Is there a community- level adaptation deficit? - World Bank Group

Background Paper

Is there a communitylevel adaptation deficit? Maximillian Ashwill & Rasmus Heltberg The World Bank

Is There a Community-Level Adaptation Deficit? By Maximillian Ashwill and Rasmus Heltberg

ABSTRACT The purpose of this chapter is to understand how communities in developing countries can more successfully adapt to climate change. We find that poor communities do face an adaptation deficit. More specifically, local communities engage more in coping measures in response to climate change than they do adaptation measures. The reason seems to be that the costs of adaptation are too high and the effectiveness of adaptation in building resilience to severe weather events is often limited or not sufficient in addressing longterm environmental trends. Further, when adaptation does occur, it frequently leads to negative outcomes, or maladaptation. We find that maladaptation occurs when planning does not sufficiently account for temporal and spatial factors, when policies contradict one another and create perverse incentives, when governance systems fail, and when communities lack the knowledge to adapt. By contrast, we find that community leadership, organization and trust towards nonlocal adaptation planners are essential local characteristics for building the social capital needed for collective action and successful adaptation. Finally, we argue that in order to promote adaptation in developing communities, the high costs and negative or ineffective outcomes of policies associated with adaptation must be reduced. This chapter’s methodology uses original primary source data from several World Bank-led case studies on the “social dimensions of climate change” that took place from 2008-2012.

The purpose of this chapter is to understand how communities in developing countries can more successfully adapt to climate change. Climate change is happening (IPCC, 2007a) and has been shown to interact with political, institutional, technical, economic, social, physical and cultural conditions to create greater social vulnerability (ACF, 2011; O’Brien, et al., 2008; McLaughlin and Dietz, 2008; Folke, 2006; Adger, 1999). The world’s poorest people, who have the lowest capacity to adapt and are the most likely to be engaged in livelihood strategies that rely on the natural environment, are especially at risk (IPCC, 2007b). This chapter focuses on these people and the communities in which they live. We find that poor communities do face an adaptation deficit. More specifically, local communities engage more in coping measures in response to climate change than they do adaptation measures. The reason seems to be that the costs of adaptation are too high and the effectiveness of adaptation in building resilience to severe weather events is often limited or not sufficient in addressing long-term environmental trends. Further, when adaptation does occur, it frequently leads to negative outcomes, or maladaptation. We find that maladaptation occurs when planning does not sufficiently account for temporal and spatial factors, when policies contradict one another and create perverse incentives,

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when governance systems fail, and when communities lack the knowledge to adapt. By contrast, we find that community leadership, organization and trust towards nonlocal adaptation planners are essential local characteristics for building the social capital needed for collective action and successful adaptation. Finally, we argue that in order to promote adaptation in developing communities, the high costs and negative or ineffective outcomes of policies associated with adaptation must be reduced. This chapter begins with a brief note on the methodology and sources of data. The next three sections examine, first, why adaptation is not occurring at a rate commensurate with community-level climate challenges and social vulnerability, second, why adaptation measures sometimes fail, and third, what the conditions are for successful adaptation. We conclude by examining how policymakers can promote collective action and achieve successful adaptation. Methodological Note The objective of the research behind this chapter1 was to help answer three general questions. These include: (1) what are the main community-based responses to environmental change and shocks? (2) Why do these responses succeed or fail? (3) What types of external interventions are the most effective? And how can these be supported? The methodology uses original primary source data from several World Bank-led case studies on the “social dimensions of climate change” that took place from 2008-2012. These studies were carried out by different research teams with similar, but not identical, methodologies and objectives. The data was collected from the major developing regions of the world, including South Asia (India, Bangladesh, Pakistan), East Asia (Vietnam, Mongolia), sub-Saharan Africa (Burkina Faso, Niger, Senegal, Ethiopia, Mali, Ghana, Mozambique, Kenya), the Middle East and North Africa (Jordan, Lebanon, Yemen), and Latin America and the Caribbean (Dominican Republic, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay, Argentina). This primary source data comes mainly from the household surveys, transcripts of focus group discussions and interviews from developing communities, mostly rural, that took place as a part of each study. This amounted to roughly 8,000 household surveys, 275 focus groups, 2,000 interviews, and 100 national and regional workshops from 69 regions in 24 countries. This added up to several thousand pages of data. In order to review this information, we used a three-step process. First, we read in detail each report and background paper (published and unpublished) related to each study, second, we searches each document electronically for key words, and third, we searched the raw data for quotes and specific numbers related to certain indicators. This chapter represents a summary of some of the more important findings. Why adaptation is not occurring The case study review shows that poor communities are coping with climate impacts more than they are adapting to climate changes. Coping tends to occur when communities are not resilient enough to prevent the damage and losses that result from physical 1

This work was originally commissioned to serve as a background paper for the World Bank’s forthcoming World Development Report for 2014 on managing risk for development.

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climate impacts and weather hazards. In the absence of adaptation, coping actions will be more frequent. After an examination of the conceptual background to coping and adaptation, this section will look at why adaptation is not happening and how this lack of planning can lead to “erosive” coping. Conceptual Background In order to analyze the ways in which adaptation succeeds and fails it is important to understand that “adaptation” is not the same as “coping.” The most commonly cited definition of adaptation, which we will also use, is that offered by the IPCC (2007b), “An adjustment in natural and human systems in response to actual or expected climate stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities.” The process of building climate resilience and reducing vulnerability is a result of successful adaptation. A common mistake is to conflate the act of adapting with that of coping. CARE (2009) differentiates the two concepts, in part, by saying that coping is a shortterm, reactive, immediate, non-continuous act motivated by crisis and oriented towards survival, whereas adapting is a continuous process that involves planning and is oriented towards longer-term livelihood security. Birkmann (2011: 815) elaborates this difference further, “adaptation might indicate a turning point leading to a different development path. While this change might be gradual, it is, however, different from a more short-term oriented response to hazard impacts (coping).” Results The case studies show that there is much more coping occurring at the local-level than adapting. In all of the case studies where respondents were asked about local-level responses to climate change (ACDCC, 2011; ACF, 2011; SAR, 2013/14; GenBo, 2011), they nearly always cited coping strategies more frequently than adaptation strategies. This frequency varied depending on how questions were asked and the local context in which questions were asked. In the five countries of the ACF (2011) studies, respondents were only asked about “adaptive,” not coping, strategies, still over half of the types of actions that communities described could be considered “coping.” For example, respondents would refer to the act of cutting down forests to expand cultivable areas as “adaptation,” but this was more of a reaction to declining productivity in other lands than a change in process. In the ABDCC (2011) study, where respondents in agricultural communities were asked about “coping,” “adaptive,” and “survival” strategies separately, actions people took to “cope” (e.g. dietary modifications) and “survive” (e.g. eating fewer meals) were all forms of coping, whereas actions taken to “adapt” were commonly a mix of adaptation (e.g. seeking permanent employment not related to agriculture) and coping (e.g. prioritizing food crops over cash crops) (ABDCC Niger, 2010). When communities were asked generally about how they “responded” to hazards and climate change without specifying whether it was coping or adapting, most answers were examples of coping strategies. For example, in the 16 villages in rural Senegal (ABDCC Senegal, 2010) where respondents were asked about “responses,” they identified the following actions: distress sales of household assets for food, dietary modifications (eating less and of lower quality), borrowing at

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prohibitory rates for short periods of time, temporary migration to find wage labor, petty trades, modifications to agricultural practices (planting new areas, planting at different times) and, to a lesser extent livelihood modifications (damn construction to avoid saltwater intrusion and fish farming). In this case, with the exception of the more isolated examples of livelihood modifications, these responses are overwhelmingly reactive strategies (coping), and not changes to process (adaptation). In terms of planning, several research teams observed that respondents were too busy with their day-to-day lives to envision how to respond over the long-term (ACF 2011; GenBo, 2011; AgMENA, 2013). This contributed to the predominance of short-term coping. The reason that more coping is occurring seems to be the result of a lack of resources available for adaptation and the ineffectiveness of adaptation to prevent losses from severe physical impacts. The primary purpose of adaptation is to reduce the vulnerability and build the resilience of natural, economic and social systems to climate change. If a community is not sufficiently resilient it will not be able to withstand climate changes or severe weather events and, as a result, damage and loss will occur (Warner, et al., 2012). When damage and loss occur, communities are forced to cope. In other words, coping should be seen less as a local decision, than as a result of a lack of adaptation. Warner and colleagues (2012) and, in part, Birkmann (2011) show that a lack of resources limits people’s ability to adapt as does the severity of weather hazards, from which adaptation is often unable to prevent losses and damage. The case studies corroborate this by showing that the inability to prevent loss and the high costs of adaptation prevented its implementation. This is examined below. Inability to Prevent Loss In areas where physical impacts from climate change and hazards were high, the ratio of coping responses to adaptive strategies was even higher. In the Sundarbans region of Bangladesh and West Bengal, India, a coastal area consistently threatened by cyclones, respondents were asked about both the “most important” coping and adaptive strategies they used. About 75 percent of responses described coping actions (SAR, 2012/13 forthcoming), despite the fact that important adaptation measures took place, especially in Bangladesh. These measures included the creation, improvement and modernizing of early warning systems, the construction of multi-purpose cyclone shelters, the creation of coastal embankment systems that reduce the impact from storm surges, the regeneration and conservation of coastal forests, and campaigns to raise community-level awareness on the threat from cyclones. Despite these actions, which have dramatically reduced storm related mortality, Bangladesh still sustained serious losses from Cyclone Aila in 2009 (Oxfam, 2012). High Costs of Adaptation and Fewer Resources Since nearly all of the case study communities reviewed for this chapter were poor (by income), it would be expected that they would be less able to adapt and reduce climate vulnerability, and as a result coping strategies would be more common. As mentioned above this is exactly what we found. Warner and others (2012), show that the local costs of adapting act as a barrier for community members to implement these strategies. Most

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of the literature agrees that a lack of financial resources, among other factors, is correlated with a lack of adaptive capacity (e.g. Mearns and Norton, 2010; Verner, 2010; WDR, 2010; IPCC, 2001; 2007b; etc.). The case study sites examined for this chapter were all relatively poor (in terms of income), so we were unable to compare coping versus adaptation rates between the poor and less poor. External support sometimes reinforces the predominance of reactive, coping responses. More resources are often made available through non-local donors or development and relief agencies to cope than to adapt. For example, in the Dominican Republic, heavy rains in May of 2010 led to the rapid swelling of the large inland lake, Lago Enriquillo. In the wake of this event there was widespread media coverage that documented the threats to the lake and to the communities that relied on it. As a result, the Ministry of Environment made Lake Enriquillo a priority for relief and recovery efforts and international development agencies, like USAID, sought to implement projects in the region (ACF Dominican Republic, 2011). In addition, out of necessity there are generally more external resources made available to cope with shocks then there are to prepare for them (adapt), despite the cost effectiveness of the latter2. In Honduras, foreign aid amounted to 6.3% of GDP in 1997. In November of 1998 hurricane Mitch hit and aid rose to 15.2% in 1999, more than double the amount it was pre-shock, which would have included preparedness measures (Mechler, 2003). By this logic it is conceivable that if some of the post-hurricane assistance to Honduras had been spent on preparation, damages from hurricane Mitch would have been far fewer and eventual costs would have been reduced or avoided for the country and its development partners. Erosive Coping As mentioned above, coping often lacks an element of planning; therefore the consequences of these actions could potentially exacerbate social vulnerability to climate change. When this occurs, it is called “erosive coping” (De Waal, 1989; Van der Geest and Dietz, 2004; Warner, et al., 2012). This dynamic was commonly seen in the case study communities (see ACF, 2011; ABDCC, 2011). For example, in Niger, environmental changes, specifically climate change combined with unsustainable agricultural practices (such as slash and burn), have substantially reduced the productivity of existing agricultural lands (ABDCC Niger, 2010). As a result, farmers have begun cutting down forests to plant on the rich soils beneath. Consequently, these communities are altering their environments in a way that reduces the productivity of land and increases the community’s overall sensitivity to climate change. It is difficult to change these behaviors because their benefits are tangible, immediate (money in your hand) and popular (everyone is doing them). Such a result does not seem to be surprising since these coping actions took place without much planning, but as we will see next, even with planning, responses to climate change can still have negative outcomes.

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An analysis of flood control preparedness enacted in China over the past forty years found that US$3.15 billion spent had averted approximately US$12 billion in losses (Mechler, 2003).

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Why adaptation fails when it does occur From the case studies, we examined instances where adaptation failed. As a result, we were able to identify, five common characteristics of adaptation that contributed, or led directly to, negative outcomes. These include: (1) temporal failures: “adaptation” planning that does not take account of long-term trends; (2) spatial failures: policies or projects that create benefits for certain areas or populations, but create costs for others; (3) incentive failures: policies or projects that produce perverse incentives; (4) governance failures: governance structures that lead to inefficiencies and the unequal distribution of benefits; and (5) knowledge failures: where communities or their members lack sufficient knowledge of climate change challenges and the technical capacity to adapt. These factors can contribute to maladaptation in isolation or association, and after a conceptual background, each will be examined in turn. Conceptual background Maladaptation is defined by Barnett and O’Neill (2010) as, “action taken ostensibly to avoid or reduce vulnerability to climate change that impacts adversely on, or increases the vulnerability of other systems, sectors or social groups.” They further identified five negative outcomes of adaptation that can be classified as maladaptation. These outcomes include: increased emissions of greenhouse gases; a disproportionate burden on the most vulnerable populations; high opportunity costs; reduced incentives to adapt; and limited choices available for future generations. Results Using these definitions as a guide, we looked at each of the 24 countries included in the data review and they all showed at least one example of maladaptation. Granted the definitions of maladaptation outcomes are broad, and there is no account of the scale of the problem, but at the very least it shows that maladaptation is occurring, and commonly. Of the 69 regions examined, there was evidence that maladaptation was occurring in over half of them. Many of the regions did not report maladaptation occurring since their study methodologies did not specifically ask about it, but that does not mean that it wasn’t happening. By contrast, some of the evidence that suggested that maladaptation was occurring was not conclusive or did not take into account positive outcomes from the adaptation process. Also, evidence was based on what respondents said—their perceptions—therefore is subject to bias. According to Adger and others (2005), one adaptation outcome may be seen positively by one social group and negatively by another. The data review certainly showed evidence of this as well. Yet, despite the limitations inherent in the methodology, there is still substantial evidence that even humans’ best efforts at adapting to climate change commonly have unintended consequences. Temporal Failures The most common pathway towards maladaptation, as witnessed in the global case studies, is a project or policy that is designed for a short-term outcome but applied to a

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long-term challenge. Adger and colleagues (2005) describe these as temporal externalities. For example, in Mongolia, climate change has likely contributed to more frequent and severe Dzuds, a winter disaster in which livestock forage is rendered inaccessible because of heavy snowfall or severe cold and leads to high levels of livestock mortality. In the Mongolian winter of the 1999-2000 season, a Dzud led to a major decline in livestock. As a result, an initiative was put in place to provide in-kind loans of livestock to pastoralists to restock the herds that were lost in the Dzud. This was actually a quite innovative and forward-looking project that included a participatory approach to identify and target eligible pastoralists. Selection criteria emphasized the skill and experience levels of herders to ensure that only the pastoralists most capable of repaying the loan were restocked. However, despite over a half dozen years passing since the last Dzud, the next year (2000-2001) another Dzud struck, and the following year (2001-2002) another. These led to further losses to livestock including that of the pastoralists who had been restocked. As a result of this policy, not only did it fail to permanently help pastoralists recover from the first Dzud, it actually put them further into debt (Mearns, 2012). Understanding temporal failure, is especially important when intense and frequent climate hazards are projected to become the long-term trend (IPCC, 2012). Other distinct examples of temporal failures leading to maladaptation were seen in Argentina, Paraguay, Bolivia, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Jordan and Lebanon. Spatial Failures Adaptation that produces benefits in one area for one group of individuals may impose costs in other areas for other groups. Adger and others (2005) refer to these as spatial externalities. Several examples of this were witnessed in case study communities in Paraguay (ACF Paraguay, 2011). In the Paraguayan Chaco, for example, respondents said that market incentives compel owners of large cattle ranches to build dams to retain water from seasonal river floods. They do this to help increase the water available for livestock production. In the eastern Ñeembucú region, cattlemen and agriculturalists build channels to drain wetlands in order to increase the amount of available land for agriculture and pasture. In both cases, these activities, while helping short-term profitability in the face of water abundance, are depriving other social groups, such as small landholders and fisherpersons, of their water needs. Incentive Failures Policies that aim at achieving one goal may contradict others and lead to maladaptation. Ashwill and others (2011), refer to these as perverse incentives. For example, in the southern Argentine province of Rio Negro, traditional sheepherders have been confronted by lower wool prices and drier conditions, which has reduced the availability of grazing lands. As a result, nearly half of these pastoralists have permanently migrated from these lands and the number of sheep in the region has declined by almost half (ACF Argentina, 2010). The Argentine government, in an effort to make more efficient use of this land, enacted a law that can require pastoralists to sell their ancestral lands if they are no longer using them for traditional grazing. As a result, sheepherders have been restocking their sheep (often using state funds, which supplement this) to maintain tenure rights. This has created a situation where people maintain sheep stocks (an unsustainable livelihood), not

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for their own financial well being, but rather to stay on their lands and take advantage of state funds (ACF Argentina, 2010). Incentive failures were also shown to have led to maladaptation in Bolivia, Peru, Lebanon, Jordan, Mali, Senegal, Vietnam and others. Governance failures Governance failures can also lead to maladaptation. Governance failures can come in the form of corruption, a lack of leadership, inequity or conflict. These qualities were hard to measure in the studies since people typically do not feel comfortable discussing them with investigative teams. Still, enough evidence exists to suggest that not only are these issues, but they are issues that undermine successful adaptation.3 In Paraguay, focus groups uncovered a lot of discussion surrounding political clientelism and favoritism. In such a situation, local leaders are in a position to hoard development or adaptation funds for themselves or funnel them to their associates (ACF Paraguay, 2011). In Burkina Faso, similar worries were voiced about how certain clans had greater access to resources to the detriment of rivals or other unconnected individuals. These clans are inextricably linked to certain tribes, families and socio-linguistic groups and it is these allies who benefit the most from aid and development assistance (ABDCC Burkina Faso, 2010). According to Adger (2003: 396), “social hierarchies and inequality in resources and entitlements are rarely overturned in the course of adaptation, and external changes, such as extremes in climate and other natural hazards, tend to reinforce these inequalities” (also see Adger, et al, 2001). In a certain way, by external interventions utilizing these traditional structures as conduits in the development process, they are unwittingly reinforcing an inequitable social arrangement. Knowledge Failures Across the case studies, respondents often demonstrated a lack of knowledge concerning the sources of negative environmental changes (i.e. climate change and social vulnerabilities) and how to respond successfully. By contrast they usually demonstrated an acute knowledge of what these changes were and how they affected communities and households. For example, in the Peruvian Amazon over 90% of respondents from a Machiguenga community observed some form of climate change occurring. These observations included: changing precipitation patterns, increasing cold spells, and changing seasons. Community members commented that fish population levels, crop yields, and the availability of animal species for hunting were lower than anytime they can remember. Despite these impacts, not a single community member identified “climate change” or many aspects of their own vulnerability as sources of these problems, instead they blamed pollution caused by a series of spills from a nearby natural gas pipeline and angry spirits. A local representative of the Machiguenga Council of the Urubamba River4 (COMARU) summed up well the Machiguenga people’s belief when he said, “The Machiguenga Amazon Indians of the Upper and Lower Urubamba, 3

This was further supported in the literature, for example see: Arrow (2000), Woolcock (1998) and Portes (1998). 4 Consejo Machiguenga del Rio Urubamba (COMARU) the largest indigenous Machiguenga organization representing 30 native communities. They have become well known for their persistent resistance of the Comisea natural gas extraction project.

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acknowledge that it may be true that Choris (white people) are causing damage to the planet. But they believe that the root cause of this breakdown of nature is their own failure to observe rules and principles of behavior as outlined by Tasorintsi (God). Society is not nature, and it is nature that guides the indigenous interpretation of climate change” (ACF Peru, 2011). When only the impacts from climate change and social vulnerability are observed (e.g. floods, crop failure, disease, etc.), responses will continue to be reactive. However, in order for communities to adapt and change processes, they must understand and tackle the sources of these impacts and vulnerabilities (e.g. damaging land-use practices, unsustainable livelihoods, etc.). Some form of knowledge failure was observed in most of the 24 countries examined. How successful adaptation occurs To achieve successful, collective adaptation, communities must share three common characteristics: trust, leadership and organization. After a conceptual background to successful adaptation, collective action and social capital, we will examine specific examples of how a lack of trust, leadership and organization can undermine adaptation. Conceptual background We define successful adaptation as Adger and others (2005) do, as actions that generate outcomes that are effective, efficient, equitable, and legitimate. Of course, such outcomes are contested, context specific, and based on competing values (Adger, et al., 2003). Defining successful adaptation is therefore difficult because, as we have seen earlier, while certain outcomes may be deemed a success at certain spatial and temporal scales, they may be deemed a failure at others (Adger, et al., 2005). Effectiveness is judged by how well adaptation strategies meet their stated objectives. Efficiency refers to the relative benefits compared to costs. Equity is determined by who decides what action is taken and who benefits (or more importantly who does not), which is important since equitable outcomes increases the potential to reduce future vulnerability (Boyce, 2002). Legitimacy is the extent to which affected people accept the adaptation decisions and outcomes. A lack of legitimacy undermines the capacity of adaptive actions to achieve full implementation (Adger, et al., 2005). Few and others (2004) argue that collective action, particularly collective participation in decision-making, will lead to successful adaptation. This is especially true for naturalresource dependent livelihoods, where these resources, “frequently exist under multiple property-rights regimes” and where “the implementation of investment and planned adaptation is best brought about by the comanagement of resources” (Adger, 2003: 389 and 396). Woolcock and Narayan (2000: 226), contend that social capital is “the norms and networks that enable people to act collectively.”5 Other studies have shown that the ability of community members to develop and maintain security over their livelihoods in resource-dependant societies is dependant on their social capital.6 By extension, in order 5

Other literature has shown this as well, including: Dasgupta and Serageldin (2000); Putnam (2000); and Coleman (2000). 6 These studies include: Berkes (2002); Pretty and Ward (2001); Brown and Rosendo (2000); and Bebbington (1999).

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to promote collective action and adapt successfully, social capital must be strengthened. The two components of social capital include: bonding social capital – the strengthening of internal organization and the capacity to take collective action – and bridging (or networking) social capital – the linkages between local groups and external partners and resources.7 Adger (2003: 389) contends that, “collective action requires networks and flows of information between individuals and groups to oil the wheels of decisionmaking.” Strong bridging and bonding social capital maintain these networks and flows. Social capital, and its ability to promote collective action, is especially important when dealing with unforeseen climate changes or hazards (Burton, et al., 1993; Adger, 2003).8 Trust Trust is defined as the “assured reliance on the character, ability, strength, or truth of someone or something.” Within the context of climate change adaptation, it means that in order for external interventions to be successful, their target communities must trust the implementing agencies. Such trust allows for the “buy-in” by locals of non-local initiatives and is crucial for building broad-based support and, more importantly, collective participation from the community in project activities (Ostrom, 2000). Building trust is related to building legitimacy (Adger, et al., 2005) and strengthening bridging social capital. Adger (2003: 388) argues that successful adaptation is contingent on the “social acceptability of options for adaptation.” There were no examples of successful interventions from the case studies without a certain level of community trust towards the implementing agencies. By contrast there are several examples where a lack of trust (or lack of project legitimacy) decreased collective participation and led to failed interventions. Distrust inhibits collective action In Salta in northern Argentina, local civil society respondents voiced a serious distrust of the federal government. They claimed this distrust was the result of the government’s role in displacing poor and indigenous people from their traditional lands and livelihoods in the interest of major natural gas and soy businesses. The investigation team was perceived by locals in Salta to be working on the government’s behalf, and as a result the team’s access to communities was constrained and follow-up visits were not allowed. Consequently, the study’s (ACF Argentina, 2010) goal of mobilizing collective action to adapt to climate change was not successful. In fact, not a single coalition was ever established in Salta. The research team applied this lesson in the future by working exclusively in communities where they were accepted and where distrust was not as prevalent.

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For additional information on these definitions and a background on social capital refer to: Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) and Narayan (1999). 8 In addition, some studies have argues that social capital and collective action do not necessarily lead to successful adaptation. For examples refer to Dasgupta (2003) or Portes (1998).

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Leadership Leadership is an important component in making external interventions successful (Ostrom, 2000; Varughese, 1999; Frohlich, et al., 1971). A leader is a person that maintains the networking social capital from the community-level. More specifically it is important that there are individuals that can drive adaptation measures locally, compel people and institutions to organize and mobilize around project objectives. It is also important that these leaders are trusted locally, which can help legitimize the merits of external interventions. Such individuals can act as the conduit between the local and nonlocal and they can drive the development process from within (Verner, 2012). Individual leaders have the capacity to promote networks of trust, reciprocity and organization (Adger, 2003). A lack of leadership inhibits collective action In several Bolivian highland communities, a deficiency in community leaders limited the process of building collective action (GenBo, 2011). The reason for this lack of leadership was not because the community had no leaders; it was just that these leaders no longer lived in the communities. Most moved to the lucrative gold mines nearby for weeks and months at a time and as a consequence neglected their roles as leaders in their communities. With the leaders away, it was difficult for investigation teams to organize the remaining community members for meetings and workshops, let alone for collective action. What made matters more complicated was that mine workers, a relatively resilient livelihood, voiced much less concern for the climate vulnerabilities encountered in their old communities than they did other issues. Organization Organization can be defined as, “A structure through which individuals cooperate systematically to conduct business” (Dictionary.com, 2012) and is a functional component of collective action. Organization, often manifested in the form of local institutions, provides the social infrastructure that interventions require to mobilize participation in project activities and apply these activities broadly without being limited to individuals or individual households. An organization also represents an entity that has experience in executing projects or activities that are complex in nature and hard to understand: climate change fits this bill precisely. Woolcock and Narayan (2000: 234) argue that the effectiveness of strategies for adapting to climate change and “the very capacity of social groups to act in their collective interest depends on the quality of the formal institutions under which they reside” (also see Adger, 2003; Evans, 1996; Ostrom, 1996). Internal organization is the key to strong bonding social capital, and promoting equitable decision-making and outcomes. A lack of organization inhibits collective action The ACF study (2011) found that the process of promoting collective adaptation was most effective in communities that had a history of organization. In cases that spanned each of the five countries, it was the communities, which already knew how to organize

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or already had existing and functional institutions that were able to act collectively. In the Paraguayan Chaco, where families are widely dispersed and often work alone (low internal organization), there were major delays as the investigation team tried to organize workshops and other activities on their own (ACF Paraguay, 2011). As a result, the process of building coalitions took longer in Paraguay than in any other country and, despite the additional time dedicated to organizing, the sustainability of these groups was still by no means guaranteed. Conclusions on how policymakers can promote successful adaptation Before providing some general conclusions, we look at some practical ways, identified in a case study from Mongolia, to catalyze collective action. Comparative examples of collective action The Mongolia case study, (Dzud, 2012) provides a valuable comparative analysis of three different initiatives that aimed to induce collective action in response and preparation for Dzuds. This analysis delivers insights into why certain types of interventions are more successful than others. These three initiatives took three distinct approaches to promoting collective action. The first was the creation of territorially-based pasture user groups, which sought to involve all herders within a given territorial range to cooperatively manage pastures. The second initiative supported project-specific, herder-proposed initiatives. By putting the onus on herders to organize and propose projects, it was those that were most active and organized that tended to receive support. As a result, other groups perceived the process as unfair and non-transparent. The third initiative created smaller kinship- or neighborhood-based groups with the aim of collectively managing pastures and improving livelihoods. This program was the most successful of the three in catalyzing collective action among herders, building herder-government cooperation and contributing to measurable improvements in herder resilience (Dzud, 2012). Lessons learned This comparison teaches several lessons in how to catalyze collective action. First, it is more difficult to induce collective action from large groups than it is from smaller ones based on closely related social networks. In larger groups, people simply do not know one another that well and are not as comfortable working with strangers. It is much more realistic to expect people to maintain collective cooperation over the long-term if these groups are comprised of families and people they know, trust and have worked with before. Baland and Platteau (1996) have demonstrated that self-organized groups tend to fall apart quickly in areas where new settlement (strangers moving into the community) occurs. Second, these smaller, close-knit groups are more likely to be accused of unfairly benefitting from assistance than large inclusive groups. Efforts can be made to improve transparency, but this may just be an unavoidable problem when relying on existing social structures rather than creating new ones. Third, it seems that an influx of resources is the most likely impetus to catalyze collective action. If there is a financial incentive to organize and cooperate, people will. Of course, this also would suggest that once resources disappear, so will the collective action (Ostrom, 2000). Fourth, collective

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action may be sustainable even in the absence of direct financial incentives if there is a strong enough perceived need to act. When a group of individuals view a problem as real and too large to deal with alone, they will often act collectively to find a solution (Ostrom, 2000). This would suggest that opportunity exists in crisis. These lessons apply to community-level efforts at collective adaptation only, which raise additional questions. At what scale can these lessons be applied? Can they be applied within larger political boundaries? How about to shared resource systems, like watersheds that cross national borders? At the end of the day, climate change is a shared challenge and the level of collective action needed to reduce emissions needs to happen at the global level. How can the potential for this scale of collective action be improved? These questions extend beyond the scope of this chapter, but further research in this area is warranted. General conclusions To answer the question posed in the title of this chapter: yes, there is a community-level adaptation deficit. This deficit is represented as the lack, or ineffectiveness, of adaptation measures to reduce social vulnerability to climate change. In order for policymakers to reduce this vulnerability and build climate resilience, it is necessary to make adaptation more appealing to local communities by reducing its costs and its potential for negative outcomes. We have seen that temporal, spatial, incentive, governance and knowledge failures often lead to maladaptation. To reduce this risk, these potential failures have to be taken into account and safeguarded against during adaptation planning and project implementation. Finally, policymakers must increase the prospects for successful adaptation by increasing the potential for collective action through measures to build local leadership, trust and organization.

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