Councillor Catherine West Leader of the Council Labour Member for Tollington Ward LGiU & CCLA ‘Leader of the Year’ 2013
Councillor Terry Stacy MBE JP Leader of the Opposition
Town Hall Upper Street London N1 2UD T 020 7527 2000 W www.islington.gov.uk
Liberal Democrat Member for Highbury East PA: Jacqueline Haniff-Bentham T: 020 7527 2986 E:
[email protected]
Ron Dobson Commissioner London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority 169 Union Street London SE1 0LL
17 June 2013
By email to
[email protected] cc.
[email protected]
Dear Ron Islington Council’s response to LSP5 consultation We write to you corporately on behalf of Islington Council and representing the unanimous view of all our elected Members to enclose a copy of our response to the draft 5th London Safety Plan. We accept that the fire authority, like all public bodies, must continuously review its performance, effectiveness and value-for-money. We support the proposals in LSP5 to further reduce fire risks across London although we are not fully convinced these will reduce incidents at the rate seen over the past decade. In our view, fire safety and risk reduction have to be complemented by sufficient fire and emergency response capability and we do not believe that LSP5 has made the case for reducing fire stations, appliances and fire-fighters. We therefore strongly oppose the plan to cut the number of fire stations in London from 112 to 100 and to reduce the number of appliances from 169 to 151. Two of the fire stations slated for closure, Clerkenwell and Kingsland, provide emergency cover to a large part of our Borough and to Hackney, the City of London and Camden. Having fewer appliances that take longer to reach incidents cannot be justified. Fire and emergency incidents have declined in the past decade, but when incidents do occur, the distance required to reach those incidents does not diminish.
We believe e there are strong reas sons to main ntain the cu urrent response capacitty:
on is now th he most den nsely popula ated boroug gh in the couuntry; Islingto Our po opulation is rising fast a and will continue to do so in cominng years; We havve many tho ousands of residents liiving in med dium and hiigh-rise builldings which h require e multiple ap ppliance ressponses to incidents; The “eq quity” principle underp inning response times in LSP5 is not right for Boroughs with ma any taller buildings beccause it tak kes longer to o begin activve-fire-fightting in tall building gs than it do oes for typiccal homes in i more sub burban setti ngs; Modelled response times sho ow our Boro ough will experience in creases in response time and 4 wards w will fa all outside tthe 6 or 8 minute m target Clerkenwell fire sttation serve es a vital stra ategic role in central Loondon and serves the south of o our Borou ugh
By unanim mous resoluttion taken at a a meeting g of the full Council, C Isliington’s reppresentative es have expressed their oppossition to the e loss of fire stations that provide cover c to ourr Borough. ouncil, otherr Boroughs and the public to this cconsultation n will convin nce We hope the response of this Co p in LSP5 should not be im mplemented . the Authorrity that the “151/100” proposal Yours sinccerely
Councillorr Catherine e West Leader of the Counc cil Labour Grroup
Cllr Terry Sta acy Lea ader of the e Oppositio on Lib beral Demo ocrat Group p
Islington Council’s response to LSP5 consultation 1.
Introduction
1.1 Islington Council welcomes the approach in LSP5 to reducing fire and other incidents through a combination of improved public awareness, better detection systems, automatic fire control systems and improved building design. We welcome the steady reduction in false alarms and non-emergency call-outs which directly result from the LFB’s fire safety measures over the past decade and which also reflect societal, behavioural changes and design or technological innovation. 1.2 We also recognise the need to regularly review and reconfigure fire and emergency services to reflect population and geographic change in London. Like all public authorities the LFEPA rightly pursues a process of continuous improvement, efficiency and service reform to provide the finest fire service in Britain and one which delivers good value to taxpayers. 1.3 We believe that London’s fire service faces challenges that are unique in Britain. It serves the country’s largest conurbation, a global city undergoing rapid economic, social and physical change. It is a city that produces more wealth per capita than almost anywhere else in Europe yet is home to a large population living on very modest incomes who are at risk in increasingly precarious labour and housing markets. 1.4 But London is undergoing a long period in which rapid population and economic growth are accompanied by considerable uncertainty and unpredictability. We believe London and our Borough need a safety plan that retains its current level of fire and rescue response service.
2.
The consequence of having fewer fire appliances
2.1 We support the strategic goal outlined in LSP5 to stop fires and other emergencies from happening in the first place. So, many of the measures contained in LSP5 are ones that we support. The Commissioner has described LSP5 as being a ‘balanced approach’: on the one hand continuing to reduce the risk of fires and incidents from happening, but on the other hand, scaling-back the Brigade’s capacity to respond to incidents when they happen. 2.2 This is not sound logic. Fire incidents have declined in the last decade but fires and other emergencies still happen and, furthermore, larger fire incidents seem to have increased. It is not logical to thin-out the number of fire stations and increase in response times just because there has been a downward trend in overall incidents recent years. Fires which do occur are no quicker to reach today than they were ten years ago. One attendee to the Islington consultation meeting drew an apt metaphor: just because no-one has drowned in a swimming pool does not justify removal of the lifeguard. 2.3 The consequence of having fewer appliances which have to travel longer distances was illustrated quite recently. When the Brigade experienced a temporary reduction in available appliances during the 2010 dispute it appears that fires worsened in severity. During the final 3 months of that year 27 appliances were made unavailable due to FBU action. The proportion of fires classed as “serious” increased by ten percentage points and this was matched by similar reduction in fires classed as “slight”. That suggests an increase in the intensity of fires during that period caused by the increased time it took appliances to arrive at incidents.
2.4 In Islington we experienced one such fire which resulted in a fatality in December 2010 at Pollard Close, Holloway. During the dispute, one of the Hornsey Road appliances was removed from operations and was unavailable to attend the incident in a 7th floor flat at a location barely one mile from the fire station. The other Hornsey Road appliance had already been mobilised to another incident. A typical response time would have been less than 2 minutes had the Hornsey Road appliance been available. Instead fire engines from Upper Street and Kentish Town attended the incident and these took between 6 and 8 minutes to arrive. No-one can say with certainty whether that fatality would have been avoided if both Hornsey Road appliances had been available but the incident illustrates that having fewer vehicles results in response times that may be unacceptably long. 2.5 We therefore do not believe that LSP5 is a strategy that offers sufficient protection to our residents. We disagree with closure of fire stations covering our Borough, removal of appliances and reduction in fire-fighters. We consider these reductions are not driven by a strategic view of the fire-fighting needs of the Brigade but simply reflect the cut in funding from central government which has been passedon by the Mayor of London.
3.
Our Borough’s characteristics
3.1 Islington is a very typical example of the great social and economic differences seen across London. We believe that Islington has a number of characteristics which mean that we face greater fire risks now and in the future than may be the case elsewhere in London, especially the outer Boroughs. 3.2 Despite the presence of many landmark international companies and, having some of the highest land values and property prices, we are nonetheless ranked 5th amongst London’s most deprived Boroughs and 14th amongst England’s most deprived local authorities. Just over a half our population (52%) lives within the 20% of most deprived neighbourhoods in England and we have the 2nd highest level of child poverty in London. There is a strong link between deprivation and fire risk, which LSP5 acknowledges, and we believe that Islington’s policies to increase the number of socially rented homes and our commitment to provide more generous adult social care may result in a growing number of families and older people who could be at greater fire risk than the general population. 3.3 Because a significant part of our Borough is within the Central Activity Zone, we are home to just over 10,000 employers and – at 180,000 – have the 4th highest volume of jobs located in any London Borough. Only the Square Mile, City of Westminster and Camden contain more. We expect that the Borough’s employment base will increase during the next decade partly because there is a well established economic growth trend around Angel and in the area south of Pentonville Road / City Road which is reflected in continuing demand for office space. 3.4 In Clerkenwell we anticipate a particularly large increase in demand for employment space with the arrival of Crossrail and the Thameslink East Anglia extension further stimulates growth around Farringdon. The total number of people using Farringdon station is expected to grow from 20,000 per day to 56,000 and the stimulus to residential and business demand is expected to grow sharply. The Islington Core Strategy (2011) states that the Central Activities Zone (CAZ) is expected to continue to be the most attractive location within Islington for extra business floorspace, with the Bunhill and Clerkenwell wards expected to account for around 70% of the borough’s new “B”-use floorspace (employment uses).
3.5 Whilst the improvements to automatic detection systems and sprinklers in commercial premises means that fire risk is reducing, nonetheless, an increase in employment uses especially those which may be potential terrorism targets, merits maintaining fire fighting capacity in this area. 3.6 At 143 people per hectare, Islington has the highest population density of any local authority in Britain. Our population grew between 2001 and 2011 by 30,000 (a 17% increase) to a total of 206,100 residents. Almost 40% of this increase was accounted for by growth in the population born in the European Union outside of the UK and Ireland. As a result we have a relatively high proportion of households (24%) where English is not the main language. 3.7 The largest single component to our recent population growth is young, educated single people. Sixty percent of our population is single – the highest anywhere in Britain – and 32% of the Borough consists of single person households. Nearly a third of the Borough’s entire population is aged 25-35 and they dominate the rapidly growing private rental housing sector. 3.8 LSP5 acknowledges this young demographic to be responsible for almost a quarter of all fires and to be highly resistant to measures that might adjust their behaviour. LSP5 suggests that social media can be used to change behaviour but we are sceptical about this because risky behaviour by young adults seems relatively immune to warnings posted by the authorities on social media. We know this from recent experience trying to counter smartphone thefts. Islington is one of the top 4 Boroughs for these types of snatch theft or robbery and, despite nearly 18 months of continuous persuasion and warning through social media, it has had very little impact on individuals’ practice. Indeed, the relative decline in such offences is mainly due to more rigorous police detection and enforcement rather than changing the behaviour of users. 3.9 Historic rates of population growth are expected to continue despite the shortage of available land. It is currently estimated that Islington’s population will increase by another 35,400 to 247,800 between now and 2026. With our population having already increased by almost 37,000 since 2001, this means that, over the 25 year period to 2016, our actual and projected population growth will be almost 72,000 – an increase of 41%. Most of our population growth will be accommodated through intensification of existing housing although a number of new development sites exist. 3.10 The two wards in the south of the Borough are expected to accommodate a sizeable part of the Borough’s population growth and new housing: Between 2013 and 2026, Bunhill is projected to increase from 15,700 to 20,050 people whilst Clerkenwell is projected to increase from 11,950 13,500. These wards contain two very substantial housing development sites: at Mount Pleasant, around 680 extra new homes are planned whilst at the City Forum site adjacent to City Road Basin, a planning application has now been received which would deliver around 900 additional residential units. These would principally be arranged over two buildings both exceeding 30 storeys. The redevelopment of Kings Cross is also proving to be a stimulus for additional housing and businesses in the south of the Borough. 3.11 We note the LSP5 assertion that there is no correlation between population and numbers of fire incidents. This is principally because there are many other factors which mask any indication of a statistically valid correlation. 3.12 Between the 1960s and 1980s the total number of fire and other incidents rose sharply yet London lost a significant part of its population during that time. In the 1960s for example, the was a rapid shift from domestic coal fires to electrical, gas and paraffin
heaters following clean air legislation. For a combination of reasons – technical and behavioural – the number of fires increased sharply. In the 1970s domestic lock-outs increased as the population began to secure their homes from theft; and in the late 1980s and early 1990s there was a rise in lift release incidents as the generation of lifts in 1960s built high rise blocks began to reach end-of-life and began to fail. 3.13 Conversely, in the last decade, fire incidents have declined because of the widespread introduction of domestic smoke detectors, reduction in cigarette smoking, improved building regulations and legal requirements for fire resistant furniture. This coincided with a period in which London’s population has grown rapidly. 3.14 Other significant technological factors have contributed to reduced demand, for example, the traceability of most telephone calls which have led to a very significant reduction in hoax call-outs. 3.15 So, there is clearly a basic relationship between population size and the number of incidents even though, on the face of it, there is not a statistical correlation. As a Borough that is experiencing substantial population growth and intensification, we remain unconvinced that it is safe to reduce fire cover. In particular we challenge the assumption in LSP5 that recent technical improvements and behavioural changes will continue to drive the number of incidents downwards. 3.16 The evidence in LSP5 does not demonstrate why the trajectory of incidents is expected to continue downwards. We fear the benefits of technological innovation and behaviour change will begin to bottom out. For example, in the last decade, the number of hoax calls has been virtually eliminated so this type of demand cannot contribute to further reductions in the overall total because it has almost reached zero. There is no more reduction in false alarms that can be achieved. Equally, we can show from our own experience that current levels of fire detection might not be significantly improved upon. In all of Islington Council’s own residential tenanted properties, we have installed hard-wired smoke detection systems and the same is true of most RSL properties in the Borough. So, there is no further reduction to be obtained from installation of detection and alarm systems. Similarly our adult social services have comprehensively identified the majority of individuals at risk for reasons of mental health or infirmity. Put simply, we know who our high risk individuals are and have already implemented measures to mitigate the risk. 3.17 Indeed, we fear that new societal factors may cause fire risk to rise despite excellent efforts to reduce it. As a local authority that is increasing its social rented provision, we are likely to see an increase in the number of people who have forms of vulnerability and represent a greater fire risk. Whilst we remain committed to identifying and supporting high risk individuals, nonetheless, we believe the current response service is necessary to reflect this risk. 3.18 The overwhelming majority of our population (86%) lives in flats, maisonettes or apartments within purpose-built or converted buildings. We have a very high percentage of residents who are either social tenants (42%) or private rental tenants (26%) and one of the lowest percentages in the UK of residents who are owner/occupiers of their homes – at just 28%. The evidence shows that highly intensive living conditions represent a greater fire risk than in lower density suburban settings and we think our population faces higher risks than elsewhere in London, particularly the outer Boroughs. 3.19 Reflecting the dominance of private sector rentals, our population is also London’s most transient. We have the highest rate of people moving in and out of the Borough every year – at 273 per 1,000 of population. Such a transient population, we
believe presents a higher fire risk because individuals have less awareness of their surroundings and layout of buildings in which they live and tend to use domestic appliances, particularly heating and kitchen equipment with which they are less familiar. 3.20 We have a particularly large number of high rise residential blocks within Islington Council’s direct ownership. There 115 residential buildings which are higher than 5 storeys, and these account for 2,531 properties. We are aware of another 16 residential buildings in the Borough that are 5 storeys or higher which are owned privately or by housing associations. The majority of our tallest residential buildings are in Clerkenwell and Bunhill wards and these include blocks of 25 and 27 storeys. Fires in these types of buildings invariably require mobilisation of more Brigade resources and, because greater time is required to mount fire-fighting operations in high buildings, are at risk of fires taking greater hold. The Borough has planning policy which mainly restricts any new buildings taller than 30 metres to the area south of Pentonville Road and City Road. Several new developments have recently been built, are and under construction or seeking planning permission. The area around City Road Basin, for example, has attracted four new structures of up to 36 storeys. 3.21 In the Borough there are at least 7 significant groups of high density buildings that are greater than 5 storeys which accommodate full-time students. Altogether, we estimate that “institutional” student residences accommodate about 6,000 students and, as a result, Islington has the 3rd highest number of student places of any London Borough (after City of Westminster and Camden). Islington’s Core Strategy commits to deliver 3,600 extra non self-contained student housing places over the period 2010/11 to 2024/25. Site availability constraints inevitably mean that all of this new accommodation will be delivered in high-rise, high density developments. The bulk of Islington’s purpose-built student accommodation is concentrated in Bunhill, Clerkenwell, around Pentonville Road and on Caledonian Road, with most being well within Clerkenwell fire station’s area. Purpose built student accommodation represents particular risk which can be mitigated in well managed facilities, but nonetheless poses greater challenges to fire-fighting should incidents occur.
4
Brigade response times
4.1 It is worth observing firstly that Islington’s overall performance has worsened over the past decade particularly for the arrival of a second appliance. Between 2004/5 and 2011/12 the average for a 1st appliance arrival has lengthened by around 7 seconds but for the 2nd appliance, performance has deteriorated by 35 seconds. 4.2 The Borough’s current average of 4 mins 43 seconds covers a wide range of actual arrival times. There is widely held public perception that a 6 minute “target” is actually a 6 minute “guarantee” of arrival for a 1st appliance. 4.3 Averages cover a wide range of values and the evidence presented in LSP5 (supporting document 23) shows that in Islington, under current performance, a 1st appliance does not reach an incident within the 6 minute target in around 22% of cases. If LSP5 were implemented, this would increase to just over 30%. The certainty of a 1st appliance arriving to fight a fire in Islington is therefore entering an unacceptable range: presently, a fire engine arrives within six minutes 4 out of 5 times; under LSP5 proposals, this declines to the extent that, in around 220 incidents, a first appliance would fail to arrive within the promised timeframe. We consider this to be an unacceptable worsening of the Brigade’s capacity to fight fires in our Borough. 4.4 Whilst the draft LSP5 document promises that Islington would remain, on average, within the 6 minute target, the modelling nonetheless shows that the average
1st appliance arrival time worsens by 26 seconds (rounded) from 4 mins 43 secs to 5 mins 8 secs; and the 2nd appliance arrival time increases by 52 seconds from 5 mins 12 secs to 6 mins 4 secs. 4.5 However these are also average arrival times, averaged for the whole Borough. It is self-evident that Islington is not a uniform geography because it is served by several fire stations and different parts of the Borough are either nearer or further from fire stations. At a ward level geography, it is clear that every single ward will experience an increase in arrival times for 1st appliances. 4.6 Furthermore, in three Islington wards the modelled increase means a 1st appliance will not reach an incident within 6 minutes on average: Arrival times for 1st fire appliance Current average arrival time Clerkenwell 4.19 Mildmay 5.44 Caledonian 6.09
Expected arrival time post LSP5 6.26 6.41 6.17
Increase 2.07 0.57 0.08
4.7 All wards in Islington will experience increases in arrival times for 2nd appliances too. In Barnsbury ward, following LSP5, a 2nd fire appliance will not reach an incident within 8 minutes. Arrival times for 2nd fire appliance Current average arrival time Barnsbury 6.06 Clerkenwell 6.18 Mildmay 6.06 St Marys 4.48 St Peters 5.51
Expected arrival time post LSP5 8.27 7.28 7.27 6.02 7.48
Increase 2.21 1.10 1.21 1.14 1.57
4.8 We also need to stress that, like many other inner Boroughs, Islington has a vertical geography not simply a horizontal one. We believe that a uniform “equalised” regime of 6, 8 and 10 minute targets fails to reflect the problems with high rise residential buildings.
5.
Equity of response times
5.1 We are concerned that the performance targets are measured on an artificial basis and the target is not evenly applied to all circumstances. 5.2 Public perception is that the 6 minute target is a promised arrival time – an appliance will arrive to an incident and begin fire-fighting within 6 minutes of a 999 call. But this is not the case. The 6 minute clock begins ticking only when a mobilisation message arrives at the fire station and an appliance is booked-out. The end-time is measured when the vehicle comes to a halt at the incident and not when crew begin to fight the fire or perform any rescue. At incidents in high rise buildings many additional minutes can elapse between a fire engine arriving on the scene and the point at which crew are able to attack the fire or take-out casualties. 5.3 Members of this authority have viewed the BRE animations showing the spread of fire at Lakanal House and the chronology of LFB engagement. This shows that sufficient crews and appliances were speedily at the scene and that firefighters were
organised with efficiency and considerable urgency. Yet it took around 20 minutes from 1st arrival to establish a bridgehead and begin active firefighting. 5.4 Compared with fighting a fire in a single dwelling house, tower blocks present considerable extra challenges not least the additional vertical distances. Islington has a significant number of tower blocks especially in the southern part of the Borough which is covered by Clerkenwell fire station. 5.5 A very recent Islington incident illustrates the difference. On May 6th a fire broke out on the 7th floor of the 17 storey Kestrel House on Pickard Street, EC1. Eight pumps and over 50 crew attended the incident which was fortunately non-fatal. First, second and third appliances all arrived within target times; the occupant of the flat had evacuated and closed fire doors behind him; a fire lift was available and crews reached the affected floor quickly. It is estimated that it took around 4 further minutes between the arrival of sufficient appliances and active firefighting to begin. That means active fire-fighting began about 12 minutes after the arrival of the 1st appliance. 5.6 But circumstances might have been different. If the occupant had not closed the flat’s front door, smoke and heat would have affected the whole block and a large number of other occupants might have begun to use the lifts and stairs to evacuate. Equally, the arrival of a 3rd appliance – which is generally necessary before a BAequipped crew can begin to fight a tower block fire – might not have been so timely.
6.
The role and position of Clerkenwell fire station
6.1 We believe that Clerkenwell fire station has considerable strategic significance for fire and rescue cover in central London. It is one of several central London fire stations that are earmarked for closure in LSP5 and this would leave just 6 pumping appliances located within the central London Boroughs. Clerkenwell is London’s fifth busiest station for incidents after Soho, Paddington, Euston and Hammersmith. At 11%, its appliances have the third highest utilisation rate in London after Soho and Euston. 6.2 The station serves a Borough and close vicinity containing many highly sensitive buildings and places, including the Emirates Stadium which is considered to be such a high risk terrorist target that its underground car park has been banned for use by coaches despite being designed for that purpose. Kings Cross and St Pancras rail and underground stations now form the busiest transport interchange in Europe and, particularly in the case of international trains, represents a significant security risk. 6.3 The Kings Cross / Russell Square vicinity was the most affected site during the July 2005 terrorism incidents and it is significant that an appliance from Clerkenwell was first on scene to Russell Square despite the proximity of Euston fire station. Clerkenwell is also a fire station that attends incidents throughout the Square Mile, City Fringe, Holborn and the group of major hospitals and museums in Bloomsbury. Clerkenwell fire station specifically serves the hospitals at St Bartholomew’s, Great Ormond Street, Eastman Dental, the National Neurological and the Royal Ear Nose and Throat. 6.4 Within the south of Islington, we have significant large public venues such as Sadlers Wells theatre and the Business Design Centre which hold public events to which many hundreds of people are in attendance at any one time. Clerkenwell also serves sensitive and historic sites such as the Royal Courts of Justice, the Inns of Court, the City University, Honourable Artillery Company and the Queen Mary University Charterhouse campus.
6.5 Clerkenwell also houses one of the specialist rescue tenders for central London. We are concerned that LSP5 does not sufficiently address the level of need for rescue services, in particular, road traffic accidents. Clerkenwell’s rescue tender is geographically well positioned for incidents on Euston Rd / Pentonville Road (the A501, Inner Ring Road) where a number of fatal and life threatening casualties have occurred recently, especially those involving large trucks and cyclists. The Commissioner has indicated that facilities to counter biological, nuclear or chemical incidents which are housed at Clerkenwell would be relocated to Upper Street fire station, which would be around a mile further away from the central London locations which are most at risk. We do not believe that LSP5 has properly considered the impacts of scaling-back these specialist rescue services. 6.6 Clerkenwell fire station is extremely well located at the junction of Farringdon Road and Roseberry Avenue with a substantial forecourt and excellent access. Appliances can be moved out and heading in a range of directions very quickly and, from Clerkenwell, can respond faster to a much wider area than many other fire stations.
7.
Criterion for selecting stations to close
7.1 We consider that LSP5 has not fully used a risk-based criteria to select fire stations for closure and has chosen an arbitrary number of stations based not on risk and need but on a financial target set by the Mayor’s budget. 7.2 From a document presented in September to LFEPA Members and dated October 2012, it is shown that amongst the criteria used to select fire stations for closure were a number (headed as “estate considerations”) that included “Past/future capital investment” and “the PFI programme”. The chairman of the Authority is reliably quoted saying during Mayor’s Question Time on 17th October 2012 that there was a list of “safe” or “protected” fire stations. These had been eliminated from the trawl of candidate fire stations because they were financed through PFI or had recent or planned investment. He described some of the LFB’s fire stations as being “quite antiquated” and indicated that their age or lack of recent investment made them suitable for closure rather than being located in places where response times could be maintained if they were closed. Because a majority of older fire stations are located in central and inner London, this means an arbitrary reduction in fire cover for those Boroughs even though these are amongst the busiest of fire stations in the Capital, including Clerkenwell. 7.3 It is also clear that it is the simply the level of cut in funding from the Mayor’s budget that has driven the decision to opt for a combination of 100 fire stations and 151 appliances. In October 2012, LFEPA members were shown several cost-reducing combinations including one described as the “preferred option” which would close 17 stations and keep 152 appliances. Officials assured LFEPA Members that this option maintained 26 Boroughs within the 1st appliance target and 32 Boroughs within the 2nd appliance target – and saying that the latter represented an improvement on the existing position. This would have saved £65m from the LFEPA budget. The chairman of the Authority said the aim was to have a “smaller number of on average larger and more modern fire stations, and that will enable us to maintain our attendance times and keep Londoners safe.” The Mayor of London furthermore said this level of cuts would be “accompanied by no reduction in safety" and that Londoners would be “as protected from fire as they are at the moment”. In other words, this would be a more effective configuration of the Brigade’s resources. 7.4 However, LSP5 has retreated from that “preferred option” and proposes fewer cuts to fire stations or firefighter numbers than had been declared to be safe in October
2012. The reason is because the grant cut from central Government passed-on by the Mayor of London in his Component Budget was less than had been anticipated in October 2012 and £45 million of savings were now required. Whilst this means fewer fire stations are proposed for closure, it is evident that reduced Brigade size proposed in LSP5 has been determined by the budget decision of the Mayor and not by a strategic consideration about the optimal size of the LFB estate or the number of firefighters and appliances required to keep London safe.
