INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND ESTONIA

system in Russia. though Russia's current political leaders have never shied away from using various administrative means for influ- encing election results, such attempts will run significant risks on a backdrop of general discontent . The ruling elite remember 2011, when State Duma election fraud was the last straw that.
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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND ESTONIA

2018

CONTENTS

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 The domestic political situation in Russia The Russian economy

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The effects of the sanctions

4

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14

The Russian military . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Russian foreign policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 28



Outlook for the Minsk Agreements



Rosneft and Gazprom as the tools of Russian foreign policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Relations between Belarus and Russia

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Intelligence from the territory – threat to foreign nationals in Russia . 35

The FIFA World Cup in Russia – Putin’s PR project . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Influence operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 47



Information warfare units targeting NATO



Kremlin’s use of misrepresentation of historical events in influence operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

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Cyber threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 Terrorism in Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 North Korea’s weapons programme continues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 The Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service’s mission

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INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

I

am pleased to present the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service’s third public report, in which we describe the world security environment surrounding Estonia. In 2017, Russian meddling abroad was starkly exposed for a large share of the public in the US and Europe. The topic received an unprecedented and quite deserved level of attention. Defining moments included the unanimous assessment of US intelligence agencies regarding Russia’s interference in the 2016 American election, French president Emmanuel Macron’s denunciation of Russian media channels as “agents of influence”, and German chancellor Angela Merkel’s warning to Russian president Vladimir Putin not to meddle in the German election.

Director General, Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service

Estonian security institutions have been talking for years about attempts on Russia’s part to splinter the unity and trust that exists between nations in the West. The awareness of this fact is now spreading more broadly in the US and in many places around Europe. Unfortunately, no changes can be seen in Russia’s behaviour. In the years ahead, Russia see