BOOK REVIEWS FIXING STATUTORY INTERPRETATION JUDGING STATUTES. By Robert A. Katzmann. Oxford University Press. 2014. Pp. xi, 171. $24.95.
New York, N.Y.:
Reviewed by Brett M. Kavanaugh∗ Statutory interpretation has improved dramatically over the last generation, thanks to the extraordinary influence of Justice Scalia.1 Statutory text matters much more than it once did. If the text is sufficiently clear, the text usually controls.2 The text of the law is the law. As Justice Kagan recently stated, “we’re all textualists now.”3 By emphasizing the centrality of the words of the statute, Justice Scalia brought about a massive and enduring change in American law. But more work remains. As Justice Scalia’s separate opinions in recent years suggest, certain aspects of statutory interpretation are still troubling.4 In my view, one primary problem stands out. Several substantive principles of interpretation — such as constitutional avoidance, use of legislative history, and Chevron — depend on an initial determination of whether a text is clear or ambiguous. But judges often cannot make that initial clarity versus ambiguity decision in a settled, principled, or evenhanded way. The upshot is that judges sometimes decide (or appear to decide) high-profile and important statutory cases not by using settled, agreedupon rules of the road, but instead by selectively picking from among ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– ∗
Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. See e.g., Justice Elena Kagan, The Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice Kagan on the Reading of Statutes at 8:09 (Nov. 17, 2015), http://today.law.harvard.edu/in-scalia-lecture-kagan -dis cu sses -s t atut or y-in terpr et ati on [h ttp:// per m a. c c/3B CF-FEFR] (explaining that “the primary reason” Justice Scalia will “go down as one of the most important, most historic figures in the Court” is that he “taught everybody how to do statutory interpretation differently”). For an early description of the “new textualism,” see William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990). 2 See Kagan, supra note 1, at 8:28 (“I think we’re all textualists now in a way that just was not remotely true when Justice Scalia joined the bench.”). 3 Id. For an excellent discussion of the distinction between textualists and purposivists, see John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70 (2006). 4 The Court often still divides in statutory interpretation cases. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2094 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1610 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1090 (2015) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 1
FIXING STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
a wealth of canons of construction.5 Those decisions leave the bar and the public understandably skeptical that courts are really acting as neutral, impartial umpires in certain statutory interpretation cases.6 The need for better rules of the road is underscored by a recent book written by Robert Katzmann, the very distinguished Chief Judge of the Second Circuit. I know Chief Judge Katzmann from our service together on the Judicial Branch Committee of the Judicial Conference, where he served for many years as Chairman by appointment of the Chief Justice. Chief Judge Katzmann is one of America’s finest judges and a true role model for me and many others, both in how he approaches his job and in how he seeks to improve the system of justice. His new book Judging Statutes is a pleasure to read. It is succinct and educational. Chief Judge Katzmann’s goal is to show that various tools of statutory interpretation, especially legislative history, can enhance judges’ understanding of statutory meaning and allow them “to be faithful to