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Translation of the Siemens AG Position Paper for the Public Consultation of the European Commission: “Towards a Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress” Register Number of Siemens AG: 4266797770-31

Contents

I. Introduction

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II. Siemens’ position in summary

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III. Siemens’ position in detail

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1. Europe-wide harmonization of mechanisms for collective redress is not necessary

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2. Only the state should be empowered to pursue interests beyond compensation for damages

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3. There is no legal basis for harmonization

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4. The Commission has not considered the interdependence of procedural and substantive law

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5. Economic consequences have not been analyzed

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6. System-abuse must be avoided

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IV. Siemens’ responses to the questions posed by the Commission

Brief vom

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Statement, dated April 12, 2011

I. Introduction 1

Siemens AG (“Siemens”) welcomes the opportunity to make a statement as part of the public consultation of the European Commission (“Commission”) on collective redress. Siemens commends the holistic approach of the consultation.

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Siemens also agrees with the Commission that effective redress must be ensured at all levels, in particular for consumers and small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs). Infringements must be punished and damage appropriately compensated for.

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However, the Commission has omitted from its consultation paper the most important question of all, namely whether additional mechanisms of collective redress are required at all at the European level. (For the individual questions, see IV. below). Because of this important omission, the Commission’s stated intention to decide on the matter after discussion seems half-hearted.1

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In this context, the most recent statement by European Commissioner for Competition Almunia suggests that collective redress is a foregone conclusion. On March 22, 2011, he made the following statement: “Finally, there is the collective redress issue. The public consultation runs until the end of April and the Commission will adopt a position on the common principles of collective redress by the end of the year. After this, in 2012, I intend to put forward a legislative initiative for private enforcement consistent with those principles.” (emphasis added)2

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The impression provided is that the results of the consultation are of secondary importance to the Commission and that a legislative initiative will be launched in any case for political reasons. Such an attitude is inconsistent with the whole purpose of the consultation procedure.

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Moreover, the supposedly clear intent of the Commission to avoid “American conditions” is not followed consistently by the Commission. In its Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress – Questions and Answers, the Commission already stated that there

1

http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/132&format=HTML&aged=0&language=DE&gui Language=en. 2 http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/11/197&format=HTML&aged=0&language= EN&guiLanguage=en. Seite 2 von 28


will be no “toxic cocktail,” i.e. the cumulative effect of “contingency fees,” “punitive damages,” “pre-trial discovery,” and “opt-out” system, in Europe.3 In the current consultation paper, the Commission has reiterated this statement.4 Nevertheless, many of the questions asked as part of the consultation seem to indicate that the Commission is considering at least some of the elements mentioned. It would seem from the consultation paper that the Commission is possibly under the impression that the stated elements are only likely to encourage abusive actions when all are combined. However, the contrary is true: each element individually provides a significant potential for abuse and could, if introduced, likely produce unforeseeable consequences in the existing legal system of the individual Member States.

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In the United States of America (United States), legislators did not even predict, let alone intend, the current abusive practice of compensatory class actions. Europe should learn the right lessons from this experience. Any weakening of the established, balanced continental European legal tradition in favor of speculative and abusive class actions must be avoided. It is rather advisable to strengthen mechanisms and institutions already existing in the Member States, where necessary.

II. Siemens’ position in summary 8

Neither new instruments of collective redress nor Europe-wide harmonization of instruments of collective redress are necessary. The studies presented by the Commission simply do not provide evidence that there is any need for European harmonization. Such need does not exist. Class actions are not a suitable means for achieving the objectives pursued by the Commission. Moreover, the sum of mechanisms for collective redress currently available in Germany take into account the important interests of consumers and seek an effective resolution of disputes, even in cases where damages to individual claimants are low. Countries that, unlike Germany, are about to introduce such mechanisms should first have the opportunity to initiate their own measures in line with the principle of subsidiarity. The harmonization efforts of the Commission risk interfering with the current dynamic processes in individual Member States. [III.1]

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Objectives beyond compensation for damage, such as deterrence and prevention, should only be enforced by the state. Using aggrieved individuals to implement state regulatory

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http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/08/741&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN Question 9. Seite 3 von 28


policy is the wrong approach.5 The existing system in Germany is efficient. Even if we assume that deterrence and prevention through private actions are legitimate goals, there is no proof that collective redress would be a greater deterrent. Rather, a system in which incentives are created for individuals to enforce state regulatory policy provides enormous potential for abuse. Furthermore, such a system would be incompatible with the German and European legal tradition. [III.2]

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The Commission lacks the legislative authority for such harmonization [III.3]. The Commission has also failed to consider the interdependence of procedural issues with substantive law [III.4]. Moreover, the Commission has also not sufficiently examined the economic consequences of introducing additional mechanisms of collective redress [III.5].

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Should the Commission conclude that a harmonized European standard of collective redress is necessary despite the arguments described above, the right approach should be to learn from the experience of the United States and to avoid abuse. The Commission should be cautious in removing purported obstacles to collective redress. Unrestricted access by plaintiff to the courts even with respect to frivolous actions would upset the balance between the interests of plaintiffs and defendants. The system should not create improper incentives for plaintiffs: the “loser-pays-rule” with respect to the costs of the proceedings must be retained. Another significant potential for abuse is the creation of improper incentives for lawyers. The floodgates should not be opened for frivolous litigation by the introduction of contingency fees and the development of a profitable litigation industry. As with respect to the choice between ”opt-in” or an “opt-out” model, it should be noted that “opt-out” models are incompatible with the German legal system, because they are believed to violate due process. [III.6]

III. Siemens’ position in detail 1. Europe-wide harmonization of mechanisms for collective redress is not necessary 12

The Commission has not provided any evidence that there is any need for a European harmonization of collective redress [a.] and such need does not exist. Class actions are not a suitable means to achieve the objectives pursued by the Commission [b.]. Moreover, the sum of mechanisms for collective redress currently available in Germany

4 5

http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/health_consumer/dgs_consultations/ca/docs/cr_consultation_paper_en.pdf , Para. 21. As already stated in the BDI Statement on the White Paper of the Commission dated July 14, 2008 A.1.2. Seite 4 von 28


take into account the important interests of consumers and seek an effective resolution of disputes, even in cases where damages to individual claimants are low [c.]. Countries that, unlike Germany, still have to introduce such mechanisms should first have the opportunity to initiate their own measures in line with the principle of subsidiarity [d.]. The harmonization efforts of the Commission risk interfering with the current dynamic processes in individual Member States [e.]. a. The Commission has not established a need for harmonization

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So far, the Commission has not proven a need for collective redress. Neither has the study “Evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of collective redress mechanisms in the EU”6 (study) provided clear proof of a need. On one hand, it is doubtful whether analysis of little more than four cases per year per country really provides a solid basis for assessing the effectiveness of collective redress in the EU.7 On the other hand, the study fails in decisive aspects in its attempt to present unequivocal and testable results. For example, the loss incurred by consumers due to the complete non-availability of collective redress in their country is specified as possibly being €2.1 million per year, although it is not excluded that the loss may be in the range from just over €1,000 to €64 million: “However, taking into account the experience with such mechanisms in the EU so far, this detriment is modest. For consumers as a whole across the 14 countries that do not have collective redress mechanisms, the loss of consumer welfare may be equal to around 2.1 million Euro per annum, though a range of outcomes from 1,352 Euro to 64 million Euro per annum is also possible”8 (emphasis added).

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The studies presented by the Commission simply do not provide evidence that deficiencies in relation to enforcement, particularly in reference to cross-border cases, would justify action at the European level. On the contrary: the study described above concludes that cross-border cases are only 10% of the total volume of claims.9 Such a far-reaching decision can and must not be made based on these findings.

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http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/finalreportevaluationstudypart1-final2008-11-26.pdf. See Evaluation by Deutlmoser/Weston: Status of Collective Redress in Germany – Expansion Uncalled for, ICLG TO: Class & GROUP ACTIONS 2010, p. 14 available at http://www.iclg.co.uk/khadmin/Publications/pdf/3160.pdf. 8 http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/finalreportevaluationstudypart1-final2008-11-26.pdf, p. 5. 7

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b. Collective redress is not suitable for achieving the Commission’s objectives

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The Commission overestimates the potential of collective redress. Collective redress will not achieve the stated goal of the Commission to compensate consumers more fairly. Experience in the United States has shown that less than half of the money awarded in lawsuits is actually received by the aggrieved parties. One reason for this is the enormous cost of administering the distribution of recoveries. Another reason is that a large part of the total compensation is paid to the lawyers with the result that the plaintiffs’ lawyers benefit especially from such litigation. The enormous costs of such litigation result in higher costs for businesses and have a knock-on effect on their product pricing so that, in economic terms, the consumers ultimately pay the legal costs. c. A Sufficient level of protection exists in Germany

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The level of protection in relation to collective redress is sufficient in Germany, as it is in many other Member States. One special aspect of German law is the model case litigation in the field of capital markets. German lawmakers have developed model case litigation to enable mass litigation to be processed without weakening the elementary procedural safeguards of German and European law. Factual and legal issues in comparable cases can be clarified in advance in model litigation before the Regional Appeal Court (Oberlandesgericht) with a binding result. This avoids the need for judges to rule on identical factual and legal issues repeatedly without endangering an individual’s right to due process by forcing the individual into a “class” categorization. Despite the recognized potential for improvement, the Capital Markets Model Case Act (KapMuG) demonstrates that effective collective redress is possible in conformity with the German and European legal tradition.

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The Commission has expressed its concern for the effective redress with respect to small individual claims (trivial or nominal damages or widely spread damages) of individuals. The Commission seems to believe that the protection of consumers and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) is insufficient if many parties are affected but the individual damage is low in each case. Studies commissioned by the Commission have shown that consumers usually only sue above a certain level of personal loss (Leuven study 2007: €50010, current Eurobarometer: €20011). Below this amount, litigation is

9

http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/finalreportevaluationstudypart1-final2008-11-26.pdf, p. 45. Leuven study (Final Report) available at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress/reports_studies/comparative_report_en.pdf.

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usually not pursued because of the expected legal costs. The Commission fears that businesses are using this fact at the expense of consumers. Siemens agrees with the Commission that such practices should not be permitted. Preventing such practices is not only good for consumer protection but also protects businesses operating ethically and competition. However, we strongly disagree with the Commission’s view that such practices cannot be effectively countered with the mechanisms already available.12

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There is no need for additional disciplinary measures. Illegal and unethical practice can be disciplined through existing regulatory, penal and administrative proceedings. The German authorities can impose fines and punish participants for their actions. Another means of countering illegal or unethical practice are actions brought by associations, such as consumer protection agencies. The Commission also overlooks the fact that warranty claims and possible reputational harm already have a significant disciplinary effect.

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The existing system is not limited to putting a stop to or punishing incorrect behavior. In the case of low individual loss, bundled claims for individual damage are also possible. In a special opt-in collective action, the “Einziehungsklage,” consumer protection organizations can accumulate and lodge the claims of a large number of consumers. Moreover, the aggrieved individuals can sell their claims for compensation to a litigation funding specialist/investor, who accumulates the claims and enforces them in court at its own risk and in its own name (“cement cartel” ruling of the German Federal Court of Justice (BGH)13).

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If the cost of joining (existing) collective litigation really is a large obstacle for the consumer (as this study implies), it is doubtful whether there is even any need for compensation in these cases. That is why the focus is more appropriately placed on action by the state in the case of trivial and petty damage and, where applicable, on the disgorgement of unfairly obtained profits rather than on compensation of individual

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Eurobarometer No. 343 (not yet published): According to this source, 48% of consumers will not sue if the damage is less than € 200, See Consultation Paper Para. 10, Fn. 10. 12 Former Minister of Justice Brigitte Zypries: [Translation:] “We are already well served in Germany. Initiatives of the EU give us cause to examine whether we have to change German law or whether, on the contrary, our law is not rather a suitable example for others to follow. We should not be too quick to denounce every new idea as “Americanization,” but it is a quality feature of law “made in Germany,” that businesses and consumers enjoy much more legal certainty than they do in the United States. This must continue to be the case.” Original German version available at http://www.1.rechtinfo.de/kapitalrechtinfo/archiv/texte_b/2008112651838373_Bundesjustizministerium_Sammelklage_Rechtsdurchsetzung.shtml. 13 BGH, order dated April 7, 2009 KZR 42/08 (OLG Düsseldorf) in GRUR-RR 2009, 319; OLG Düsseldorf, decision of May 14, 2008 VI U (Kart) 14/07, U (Kart) 14/07 in BeckRS 2008, 10947. Seite 7 von 28


consumers. Prosecution of such infringements by state authorities is the less expensive and more effective option for society as a whole. d. The Member States’ right of initiative must be respected

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Action by the Commission is incompatible with the principle of subsidiarity: Those Member States, in which there is a need for improvement, should be given the opportunity to make any necessary changes to their legal systems themselves. They can base these on existing schemes in other Member States and introduce schemes that are in keeping with their own legal tradition. The differences between the individual procedural systems of the Member States deserve respect and cannot be harmonized without serious consequences for civil procedure law in each state. Any changes that are made must be compatible with the system and based on existing law.

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A protection gap in individual countries need not be feared either. Investors have discovered the “European market” and are working autonomously across the national borders of the Member States, especially in the field of antitrust law. This can currently be observed, for example, in relation to the air cargo cartel. According to its own statements, Claims Funding International (CFI) has recently bundled the claims of aggrieved parties from 11 Member States worth more than €500 million. CFI has since filed a suit against Air France-KLM and Martinair in the Netherlands through the Equilib special purpose vehicle. According to a press statement14, CFI is bearing all costs in relation to the litigation in return for a contingency fee. e. The Commission should not stifle the dynamics of current national legal developments

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The Commission should not underestimate the dynamic nature of current legal developments. Many Member States have only just introduced new instruments of collective redress or are about to do so. For example, Italy and Poland have only recently introduced mechanisms of collective redress that also permit class actions. Belgium has set up an expert committee on the introduction of collective redress, which has produced draft legislation to this effect. Announcements of harmonization impede such processes and can even result in autonomous national efforts being slowed or halted. No Member State wants to have to modify its system soon after having introduced it to meet the

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http://www.claimsfunding.eu/fileadmin/Documents/Media_Release_for_Website.pdf. Seite 8 von 28


harmonization wishes of the EU. Another reason why the Commission should initially restrict itself to monitoring developments is that the threshold from which consumers throughout Europe bring claims before the courts has been shown by the current Eurobarometer figures to have fallen significantly over the past few years, namely from €500 (Leuven study 2007, see above) to €200. This seems to indicate that purported obstacles for consumers are coming down of their own accord and that the existing systems are increasingly being accepted by consumers. This also shows that implementation of novel mechanisms takes time. Existing instruments can only be efficiently fully utilized with the relevant information, experience and familiarization. In this situation, forcing new instruments on individual states without having sufficiently examined and monitored the effects of existing or newly introduced systems and their suitability over a meaningful period is counterproductive. The consequence will not be improvement in the level of protection but uncertainty for those seeking redress. 2. Only the state should be empowered to pursue interests beyond compensation for damages 24

The aggrieved party is adequately protected by the possibility of claiming compensation for his or her own loss. No further interest of the aggrieved party is apparent. Using aggrieved individuals to implement state regulatory policy is the wrong approach. The existing system in Germany is efficient. There is no proof that collective redress would be a greater deterrent [a.]. Rather, considerable disadvantages are to be feared. A system in which incentives are created for individuals to enforce state regulatory policy provides enormous potential for abuse [b.]. Furthermore, such a system would be incompatible with the German and European legal tradition [c.]. a. Collective redress does not increase deterrence

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The Commission takes the view that supervisory authorities are unable to handle the current development and that there is a need for “a more decentralized enforcement of EU law […],” i.e. “private enforcement of EU law15.”

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This must be challenged. In Germany, at least, prosecution under criminal law and other state mechanisms work. There is no reason to mingle public supervision with the enforcement of private compensation suits or to use private individuals and businesses as “auxiliary agents of the state.”

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Consultation Paper, Para. 3 f. Seite 9 von 28


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There is no reason to suppose that this traditional separation causes any disadvantage for consumers. To our knowledge, there is no testable study that proves that collective redress on the American model would be a greater deterrent than penalties imposed by public bodies.

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However, even if it were proven that the existing system does not provide adequate protection, the natural approach would be to strengthen existing systems before considering the adoption of a foreign concept large parts of which are incompatible with the procedural principles of various European legal systems and that has the potential to damage the economy considerably.

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The Commission has also failed to consider that the introduction of additional mechanisms of collective redress will likely shift alleged excessive workloads on authorities to the courts. Collective redress results in more lawsuits due to the incentive for plaintiffs’ lawyers to earn fees and therefore to a greater workload for the courts. b. Danger of abuse

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Because of the extensive publicity, companies are likely to become victims of abuse and suffer considerable losses arising from collective actions (ranging from falling stock prices when such litigation is made public to bankruptcy) and, as experience with US class actions has shown, to force them to settle out of court even with respect to claims without merit, simply to avoid litigation costs. Even when compensation awards are extremely large, it has been statistically proven that the instrument does not meet its real purpose: only a small part of the compensation actually paid is received by the aggrieved parties. The greater part is spent on administering the payment procedures and on the contingency fees of the lawyers.16

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The results of some studies on class actions in the US are noteworthy in this respect:

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Between 70 and 90 % of all US class actions were settled out of court.17

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About 35 % of issuer firms faced with a class action file for bankruptcy.18

16

As already stated in the BDI Statement on the White Paper of the Commission dated July 14, 2008 C.1.b. Rupert Bellinghausen, Linklaters, in Handelsblatt 24.07.08, supplement Legal Success, p. 19, quoted according to Deutscher Industrie- und Handelskammertag (DIHK): Sammelklagen – Ein einheitlicher Referenzrahmen available at http://www.muenchen.ihk.de/mike/ihk_geschaeftsfelder/recht/Anhaenge/Forderungen-derWirtschaft.pdf. 17

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Only about 36% of the compensation paid is actually received by the aggrieved parties with a much greater part going to the plaintiffs’ lawyers.19

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In the case of products that are particularly prone to litigation, insurance premiums make up 20% of the price of the product.20 The costs of insurance for large US companies are six times greater than in Europe.21 In economic terms, these costs are ultimately borne by the consumer.

c. The pursuit of interests beyond the competition for damages by private parties is incompatible with the German and European legal tradition

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That goals beyond compensation for damages are enforced by private individuals is incompatible with the German and largely also with the European22 legal tradition whereby the supervision of businesses is the task of public authorities and not of the individuals affected.

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This legal tradition should not be abandoned unnecessarily. The value judgment behind this tradition must be preserved. Unlike private claimants, state authorities have a duty to the wellbeing of the state and society as a whole. The interests of individuals, by contrast, do not necessarily coincide with the general interests of society. For this reason alone, private parties should be restricted to enforcing their own damage claims, not those of society as well. Enforcement of public policy objectives should remain in the hands of state authorities and not be left to the personal interests of plaintiffs’ lawyers.

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Although not explicitly addressed by the Commission in the consultation, it is worth taking a brief look at the concept of punitive damages in this context. The statements of the Directorate-General for Health and Consumer Protection continue to be a cause for concern. According to “Benchmarks” 2008, there is no intention to introduce punitive

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Study of the Stanford Law School entitled “Securities Class Actions Settlements 2006, Review and Analysis” available at http://securities.stanford.edu/Settlements/REVIEW_1995-2006/Settlements_Through_12_2006.pdf, p. 14. 19 Prof. Westerholt, paper given March 17, 2006 at IHK Frankfurt/M, quoted in DIHK: Sammelklagen – Ein einheitlicher Referenzrahmen available at http://www.muenchen.ihk.de/mike/ihk_geschaeftsfelder/recht/Anhaenge/Forderungen-der-Wirtschaft.pdf. 20 Prof. Westerholt, paper given March 17, 2006 at IHK Frankfurt/M, quoted in DIHK: Sammelklagen – Ein einheitlicher Referenzrahmen available at http://www.muenchen.ihk.de/mike/ihk_geschaeftsfelder/recht/Anhaenge/Forderungen-der-Wirtschaft.pdf 21 Commission on Capital Markets Regulation, Interim Report (2006), p. 78. 22 Joint statement of the Mouvement des Entreprises de France (“MEDEF”), the BDI, Economiesuisse, the European Banking Federation (“EBF”), the Swiss Bankers Association (“SBA”), and the Institute of International Bankers (the “IIB”) to the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), p. 5, Fn. 25 with reference to John C. Coffee, Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 229, 266-67 (2007) available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-617/4617-46.pdf; PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 2008 Securities Litigation Study 53 (2009). Seite 11 von 28


damages on the US model, but the Directorate-General plainly views the punitive overcompensation of plaintiffs sympathetically: “The compensation to be provided by traders/service providers against whom actions have been successfully brought should be at least equal to the harm caused by the incriminated conduct, but should not be excessive as for instance to amount to punitive damages.”23 (emphasis added)

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The points made above should preclude any intermediate step on the dangerous path to punitive damages. Such a set of instruments increases the incentive for abusive litigation. 3. There is no legal basis for harmonization

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The Commission has so far failed to explain the legal basis on which harmonization would be undertaken. The Commission has no competence for incisive changes to civil procedure law and substantive law of the Member States. 4. The Commission has not considered the interdependence of procedural and substantive law

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In its current stance, the Commission has failed to consider the interdependence of substantive law with procedural law. However, the interdependence of substantive law with procedural law is of decisive importance, especially, in collective redress. This is apparent in the United states: with respect to securities, US class actions are not only problematical because of the procedural aspects described above. Rather, certain areas of substantive law can also raise issues, for example, the rebuttable presumption that investors were damaged by the drop in stock prices simply because the market is believed to operate efficiently (“fraud on the market” theory), is a significant catalyst for class actions. This theory permits de facto a collective decision of the case for or against the entire class without any need for the individual to prove his or her claim. It is clear that different substantive law standards in the individual Member States, for example, with respect to proof of causation and presumption of culpability, will result in large differences in the application of collective redress. The result, however, should not be an attempt to harmonize substantive law. That is neither necessary nor does the legislative authority to do so exist at the EU level. Rather the Commission should refrain completely from an EU initiative in the field of collective redress.

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Benchmarks available at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/collective_redress_en.htm#Benchmarks. Seite 12 von 28


5. Economic consequences have not been analyzed 38

As has already been demanded of the ECJ in its application of the law, in the field of legislation, it is all the more important that the Commission carefully examine the economic consequences of its actions before it acts. It has so far failed to do so. 6. System-abuse must be avoided

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Should the Commission conclude that a harmonized European standard of collective redress is necessary and permissible despite the arguments set forth above, the correct approach would be to learn from the experience of the United States and to avoid abuse. Caution should be exercised in removing purported hurdles to class actions. Unfettered access by plaintiffs to the courts for abusive actions would upset the balance between the interests of plaintiffs and defendants. One of the most significant factors leading to abuse is the creation of absolutely risk-free access to the courts for plaintiffs: The loser pays rule where the loser bears the costs of the proceedings must be preserved [a.]. Another significant factor leading to abuse is an improper financial incentive for lawyers: The door to abusive litigation funding and a profitable litigation industry must not be flung wide open by the introduction of contingency fees [b.]. As for the choice between an “opt-in” and an “opt-out” model, it must be pointed out that “opt-out” models are incompatible with the German legal system because they violate the right to be heard [c.]. In relation to collective redress, in particular, the obligation to disclose documents (“discovery”) is a critical factor. Above all, in conjunction with discovery, collective redress provides enormous potential for extortion given the enormous costs and time involved. Moreover, a remedy must be found for the resulting threat to company and business secrets. [d.] a. The loser must pay the costs of the litigation

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The principle according to which the loser must pay the costs of the litigation acts as an important threshold against abusive actions. This threshold is essential, especially in connection with mass litigation and the resulting high defense costs. It is patently unfair to expect a defendant improperly forced into litigation to also bear the costs of its own defense, which can be considerable.

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It is not necessary to weaken the loser pays rule to ensure effective legal protection for consumers with small damage claims. Not every purported hurdle to obtaining Seite 13 von 28


compensation should be removed as a matter of regulatory policy. Many rules, including the loser pays rule, are based on the fundamental value judgments of the applicable legal system. Effective legal enforcement does not require unfettered access to the courts even for abusive actions. On the contrary, each consumer must conduct an economic viability analysis. If the claim is substantiated and viable, consumers discouraged by the costs of an individual lawsuit can contact a consumer protection organization, to attempt an opt-in collective action (Einziehungsklage). Alternately, they can assign their damage claims. The fact that both the consumer protection organization and the purchaser of such claims first conduct an economic viability analysis is not an unfair obstacle to obtaining justice but a useful threshold to filter out baseless and unmeritorious actions.

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Unrestricted access to the courts is neither necessary nor advisable. Unrestricted access would result in tax-based financing for abusive actions, to the detriment of the defendants involved and society at large. b. Contingency fees should not be permitted

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In Germany, as in most other “civil law” countries24, contingency fees are generally not allowed. Europeans are rightly critical of a system that gives plaintiffs’ lawyers incentives to pursue speculative actions to force the defendant to settle out of court using the threat of costly litigation.

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The well-reasoned general rule not permitting contingency fees does not constitute an unreasonable obstacle for consumers. First, plaintiffs in Germany have access to legal aid if they do not have the means to pay for a lawsuit themselves. Second, the general prohibition against contingency fees does not apply if a plaintiff would be unable to pursue an action without such an agreement (§ 4a Sec. 1 Attorneys’ Fees Act, RVG). Third, plaintiffs currently have access to the existing litigation financing options. As explained above, the fact that an economic viability analysis may have to be conducted before funding is obtained is not an unreasonable restriction on effective redress. Funding models that go beyond the existing system do not promote effective redress. The overemphasis on consumer rights is not the appropriate way of ensuring effective redress but permits abusive litigation without real substance. If an action is not worth bringing within the framework of existing collective redress mechanisms or if a consumer

24

See also joint statement of the Mouvement des Entreprises de France (“MEDEF”), the BDI, Economiesuisse, the European Banking Federation (“EBF”), the Swiss Bankers Association (“SBA”) and the Institute of International Bankers (the “IIB”) to the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), p. 6 Fn. 40 with further reference. Seite 14 von 28


is not willing to take a small risk, there is arguably no real need for individual redress in that instance. c. Opt-out models are incompatible with the German and European legal systems

45

The German Basic Law and the European Convention on Human Rights ensure an individual right to justice. However, this basic right also includes passive protection: the individual must not unwittingly or unwillingly be made a party to (civil) proceedings. In an opt-out model, each potentially aggrieved party is automatically subject to the legal force of a judgment or out-of-court settlement unless he or she first explicitly opts out of a class once that class has been admitted. The passive protection of the right to justice dictates that an individual not lose his or her right by means of such an automatic mechanism. Such an automatic mechanism is equivalent to private “expropriation” of the claim. This shows that an “opt-out” solution is incompatible with the German legal system.

46

Accordingly, a mechanism for collective redress should not be established at the expense of the principle of individual redress. The right of the individual and his or her individual claim must not in any way be replaced by the claim of the “class,” as can often be observed in the United States. Class compensation could result in compensation for speculative or punitive damages, which would violate German legal principles. Only damages actually incurred are compensable. d. US-style discovery should not be adopted

47

The Commission has not only omitted from its questions the issue of punitive damages but also that of discovery. Nevertheless, we will briefly set forth our position with respect to discovery, which is an essential element of the “toxic cocktail.” Particularly, if the discovery mentioned by the Commission were permitted, the “potential for extortion” through speculative litigation would increase significantly because of the exploding legal costs and resulting increase of improper financial incentives for plaintiffs’ lawyers to bring unmeritorious actions. Indeed, the US Supreme Court has confirmed the potential abuse created by (pre-trial) discovery:

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“extensive discovery and the potential for uncertainty and disruption in a [securities class action] lawsuit allow plaintiffs with weak claims to extort settlements from innocent companies.”25

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Discovery is also incompatible with the continental European legal tradition of “civil law” Member States. The general disclosure of all relevant documents is an element peculiar to common law. In most Member States, plaintiffs must present their claims with detailed evidentiary support. If the defendant is forced to produce “categories of documents” that may be relevant to the claim according to plaintiff's discovery request, pleading standards would likely be reduced and the plaintiff would no longer be obligated to substantiate his or her claim in detail. Such a rule would clearly result in “fishing expeditions” that the European Commission has clearly indicated it would like to avoid. The European Commission should not permit U.S.-style cases, such as Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. Ltd., where the defendant was required to produce 35 million documents, to proceed in Europe.26

49

The development of discovery in the United States was accompanied by the development of mechanisms to protect confidential documents and documents requiring special protection. A similar development has not taken place in Europe because it was not necessary. Without discovery, there was no need to protect confidential documents from access by the opposing party in civil litigation. In the United States, business or trade secrets, which are extremely important to businesses and crucial for their survival, can be protected by court order. The recipient of a discovery request can request a protective order from the court that, if granted, can release it from the obligation to produce particular documents or order the recipient of the documents to ensure the confidential treatment of the documents received. In addition, common law legal systems recognize categories of privileged documents that are generally not discoverable.

50

The protection mechanisms for confidential documents produced in civil litigation is still underdeveloped in Europe. In the view of the Commission, a specific weighing of legal interests against the discovery interest of the plaintiff should be conducted on a case-bycase basis. However, this would not provide sufficient protection if an instrument comparable to US-style discovery were to be introduced.

25 26

US Supreme Court Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 772 (2008). See BDI statement on the White Paper of the Commission dated July 14, 2008 B.2.c with further reference. Seite 16 von 28


51

A further point is the protection of correspondence between an attorney and his or her client. The correspondence, including with in-house lawyers, is subject to an extraordinary level of protection in the United States. Unfortunately the situation within the EU, in particular, with respect to protection of correspondence with in-house lawyers is unclear. In the field of antitrust law, the ECJ rejects the attorney-client privilege for correspondence with in-house lawyers. There is therefore a considerable danger that (pre-trial) discovery would be even more far-reaching than in the United States due to the lack of a level of protection comparable with that in the United States, although the Commission does not actually want to create American conditions in Europe. The protection of company and business secrets and attorney-client correspondence (including with in-house lawyers) should therefore be ensured in any event. In any case, documents should not be disclosed to the parties to the proceedings but only to the judge.

IV. Siemens’ responses to the questions posed by the Commission 1. What added value would the introduction of new mechanisms of collective redress (injunctive and/or compensatory) have for the enforcement of EU law?

52

The suggestive way in which the questions have been framed – that collective redress in Europe is a foregone conclusion – is disappointing. The most important question, namely, whether there is even a need to introduce new mechanisms of collective redress at the European level, has been completely overlooked. This is at odds with the Commission’s intent articulated before the consultation - that the discussion will be open-ended, including as to whether new instruments of collective redress are needed at all: “The outcome of the public consultation is open […] The final decision on whether new EU legislation is needed will be based on the consultation’s outcome […]”27 (emphasis added).

53

The answer to the question as to whether new mechanisms of collective redress are needed at the European level is “no” (see Para. No. 12 et seq.). New mechanisms of collective redress would provide no discernable added value (see Para. No. 25 et seq.). On the contrary, Siemens firmly believes that their introduction would wreak havoc on Member State legal systems and promote abusive litigation (see Para. No. 23, 30f.).

27

http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/132&format=HTML&aged=0&language=DE&gu iLanguage=en. Seite 17 von 28


2. Should private collective redress be independent of, complementary to, or subsidiary to enforcement by public bodies? Is there need for coordination between private collective redress and public enforcement? If yes, how can this coordination be achieved? In your view, are there examples in the Member States or in third countries that you consider particularly instructive for any possible EU initiative?

54

Enforcement by public bodies and private legal action target different interests and goals. Public bodies act to protect public interests. Private legal actions seek to promote individual interests. As a result, they should be kept separate. Goals beyond compensation for damage, such as deterrence or prevention, should only be enforced by the state (see Para. No. 24 et seq.). However, excessive penalties must be avoided. Compensation payments to aggrieved parties should always be considered in penalty assessments by public bodies (even at a later date). For example, there is no need for further disgorgement of profit if the profit has already been completely disgorged by compensation payments to the aggrieved parties. 3. Should the EU strengthen the role of national public bodies and/or private representative organizations in the enforcement of EU law? If so, how and in which areas should this be done?

55

The instruments available in Germany already guarantee effective redress even when the value of individual claims is low. No further strengthening is required (see Para. No. 16 et seq.). Both public institutions (opt-in collective action) and private organizations (assignment of claims) provide aggrieved parties a mechanism for obtaining justice without great financial costs as part of collective litigation.

56

The same applies with respect to other Member States. There is no need for strengthening the level of protection at the EU level. In line with the principle of subsidiarity, the first step should be to respect the Member States’ own right of initiative (see Para. No. 21 f.) and not to impede the current dynamic process at the national level (see Para. No. 23). 4. What in your opinion is required for an action at European level on collective redress (injunctive and/or compensatory) to conform with the principles of EU law,

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e.g. those of subsidiarity, proportionality and effectiveness? Would your answer vary depending on the area in which action is taken?

57

The principles of subsidiarity, proportionality, and effectiveness do not support an EU initiative. On the contrary, they require restraint on the part of the Commission. Member States should establish their own mechanisms within the frameworks of their own legal systems, if necessary (see Para. No. 21 f.).

58

Before an EU initiative is introduced in this area, a need must be clearly ascertained, the interdependence with procedural and substantive law should be carefully considered (see Para. No. 37), and the economic consequences of an initiative must be examined (see Para. No. 38). However, no legal basis appears to exist for an initiative by the Commission (see Para. No. 36). 5. Would it be sufficient to extend the scope of the existing EU rules on collective injunctive relief to other areas; or would it be appropriate to introduce mechanisms of collective compensatory redress at EU level?

59

Neither the extension of collective injunctive relief nor the introduction of collective compensatory redress is necessary. 6. Would possible EU action require a legally binding approach or a non-binding approach (such as guidance in the form of a set of good practices)? How do you see the respective benefits or risks of each approach? Would your answer vary depending on the area in which action is taken?

60

An EU initiative is not necessary. At most, a non-binding recommendation should be considered, irrespective of the area of law. A binding initiative would clearly result in a violation of the subsidiarity principle, which puts responsibility with each individual Member State, and would disrupt the current dynamics at the national level (see answer to Question 3 above). A non-binding recommendation with a relevant evaluation of existing procedures in other Member States could be of assistance to Member States that have not yet introduced instruments of collective legal redress with the introduction of their own mechanisms. However, this could also be achieved by coordination of the individual states among themselves without any action on the part of the Commission.

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7. Do you agree that any possible EU initiative on collective redress (injunctive and/or compensatory) should comply with a set of common principles established at EU level? What should these principles be? To which principle would you attach special significance?

61

An EU initiative at the European level is not necessary. There is also no need to harmonize existing national systems. Instead, the Member States should have the opportunity to achieve the corresponding level of protection in a manner that fits each of their national legal systems.

62

If the Commission nevertheless favors an EU initiative, it must ensure that US-style conditions are avoided. The loser-pays rule, where the loser bears the costs of the proceedings, must be preserved. Also, the Commission must consider the problems associated with creating financial incentives for lawyers. The door to abusive funding of litigation and the development of a litigation industry should not be flung wide open by the introduction of contingency fees. As for the choice between an “opt-in” and an “opt-out” model, it should be noted that “opt-out” models are incompatible with the German legal system because they violate the right to be heard. In connection with collective redress, in particular, the obligation to disclose documents (“discovery”) is a critical factor. Discovery in connection with collective redress provides enormous potential for abuse and “extortion” because of the tremendous costs associated with discovery . Moreover, any introduction of discovery needs to be accompanied by strengthened protection against the new threats to trade and business secrets. (see Para. No. 39 et seq.)

63

Any action by the Commission must also ensure that the effectiveness of leniency programs, which have been very successful, especially in connection with antitrust law, is not undermined. Information that is obtained as part of investigations by authorities and in connection with the leniency program should not be disclosed for collective redress actions in connection with private actions because the incentive to make use of the leniency program would be significantly decreased.. 8. As cited above, a number of Member States have adopted initiatives in the area of collective redress. Could the experience gained so far by the Member States contribute to formulating a European set of principles?

64

It is appropriate to monitor and evaluate the mechanisms introduced so far and to draw conclusions from them and from the US experience with abusive class actions. The Seite 20 von 28


current dynamic development processes merit restraint by the Commission and the avoidance of premature initiatives. Most of the mechanisms have only been in place for a few years; some have only just been introduced. Their effectiveness can therefore not yet be adequately evaluated. Accordingly, a European “set of principles” cannot yet be formulated on that basis (see Para. No. 23). 9. Are there specific features of any possible EU initiative that, in your opinion, are necessary to ensure effective access to justice while taking due account of the EU legal tradition and the legal orders of the 27 Member States?

65

There is already effective access to the courts. Member States that have not yet introduced mechanisms of collective redress should be given the opportunity to introduce such mechanisms themselves in conformity with their individual legal systems. 10. Are you aware of specific good practices in the area of collective redress in one or more Member States that could serve as inspiration from which the EU/other Member States could learn? Please explain why you consider these practices particularly valuable. Are there on the other hand national practices that have posed problems and how have/could these problems be overcome?

66

One special aspect of German law is the model case litigation in the area of capital markets. German lawmakers have developed model case litigation to enable mass litigation to be processed without weakening the elementary procedural safeguards of German and European law. Factual and legal issues in comparable cases can be clarified

in

advance

in

model

litigation

before

the

Regional

Appeal

Court

(Oberlandesgericht) with a binding result. This avoids the need for judges to rule on identical factual and legal issues again without substituting the individual’s right to be heard with a “class” Proceeding. Despite the acknowledged potential for improvement, the Capital Markets Model Case Act (KapMuG) demonstrates that effective collective redress is possible in conformity with German and European legal traditions.

67

The German ombudsman system in the insurance business also merits further examination. At little or no cost to the consumer, the ombudsman attempts to arbitrate disputes between consumers and insurance companies in, for example, special areas of insurance, and thus provides an appealing alternative to judicial proceedings. The important aspect is that the ombudsman acts without an economic interest of his own.

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11. In your view, what would be the defining features of an efficient and effective system of collective redress? Are there specific features that need to be present if the collective redress mechanism were open to SMEs?

68

Collective

redress

should,

where

not

already

possible,

make

possible

the

commencement of actions in cases that would otherwise not be economically viable, provided that such an action is absolutely necessary to enforce the rights of the aggrieved party and that sufficient safeguards are in place to prevent abuse. 12. How can effective redress be obtained, while avoiding lengthy and costly litigation?

69

Effective redress can be provided, for example, through the use of administrative agencies, avoiding the necessity of lengthy and costly litigation. If necessary, the resources allocated for such agencies could be increased. In any case, the creation of a profitable litigation industry must be avoided. Appropriate redress, i.e. purely in the interest of the aggrieved party, is only possible if no economic incentives are created for third parties. Otherwise, litigation is not conducted as efficiently as possible, but rather, in a manner that will maximize the recovery by third parties. 13. How, when and by whom should victims of EU law infringements be informed about the possibilities to bring a collective (injunctive and/or compensatory) claim or to join an existing lawsuit? What would be the most efficient means to make sure that a maximum of victims are informed, in particular when victims are domiciled in several Member States?

70

Naturally, effective redress is only possible if the aggrieved parties are informed. At the same time, the potential for abuse of such information should be limited. In the United States, it is one of the tools of the trade for any successful class action lawyer to exert public pressure on the company being sued with some well-aimed PR work. Frequently, the reputation of the company being sued is harmed by the search for potential plaintiffs, irrespective of actual culpability or the outcome of the lawsuit. Stanford University examined 224 US class actions that were ongoing in 2002 and found a decline of almost 2 billion dollars in the post-suit stock market value of the defendants examined.28 This

28

(Rupert Bellinghausen, Linklaters, in Handelsblatt July 24, 2008, supplement Legal Success, p. 19, quoted according to Deutscher Industrie- und Handelskammertag (DIHK): Sammelklagen – Ein einheitlicher Referenzrahmen available at http://www.muenchen.ihk.de/mike/ihk_geschaeftsfelder/recht/Anhaenge/Forderungen-der-Wirtschaft.pdf). Seite 22 von 28


highlights the abuse potential by creating situations that force companies to settle out of court even in cases without merit, simply as a form of damage control. It is therefore crucial that the information for potentially aggrieved consumers is objective and not sensational. Defamation or prejudgment of the defendants must be avoided. In cases where plaintiffs and their lawyers disseminate false, ambiguous, highly biased and defamatory information or instigate boycotts against target defendants, the prejudice to the defendant outweighs the value of press reporting. The Commission should ensure that improper or irresponsible publicity practices can also be punished.

71

In cases brought under the German Capital Markets Model Case Act (KapMuG), the “elektronischer Bundesanzeiger” (Electronic Federal Herald) has proven a useful tool. There, anyone can retrieve the current status of individual cases and download (interim) decisions for all ongoing litigation. 14. How could the efficient representation of victims be best achieved, in particular in

cross-border

situations?

How

could

cooperation

between

different

representative entities be facilitated, in particular in cross-border cases?

72

The Commission has not established that a deficiency exists in connection with efficient representation of victims, particularly in cross-border cases. The contrary seems to be demonstrated by models in which investors can claim damages in cross-border situations (see Para. No. 22). 15. Apart from a judicial mechanism, which other incentives would be necessary to promote recourse to ADR in situations of multiple claims?

73

The establishment of an ombudsman mechanism as described above would be helpful. An ombudsman mechanism would provide low or no cost redress. The most important aspect of any such mechanism, however, is that no individual economic interest is created for the neutral. 16. Should an attempt to resolve a dispute via collective consensual dispute resolution be a mandatory step in connection with a collective court case for compensation?

74

For trivial or nominal disputes, an collective consensual dispute resolution procedure could be a mandatory first step. However, in cases where the dispute involves significant Seite 23 von 28


monetary amounts, an out-of-court settlement may not be a realistic possibility. The mandatory use of collective consensual dispute resolution may actually delay or draw out the resolution of the dispute, which also creates an abuse potential. Any collective consensual dispute resolution procedure should contain safeguards against abuse. 17. How can the fairness of the outcome of a collective consensual dispute resolution best be guaranteed? Should the courts exercise such fairness control?

75

Courts should not exercise fairness control over the outcome of a collective consensual dispute resolution. First, such a fairness control would considerably diminish the appeal of amicable settlement. One of the main advantages of an out-of-court settlement is that a final decision can be reached quickly. It is questionable whether a party would agree to an out-of-court settlement if it needs to be approved by a court. The settlement is not final and may not be approved by the court. Second, such an institution is based on the assumption that the parties cannot reach a decision responsibly. This would not be compatible with the German understanding of the autonomy of the parties. There is also no need for automatic control. The potential for abuse is already limited by the right of each party to contest unconscionable settlements before a court. 18. Should it be possible to make the outcome of a collective consensual dispute resolution binding on the participating parties also in cases which are currently not covered by Directive 2008/52/EC on certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters?

76

Yes. But only on those parties who actively participated in the dispute resolution and not on the entire “class.” 19. Are there any other issues with regard to collective consensual dispute resolution that need to be ensured for effective access to justice?

77

No further issues are currently apparent (see above). 20. How could the legitimate interests of all parties adequately be safeguarded in (injunctive and/or compensatory) collective redress actions? Which safeguards existing in Member States or in third countries do you consider as particularly successful in limiting abusive litigation?

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78

The loser pays rule must be retained. Moreover, the risk of creating improper financial incentives for lawyers must be carefully considered. The door to abusive funding of litigation and the development of a litigation industry must not be flung wide open by the introduction of contingency fees. As for the choice between an “opt-in” and an “opt-out” model, it should be noted that “opt-out” models are incompatible with the German legal system because they violate the individual’s right to be heard. In connnection with collective redress, in particular, the obligation to disclose documents (“discovery”) is a critical factor. Discovery in connection with collective redress provides enormous potential for abuse and “extortion” because of the tremendous costs associated with discovery. Moreover, any introduction of discovery needs to be accompanied by strengthened protection against new threats to trade and business secrets. (see Para. No. 39 et seq.) Punitive damages are also not compatible with the German and European legal tradition (see Para. No. 32 et seq.). 21. Should the "loser pays" principle apply to (injunctive and/or compensatory) collective actions in the EU? Are there circumstances which in your view would justify exceptions to this principle? If so, should those exceptions rigorously be circumscribed by law or should they be left to case-by-case assessment by the courts, possibly within the framework of a general legal provision?

79

Yes. The “loser pays” principle must be retained without exception to avoid abuse (see Para. No. 40-42). 22. Who should be allowed to bring a collective redress action? Should the right to bring a collective redress action be reserved for certain entities? If so, what are the criteria to be fulfilled by such entities? Please mention if your reply varies depending on the kind of collective redress mechanism and on the kind of victims (e.g. consumers or SMEs).

80

Only aggrieved parties should be entitled to bring collective redress. Any other parties (e.g., lawyers) should not be permitted to pursue their own personal financial interests by bringing or instigating collective actions. 23. What role should be given to the judge in collective redress proceedings? Where representative entities are entitled to bring a claim, should these entities be recognized as representative entities by a competent government body or should this issue be left to a case-by-case assessment by the courts? Seite 25 von 28


81

To ensure legal certainty, a competent government body should recognize the representative entities. 24. Which other safeguards should be incorporated in any possible European initiative on collective redress?

82

Only state bodies and authorized entities should be entitled to bring collective actions. Safeguards must, however, be put in place to ensure that such state bodies or authorized entities do not pursue their own financial interests. 25. How could funding for collective redress actions (injunctive and/or compensatory) be arranged in an appropriate manner, in particular in view of the need to avoid abusive litigation?

83

Increasing the methods available to fund collective redress actions will inevitably result in in a considerably increased potential for abuse because of the resulting system of additional financial incentives (see Para. No. 43, 44). If the individual Member States come to the conclusion that aggrieved parties within their jurisdiction are discouraged from bringing meritorious actions by the associated litigation risk or high costs, they are each free to lower the filing fees or provide legal aid to aggrieved parties to the extent necessary to obtain justice. It is not the task of the Commission to ensure unfettered access to the courts without individual risk. 26. Are non-public solutions of funding (such as third party funding or legal costs insurance)

conceivable

which would

ensure

the

right

balance

between

guaranteeing access to justice and avoiding any abuse of procedure?

84

The existing system in Germany ensures that every action be subjected to an economic viability analysis before it is filed. This is necessary and appropriate to avoid the commencement of abusive actions. Funding models that go beyond the existing system cease to be oriented towards effective redress. The overemphasis on consumer rights is not an appropriate way of ensuring effective redress. On the contrary, it makes abusive, unmeritorious litigation feasible. If an action is not worth bringing within the framework of existing systems of collective redress or if a consumer is not willing to take a small risk, there is clearly no real need for redress. (see Para. No. 43, 44.)

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27. Should representative entities bringing collective redress actions be able to recover the costs of proceedings, including their administrative costs, from the losing party? Alternatively, are there other means to cover the costs of representative entities?

85

Yes. That is already the case in Germany. State funding of the representative entities is also conceivable. 28. Are there any further issues regarding funding of collective redress that should be considered to ensure effective access to justice?

86

No further issues are currently apparent. 29. Are there to your knowledge examples of specific cross-border problems in the practical application of the jurisdiction, recognition or enforcement of judgments? What consequences did these problems have and what counter-strategies were ultimately found?

87

Basically, the same jurisdictional problems arise as in the case of individual actions with respect to the applicability of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001. With regard to the enforceability of decisions in Member States, it is worth noting that German courts will probably not enforce decisions made based on an opt-out procedure because it would violate the public policy doctrine (see Para. No. 45, 46). 30. Are special rules on jurisdiction, recognition, enforcement of judgments and /or applicable law required with regard to collective redress to ensure effective enforcement of EU law across the EU?

88

No. The general rules of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 apply. 31. Do you see a need for any other special rules with regard to collective redress in cross-border situations, for example for collective consensual dispute resolution or for infringements of EU legislation by online providers for goods and services?

89

No. The level of protection is already sufficient.

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32. Are there any other common principles which should be added by the EU?

90

The relevant principles have already been described above (see Para. No. 32 and 39ff.). 33. Should the Commission’s work on compensatory collective redress be extended to other areas of EU law besides competition and consumer protection? If so, to which ones? Are there specificities of these areas that would need to be taken into account?

91

No, not based on our current view. 34. Should any possible EU initiative on collective redress be of general scope, or would it be more appropriate to consider initiatives in specific policy fields?

92

There is no need for an EU initiative. If the Commission nevertheless intends to introduce an initiative, it should be uniform and there should not be different solutions for different policy fields.

April 12, 2010 Contacts: Felix A. Gloeckner, Phone +49 (0)89 636 33049, [email protected] Dr. Boris Kasten, Phone +49 (0)89 636 32730, [email protected] Maximilian Reichert, Phone +49 (0)89 636 34675, [email protected] Paul Salazar, Phone +49 (0)89 636 36258, [email protected]

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