Scott S. Lee: Curriculum Vitae - Scholars at Harvard - Harvard University

Mar 14, 2018 - Clinical Fellow in Medicine, Harvard Medical School, 2015-Present. Education ... better, with health facility and household survey data showing ...
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Scott S. Lee Brigham and Women’s Hospital 75 Francis Street Boston, MA 02115

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[email protected] scholar.harvard.edu/lee http://bit.ly/scott_lee_cv

Employment Resident in Internal Medicine (Primary Care Track), Brigham and Women’s Hospital, 2015-Present. References: Bill Taylor Brigham and Women’s Hospital [email protected]

Joel Katz Brigham and Women’s Hospital [email protected]

Clinical Fellow in Medicine, Harvard Medical School, 2015-Present.

Education Ph.D. Health Policy and Management, Harvard Graduate School of Arts and Sciences and Harvard Business School, 2015. Thesis Title: “Three Field Experiments on Incentives for Health Workers” References: Nava Ashraf London School of Economics [email protected]

Paul Farmer Harvard Medical School [email protected]

Michael Kremer Harvard University [email protected]

Rob Huckman Harvard Business School [email protected]

M.D. Harvard Medical School, 2015. M.P.A. Development Studies, Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, 2006. M.Phil. Environment and Development, Highest Honors, University of Cambridge, 2004. A.B. Anthropology and Religion, summa cum laude, Certificate in African Studies, Harvard College, 2003.

Economics Publications and Work in Progress (* Denotes alphabetical authorship and equal contribution to work) Lee SS. “Intrinsic Incentives: A Field Experiment on Leveraging Intrinsic Motivation in Public Service Delivery,” January 2018, 1–44. (Job Market Paper) Although extrinsic and intrinsic motivation likely jointly explain the effort of many agents engaged in public service delivery, canonical models of incentives in firms focus on the former. In the context of a rural health worker program in India, I develop and test a novel

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mobile phone app designed to increase agents’ intrinsic returns to effort. At one year of follow-up, the self-tracking app leads to a 24% increase in performance as measured by the main job task (home visits). Moreover, the app is most effective when it leverages pre-existing intrinsic motivation: it produces a 41% increase in performance in the top tercile of intrinsically motivated workers, but no improvement in the bottom tercile. This treatment effect persists over time for the most intrinsically motivated workers, whereas early improvements decay among the most extrinsically motivated workers. Supplementary evidence suggests that the treatment effect on performance is mediated primarily by making effort more intrinsically rewarding, and not by other mechanisms such as the provision of implicit extrinsic incentives. Despite these effects on worker performance, I find no effect on health outcomes. Ashraf N, Bandiera O, Lee SS. “Awards Unbundled: Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 100 (April 2014): 44–63.* Organizations often use non-monetary awards to incentivize performance. Awards may affect behavior through several mechanisms: by conferring employer recognition, by enhancing social visibility, and by facilitating social comparison. In a nationwide health worker training program in Zambia, we design a field experiment to unbundle these mechanisms. We find that employer recognition and social visibility increase performance while social comparison reduces it, especially for low-ability trainees. These effects appear when treatments are announced and persist through training. The findings are consistent with a model of optimal expectations in which low-ability individuals exert low effort in order to avoid information about their relative ability. Ashraf N, Bandiera O, Lee SS. “Losing Prosociality in the Quest for Talent?: Sorting, Selection, and Productivity in the Delivery of Public Services” (Previously, “Do-Gooders and Go-Getters: Career Incentives, Selection, and Performance in Publi