All political parties represented in the Swedish Riksdag (Parliament) agreed. ... thus several steps in European integra
Public awareness in the pre-accession period in Sweden
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Editor:
Rolf Engström, MFA, Press and Information department
Layout:
Jonas Nilsson, MFA, Press and Information department
Cover photo: Jonas Nilsson, MFA, Press and Information department Print:
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XBS Grafisk Service, Stockholm 2002 ISBN 91-7496-300-7 Art. no.: UD 02.066
The Swedish Government’s work on information and the media 1991–1994, prior to the Swedish referendum on membership of the EU
Contents: 0.
Introduction....................................................................................5
1.
Background to the negotiations.........................................................6
2.
Selected strategy..............................................................................8
3.
Financing.....................................................................................12
4.
Media management – focus and organisation...................................14
5.
The Secretariat for Information on European Affairs..........................18
6.
Public opinion on membership.......................................................25
7.
Conclusions..................................................................................27
8.
Appendix......................................................................................30
9.
Appendix II......................................................................................36
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Introduction
Sweden’s membership of the European Union became an issue in the early 1990s. Application for membership was submitted in 1991. By then, negotiations on the EEA agreement between the member states of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), and the European Community (EC) were already well under way. Soon enough, Sweden would have close cooperation with the EEA countries. The Government had declared its intention of submitting the question of Sweden’s membership to a referendum even before Sweden’s formal application. All political parties represented in the Swedish Riksdag (Parliament) agreed. The Riksdag also informed the Government that major information activities would be necessary prior to a referendum. The outcome of a referendum was not given. Irrespective of a possible outcome, it was recognised that thorough information was needed on the EEA agreement, on the existing EC and on the EU, which would come into force in November 1993, well before an eventual Swedish membership. There were thus several steps in European integration that had to be covered in the Swedish information campaign. The information activities that took place between 1992-1994 are described in this leaflet. It has been put together by Martin Haag, who at that time was Press Secretary to the Minister of European Affairs, and Thomasine Hindmarsh, then Information Officer at the Secretariat for Information on European Affairs. The material is based on the writers’ own experiences from that time. During the autumn of 2002, it will also be presented in speeches in some of the candidate countries engaged in planning referendums of their own.
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1. Background to the Swedish negotiations · Sweden outside the EC/EU for many years · Surprise application in 1991 · Public opinion positive from the outset The Swedish request for membership of the European Community was made public in late 1990. The formal application was submitted to the EC Council of Ministers in July 1991 by the (then) Social Democratic Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson. This step was seen as a total change in direction, as opposed to the earlier, very hesitant Swedish attitude towards EC membership. The question of membership had been an issue of public debate for many years, but the main obstacle had always been the traditional Swedish foreign policy of non-alignment. What made the situation change was primarily the new security order within Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. After the general elections in September 1991, a new, centre-right government was formed, headed by Prime Minister Carl Bildt from the Moderate Party. The new government fully supported the application for EC/EU membership and made it one of its top priorities. The Government wanted “to bring Sweden fully into the European Cooperation through negotiations for Membership of the European Community”, as it stated in its first declaration to the Riksdag in October 1991. The Prime Minister appointed a special minister within the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Foreign Ministry) to be responsible for the forthcoming negotiations. The assignment was given to Mr Ulf Dinkelspiel, Minister for European Affairs and Foreign Trade. The application for membership had broad political support, both from the Social Democratic Party (Sweden’s largest party) and the new coalition government, although there were very different opinions towards membership
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within the four government parties as well as within the Social Democratic Party. Membership or not was an issue that divided parties from within, rather than between them. The (smaller) Left Party and the Green Party were clear opponents to membership however. Around the time of application, public opinion was very much in favour of membership. According to the main poll institute (SIFO/Research International) over 60 per cent of the population was in favour. The question in the poll was phrased as follows: if there were a referendum today, would you vote Yes or No to a Swedish membership (of the European Community). The Yes-side had had a majority in the polls for several years, but public opinion was soon to change in a negative direction. Public opinion was a key to the whole process of membership, since the main political parties had decided in 1991 that the people should have the final vote through a referendum after negotiations. It is thus fair to say that, even at an early stage, the Government knew that it would have to conduct two parallel negotiations: one with the EC/EU and its members concerning the conditions for membership, and one with the Swedish people concerning public support for this bold new project.
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2. Selected strategy
· Information seen as a key issue · A separate body for factual and unbiased information · Financial support for adult education and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) · Government taking part in the debate – in favour of membership With the future referendum in mind, the issue of information, the media and opinion was seen as crucial from the beginning. This had also been of prime importance during the earlier process of Swedish-European integration, comprising membership of the EEA, an area of cooperation between the EU and EFTA (where Sweden had been one of the founders). The Swedish Riksdag had already asked the Government for proposals for increased information of various kinds. In view of this, the Government proposed to the Riksdag an information campaign in two stages: Stage 1. During the first year (fiscal year 1992/93) financial support was to be awarded to organisations wishing to inform and bring into discussion the European process of integration; the EEA agreement, the EC/EU and the Swedish membership application. The Government proposed a separate delegation, under the chairmanship of former Centre Party Prime Minister Thorbjörn Fälldin, to allocate grants and financial support to adult education and NGOs. Establishing a separate delegation was a way of avoiding the Government being accused of only promoting its own EU-positive policies. The Riksdag had also expressed the importance of engaging the adult education associations. 8
The Fälldin Delegation consisted of five persons, all of them experts on European integration. They also had very different opinions on the membership issue. The delegation was given the task of allocating money to adult education information projects run by adult education associations and Swedish NGOs over a two year period. The aim was to raise public awareness on EC/EU issues. (See more in details in the Appendix). Apart from the delegation, the main responsibility for EU information rested with the Foreign Ministry, which also conducted and coordinated the negotiations. Within the ministry, a separate body, the Secretariat for Information on EU Affairs, was planned to be set up. Stage 2. During the second year (fiscal year 1993/94) financial support would also be allocated to organisations wishing to conduct a formal campaign pro or contra Swedish membership, with the upcoming referendum in mind. The Government proposed to the Riksdag that the money available should be divided equally between the “Yes” and “No” side. Information issues led to a comprehensive debate in the Riksdag. Support for an information campaign was vast. There were requests for special information for women, as well as strong support for the traditional Swedish NGOs conducting various kind of education. The Riksdag stipulated that information was to be broad and comprehensive and mirror all sides. Both the positive and negative aspects of a Swedish membership should be highlighted and debated. The Government’s own ambition, with support from the Riksdag, was to concentrate primarily on information about the negotiation process. The Government was to provide basic information about the negotiations, proving that the results were in line with the demands that Sweden had already presented at the outset of negotiations. It would be false to pretend that the Government could give a “neutral” or indifferent attitude towards membership. It was clear from the start of the process that the Government’s overriding political goal was a Swedish membership.
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Thus, to fulfil the Riksdag’s demands for broad and comprehensive information, it was decided that a separate body - a Secretariat for Information on European Affairs (the Secretariat) - was to be set up within the MFA in order to ensure unbiased and factual information about the EC/EU, without taking a stand for or against membership. The Secretariat would function as a source of knowledge and information and, together with the adult education associations and NGOs, answer the need for basic facts prior to the referendum. The Secretariat would not produce opinions pro or contra membership. This role was confined to the political parties and campaign organisations. It was discussed whether the Secretariat should be given a more independent position, and placed outside the Government. However, the need for close contact with relevant experts within the Government, as well as easy access to the negotiation team, were important factors in deciding to set up the Secretariat within the Government, but with its own administration and budget. This solution was perhaps not perfect, and it would come into criticism, especially from opponents to Swedish membership. They claimed that the Secretariat would become a hidden propaganda organisation within the Government. The Government had no intention of creating such an organisation, however. This would easily have been exposed and would have backfired on the whole membership issue. Instead, by doing a good job, it was expected that the Secretariat would gradually be able to gain respect. Factual and unbiased information was needed in order to understand the rather complicated European issue. Information could reduce uncertainities, and enable citizens to take a personal decision, whether positive or negative, towards membership. But information as such was not enough for the final decision. There was also a need for debate, for various opinions to be uttered and challenged. The Government, with its own clear political objective, must also have scope to influence opinion and take part in the debate as must also political parties and organisations that were against membership. Debate was
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of greater importance than pure information in this process. On the other hand, a debate could not be undertaken without good basic information. A sufficient level of knowledge and information among citizens would avoid the debate becoming restricted to an area for the “political elite” only. The Government remembered the surprising No to EC membership that the Norwegian people had decided on back in 1973. A clear mistake from the Yesside, comprising the main political parties, the unions and the corporate sector, was the inability to involve the “man on the street”. European integration was thus seen as benefiting the “establishment” only. According to all the studies made of this issue, the Swedish people felt relatively uninformed and uninvolved in European matters. A “Eurobarometer” published in 1992 concluded that seven out of ten Swedes thought that they had too little knowledge about the EU. There is a strong tradition of easily accessible public information prior to political changes and decisions. Swedes demand an open debate and thorough information prior to political decisions. People often claim that they lack information and require more knowledge ahead of decisions. Clearly, the very complicated EU question was to be a great challenge for the political system in Sweden. Good, relevant information was a keyword for the whole process of integration.
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3. Financing
· SEK 181 million (EUR 20 million) over a two-year period · Split between the Government, adult education, NGOs and campaign organisations The Government realised early on in the process, even before the start of negotiations, that the vast information that would be required would also need extra money, in addition to the Government’s ordinary information budget. In its bill to the Riksdag (fiscal year 1992/93) the Government calculated that SEK 100 million (about EUR 11 million) would be required during the following two years. The Government asked for the Riksdag’s approval for this sum, which consisted of two items: the Government’s own EU information (performed by the information Secretariat) as well as grants to adult education and NGOs. The money would be allocated on a 50/50 basis between the Government itself and adult education and NGOs. This was a burden on top of the already very strained Government budget at a time when Sweden was in a recession and had large deficits in its public finances. The Government proposed to the Riksdag that half of the amount should be financed through cuts in other areas of public expenditures. However no extra cuts were made and the information campaign thus momentarily put strain on the budget. The need for a vast and costly information campaign was never questioned, and the Riksdag agreed that information prior to the referendum had to be given proper resources if it were to have a chance of reaching out to the public. When the date for the referendum had been set to 13 November 1994, it was evident that more money had to be allocated. Campaign organisations and political parties received an additional SEK 60 million (EUR 6.6 million) for 12
highlighting the pros and cons of membership. Information provided by the Government and Secretariat also proved to require more funding. In total, SEK 181 million (EUR 20 million) was granted for the Swedish information campaign. In addition, resources were used from other public sectors. Most important was that personnel for the Secretariat and public libraries (see Chapter 5) were recruited through a Government programme for the unemployed.
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4. Media management
· The media, the key information channel · Good service to journalists · Press briefings and –releases · An open information policy, promoting the Swedish view The Government chose a strategy of relying heavily on the media as a main channel of information to the people. The media was provided with background information about membership issues and the negotiations. Direct, public, information was to be handled by the separate Secretariat. An exception was a leaflet concerning the final result of the negotiations, which was produced by the Government once an accession treaty had been achieved in early 1994. This leaflet was distributed directly to all households. The media was chosen as the best way of reaching Swedish citizens. There were several reasons for this: 1. EC/EU negotiations were a “hot topic” in the general news, and attracted widespread attention from journalists and the media. Generally, they found it interesting, and often even exciting, to follow the process of negotiations. 2. The media had high credibility among Swedes, often higher than that of the Government itself. 3. Good media coverage demonstrated the Government’s choice to act forcefully, thus fulfilling the political goal of EU accession. This high visibility was also important in the domestic political debate. 4. The media reached large audiences in a very effective way.
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The Swedish media has a long tradition of engaging in public education. More than once, the main national newspapers produced large supplements about the EU and what Swedish membership would mean to its citizens with regard to such fields as the economy, politics, travel, education and other issues. Radio and TV staged many hearings and special programmes. Although most of the media had a critical angle in their coverage, this focus was a very valuable channel for information. The Foreign Ministry wanted an open information policy. As much of the negotiations were taking place behind closed doors, it was not always possible to give full information. But the Government insisted on giving the media the “Swedish view”, as it was known in turn, that their counterparts were giving the media their views. During the negotiations, the Foreign Ministry produced a serie of press releases, showing how far the negotiations had advanced, and how many of the 29 negotiation chapters that had been closed. Ministers from all ministries gave press briefings, adding more details about the on-going process. Often, these were held in Brussels. The Swedish Delegation to the EC/EU in Brussels was a vital focal point for media contacts. The Swedish media had many correspondents in Brussels, and they were the main target group. In Brussels, it was also easy to reach major journalists from foreign media. Another important target group was foreign correspondents based in Stockholm. The Foreign Ministry regularly produced special briefings and press releases for them too. Local media had fewer resources to cover European integration and were not so well-informed on European issues. The Secretariat for Information on European Affairs played an important part for them during the whole process (see Chapter 5). From a political perspective, the main task was to convey the message that Swedish negotiations for membership were succesful, and that the Government had obtained a response for special Swedish demands. This was a goal in itself. But the Government also knew that it would never obtain
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public support for a bad treaty in a referendum. The negotiators worked very hard to secure a good accession treaty. Swedish demands were made public in a speech by the Minister of European Affairs, Mr Dinkelspiel, in Brussels in February 1993 when the formal negotiations were opened. Media response was very good. The papers published long articles, with headlines reporting “Sweden’s tough demands” (Aftonbladet). Some papers printed Mr Dinkelspiel’s whole speech. Radio and TV broadcast direct. The Swedish demands had been coordinated with the Social Democratic opposition party, and had widespread support in the Riksdag. It was important at that time to show national unity in the forthcoming negotiations. After the opening, a year of tough negotiations followed. In March 1994, a preliminary agreement between Sweden and the EU member states (the EU had now come into force) was reached after some days of round-the-clock negotiations. The Foreign Ministry had prepared a comprehensive (10-page) press release, with a summary of the accession treaty well in advance. The summary was presented to the media at press conferences held by Swedish ministers in Brussels. The closing of the negotiations came as a great surprise, since the negotiations had previously been progressing very slowly. It resulted in “a news break-through” in all the media, and was given quite a positive angle. It is easier to get good publicity for something you achieve than for something that breaks apart! Important results in the negotiations were Sweden’s right to continue with its restrictive alcohol policy, as well as the use of the special Swedish “moist snuff”, and our high environmental standards. This was all presented in the media as “gifts to the people” from the negotiations. This kind of news was regarded as hot stuff by the media, and the vast coverage certainly considerably helped the Government on its home turf. Information and media work was coordinated by the Foreign Ministry and Mr Dinkelspiel’s office. The main tools were:
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· · ·
Press releases Frequent press briefings Direct contacts, updating key journalists
A special group of information officers from the various ministries was set up to follow and coordinate intra-government work. Each minister had responsibility for his/her own areas, such as agriculture or finance. The Prime Minister had a strong personal interest in the EU process, and within the Prime Minister’s Office one person was given a special role for information and polical coordination. The Government tried to set up a special body to monitor the daily press, with the task of “correcting” misinformation and false reports. This proved a less successful initiative, however. In Sweden, it is very difficult to get the media to make swift corrections. It was found more productive to let a few false reports slip through, and instead comment and correct the false picture when given the initiative in the media. Details were important, but equally important was the general impression of the whole process. A screening of media coverage showed that it was relatively unbiased, presenting both positive and negative sides. The editorial pages were generally favourable towards membership. National unity also worked in favour of the Government. The negotiations could be compared with sports events, where national teams often have the broad public support of their own citizens. There was a good deal of speculation before the negotiations that Sweden would do badly, and “give up the match”. This kind of criticism was hardly seen in the media after the negotiations were closed.
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5. The Secretariat for Information on European Affairs · Unbiased information within the Foreign Ministry · Separate budget and personnel to ensure neutrality regarding membership The Secretariat for Information on European Affairs (the Secretariat) was located in the Foreign Ministry to enable it to make use of the knowledge of experts on European integration. These were at the time mainly to be found within the ministries, especially within the Foreign Ministry and its trade department, responsible for negotiations. The Riksdag had stated that broad, comprehensive and unbiased information should be spread all over the country. The Secretariat was not to argue for membership and it was to take no part in the debate. The main task was instead to facilitate peoples’ own decisions in the referendum to come. The overall objective for the Secretariat was initially set up by the Minister of European Affairs, Mr Dinkelspiel. He formulated it quite simply, stating that nobody should be able to argue, on the day of the referendum, that they had lacked information. Head of the Secretariat was Ms Suzanne Askelöf, who was recruited from the Swedish Association of Local Authorities. All personnel were recruited from outside the Government Offices. The Secretariat had a budget of its own of a total of SEK 63 million (EUR 7 million). All of the above were in order to ensure an unbiased performance.
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Forming an information strategy · Surveys on information behaviour on which to base the strategy · Printed matter, distribution through networks and direct information services the main cornerstones To establish an information strategy, the Secretariat began by analysing the need for information. Surveys and opinion polls were used to obtain a picture of what people knew about the EEA agreement and the EC/EU, what they wanted to know more about and what information channels that were found reliable. Researchers on mass communication were also asked for advice. The Secretariat realised that knowledge of European integration was limited and that people wanted to learn more. As regards information channels, the media was the most important. Several surveys over the years have shown that the mass media has considerable impact on Swedes’ opinions and knowledge. In 1992-1993, the main national dailies, TV and news agencies had correspondents in Brussels and covered European matters to some extent, while local media found it difficult to find the time to engage in European integration and knew less about it. It was also noted that opinions and attitudes are often formed within groups of friends, family and colleagues. In these limited groups, people who took an active part in the public debate were important opinion-makers. When forming the strategy to reach out to the people, it was also considered of interest that a majority of the Swedes quite often visited public libraries, not only to borrow books but also to find information about politics, services and current issues. The above findings resulted in the conclusion that the Secretariat would focus its strategy on three main activities:
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1. Producing basic, unbiased and comprehensive information material at different levels to make information accessible. 2. Distributing information material through well-established institutions that could reach large groups of people. An information network was set up with libraries, schools, adult education associations, NGOs and journalists. 3. Establishing a direct information service for people who wanted to pose questions directly; a call centre. Using these three types of channels, the Secretariat would ensure that broad and comprehensive facts about European integration would be available all over Sweden. More details about these activities can be found in the Appendix. When reviewing the strategy today, it is important to note that the Internet was not available at the time. Today, the Internet could have been an easy way of producing and spreading information and holding a dialogue with people.
Press service · Journalists needed extra attention · Background information sent out prior to events · Seminars held in Sweden and Brussels The call centre that was set up for the general public received many calls from journalists asking for help in finding information and background facts for their reports and articles. Journalists and editorial offices were found to need special attention in terms both of more thorough facts and instant answers. Responding to this need, a call service was set up that was exclusive to the media. The Government’s own work with the media dealt with negotiations for membership (Chapter 4). The major newspapers and news agencies had correspondents in Brussels who had a good grasp of European integration. Local media had less knowledge and resources for covering EU issues. At times they also needed help in understanding the background to information about the negotiations from the Government. 20
The press service became an important service centre. It answered questions within hours and sent out background information prior to major decisions and events. Local media made extensive use of the service, and the national dailies and major news desks on TV and radio were frequent callers. Employees of the press service were also asked to appear on both TV and radio. This contributed to the Secretariat’s own marketing. The Secretariat also conducted a series of seminars for journalists in different parts of Sweden and a trip to Brussels was arranged for some thirty journalists in 1994 to meet with experts in the Swedish Delegation to the EU and in EU institutions.
Target groups appointed by the Riksdag · The Riksdag appointed groups with special needs · Disabled, immigrants, young people · Women’s perspectives on membership · Activities performed by the Secretariat and NGOs who received money from the Fälldin Delegation When the Riksdag approved the funding for the information campaign, it also pointed out that certain groups had special needs as regards information. It was the Secretariat’s duty to cater for these groups. This applied to the disabled. For the visually handicapped, information was available on cassettes and in Braille. Deaf people could communicate with the call centre through a text-telephone and a special information brochure was available for people with mental development disturbances. Immigrants were another target group, since they could have difficulties taking advantage of normal sources of information. A brochure was therefore translated into the eight largest immigrant languages. Pupils in the upper secondary school were also targeted. Schools became members of the Secretariat’s network and were given extra attention. A one-
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day EU introductory course was provided for teachers and school librarians all over the country. Schools had free access to the data bases and they could order as much as they wanted of the printed matter. The fact sheets were commonly used in teaching. The call centre also helped many pupils with questions they had when writing essays. In addition, an exhibition and a book on the EU aimed directly at young people was produced by an independent group consisting of journalists and artists. The “Mexa Express” project was sponsored by the Secretariat. The exhibition toured Sweden by train and the book, which was very much appreciated among young people because of its informal tone, was sent out to schools. Finally, the Riksdag had pointed out that it was important also to focus on women’s perspectives on EU issues. The Secretariat conducted seminars highlighting these issues, and disseminated printed matter. Another important means of reaching the prioritised target groups was through the Fälldin Delegation, which allocated money to information projects in accordance with these priorities.
Knowledge and information need among the general public · Continuous evaluation to ensure results · EU membership was considered a very complex question · The media was the most credible channel · The Secretariat managed to gain relatively high credibility The Secretariat’s activities were continuously evaluated to ensure that resources were deployed in an efficient manner and that information was, in fact, easily accessible. For this task, the Department of Journalism and Mass Communication at the University of Gothenburg was engaged. Surveys conducted by this university showed that the question of Sweden’s
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membership was considered to be very complex by a majority of people. The last month before the referendum, interest for the matter had increased but the majority of the adult population was uncertain as to how they should vote. The media, and especially TV and morning papers, were the most important channels for information. But in the last month as many as 78 per cent of the population also wanted more thorough information than that given by the media. Discussions with friends and family were in that sense important for a majority of the people. The Secretariat was also stated to be an important and credible source of information. Over 40 per cent of the population had read some of its material at the time of the referendum. Over 50 per cent were also aware that there was a call centre they could use. Two thirds of the population thought it was easy to find information prior to the referendum. Considering all the activities performed and the amount of money spent on the information campaign, the fact that one-third still had difficulties in finding information, once again proves the great demand posed by the Swedish people on information. Another figure showed that 75 per cent knew that there was information available, but they hadn’t read it since it was too difficult or because of lack of time. As a consequence, only about 40 per cent considered that they knew enough about the EU one month before the referendum. A few months earlier that figure had been 60 per cent, so people seem to have become more insecure towards the end, when they had to take a stand. A possible reason why so many were indecisive may have been a feeling of uncertainty about the future. It was hard to give absolute firm answers as to what membership – or standing outside the EU – would mean on areas such as Sweden’s independence, the rate of crime and threats to or improvements in the environment. The campaign organisations had different attitudes and answers to several questions and the Secretariat could only state what rules would have to change (some for the better, some for the worse). At times, the call centre personnel noted that people were confused and, as a point of interest, also frustrated over the fact that the Secretariat would not advise them on how to vote!
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Given the above, it is interesting to note that 34 per cent of the population thought that feelings were more important than logical arguments when one was to decide on a Yes or No and as many as 42 per cent thought it was a matter of principle which no information could change. The figures above are average figures. There was considerable divergence in the ways in which different groups of society sought information and how involved they were in the referendum. The well-educated had more knowledge than the less educated and were also more active in seeking information. Men thought that they knew more than women and people in the cities had a greater knowledge than people in the countryside. The Department of Journalism and Mass Communication at the University of Gothenburg stated briefly in their final report on the information campaign that people all over Sweden were seriously engaged in the question of membership. They sought information, they made use of the EU info points that the libraries constituted, many rang the call centre and they generally discussed the issues involved to a large extent. People were emotionally engaged. However, it is interesting to note that their knowledge of basic EU matters, such as the role of the Council of Ministers, hardly increased at all.
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6. Public opinion on membership
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· No-side gaining strength · Large numbers of undecided · Lack of sufficient information and knowledge From the Government’s point of view, the most difficult part of the whole European integration process was to convince the Swedish people of the advantages of EU membership. As mentioned earlier, positive opinion shifted rather abruptly during 1992. Several reasons can be found: · Economic recession in Sweden in the early 1990s · Growing reluctance towards supra-nationality and political union · Scepticism towards a single currency · Important national issues seen as threatened by EU membership · Concerns about reduced welfare and social services Negative opinion culminated in the autumn of 1992, when 53 per cent of the population said they would vote No in a referendum. The Yes-side only gathered 30 per cent. A year earlier, 60 per cent had said they would vote Yes. During 1993, the Yes-side increased slowly to around 35 per cent, but the Noside still had the lead. There was no given outcome for the referendum. A large proportion of the population, approximately 30 per cent, was unsure and undecided just before the referendum in November 1994. The referendum concerned a Yes or No to the accession treaty that Sweden had negotiated with the EU. In the actual referendum, on 13 November 1994, 1. See appendix II
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Yes-votes outweighed the No-votes. 52.27 per cent voted for membership according to the accession treaty and 46.83 per cent voted against. About 83 per cent of the population took part in the referendum. After the referendum, support for membership once more declined, followed by stronger support after some three years of membership. Women were more negative than men. Elderly and young people were also more negative than middle-aged people. The typical No-voter was a woman, employed in the public sector. The typical Yes-voter was a middle-aged, privately employed, man.
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7. Conclusions
· Large resources required · Unbiased information necessary · Public debate necessary for final decision In our experience, it was a wise decision to spend considerable resources on information. A referendum as a forum for decision-making requires substantial information efforts. As the Government itself was in favour of membership, it was also wise to confine the allocation of money for adult education and NGOs to a separate delegation. In Sweden, with a well-developed network of adult education associations and NGOs, information, knowledge and education that was channelled outside official institutions was very important. To allocate substantial sums for these organisations made the Government less vulnerable to criticism than if it had tried to promote its own policies with public money. Public support for the Fälldin Delegation was large. It was perceived as honest and just. The Government deliberately chose not to use advertising- or PR agencies in the information campaign. This would have backfired and certainly given the whole campaign a less serious image. Those parties and organisations that wanted to run their own campaigns pro or contra membership were, of course, free to use agencies. The Secretariat for Information on European Affairs managed to gain relatively high credibility for its work, but the fact that it was placed within the Foreign Ministry meant that it had to work hard to achieve it. This took a lot of time and energy which could otherwise have been used for actual information activities. On the other hand, the Secretariat would have had great difficulties in receiving facts and updates on the negotiations if it had been placed outside the Government Offices.
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The Secretariat’s printed matter was initially subject to criticism for being hidden propaganda. It was therefore was very cautious in eliminating all judgements and views of opinion and concentrating on basic and easy readable facts. Facts were received from experts in the ministries and then edited into easily understandable texts. At times, this process created tensions between experts and information officers, who had different roles. Experts were working with the negotiations and, of course, arguing in favour of the Government’s achievements while information officers were struggling to show that they were unbiased and to make the EU interesting for people who knew very little, which also meant simplifying the facts. The two campaign organisations referred to the Secretariat from time to time, on some occasions agreeing, and on others arguing that the Secretariat was wrong. This was, in fact, positive for the Secretariat. It would have been devastating always to have been applauded by one side. The call centre and information available at libraries was a success in so far that information was easily accessible for everyone. Printed matter was produced in very large editions and it can be questioned whether the quantity needed was actually over-estimated. However, this made it easy to find throughout the country. The least succesful part of the whole information campaign was probably the brochures distributed to all households. One was sent out by the Secretariat just when the negotiations opened (but was in fact written by experts in the Government since the Secretariat did not yet have its own editorial staff). The second was produced by the Government when the accession treaty was closed and gave the Government’s view on the treaty. It was much criticised. The impact of these brochures can be questioned. They were expensive to distribute, many probably went into the waste paper basket and they were accused of being hidden propaganda. The debate on being “neutral or not”, clouded the main information purpose. The Swedish information campaign took place in 1992-94, well before the arrival of the Internet in daily life. If it had been organised today, a major part of the information effort would probably have been published on the Internet, and much less resources spent on brochures.
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In conclusion, it must be appreciated that information campaigns are difficult to run, especially on subjects that are controversial, which EU membership was for Sweden. There is often an assumption that information campaigns are hidden propaganda and the opposite then has to be proved. The fact that the two campaign sides, working for Yes and No in the referendum, were given equal economical support was extremely important. Despite this, the No-side argued that the conditions were unfair, since the Yesside was, in fact, supported by industry, by the farmers association and several trade unions that also put money into the Yes-campaign. The anti-EU movement did not have such financially strong supporters and because of this, it is true that the Yes-side was in fact financially stronger. Public support was however allocated equally. The main task of this campaign was to give the Swedish people information that enabled citizens to form a personal opinion and to take part in the referendum. The overall goal laid down by the Riksdag about “broad, comprehensive and easy accessible information” prior to the referendum seems to have been relatively well achieved. Information was available and people were engaged in the matter. The level of knowledge, however, did not increase.
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8. Appendix
The Fälldin Delegation in more detail The Fälldin Delegation allocated funds for information projects run by adult education associations and NGOs. In the second year, campaign organisations were also invited to apply for grants. Support could be awarded for seminars, courses, education and exhibitions as well as for the production and distribution of information material. Support was not given to administration costs. Individuals, companies, political parties and the mass media could not be granted funds. The Delegation covered 80 per cent of the budgeted costs of an approved project while the organisation itself had to provide the other 20 per cent. To be approved, an information project had to be broad and comprehensive, have a distinct information purpose and a target group. The effects of membership on the situation of women in Sweden was a subject that was particularly prioritised in accordance with the guidelines laid down by the Riksdag. Applications had to contain a project plan and budget. This helped the Delegation to conclude whether it was a seriously considered project that would generate the widespread dissemination of information. The Delegation announced every period of application in national morning papers. On each occasion, several hundred organisations applied for funds and from these, some 20-30 organisations were usually approved. The Delegation chose to grant funds to major projects that were considered to have a good chance of reaching out to the public. The major part of the money was allocated to the well-established adult educational associations and schools. In the first year (1991/1992) they received SEK 16 million while SEK 9 million went to NGOs. During the second year (1992/93), campaign organisations were also invited to apply for contributions for campaign activities. The closer to the referendum, the more important it was to help stimulate the debate on the pros and cons of membership. Adult educational associations and schools received SEK 12
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million, NGOs SEK 2 million and the campaign organistions SEK 5 million each. An additional SEK 60 million (EUR 6.6 million) was subsequently allocated to these organisations and the political parties in the Riksdag for campaign activities.
The Secretariat’s main activities in more detail Production of information material and data bases
· Brochures at different levels of simplification to make them easy to read for everyone · Data bases · Fast production on topical issues The Secretariat recruited its own journalists and started publishing booklets, fact sheets and brochures with facts on European integration, covering the EEA agreement and the EC/EU. Facts were collected from government officials involved in European affairs and edited by the Secretariat’s editorial office. The fact sheets were published in three different series at varying levels of simplification.. The brochures had to be easily accessible in two ways; easy to obtain, but also easy to read and comprehend. Ultimately, there were three general brochures, 20 booklets and about 100 fact sheets at different levels. Printed matter dealt with subjects that people wanted to know more about (which the Secretariat gathered from the call centre). Eventually the material covered all factual matters. Whenever there was an increase in interest in some issue, a new fact sheet was produced in order to provide people with the facts they wanted. Printed matter was published in very large editions (300 000 to 600 000 copies). It was distributed all over the country and was free to pick up in all public libraries. It was also to be found in, for example, employment offices, hospitals and social insurance offices and closer to the referendum, in post offices. The very first brochure was sent to all households.
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In addition to printed matter, the Secretariat produced data bases They consisted of : “Questions and Answers” - answers to common questions received by the call centre. “EU Lecturers” - 700 experts and debaters from government ministries, public authorities, universities, adult education associations, NGOs and campaign organisations who had agreed to give lectures and take part in debates. “The EU Calendar” - information about activities and events concerning the EU in Brussels as well as all over Sweden. “EU directives” - directives and xx in full text “ABC to Europe” - explanations for abbreviations “EU bibliography” – an extensive bibliography over EU literature.
Spreading the information widely through networks · Easy accessible information all over the country · Cooperation with existing institutions · Libraries encouraged to take on regional and local EU information services In order to spread printed matter, the Secretariat established contact with several existing institutions and opinion-makers and engaged them in an information network. These institutions continuously came into contact with a large number of people of different ages and with different backgrounds. Without them, the Secretariat would have been unable to reach all these groups of people on its own. Furthermore, the Secretariat wanted to cooperate with institutions that already enjoyed credibility from the public. Using a network was time-saving in several ways.
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The most innovative project was probably the way in which the Secretariat invited Sweden’s well organised local public libraries and county administrative boards to take part in an information network. A library support organisation was created and libraries were offered several activities and means to help them build up their own EU information services. In 1992, there were approximately 1 400 library units in Sweden and as many as 60 per cent of the population visited local libraries regularly. Libraries received printed matter to hand out free to their visitors and had data bases, reference literature and special advice services from the Secretariat. The main libraries in each municipality appointed “EU-librarians” who were offered a training programme (university level) on European integration. If needed, “EU librarians” could be recruited within the framework of a Government training scheme for the unemployed. The EU services available at libraries were also marketed through the Secretariat. Libraries were also encouraged to cooperate with EU institutions and campaign organisations, and display their printed matter as well. As a result, public libraries came to play a very important part in the lead-up to the referendum as well-known and easy accessible EU info points. There was a steady increase in the demand for free brochures at all libraries. Other institutions to be engaged were the county administrative boards. They appointed “EU coordinators” with the task of networking within each region and encouraging information activities arranged by organisations, institutions and libraries, supported by the Secretariat. Cooperation was also established with schools and teachers, universities, organisations and NGOs. Journalists were another important group for the Secretariat. All groups talking part in the information network were provided with basic information, some especially designed for their particular need. Seminars on several topics and with various target groups were also arranged for them in different parts of Sweden.
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The call centre · A direct information service - call centre - for posing questions · Basic facts, no pros and cons · A data base of “Q’s and A’s” built up as a working tool In addition to its other activities, the Information Secretariat set up a call centre for those who wanted to pose questions directly and find out more about particular issues. Moreover, such a service was necessary for people who could not make it to a library. The call centre was both a way of ensuring that information was easy accessible for everyone and a means of holding a dialogue with people and finding out what they wanted to know. The call centre was manned by young law and social science graduates who were trained in EU integration and EC law. They were recruited under a Government training programme for the unemployed. The service was available on weekdays from 9 a.m. to 9 p.m. on a toll-free number. Callers received an answer at once or otherwise within 24 hours. Printed matter could also be ordered through the call centre. After being reviewed by experts, the questions and answers were put into a data base. The “Q’s and A’s” was used as a working tool when answering which allowed the call centre to answer more rapidly over time. It was also used as input when deciding on topics for new fact sheets. At times, there was great pressure on the call centre. In general, the number of calls increased every time the media contained news about Sweden and the EEA agreement or Sweden and the EU. To find out whether the Secretariat was really unbiased and neutral concerning membership, many journalists called and “tested” the call centre. Employees were, however, very cautious at giving any judgments or opinions. Questions about the pros and cons of membership were also referred to the two campaign organisations. In the final months before the referendum, the number of calls increased day by day, rocketing during the last two weeks. The call centre then received about a thousand calls a day. Twenty people were engaged in answering questions. 34
Marketing · Modest marketing budget · Information spots on TV and radio · Advertisements in newspapers when the interest arose To further increase knowledge about the information available throughout the country, the Secretariat did some marketing of its services. The budget for marketing was fairly modest, only a few per cent of its total budget. The strategy was to advertise when public interest rose due to EEA or EC/EU news in the media. Focus was mainly put on the last couple of months, which were expected to be the most intense as regards the debate and peoples’ interest. The principal means of marketing were information spots on national and commercial TV, national and local radio and a limited advertising campaign in newspapers. The Secretariat advertised in the major national morning and evening papers, as well as in local media and specialised periodicals, in order to cover the whole country and people with different interests. The institutions that took part in the network were also provided with posters to display their own EU services. The message of this marketing was “You need information prior to the referendum to enable you to form your own opinion. Unbiased information is available. Go to your library, dial the call centre and order our brochures”. Activities taking place at libraries, schools, NGOs and other networking institutions as well as attention in the media were still the most important ways of marketing the information available prior to the referendum.
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9. Appendix II
EU Preferences in Sweden EU preferences (May 1992–May 1994). Percentage Total For
Against Don’t know
Tot. %
No. resp.
Women For Against Don’t know
May ‘92
31.1
35.8
33.0
100
7522
23.1
39.4
37
Nov ‘92
27.4
43.2
29.4
100
7491
20.8
45.7
33
May ‘93
28.2
42.5
29.2
100
7406
21.0
45.7
33
Nov ‘93
26.0
44.8
29.2
100
7496
19.8
46.4
33
May ‘94
30.5
40.0
29.4
100
7492
24.6
41.2
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Question: If there were a referendum today about Sweden joining the EU, h or against joining?
EU preferences (May 1995 – May 1996). Percentage Total Yes/ for
No/ against
Don't know
Tot. %
No. resp.
Women Yes/ No/ for against
Don't know
Referendum Nov ‘941
48.3
42.0
9.7
100
7443
43.7
45.3
11
May ‘952
28.6
61.9
9.5
100
7422
23.2
65.7
11
Nov ‘95
26.9
60.5
12.6
100
7521
20.8
65.0
14
May ‘96 May ‘963
26.2
60.4
13.3
100
3673
19.9
65.1
15
30.0
52.4
17.6
100
3710
23.7
56.8
19
1
This is the distribution of the answers to the question: “How did you vote in membership?”. In this case “Don’t know” includes 8.7 percentage points “Di 2
Question (May 1995–May 1996): If there were a referendum today on the S the EU, how would you vote – YES or NO to membership? 3
Question (May 1996 –): Are you principally for or against Sweden’s memb you undecided?
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EU Preferences in Sweden May 1992 - May 2002
How woul d you vote?
How did you vote?
How would you vote?
For / aga members
Per cent 70
60
No
50 Against 40
30 For
Yes
20 Don't know 10 Statis
0 May Nov May Nov May Ref. May Nov May Nov May Nov May Nov Ma 92 92 93 93 94 Nov94 95 95 96 96 97 97 98 98 99
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