Risky Borrowers or Risky Mortgages? - UNC Center for Community ...

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Risky Borrowers or Risky Mortgages? Innovative Financial Services for the Underserved: Opportunities and Outcomes 2009 Community Affairs Research Conference

Research Funded by the Ford Foundation

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Findings: Mortgage Matters •For borrowers with similar characteristics, the estimated default risk is much lower with a prime, CRA-type loan than with a subprime mortgage. •Variable interest rates, repayment penalties, and broker origination help explain why subprime loans are more likely to fail. 2 Research Funded by the Ford Foundation

CAP Program Overview

• Partnership between Self-Help, Ford Foundation, Fannie Mae • Secondary market outlet for CRA/Affordable Housing loans • Fixed rate, 30-year, prime mortgages • 50,000 loans funded; $4.5 Billion • Who is served? • Low down-payments • More than half had original LTV of 97% or above • Flexibility on credit and income • More than 40% minorities; more than 40% female-headed • Average income $32,600 (62% of Area Median Income).3 Research Funded by the Ford Foundation

CAP Borrowers & Subprime Borrowers CreditCredit Score Distribution 2003-2006 Score Distribution 2003-2006 0.06

CAP

CAPsubprime Subprime

0.05

Density

0.04

0.03

0.02

0.01

0 300

390

480

570

660

750

840

FICO Score

ORIG. FICO SCORE 4 Research Funded by the Ford Foundation

Propensity Score Match: Focus on borrowers with similar risk characteristics but holding different products.

Prime Loans

Subprime Loans

Prime Borrowers Subprime Borrowers

CA P

Subprime 5 Research Funded by the Ford Foundation

For Similar Borrowers – Subprime Loans Do Worse Predicted Serious Delinquency 24 Months after Origination

3.5x

CAP Subprime 3.99x

2004 Originations

2006 Originations

Note: Estimation is based on a borrower with a FICO score between 580-620 with the mean value of other regressors. Controlling variables include borrower DTI, FICO score, home equity, loan age, loan size, area credit risk, area unemployment rate, and interest rate environment.

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Research Funded by the Ford Foundation

Subprime Features are Linked to Elevated Default Risk: Subprime Loan Feature

Default Rate of subprime vs CAP

ARM

2004 Loans

2006 Loan

1.6 x

1.26 x

3.3 x

3.3 x

5.9 x

3.04 x

5.7 x

3.6 x

Prepay Broker Penalty

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The predicted cumulative default rate is defined as 90-day delinquency as of 24 months after origination for a borrower with a FICO score between 580-620 and holding a mortgage originated in 2004 or 2006, with the mean value of other regressors. The estimation is based on regression results to be found in the full paper. The subprime default is compared to the level of default for CAP loans, which are retail originated, fixed-rate loans without prepayment penalty.

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Research Funded by the Ford Foundation

Predicted Serious Delinquency 24 Months After Origination Community Lending (CAP) and Broker Originated Subprime Loans Cumulative Serious Delinquency Rate 24 Months after Origination (CAP vs. Broker Originated Subprime Loans) CAP 60% 50% 40%

sub_bro sub_bro&ppp sub_bro&arm sub_bro&arm&ppp

30% 20% 10% 0% 2004 Orig

2006 Orig

Note: Estimation is based on a borrower with a FICO score between 580-620 with the mean value of other regressors. sub_bro&ppp and sub_bro represent broker-originated subprime FRMs with and without 8 prepayment penalties respectively; sub_bro&arm&ppp and sub_bro&arm represent broker-originated subprimeARMs with and without prepayment penalties respectively. Research Funded by the Ford Foundation

Findings •For low-income/low-wealth households, mortgage default risk can be significantly mitigated by product and origination process. •Subprime features (Variable interest rates, repayment penalties, and broker origination) increase likelihood of mortgage default. Implications • Subprime products/broker channel are root causes. • Given an opportunity to access fair mortgages, many foreclosed families would still be in their homes. 9 Research Funded by the Ford Foundation

UNC Center for Community Capital University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 919-843-2140 www.ccc.unc.edu 10 Research Funded by the Ford Foundation