standing$ Market$ Standing$ Market$ Standing$ Market$ Early* NA$ Allowed*$ NA$ Allowed*$ NA$ Allowed*$ Termination* $ $ Fee* Late*Payment* Not$ Not$ Not$ Allowed$ Allowed$ Allowed$ Fee* allowed$ allowed$ allowed$ $ Dishonored* Allowed$ Allowed$ Not$ Allowed$ Not$ Allowed$ Payment* allowed$ allowed$ Fee** Payment** Not$ Allowed$ Not$ Allowed$ Not$ Allowed$ Processing* Allowed$ allowed$ allowed$ Fee* NetworkW* Not$ Allowed$ Not$ Allowed$ Not$ Allowed$ Related* allowed$ allowed$ allowed$ Service* Fee** *$Regulatory$restrictions$apply$to$the$ETF$amount$charges$in$Victoria$and$NSW,$and$when$it$ can$be$charges$in$Queensland$$ *

$ $ We$believe$that$some$of$the$fees$and$charges$currently$ allowed$ for$ market$ offer$ contracts$ are$ simply$ “legacy_ “[R]emoving$the$use$of$ fees”$ from$ a$ time$ when$ regulators$ determined$ retail$ additional$retail$fees$and$ charges$may$improve$ prices$ for$ the$ majority$ of$ residential$ customers.$ innovation$amongst$ Regulators$have$to$take$various$retail$costs$into$account$ retailers$as$they$would$ in$order$to$determine$what$the$appropriate$price$should$ be.$ Assessing$ the$ cost$ of$ servicing$ is$ thus$ part$ of$ this$ have$an$incentive$to$find$ process$ and$ retailers$ would$ have$ an$ incentive$ to$ more$cost$effective$ways$ to$communicate$and$ demonstrate$ all$ the$ additional$ costs$ they$ incur$ due$ to$ serve$their$customers$in$ late$ payers,$ dishonoured$ payments,$ reminder$ notices$ order$to$protect$the$ etc.$ In$ today’s$ market$ the$ majority$ of$ residential$ bottom$line”! customers$ are$ on$ market$ contracts$ (although$ numbers$ vary$significantly$from$jurisdiction$to$jurisdiction),$meaning$that$the$retailers$set$the$ price$themselves.65$As$a$result$retailers$are$free$to$factor$in$the$cost$of$late$payment$ fees,$ dishonoured$ payments,$ reminder$ notices$ etc.$ when$ determining$ their$ own$ price.$ In$ fact,$ removing$ the$ use$ of$ additional$ retail$ fees$ and$ charges$ may$ improve$ innovation$ amongst$ retailers$ as$ they$ would$ have$ an$ incentive$ to$ find$ more$ cost$ !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 65

$In$South$Australia$81%$of$customers$are$on$a$market$contract,$75%$in$Victoria,$60%$in$NSW,$46%$on$ Queensland$(but$70%$in$South$East$Queensland)$and$19%$in$the$ACT.$See$AER,$State$of$the$Energy$ Market$2013,$p$126$

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effective$ ways$ to$ communicate$ and$ serve$ their$ customers$ in$ order$ to$ protect$ the$ bottom$line.$$$ $ 4.2$Disclosure$regulation$and$retailer$disclosure* * As$ noted$ in$ section$ 3$ above,$ the$ National$ Energy$ Retail$ Law$ tasks$ the$ AER$ with$ developing$and$maintaining$guidelines$for$how$the$retailers$should$inform$customers$ about$ additional$ fees$ and$ charges.66$ The$ AER’s$ Retail$ Pricing$ Information$ Guideline$ specifies:$ $ “[T]he$ use$ of$ a$ template$ (Energy! Price! Fact! Sheets)$ to$ present$ prices$ and$ other$ product$ information$ when$ retailers! present$ or$ otherwise$ market$ or$ advertise$ pricing$ information$ to$ consumers.$ It$ also$ specifies$ the$ required$ information$on$contract!offers!to$be$provided$by$retailers!to$the$AER$for$the$ price$comparator$website$and$how$that$information$is$to$be$managed.”67$$ $ The$ AER$ thus$ has$ to$ balance$ the$ issue$ of$ appropriate$ levels$ of$ information$ with$ information$ overload$ to$ ensure$ that$ the$ Energy$ Price$ Fact$ Sheets$ are$ useful$ documents$for$consumers.$In$relation$to$fees,$the$Guideline$stipulates:$ $ “A$ retailer! must$ on$ an$ Energy! Price! Fact! Sheet,$ provide$ information$ on$ key$ fees$that$are$applicable$to$a$contract!offer!in$the$table$format$presented$in$ example$ 5.$ The$ information$ must$ include$ the$ amount$ of$ the$ fee$ in$ dollars,$ inclusive$of$GST$or$as$a$percentage$of$the$bill$amount.$Key$fees$include$(but$ are$not$limited$to):$$ $ • account$establishment$fees$ • exit$fees$or$early$termination$fees$(applicable$to$market$offer$ contracts$only)$$ • late$payment$fees$ • disconnection$fees$ • reconnection$fees$ • payment$processing$fees.$$ $ If$ a$ retailer! applies$ any$ further$ fees$ that$ are$ not$ considered$ key$ fees$ to$ a$ contract!offer,$the$Energy!Price!Fact!Sheet!must$include$a$reference$to$where$ additional$information$on$these$fees$is$available.$An$example$of$a$further$fee,$ which$ the$ AER$ does$ not$ consider$ to$ be$ a$ key$ fee,$ is$ a$ fee$ or$ charge$ that$ relates$to$a$special$meter$read$or$meter$inspection$fee.$$ $

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 66!AER,!Retail!Pricing!Information!Guideline,!Version!3,!June!2012! 67

$Ibid,$p$2$

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A$retailer!must$title$any$fees$relating$to$the$disconnection$or$reconnection$of$ a$ small! customer! as$ “disconnection$ fees”$ and$ “reconnection$ fees”$ respectively.”68$$

$ An$examination$of$the$Energy$Price$Fact$Sheets$produced$by$the$retailers$show$that$ while$retailers$follow$these$guidelines,$the$information$provided$is$often$ambiguous$ and$the$information$provided$in$the$links$to$further$information$is$often$inadequate$ or$even$more$ambiguous.$$For$example:$ $ Origin$ Energy$ lists$ most$ of$ its$ fees$ on$ the$ Fact$ Sheet$ but$ some$ of$ the$ text$ is$ very$ unclear.69$ $ Distributor$charges$ You$must$pay$us$any$charges$that$your$distributor$imposes$ on$us$in$relation$to$the$services$performed$by$your$ distributor$(or$any$other$person)$at$your$supply$address.$ Disconnection$fee$ A$$35.20$(GST$Incl)$fee$may$apply$when$your$property$is$ disconnected$(including$when$you$move).$This$fee$is$ passed$through$from$your$distributor$and$may$vary.$Please$ visit$your$distributor’s$website$to$find$out$the$current$fee.$ Reconnection$fee$ A$$35.20$(GST$Incl)$fee$may$apply$when$your$property$is$ reconnected$(including$when$you$move).$This$fee$is$passed$ through$from$your$distributor$and$may$vary.$Please$visit$ your$distributor’s$website$to$find$out$the$current$fee.$ Additional$fees$ For$information$on$additional$charges$that$may$apply$visit$ www.originenergy.com.au/2402/Additional_charges$ $ $$$ Firstly,$ by$ clicking$ on$ the$ link$ and$ selecting$ South$ Australia$ you$ get$ to$ a$ webpage$ where$ the$ last$ line$ is:$ “The$ charges$ for$ network_related$ services$ may$ include$ our$ reasonable$ costs$ for$ arranging$ such$ services.”70$ $ Secondly,$ if$ $35.20$ is$ the$ right$ amount$why$should$prospective$customers$go$to$SA$Power$Networks$website?$ $ Simply$Energy$does$not$stipulate$disconnection$and$reconnection$fees$on$their$Fact$ Sheet.$ Instead,$ they$ ask$ customers$ to$ call$ or$ go$ to$ their$ website$ for$ more$ information.71$ $ Additional$information$ Account$establishment$fee$is$not$applicable$to$this$offer.$ For$information$on$additional$fees,$please$see$our$full$ contract$terms$and$conditions$available$on$our$website$or$ contact$us$on$13$88$08.$ !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 68

$Ibid,$p$6$ $The$boxed$text$is$from$Origin$Energy’s$SA$Residential$Energy$Price$Fact$Sheet$(Effective$13$January$ 2014).$$ 70 $http://www.originenergy.com.au/2402/Additional_charges?g%5Buser_state%5D=sa$ 71 $The$boxed$text$is$from$Simply$Energy’s$Energy$Price$Fact$Sheet$SA$Simply$Save$15/10$–$SIM3927MR$ 69

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Simply$Energy’s$Contract$Terms$and$Conditions$document,$however,$only$provides$ the$potential$customer$with$the$following$information:$ $ “Additional$charges$ a.$You$must$also$pay$us:$$ 1. any$other$distributor$charges$we$pay$concerning$the$energy$we$sell$ you$and$related$costs$we$incur;$$ 2. reasonable$costs$we$incur$if$you$do$not$give$access$to$the$meter$ readers$or$you$request$an$unscheduled$meter$reading;$$ 3. any$administration$fee$set$out$in$the$contract$sheet;$$ 4. for$any$additional$services$you$request$from$us$(including$meter$ testing)$unless$the$law$requires$us$to$provide$that$service$free$of$ charge;$$ 5. any$merchant$service$fees$we$incur$because$of$the$payment$method$ you$use$in$paying$your$bill;$$ 6. to$the$extent$the$law$allows,$any$late$payment$fee$set$out$in$the$ contract$sheet$and$interest$on$any$late$payment$as$set$by$us$from$ time$to$time;$$ 7. costs$imposed$on$us$if,$due$to$fault$on$your$part,$payments$you$make$ to$us$are$dishonoured$or$reversed;$$ 8. to$the$extent$the$law$allows,$reasonable$costs$we$incur$providing$you$ with$historical$billing$data,$our$standard$complaints$and$dispute$ resolution$procedure,$contact$details$for$the$Ombudsman$or$any$ other$information$you$request;$$ 9. any$other$additional$charges$set$out$in$these$contract$terms$or$in$the$ contract$sheet;$and$$ 10. GST$at$the$prevailing$GST$rate$on$any$taxable$supplies$made$by$us.$$ $ b.$Any$additional$charge$will$be$fair$and$reasonable$having$regard$to$related$ costs$we$incur.”72$$ $ Potential$ Simply$ Energy$ customers$ thus$ have$ to$ wait$ until$ they$ have$ actually$ received$the$contract$sheet$before$they$know$whether,$and$how$much,$they$will$pay$ in$administration$fees,$late$payment$fees,$dishonoured$payment$fees$etc.$ $ Lumo$ Energy$ is$ somewhat$ clearer$ in$ providing$ information$ about$ network_related$ charges.$Its$Fact$Sheet$provides$the$full$link$to$the$relevant$charges$and$the$website$ contains$ a$ comprehensive$ list$ of$ network$ charges.73$ However,$ it$ does$ not$ mention$ service$ or$ administration$ charges.$ These$ potential$ charges$ are$ mentioned$ in$ the$ customer$ charter$ but$ again$ the$ potential$ customer$ has$ to$ wait$ until$ the$ actual$ contract$is$produced$before$assessing$these$charges.$ $$$ !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 72

$Simply$Energy,$Small!Customer!Market!Retail!Contract!Terms!and!Privacy!Policy,$p$7$ $Lumo$Energy,$Energy$price$Fact$Sheet,$Lumo$Advantage$–$Lu13663MR$and$ http://www.lumoenergy.com.au/help_centre/fee_schedule_sa$

73

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“[A]dditional$ retail$ charges$ or$ other$ fees$ and$ charges$ specified$ in$ the$ Contract$or$permitted$by$the$Regulatory$Requirements$to$be$charged”74$$$

$ These$ examples,$ combined$ with$ the$ examples$ in$ relation$ to$ service$ charges$ in$ section$ 3.6.2$ above,$ clearly$ document$ that$ there$ is$ no$ easy$ way$ consumers$ can$ compare$all$aspects$of$energy$offers$available$to$them.$As$long$as$retailers$present$ information$in$a$confusing$manner,$or$request$consumers$to$search$their$website$for$ more$ information$ (and$ in$ some$ cases,$ only$ to$ discover$ that$ the$ actual$ charges$ are$ still$ not$ listed)$ consumers$ will$ not$ be$ fully$ informed$ before$ they$ have$ actually$ received$ the$ contract.$ The$ tendency$ of$ retailers$ to$ “hide”$ fees$ and$ charges$ further$ into$the$search$and$compare$process$was$also$documented$by$the$Texan$study$into$ retail$fees$and$charges.$The$study$found$that$30$out$of$44$Texan$retailers$disclosed$ their$ fees$ in$ the$ Terms$ of$ Service$ agreements$ and$ simply$ referred$ to$ them$ on$ the$ Fact$Sheets$(called$the$Electricity$Facts$Label).$The$other$14$retailers$actually$listed$ them$on$the$Fact$Sheets.75$$$ $ With$ a$ high$ number$ of$ additional$ fees$ and$ “The$tendency$of$retailers$to$ charges$ it$ becomes$ difficult$ to$ ensure$ that$ that$ “hide”$fees$and$charges$further$ consumers$ receive$ all$ potentially$ important$ into$the$search$and$compare$ information$ about$ a$ retail$ offer$ on$ the$ Energy$ process$was$also$documented$by$ Fact$ sheets.$ $ Energy$ Fact$ sheets,$ as$ well$ as$ the$Texan$study$into$retail$fees$ comparison$ websites,$ are$ there$ to$ ensure$ that$ and$charges”! consumers$can$readily$compare$offers.$As$such$it$ is$ regarded$ as$ acceptable$ that$ retailers$ simply$ refer$ to$ additional$ charges$ and$ tell$ consumers$ where$ to$ find$ them.$ In$ theory$ this$ approach$ of$ requiring$ disclosure,$ monitoring$ and$ enforcing$ compliance$ is$ fine.$ The$ AER$is$tasked$to$ensure$that$the$law,$rules$and$guidelines$are$followed$ensuring$that$ retailers$comply.$As$stated$by$the$AER:$ $ “The$ AER$ will$ monitor$ compliance$ with$ the$ requirements$ of$ the$ Retail$ Law$ and$Rules$to$identify$areas$where$breaches$may$be$occurring.$Where$issues$ are$ identified$ through$ the$ monitoring$ activities,$ the$ AER$ will$ make$ inquiries$ and$ investigate$ the$ matter$ to$ determine$ whether$ a$ breach$ has$ occurred.$ Where$it$considers$a$breach$has$occurred,$the$AER$will$take$steps$to$correct$ the$relevant$behaviour$and$restore$compliance.”76$$ $$$ However,$ as$ long$ as$ retailers$ are$ unable$ or$ unwilling$ to$ adequately$ inform$ consumers$ in$ a$ document$ that$ is$ easily$ accessible$ from$ reading$ a$ Fact$ Sheet,$ disclosure$ regulation$ becomes$ ineffective.$ Broken$ web$ links,$ inaccurate$ or$ ambiguous$wording,$inadequate$levels$of$detail$in$the$information$provided$etc.$are$ issues$the$regulator$then$needs$to$assess$in$order$to$ensure$compliance.$This$is$an$ !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 74

$Lumo$Energy,$Here’s!our!customer!charter!–!No!unfortunately!it’s!not!a!boat!trip…(Vic,SA,QLD),$p$5$ $Carol$Biedrzycki,$Texas!Electricity!Consumers,!Beware!of!REP!Fees,$Texas$Ratepayers’$Organization$ to$Save$Energy,$August$2013,$p$11! 76 $AER,$Retail$Pricing$Information$Guideline,$Version$3,$June$2012,$p$3$ 75

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enormous$task$considering$the$number$of$energy$retail$offers$available.$This$is$where$ relying$on$disclosure$regulation$fails.$$$$ $ 4.3$Implications$for$market$comparability$and$competition$$ $ While$some$may$consider$additional$fees$and$charges$as$a$minor$issue$compared$to$ some$of$the$other$issues$facing$residential$energy$consumers,$we$believe$the$issues$ raised$ in$ this$ report$ need$ to$ be$ addressed$ immediately.$ As$ illustrated$ by$ the$ Australian$Power$and$Gas$case,$there$is$significant$revenue$to$be$gained$by$retailers$ through$additional$fees$and$charges.$$ $ The$ retail$ market$ must$ be$ transparent$ and$ consumers$ must$ be$ able$ to$ compare$ retail$offers$confidently$in$order$to$have$effective$competition.$As$stated$by$the$AER$ in$a$recent$submission$to$the$AEMC:$ $ “We$ recognise$ that$ a$ competitive$ retail$ energy$ market$ relies$ on$ confident$ consumers$ exercising$ informed$ choice.$ We$ also$ acknowledge$ concerns$ that$ some$ consumers$ find$ energy$ markets$ complex$ and$ may$ be$ deterred$ from$ engaging$ fully$ in$ the$ market$ by$ lack$ of$ access$ to$ clear,$ easy_to_understand$ information$ about$ their$ current$ energy$ contracts$ and$ alternative$ contracts$ available$to$them.”77$ $$$$$ The$ current$ framework$ for$ use$ of$ additional$ fees$ and$ charges$ adds$ significant$ complexity$to$the$retail$market.$Competitive$energy$retail$markets$are$relatively$new$ in$ Australia$ and$ additional$ fees$ and$ charges$ make$ the$ task$ of$ ensuring$ consumers$ can$easily$and$confidently$compare$much$more$difficult.$ $ 4.4$Better$regulation$ $ “[W]e$believe$there$ Based$ on$ the$ analysis$ presented$ in$ this$ report,$ we$ believe$ is$a$case$for$ there$is$a$case$for$revisiting$the$cost/benefit$assumptions$of$ revisiting$the$ the$regulatory$frameworks$guiding$the$use$of$additional$fees$ cost/benefit$ and$charges$in$the$energy$retail$markets.$We$also$note$that$ assumptions$of$the$ regulatory$ the$Federal$Government$is$committed$to$reduce$regulation$ 78 or$ improve$ regulation$ rather$ than$ increasing$ it. $ The$ frameworks$guiding$ current$ regulation$ relies$ heavily$ on$ adequate$ and$ accurate$ the$use$of$additional$ disclosure$by$retailers$and$compliance$auditing$by$regulators$ fees$and$charges$in$ the$energy$retail$ (the$AER$in$relation$to$the$NECF,$the$ESC$in$Victoria$and$the$ markets”! QCA$in$Queensland).$$ $ This$ approach$ may$ work$ well$ in$ an$ energy$ retail$ market$ characterised$ by$ a$ few$ retailers$ (with$ well$ resourced$ regulatory$ compliance$ teams)$ offering$ a$ few$ !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 77

$AER,$Submission!on!National!Energy!Retail!Amendment!(Retailer!price!variations!in!market!retail! contracts)!Rule!2014,$23$March$2014,$p$1$ 78 $See,$for$example,$www.cuttingredtape.gov$au$

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products.79$The$reality,$however,$is$that$we$have$numerous$retailers$operating$in$the$ NEM$(including$some$very$small$in$terms$of$staff)$and$there$are$hundreds$of$offers$ out$ there$ changing$ continuously.$ The$ task$ of$ compliance$ auditing$ is$ enormous$ and$ resource$ intensive.$ The$ task$ of$ responding$ to$ errors$ made$ by$ industry$ (as$ in$ Australian$Power$and$Gas’$example)$is$enormous$and$resource$intensive.$The$task$of$ understanding$ and$ comparing$ the$ various$ fees$ and$ charges$ for$ consumers$ is$ also$ enormous$and$resource$intensive.$$ $ In$a$recent$submission$to$the$AEMC,$the$AER$addresses$a$rule$change$proposal$that$ would$ only$ allow$ retailers$ to$ pass$ through$ some$ particular$ price$ variations$ (i.e.$ government$charges)$to$consumers$on$a$fixed$contract$and$states:$ $ “Such$ a$ rule$ is$ likely$ to$ be$ more$ complex$ for$ the$ responsible$ regulator$ to$ administer,$as$it$would$require$prescribing$those$costs$that$could$be$passed$ through,$ and$ subsequent$ monitoring$ of$ price$ variations$ under$ market$ contracts,$ to$ ensure$ only$ allowed$ costs$ were$ passed$ through.$ This$ is$ also$ likely$ to$ result$ in$ a$ higher$ regulatory$ burden$ on$ retailers,$ depending$ on$ the$ monitoring,$reporting$and$compliance$arrangements$established.”80$$ $$$$ We$share$the$AER’s$concern$in$relation$to$the$regulatory$burden$and$we$believe$this$ cost$issue$also$needs$to$be$considered$in$relation$to$the$regulation$of$retail$fees$and$ charges.$ The$ current$ framework$ is$ expensive$ for$ regulators$ (that$ is$ tax$ payers),$ retailers$(that$is$end$users)$and$consumers$(that$is$households$and$small$businesses).$ We$have$to$ask$what$the$benefit$of$this$regulatory$approach$ is?$The$benefit$appears$to$be$that$we$allow$energy$retailers$ “The$task$of$ to$ be$ innovative$ when$ deciding$ what$ additional$ fees$ and$ compliance$auditing$ charges$ they$ can$ apply$ while$ still$ managing$ to$ retain$ or$ is$enormous$and$ attract$ customers.$ We$ question$ whether$ this$ benefit$ resource$intensive”! outweighs$the$cost$of$this$approach.$$ $ We$agree$that$a$competitive$market$is$the$best$place$for$product$innovation$to$occur$ but$the$important$product$innovation$is$in$regards$to$the$energy$component$of$the$ product$ rather$ than$ strategic$ earning$ potentials$ from$ additional$ fees$ and$ charges.$ We$ believe$ there$ is$ a$ risk$ that$ when$ a$ regulatory$ framework$ allows$ for$ too$ much$ innovation$this$can$result$in$firms$lacking$incentives$to$innovate$in$the$areas$where$ innovation$is$most$needed$(i.e.$tariff$design,$demand$side$participation,$new$forms$ of$customer$communications).$$ $ In$our$view,$better$regulation$in$the$retail$market$would$be$an$approach$that$limits,$ or$ simply$ bans,$ retailers$ from$ charging$ additional$ fees$ and$ charges.$ This$ type$ of$ regulation$would$allow$energy$retailers$to$focus$on$their$main$function$in$the$energy$ !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 79

$As$illustrated$by$Australian$Power$and$Gas’$explanation$for$why$they$overcharged$11,610$customers$ being$“an$error$regarding$the$interpretation$of$allowable$charges”$(see$section$3.1.1$above)$$ 80 $AER,$Submission!on!National!Energy!Retail!Amendment!(Retailer!price!variations!in!market!retail! contracts)!Rule!2014,$23$March$2014,$p$6$

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supply$ chain,$ which$ is$ managing$ wholesale$ cost$ risks$ for$ end$ users$ and$ communicating$ with$ their$ customers.$ The$ retail$ cost$ component$ of$ residential$ customers’$electricity$bills$are$currently$thought$to$be$as$high$as$20%$in$Victoria,$and$ we$ note$ that$ these$ estimates$ do$ not$ include$ whatever$ customers$ may$ pay$ in$ additional$ fees$ and$ charges.81$ This$ means$ that$ customers$ pay$ a$ significant$ amount$ every$year$just$for$the$retail$service.$Obviously$this$cost$can$still$be$efficient$(as$in$the$ profits$are$not$increasing)$but$it$still$warrants$us$to$questions:$Is$the$service$provided$ by$retailers$actually$worth$this$much?$And,$what$can$we$do$to$reduce$it?$Regulatory$ improvements$ that$ incentivise$ retailers$ to$ focus$ on$ the$ ‘main$ game’$ would$ be$ one$ step$in$the$right$direction.$$ $ If$there$is$no$willingness$to$ban$or$limit$the$use$of$additional$retail$fees$and$charges$ we$ believe$ the$ regulatory$ framework$ that$ enforces$ and$ reports$ on$ the$ use$ of$ additional$ fees$ and$ charges$ in$ energy$ retail$ contracts$ needs$ strengthening.$ This$ would,$however,$be$a$more$costly$approach$compared$to$simply$banning$them.$The$ regulation$ would$ need$ to$ stipulate$ that$ retailers$ must$ disclose$ additional$ fees$ and$ charges$ prior$ to$ a$ final$ contract$ being$ issued,$ and$ the$ regulators$ must$ ensure$ compliance$by$regularly$assessing$that$the$amounts$charged$are$fair$and$reasonable$ and$ that$ the$ retailers$ provide$ information$ about$ additional$ fees$ and$ charges$ in$ an$ accessible$ manner.82$ Furthermore,$ the$ regulatory$ monitoring$ of,$ and$ reporting$ on,$ retail$ market$ performances$ should$ be$ enhanced$ to$ generate$ consumer$ awareness.$ How$ often$ do$ customers$ incur$ late$ payment$ fees?$ How$ much$ revenue$ did$ the$ company$raise$from$this$fee?$How$many$customers$were$charged$early$termination$ fees?$ If$ we$ knew$ the$ answer$ to$ these$ type$ of$ questions,$ consumers$ could$ become$ better$informed$and$better$equipped$to$take$the$cost$of$additional$fees$and$charges$ into$the$equation$when$choosing$energy$contracts.$$ $ $ * * * * * * * * !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 81

$This$number$is$an$estimate$based$on$jurisdictional$‘bill_stack’$comparisons$of$wholesale$costs$ combined$with$retail$costs.$See,$for$example,$AEMC,$2013!Residential!Electricity!Price!Trends,$Final$ Report,$December$2013$and$Gavin$Dufty$and$May$Mauseth$Johnston,$The!National!Energy!Market!–!Is! there!a!devil!in!the!retail?,$December$2013* 82 $We$note$the$recent$work$undertaken$by$Allens$and$NERA$Economic$Consulting$on$the$effectiveness$ of$the$enforcement$regimes$that$recommends$some$strengthening$of$the$AER’s$powers.$If$retailers$ ability$to$impose$additional$fees$and$charges$was$to$continue,$we$believe$a$strengthening$of$the$AER’s$ enforcement$powers$is$critical.$Allens$and$NERA$Economic$Consulting,$Review!of!Enforcement! Regimes!under!the!National!Energy!Laws,$A$Report$Prepared$for$the$Standing$Council$on$Energy$and$ Resources,$Draft,$15$August$2013$$$$$

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5.*Recommendation* $ In$order$to$promote$consumer$confidence$in$energy$retail$markets,$reduce$product$ complexity$and$increase$consumer$participation$as$well$as$ensuring$that$we$have$an$ effective$regulatory$framework,$we$recommend$that:$ $ The$ AEMC$ is$ tasked$ to$ undertake$ a$ cost_benefit$ assessment$ of$ the$ disclosure$ regulation$ currently$ aimed$ at$ protecting$ customers$ from$ excessive$ and/or$ unfair$ retail$fees$and$charges,$as$well$as$ensuring$that$consumers$can$obtain$all$information$ required$ to$ give$ explicit$ informed$ consent.$ This$ should$ then$ be$ compared$ to$ the$ costs$and$benefits$of$banning$these$fees$altogether.$$$$$$$ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

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ABC$News,$ANZ!class!action:!38,000!customers!take!bank!to!Federal!Court!over!fees$by$Amy$ Bainbridge,$2$December$2013$ $ AEMC,$2013!Residential!Electricity!Price!Trends,$Final$Report,$December$2013$$ ! AER,$Retail!Pricing!Information!Guideline,$Version$3,$June$2012$ $ AER,$State!of!the!Energy!Market!2013,$20$December$2013$

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AER,$Submission!on!National!Energy!Retail!Amendment!(Retailer!price!variations!in!market!retail! contracts)!Rule!2014,$23$March$2014$ $ AEMC,$2013!Residential!Electricity!Price!Trends,$Final$Report,$December$2013$$ $ Allens$and$NERA$Economic$Consulting,$Review!of!Enforcement!Regimes!under!the!National!Energy! Laws,$A$Report$Prepared$for$the$Standing$Council$on$Energy$and$Resources,$Draft,$15$August$2013*

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Carol$Biedrzycki,$Texas!Electricity!Consumers,!Beware!of!REP!Fees,$Texas$Ratepayers’$Organization$to$ Save$Energy,$August$2013$ $ Consumer$Action$Law$Centre$and$Consumer$Utilities$Advocacy$Centre,$Unilateral!Price!Variation!&! Market!Retail!Contracts!–!Rule!change!request!for!the!Australian!Energy!Market!Commission,!October! 2013! $ Gavin$Dufty$and$May$Mauseth$Johnston,$The!National!Energy!Market!–!in!a!bit!of!a!state?,$November$ 2012$ $ Gavin$Dufty$and$May$Mauseth$Johnston,$The!National!Energy!Market!–!Is!there!a!devil!in!the!retail?,$ December$2013$ $ Herald$Sun,$Former!Australian!Power!&!Gas!customers!owed!refunds!in!power!blunder$by$Karen$ Collier,$12$January$2014$ $ IPART,$Review!of!regulated!retail!tariffs!and!charges!for!electricity!2010T2013,$Final$report,$March$ 2010$ $ IPART,$Media$release,$Final!Report!on!early!termination!fees!for!electricity!contracts!for!small! customers,$16$December$2013$ $ IPART,$Early!Termination!Fees!–!Regulating!the!fees!charged!to!small!electricity!consumers!in!NSW,$ Final$Decision,$December$2013$ $ Maurice$Blackburn$Lawyers,$Banking!revolution!begins!with!landmark!Federal!Court!ruling,*Press$ Releases$and$Announcements,$5$February$2014$ $ St$Vincent$de$Paul$Society,$New!South!Wales!Energy!Prices!July!2011!–!July!2012,!An!Update!report!on! the!NSW!TariffTTracking!Project$by$May$Mauseth$Johnston,$August$2012!

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