THE CONDITION OF CITIZENSHIP

Politics and Culture A Theory, Culture & Society series Politics and Culture analyses the complex relationships between political institutions, civil society and contemporary states. Individual books will draw on the major theoretical paradigms in sociology, politics and philosophy within which citizenship, rights and justice can be understood. The series will focus attention on the importance of culture and the implications of globalization and postrnodernism for the study of politics and society. It will relate these advanced theoretical issues to conventional approaches of welfare, participation and democracy. SERIES EDITOR:

THE CONDITION OF CITIZENSHIP

edited by

Bryan S. Turner, Deakin University

EDITORIAL BOARD

Bart van Steenbergen

J .M. Barbalet, Australian National University Mike Featherstone, University of Teesside Step hen Kalberg, Boston University Carale Paternan, University of California, Los Angeles Also in this series

Welfare and Citizenship Beyond the Crisis of the Welfare State'! Tan Cuipitt Citizenship and Social Theory edited by Bryan S. Turner

@ SAGE Publications London • Thousand Oaks • New Delhi

Editorial arrangement, Chapters 1 and 11 © Bart van Steenbergen 1994 Chapter 2 © Ralf Dahrendorf 1994 Chapter 3 © Jiirgen Habermas 1994 Chapter 4 © Herman van Gunsteren 1994 Chapter 5 © William Julius Wilson 1994 Chapter 6 © Hans Adriaansens 1994 Chapter 7 © Ursola Vogel 1994 Chapter 8 © Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon 1994 Chapter 9 © Attila Agh 1994 Chapter 10 © Richard Falk 1994 Chapter 12 © Bryan S. Turner 1994

CONTENTS ,

//2 Contributors

lA .-!-i L

First published 1994 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, transmitted or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without permission in writing from the Publishers. SAGE Publications Ltd 6 Bonhill Street London ECZA 4PU SAGE Publications Inc 2455 Teller Road Thousand Oaks, California 91320

1 The Condition of Citizenship: an Introduction

British Library Cataloguing in Publication data Condition of Citizenship. - (Politics & Culture Series) 1. Steenbergen, Bart Van n. Series 323.6 ISBN O-ll039-8881-8 ISBN O-ll039-8882--6 (pbk) Library of Congress catalog card number 93-087423

Typeset by Photoprint, Torquay, Devon Printed in Great Britain by BiddIes Ltd, Guildford, Surrey

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Bart van Steenbergen L

2 The Changing Quality of Citizenship

10

Ral! Dahrendor!

3 Citizenship and National Identity

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!ilrgen Habermas

4 Four Conceptions of Citizenship

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Herman van Gunsteren

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Citizenship and the Inner-City Ghetto Poor William ! ulius Wilson

6 Citizenship, Work and Welfare

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Hans Adriaansens

7 Marriage and the Boundaries of Citizenship

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Ursula Vogel 8

SAGE Publications India Pvt Ltd 32, M-Block Market Greater Kailash - I N!!w Delhi 110 048

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Civil Citizenship against Social Citizenship? Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon

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9 Citizenship and Civil Society in Central Europe

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Attila Agh 10 The Making of Global Citizenship Richard Falk

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Towards a Global Ecological Citizen Bart van Steenbergen

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12 Postmodern Culture/Modern Citizens

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Bryan S. Turner Index

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CONTRIBUTORS

CONTRIBUTORS Mans Adriaansens is Professor of General Social Sciences at the

University of Utrecht and member of The Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy. He is the author of General Sociology (1985) and Participation State (1990). Attila Agh is Professor of Political Science at the Budapest University of Economics. He is author of The Crisis of State Socialism in the Eighties (1990). Ralf Dahrendorf is Warden of Saint Antony's College in Oxford. He is author of The Modern Social Conflict (1988) and Reflections on the Revolution in Europe (1990). Richard Falk is Professor of International Relations at Prince ton University and Research Director of the World Order Models Project. He is author of A Study of Future Worlds (1975) and Explorations at the Edge of Time: Prospects for World Order (1992). Nancy Fraser is Professor of Philosophy and Faculty Fellow of the Center for Urban Affairs and Policy Research at Northwestern University. She is author of Unruly Practices (1989) and the co-editor of Revaluing French Feminism (1988). Linda Gordon is Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin. Among her books are Woman's Body, Woman's Right: a Social History of Birth Control,- Heroes of their own Lives: the Politics of Family Violence; and Pitied but not Entitled: Single Mothers and the History of Welfare (1994). Herman van Gunsteren is Professor of Theory and Jurisprudence at the University of Leiden. He is the author of 'The quest for control' in Ethics, July 1988 and co-author of Time for Retirement (1991).

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Jiirgen Habermas is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Frankfurt. He is author of The Theory of Communicative Action (1989) and The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1989).

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Bart van Steenbergen is Associate Professor of General Social Sciences at the University of Utrecht. He is co-author of Advancing Democracy and Participation: Challenges for the Future (1992) and 'Scenarios for Europe in the 1990s: the role of citizenship and participation' in Futures, November 1990. Bryan S. Turner is Professor of Sociology at Deakin University. He is author of Citizenship and Capitalism (1986) and 'Outline of a theory of citizenship' in Sociology, May 19~O. Ursula Vogel is Senior Lecturer in Government at the University of Manchester. She is co-editor of Feminism and Political Theory (1986) and of The Frontiers of Citizel,lShip (1991) and author of 'Patriarchal reasoning in modern natural law' in History of Political Thought (1991). WiIIiam JuIins Wilson is the Lucy Flower University Professor of Sociology and Public Policy at the University of Chicago. He is author of The Truly Disadvantaged (1987) and The Declining Significance of Race (1978).

1

THE CONDITION OF CITIZENSHIP: AN INTRODUCTION Bart van Steenbergen

Most recent publications on citizenship begin by expressing surprise that this subject has suddenly become topical. Over the past five years, more and more social problems and questions have been formulated in terms of citizenship and civil society. Whether the subject is poverty, the underclass, women's issues, national identity,

participatory democracy, minorities, authoritarian governments, supranational developments, the role of the intelligentsia and even the environment, it seems that all these problems can be fruitfully analysed from the perspective of citizenship. On the other hand, there also seems to be agreement that citizenship is a problematic c~l!t. Its meaning lias never tree-a unIvocal; on the contrary, there are several historical traditions in this respect, which in some ways oppose each other, as the contributions of van Gunsteren (Chapter 4) and Habermas (Chapter 3) elucidate. This book is not so much about citizenship as such, nor about the history of citizenship, although some contributors deal with these topics, but primarily about the question of the fruitfulness of the notion of citizenship for analysing, understanding and even solving the problems of our time and of the time to come. As we shall see, the traditional concepts are not always fully fit for that purpose, although we can find much in the old concepts that is still valuable for our time.

Although this book is not about citizenship as such, a few words on the concept itself may be illuminating, not least because different authors in this book base themselves on different traditions in this respect. To start with, a distinction (but not a separation) should be made between the citizen or citoyen, on the one hand, and the burgher, bourgeois or economic citizen on the other as the chief actors or 'dramatis personae' to use Agh's terminology (see Chapter

2


9), of social, political and economic life in modern Western societies. Citizenship represents the notion of participation in public life I)::' (which is broader than political life), In particular, since Marshall's / definition of the ideal of citizenship as full participation in the community, we can see a definite shift from a strict political i~ definition of a citizen - with an emphasis on his or her relationship , with the state - to a broader somewhat more sociological definition, / which implies a greater emphasis on the relationship of the citizen , with society as a whole. Secondly, a citizen is a person who both governs and is governed, for which qualifications like autonomy, judgement and loyalty are expected. In that sense citizenship is an 'office' for which one has to qualify as van Gunsteren (Chapter 4) emphasizes. :Y') .Thi~dly, and rel~ted to the former two, is that £!tizenship deals :/'Y!th n hts and entitlements on the one hand and with obli ations on the,OJSr. ome authors, an m particular Dahrendorf (Chapter 2), stress the entitlements of citizens vis avis the state, which can be seen as the 'entrance component', whereas others emphasize the other side of the coin, the responsibility of the citizen for the community. Ideally, a citizen is active in public life and fundamentally willing to submit his private interests to the general interest of society, whereas a burgher or economic citizen generally lacks this feeling of responsibility and public spirit. In these distinctions we can r.ecogni.ze .t~e di.r:e~ent philosophical traditions of citizensQip: t!J.h~a!!,and the communitarian one (See especially van Gunsteren in Chapter 4). ~ ".,' One of the classic texts on citizenship, to, which mJ!ny of the authors in this book regularly refer, is T.H. Mars~ssay on 'Citizenship and social class' (1949). Marshalrdistinguishes here three types of citizenship, which emerged during the past three centuries in such a way that each new type was standing on the shoulder of its predecessor. I.n the eig~teenth century the first type emerged: civil citizenship, whl~h establIshed the rights necessary for individual freedom, such as nghts to property, personal liberty and justice. The second type, political citizenship, was built primarily in the nineteenth century and encompassed the right to participate in the exercise of political power. The third type, social citizenship, was constructed in the twentieth century. This type emphasized the citizen's rights of economic and social security and gained its expression in the modern welfare state as it developed in Western Europe. For our purpose it is important to note that, according to Marshall, this last type marked the final stage of this development.

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INTRODUCTION

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With the coming of social citizenship, the ultimate ideal of citizenship; the full participation of the individual in the community could be realized. It should be stressed that there is a fundamental difference between the principles of a liberal and democratic society, based on civil and political rights on the one hand and the social rights as expressed in the welfare state on the other. Liberal principles are generally formulated in a negative way, in terms of freedom 'from' (mostly from state intervention), whereas social rights are formulated in a positive way; they imply an active and even interventionist state. These social rights are meant to give the formal status of citizenship a'!'!!t!rii!U2!lJ!g~!i9.!'. A certam level 'miiteiiru''WeIr-Demg'is'guaranteed, which enables the citizen to exercise his or her rights to full participation in the community. This implies that, in the perception of Marshall, social citizenship marks the 'end of history' or at least 'the end of the history of citizenship'. An intriguing question is, now, how do we look at this in our own time, more than forty years after Marshall developed his ideas. It .. will become evident that in this book, the notion of social citizen- / ship as the final stage is not accepted. On the contrary, certain new_ / types of citizenship are unfolded in the light of new dev PIll@ts an!ll!llIlIll!y. This definition involves'a sociological orientation because it avoids an emphasis on juridical or political definitions of citizenship. It would be more conventional, for example, to define citizenship as a status within a polity which determines the nature of rights and obligations. By contrast, a sociological definition of citizenship identifies (a) a bundle of practices which are social, legal, political and cultural; (b) which constitute rather than merely define the citizen; (c) which over time become institutionalized as normative social arrangements; and (d) which determine membership of a community. Citizenship is the new fellowship (genossenschaft) of the modern state. Within this perspective, cultural citizenship consists of those social practices which enable a competent citizen to participate fully in the ~aL culture. Educational institutions, especially universities, are thus crucial to cultural citizenship, because they are an essential aspect of the socialization of the child into this national system of values. At this stage, it may be valuable to itemize some of the principal objections to such an interpretation of cultural citizenship. First, in those societies which have a large aboriginal popUlation, the expansion of national-cultural citizenship may in fact be a form of cultural imperialism. Cultural citizenship involves either the destruction or co-optation of indigenous or aboriginal cultures. In this case, there may be a contradiction between citizen rights and human rights. Secondly, a similar argument may well apply to societies which are divided by class or caste. In a sharply divided society, cultural citizenship may involve the exclusion or marginalization of subordinate class or caste cultures by the cultural elite which surrounds the state. Thirdly, both objections in fact amount to throwing doubt on the possibility of an integrated 'national' or 'common' culture because very few modern societies have such

Cultural citizenship The postmodernization of culture and the globalization of politics are processes which have rendered inadequate much of the traditionalliterature on citizenship. A central figure in this debate is the English sociologist T.H. Marshall, who defined citizenship in terms of three types of entitlement (legal, political and social) which were institutionalized in the law courts, parliament and welfare state. In Marshall's theory, citizenship mitigates the effects of the capitalist market by providing individuals with minimum guarantees to a civilized life. There is as a result an important link between citizenship, civility and civilization. It is not necessary to rehearse the many criticisms which have been levelled against Marshall's original theory." Rather the intention here is to extend Marshall's theory by (a) identifying different types of citizenship; and (b) arguing that we should elaborate the Marshallian version of citizenship to include the idea of cultural citizenship. It is possible, by identifying two separate axes of citizensl1il?, to define four subtypes of the general category of citizenship(14 Where citizenship develops from below (as a consequence of social struggle), then we have an ~ a,nd radical form, but where citizenship is imposed from above as a 'ruling-class

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cultural uniformity. Multiculturalism is an inevitable consequence ?f globali~ation. Finally, there is the view that formal participation m the natIOnal culture may simply disguise major de facto forms of exclusion. In Britain, while there is a formal equality in the ed,:cation system (in terms, for example, of equality of Opportumty), class accent and regional culture continue to be important in terms of social divisions. While Marshall failed to consider cultural citizenship, his ideas were subsequently taken up by social theorists like Talcott Parsons who played an important role in developing this notion of cultural participation in his discussion of the 'educational revolution' of the twe~tieth ~entu~y. I~ Citizenship, within a Parsonian paradigm, is the mstltutlOnaltzatlon of the gesellschaft dimension of the Parsonian pattern variables. With the decline of religious bonding in an ind.ustrial society, citizenship is a secular principle of membership, whIch emerges with social differentiation and the institutionalization of achievement against ascription as a dominant value. For Parsons, the rise of a mass, comprehensive and national system of education in the United States was a critical step in the moderniza17 tion process. This 'educational revolution' was as significant historical~y as the industrial and French revolutions. A comprehensive educatIOn system was the necessary prerequisite for the education of citizens as active participants in society, just as information and freedom of exchange are viewed in economic theory as necessary conditions of economic participation for consumers. Cultural democratization However, with the important exception of Karl Mannheim few sociologists have been concerned with the possibility of cultural de~o.cratization. Mannheim rather baldly stated his position in clatm.mg th.at 'A democratization trend is our predestined fate, not only m PObtlCS, but also in intellectual and cultural life as a whole. Whethe~ We like it or not, the trend is irreversible.'IB Although Mannhelm recogmzed the dangers of cultural democratization in ter~~ of Nie~zsche's critique of the levelling consequences of the poltltcal dommance of the 'herd' ('democracy levels everything, it ushers. m th~ dominanc~ of mediocrity and the mass'), he argued that :hls pOsItIon was ulltmately a superficial view of the sociological relatIOnshIp between artstocratic and democratic cultures. 19 Mannheim felt. that the underlying principles of democracy (the ontologIcal equaltty of human beings, the idea of individual autonomy and the principle of open recruitment to elite positions) had

POSTMODERN CULTURE/MODERN CITIZENS

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fundamentally shaped the nature of culture in the modem world. He claimed that cultural democratization had the following sociocultural consequences: (a) it requires 'pedagogical optimism' in which the educational system assumes that all children have the capacity to achieve the highest levels of cultural excellence; (b) it is sceptical of the monopolistic character of 'expert knowledge'; and (c) cultural democratization brings about what Mannheim called the 'de-distantiation' of culture', that is the erosion of the distinction between high and low culture. 20 These democratic ideals which assume the ontological plasticity of human beings conflict sharply with the aristocratic ideal of charismatic cultural authority in which the cultured person is transformed by illumination or conversion rather than education. The aristocratic ideal requires distantiation and wants to create an 'elite culture'. It is assumed that aristocratic knowledge, cultural techniques, patterns of speech and leisure activities will be 'unshareable by the many'. 21 This elite is a genuine leisure class which cultivates 'finickiness and delicacy' to distinguish itself from the mass. In terms of the historical evolution of the democratic ideal, Mannheim claimed that a strong democratic trend is discernible from 1370 in late medieval art which developed 'intimate realism' where everyday life activities were represented in a naturalistic style. The highly formal and unrealistic style of early medievalism was no longer attractive to new urban groups. Later the Reformation challenged the hierarchical assumptions of Catholicism and produced another stage in the historical development of democratic cultural norms. Baroque culture in the age of absolutism was treated by Mannheim as a reversal of this trend; baroque culture was characterized by ecstasy 'in the form of an intensification of fervour beyond all measure, in a kind of overheated and sublimated eroticism'.22 By contrast, Mannheim treated photography as the most characteristic expression of modem democratization. Its operating norm is supremely that of de-distantiation. Photography 'marks the greatest closeness to all things without distinction. The snapshot is a form of pictorial representation that is most congenial to the modern mind with its interest in the unretouched and uncensored "moment". ,23

Cultural capital and cultural democratization Following Marshall, Parsons and Mannheim, the modernization of cultural citizenship will require a democratization of culture, or in

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Mannheim's terms will involve the replacement of an aristocratic ethos by a democratic one. The two main arguments against the possibility of cultural democratization are those criticisms which are drawn from sociological studies which suggest that cultural divisions between classes are illimitable and irreducible, and secondly those traditions of social analysis which suggest that any democratization of culture will in fact produce the inauthentication of culture by a process of trivialization and commercialization. Thus, from a sociological perspective, these claims about democratization of culture do not appear immediately persuasive. To take two widely contrasted positions, Veblen's notion of a leisure class suggests that the high culturellow culture division is likely to persist in a capitalist society where subordinate groups derive their livelihood through manual labour and are characteristically referred to as a 'working class' or a 'labouring class'. A dominant status group is likely to assume a leisure life-style as a mark of distinction against subordinate labouring classes. The second example would be that the sociology of education has shown that the competitive educational systems which were created in the postwar period, far from bringing about a major equalization of social outcomes, tended merely to reproduce the existing class structure. Formal equality of opportunity in the educational field was an important feature of the extension of citizenship rights to the whole population. However, the continuity of cultural deprivation and cultural class differences meant that actual social mobility through educational attainment was well below the level which was anticipated by postwar educational reformers. The result has been that the educational system has merely reproduced the culture of the dominant class. 24 The high culture of a society is simply the dominant culture. Pierre Bourdieu has further elaborated this idea in his study of social distinction, which was a sociological critique of Kant's theory of aesthetics. 25 Whereas Kant argued that the aesthetic judgement is individual, neutral, objective and disinterested, Bourdieu wants to demonstrate empirically that taste is social, structured and committed. Our taste for goods, both symbolic and material, is simultaneously a classification which classifies the classifier; as such, it cannot be neutral and disinterested, because it is a consequence of class position. Personal life-style, cultural taste and consumer preferences are related to particular divisions within the occupational structure of society, especially in terms of formal educational attainment. With the decline of a rigid status order, there is a constant competition between classes and class fractions to secure dominance over the definition of cultural taste. 26 These patterns of


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cultural distinction are so profound and pervasive that they also dictate how the body should be correctly developed and presented, because the body is also part of the symbolic capital of a class. Because the How of symbolic goods is so extensive in the modern marketplace, there develops the possibility of endless interpretation and re-interpretation of new cultural products. To provide this service, a class of new cultural intermediaries emerges (especially in the media, advertising and fashion) to inform society on matters of distinction. These intermediaries transmit the distinctive life-style of the intellectuals and the leisure class to a wider social audience. These processes within the world of consumer goods eventually force upper, educated social classes to invest in new knowledge and new cultural goods. What is the implication of these studies of class and culture for the Mannheimian argument that we have entered a period in which the democratization of culture is inevitable? It implies obviously that any process of cultural equalization or levelling will be met by a counter-process of distantiation and hierarchization. Within a competitive market of symbolic goods, some pattern of s~cial disti?ct.ion will be imposed upon the market by cultural mtermedIanes. Although governments may attempt to reform th~ education~1 system to provide equality of educational opportun~ty, there ,,:dl always be inequality in social outcomes, because different SOCial classes and social groups already possess different types and amounts of cultural capital which they inevitably transfer to their children. Furthermore, because for Bourdieu intellectuals play a very important role in defining standards of appropriate cultural production and consumption, intellectuals as a st~atum ~f cultur~1 intermediaries have a distinctive, if often contradictory, mterest m maintaining a hierarchy of taste. In this sense, Bourdieu's work has very pessimistic implications for cultural citizenship because it would rule out any possibility of the mass of the population participating freely and fully in the 'national' culture. From Bourdieu's perspective, any national culture will always be overlaid and structured by a class system which requires cultural distantiation. Bourdieu's thesis ~Ies out .the possibility that a national educational system and a n.atlOnal cumculum could function to reproduce the culture of a society as a whole. There are at least two criticisms of, or alternatives to, Bourdieu's analysis which we should consider. The first is taken from Zygmunt Bauman's book Legislators and interpreters in which he argues that one important feature of modern society is that the state no longer tI exercises direct hegemony and regulation over culture. There has ~I been a fissure opened up between the state and the national culture,

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with t?e result that the intellectuals no longer have effective authonty Over cultural capital. They have lost a considerable am?,:mt of social and political power as a result. This separation of polItIcs and culture, and the conversion of intellectuals from l~gislators into interprete~s, is associated with the postmodernizatlOn of culture, namely Its fragmentation and pluralization. The cultural field is more fluid, fragmented and complex than Bourdieu suggests and, as a consequence, it is far more difficult than he ima!5ines for cultural ~lites to impose their authority over cultural capI~al. In more speCIfic terms, Bourdieu's analysis may have a ~peclal relevance to French circumstances where Paris and Parisian mtell~ctuals . have a national cultural function; in Britain, North Amenca ant. Germany the cultural field is more decentralized and fragmented. A second modification of Bourdieu's argument is that his view of the workin~ class and working-class culture is extremely passive. The labounng classes are merely the recipients of the cultural products of the market. In his book on Common Culture Paul Willis, f?"owing the work of Michel de Certeau, presents us ";ith an \. alternattve view of the working class as active users and creators of popular culture which is resistant to total incorporation. 27 Consum~rs and users of a 'common culture' constantly change and modIfy cultural products to their Own local needs and requirements. In short, people are not merely passive recipients of cultural pro.ducts, and 'reception theory' has suggested that consumers have vaned, and complex methods of cultural appropriation. 28 Within a more ge~eral cultural framework, the arguments in favour of a hegemomc common culture may be as difficult to sustain as ~rguments in fav~ur of a dominant ideology. 29 This argument is an Important correcttve to the 'top-down' view of cultural capital which appears to dominate Bourdieu's view of the cultural marketplace in capitalism. We can now consider the rather different issue of the inauthentication o~ culture by co~modification and the growth of mass cul~ures m the Wester? lIberal democracies. Mannheim's essays whIch wer~ publIshed m EnglIsh in 1956 were· in fact originally composed m the early 1930s shortly before the rise of Nazism forced Mannheim to seek asylum in England. Mannheim's optimistic view o~ the pote?tlal for cultural democratization thus contrasts sharply WIth the vIew of the 'culture !ndustry' which was advanced by Theodor Adorno, who has provIded one of the most sustained and original critiques of consume: culture. We must remember, of course, that Adorno's aesthetIc theory was set within the specific context of the employment of film by the national socialists to


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manipulate public opinion, and that his attack on the culture industry was situated within a wider set of objections to the problems of instrumental rationality and rationalization. Adorno rejected the false universalism of mass art and entertainment, which he regarded as merely a respite from labour. Mass culture imposes a uniformity of culture on society; cultural production follows the same logic as all forms of capitalist production; real pleasure is converted into an illusory promise. Although Adorno's aim was to break down the division between high and low art in conservative aesthetics, and to provide a critique of the falsification of culture by commodification, Adorno's own position has been criticized as an elitist defence of high art, given for example, Adorno's rejection of jazz music as part of the culture industry. Adorno's form of critical theory has also been attacked as a nostalgic defence of high modernity against the emergence of popular culture. 30 Critical theory's attack on mass culture often in practice appears to be a condemnation of the Americanization of Western popular culture. Other critics have argued that Adorno and critical theory failed to identify the oppositional and critical elements of popular culture - a theme developed in the work of the Birmingham School of Cultural Studies, for whom popular culture is pre-eminently low and oppositional. Another argument against Adorno is that we no longer live in a world of standardized mass fashion. Instead, the world of popular taste is highly fragmented and diverse, catering to specific and distinctive audiences. Adorno's critique of mass culture is both specific to the German context in which fascist groups were able to manipulate the culture industry, and unidimensional in its opposition to popular taste. It is for this reason that Benjamin's more comp,lex view of 'the work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction' , has had far more impact over contemporary debate. Conclusion: citizenship and postmodernism There is a tension between modern citizenship and postmodern culture. In the context of feudal society, the development of citizenship was a progressive feature of modernization; it was bound up with the emergence of autonomous cities, egalitarian norms of membership and finally with the growth of parliamentary political systems. Citizenship involves the idea of a common status and a national structure of politics. It also involves in cultural terms the notion of a common culture in which citizens might participate equally. To achieve these goals, a common educational system, or

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at least equal educational opportunity, must be institutionalized. These political structures cannot be easily reconciled with postmodern culture(s). The postmodernization of culture involves an attack on the traditional hierarchy of high and low culture; postmodernism mixes, conflates and confuses such divisions. The 'death of literature' brings into question the possibility of any agreement about the cultural superiority of various high traditions. As a consequence, it brings into question the traditional role of the intellectual as a guardian of the high culture. If postmodernism has fragmented culture and challenged the authority of elite culture, then it is difficult to understand what form cultural citizenship might assume under such circumstances. To express this idea in Weberian terms, if we live in a world of polytheistic value conflicts, what agreement might there be about a 'national' or common culture which might be transmitted by a modern educational system? Although there is a tension between modern citizenship and postmodern culture, I do not regard this problem as ultimately without solution. In some respects, the postmodern recognition of incommensurable difference may be merely an extreme version of the conventional problem of liberalism with its celebration of individuality. A postmodern cultural aesthetic might simply involve the recognition and acceptance of extreme cultural fragmentation, the importance of local knowledge and cultures, the promotion of feminist recognition of the significance of emotional commitments to different cultural preferences, and the attempt to recognize rather than to incorporate various ethnic, regional and subnational cultures. Thus, the postmodern critique of grand narratives would prohibit the imposition of national standardization by a high culture and the development of a national curriculum. The de-hierarchization of culture would be compatible with the democratic thrust of modern citizenship norms. However, the postmodern celebration of difference may in the long term signify the eventual demise of the concept of citizenship as relevant to a period in history in which the nation-state came to dominance. The historical and sociological limitations of the tradition of citizenship may be exposed by the postmodern critique of the limitations of the 'social'. On these grounds, one might expect a convergence between the idea of global human rights, which are not tied to any specific nation-state framework, and postmodern cultural complexity, which recognizes the incommensurability of world-views, the fragmentation of political discourse and the contingency of social science perspectives.

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Notes 1 M. Jay (ed.), An Unmastered Past. The Autobiographical Reflections of Leo Lowenthal (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1987). 2 C. Norris, 'Lost in the funhouse: Baudrillard and the politics of post modem ism' , in R. Boyne and A. Rattansi (eds), Postmodernism and Society (Macmillan, London,

1990), pp. 119-53. 3 B.S. Turner (cd.), Theories of Modernity and Postmodemity (Sage, London, 1990). 4 A. Easthope, Literary into Cultural Studies (Roudedge, London, 1991). 5 Z. Bauman. Legislators and Interpreters (Polity Press, Cambridge, 1987). 6 W. Benjamin, Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism (New Left Books, London, 1973). 7 Turner Theories of Modemity and Postmodemity. 8 A. Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Polity Press, Cambridge, 1990), p. 167. 9 R. Robertson, 'Mapping the global condition: globalization as the central concept', in M. Featherstone (ed.), Global Culture (Sage, London, 1990), pp. 15-3? 10 P. Wexler, 'Citizenship in the semiotic society', in B.S. Turner (cd.), Theones of Modemity and Postmodemity (Sage, London, 1990). pp. 164-75. . 11 B.S. Turner, Citizenship and Capitalism: the Debate over Reformlsm (Alien & Unwin. London, 1986). . 12 M. Foueault, The Use of Pleasure. The History of Sexuality, vol. 2 (Pengum, Harmondsworth, 1987). 13 See, for example, J. Barbarlet, Citizenship (Open University Press, Milton Keynes, 1988). 14 B.s. Turner, 'Outline of a theory of citizenship', Sociology, 24 (1989), pp. 189-

n~ (87) 15 M. Mann, 'Ruling class strategies and citizenship', Sociology, 21 19 • pp. 339-54. . 16 R.J. Holton and B.S. Turner, Talcott Parsons on Economy and Soctety (Routledge, London, 1986); R. Robertson and B.S. Turner (eds), Talcott Parsons. Theorist of Modemity (Sage, London, 1991). . ' 17 T. Parsons, Societies, Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives (Prent~ce Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1966); and The System of Modem Societies (PrenttceHall, Engiewood Cliffs, NJ, 1971). 18 K. Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Culture (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1956), p. 171. 19 Ibid., p. 175. 20 Ibid., p. 208. 21 Ibid., p. 211. 22 Ibid., p. 224. 23 Ibid., p. 226. . 24 P. Bourdieu and J.C. Passeron, Reproduction in Education SOCiety and Culture (Sage, London, 1990). 25 P. Bourdieu, Distinction: a Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1984). 26 M. Featherstone, Consumer Culture and postmodernism (Sage, London, 1991). B.S. Turner, Stallls (Open University Press, Milton Keyne s , 1988).

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27 P. Willis, Common Culture, Symbolic Work at Play illlhe Everyday Cultures of the Young (Open University Press, Milton Kcynes. 1990). ;8 D. Morley, TI": 'Nation,wide' Audience (BFI, London, 1980), _9 N. Abercromblc, S. HIli and B.S. Turner, The Dominant Ideology Thesis (Alien & Unwin, London, 1980). 3~ G. St~uth and B.S. Turner, Nietzschc's Dance. Resentment, Reciprocity and ResIstance m Social Life (Blackwcll, Oxford, 1988). 31 Benjamin, Illuminations.

Index I

I

action thinking and doing, 67, 71-3 vs contemplation, 143 active citizenship, 3, 12, 24-8 activism, transnational, 138-9, 143 administrative elites, Central Europe, 112-14 admission to citizenship, 37-8. 47 see also membership Adorno, Theodor, 164-5 Adriaansens, Hans, 5, 66-75 adultery, 81, 84 aesthetic judgement, 162-3, 165 affirmative action, United States, 54, 58 age, and employment, 75-6 Agh, Attila, 1, 6, 108-26 Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), 102, 103 American revolution, 128 Amnesty International, 138 Anderson, Waiter, 145, 146 animals, citizenship of, 143, 144-6, 151 anti~discrimination legislation, 54 aristocratic ideal of culture, 161, 162 Aristotle, 25, 158 armed forces, role of state, 36 arms race, 130 Aron, Raymond, 7, 29 Ash, T.G., 119 aspiration, axis of, 140 attachment to place, 149, 150--1 authoritarianism, Central Europe, 109, 118 authority, and democracy, 84 autonomy in civil society, 43 economic, 67

Bauman, Zygmunt, 163 Beck, Ulrich, 19

Belgium, public opinion about poverty, 60 benefits, 67 maximization of, 38-41 passive, 74 Benjamin, Waiter. 165 Bentham, Jeremy, 145 Birmingham School of Cultural Studies, 165 birth forgetfulness, 150 black people poverty, United States, 53-5, 56 social rights, United States, 57 BIllt und Boden, 151 bodies, women's, 81 Bohemia, 117 boundaries of state, 25 Bourdieu, Pierre, 162-4 bourgeois see economic citizen bourgeoisie, Central Europe, 110, 111, 114--17 breadwinner households, 73, 85 Brown, Lester, 136 Brundtland Commission, 135-6, 144, 150 Bruszt, Laszl6, 125 Budapest, demonstrations, 118 bureaucracy, European Community, 30 burgher see economic citizen Bush, George, 127, 130, 136 capital, cultural, 161-5 capitalism and citizenship, 148 and civil rights, 30 and democracy, 28 global, 138, 148-9, 151 and growth, 11 and poverty, 150 see also markets care for global ecology, 149-51

170


carers and caring, 74 Castel, Robert, 50 Central Europe see under Europe Certcau, Michel de, 164 charity contract-versus-charity dichotomy, 91, 94, 95, 101-5 welfare provision as, 91, 95, 101-5 citizen, 108 as citoyen(fle), 1-2,90 see also economic citizen citizen pilgrims, 139 citizenship, 1-2 civic-mindedness, 39-40 civic rights, 95 civil citizenship, 2, 5, 17, 92, 142 and gender, 102-3 United States, 55, 90-107 civil liberties, 91 civil public community, 45 civil rights, 24-6, 30, 57, 94-5 and property rights, 98, 105 United States, 91 and welfare, 102-3 civil society, 43, 95-6 Central Europe, 115, 120-4 global, 138 Clark, Kcnncth B., 57 class, 4, 15,33 Central Europe, 111-12, 115, 116 and citizenship, 92-3, 94,141,142 and culture, 159, 162-3, 164 and education, 160, 162, 163 and poverty, 49 climate, 136 Club of Rome, Limits to Growth, 8 codes of behaviour, 41 coincidence and individual, 39 Cold War, 127, 131, 134 collective consciousness, 27 commodification of culture, 155, 164-5 communal responsibility, 99 communication, and participation, 25, 32-3 communist states, former, 6, 137, 141, 156 see also Europe, Central and Eastern communitarian citizenship, 2, 12,27, 40,41-2,45,91

community, participation in, 2, 3, 5, 25,60,66-7,72,91 competence and citizenship, 38, 45, 46, 47, 159 concentration effects, inner cities, 54 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 128 Congress, US, General Accounting Officc (GAO), 52-3 consensus, 24, 40 conservatism, of postmodemism, 153 conservative governments Europe, 62, 63 United States, 62 contemplation (tao), and environmentalism, 143 contracts in civil society, 95-6, lOO-I, 104, 105 contract-versus-charity dichotomy, 91,94,95,101-5 and kinship, 100-1 social provision as, 91 contributory welfare programmes, 91-2, 102 control of global eCOlogy, 149-50 corporate society, 43--4 Council of Europe, 17, 128 counter-elites, Central Europe, 112-14, 119, 121 coverture, 97-8 crime, United States, 59 cultural capital, 161-5 cultural citizenship, 3, 8, 9, 158-60 cultural diversity, 43, 60 cultural elites, 159-60, 161 cultural imperialism, 130-1, 159, 165 cultural integration and nationalism, 22,23 culture and class, 159, 162-3, 164 commodification/commercialization of, 155 democratization of, 153, 155, 160-5 dominant, 162 and education, 161, 165-6 European, 33 globalization of, 9, 130-1, 156-7 highllow, 161, 162, 166 mass, 154, 163-5 and morality, 83

INDEX

culture, cont. national, 154, 163, 166 and postmodernization, 154 responsibility for, 146 Czechoslovakia, 112, 115, 117, 118, 119, 120 Dahl, R. t 40 Dahrcndorf, Ralf, 2, 4, 7, 8, 10-19 Dante Alighieri, 133 Dawisha, Karen, 112 de-distantation of culture, 161 de-industrialization, 70 de-nationalized global elites, 149, 150-1 decentralization, inner cities, 61 deliberative democracy, 32-4 Delors, Jacques, 134 democracy and authority. 84 and capitalism, 28 Central Europe, 116, 118, 120-4 and citizenship, 128 deliberative, 32-4 global, 128 and individual, 40 and social rights, 105 and subordination of women, 77, 81-5 and supranational organization, 20, 21,28-30 Third World, 28 democratization, 9 of culture, 153, 155, 160-5 levelling effect, 160 Denmark, public opinion about poverty, 60 dependence, 38,41,76,98 Descartes, Rem!, 145 deserving poor, 51, 102 despotic attitudes to nature, 147 development, sustainable, 8, 135-6, 144, 149, 150 deviation, 41 differences. 166 disability and employment, 68 discourse and networks, 32 disorder and equality, 80-1 distantation of culture, 161, 163 distribution of wealth, 31 diversity, cultural, 43, 60 domestic see household

171

domesticity, 100 dominant culture, 162 drug abuse in United States, 59 dual society in Poland, 118 duties see obligations early retirement, 68 earth citizens, 8, 150-1 Earth Summit (Rio 1992), 8, 135, 147 Eastern Europe see under Europe ecological citizenship, 3, 8, 141-52 see also environment economic citizenlburgherlbourgeois(e), 1-2, 108, 143, 148, 159 Central Europe, 112, 115-17 economic imperatives, 71-3 European Community, 30 economics, and politics, 12, 71-3 education and class, 160, 162, 163 and culture, 161, 165-6 and employment, 70, 74 Europe, 61 and gender stereotypes, 87-8 public, 93 as socialization, 40, 41,159 United States, 59, 160 elderly people, employment, 75-6 elections in Hungary, 121 elites Central Europe, 112-14, 116-17, 119, 121 cultural, 159-60, 161 global, 134-5, 148-9 empires, 21 employment and education, 70, 74 labour nature of, 72 end of history, 3, 12, 141 enfranchisement, 14, 128 entitlements, 12, 13, IS, 17, 37-8, 95 and kinship, 99 environment, physical, 18 and global citizenship, 8, 127-40 global management, 135-6 and growth, 10 Rio Conference (1992), 8, 135, 147 transnational activism, 138-9 equal pay, 73 equality, 14 and order, 80-1

172


equality. cont. social, 47 of social worth, 60, 63 of women, 77, 78--81, 82, 83, 85 equivalents, exchange of see exchange ethics, public and private, 40 ethnic divisions, 16--17,20 see also race; racism Europe Central and Eastern, 6, 20, 21: citizenship and civil society. 108-26; minorities, 16-17,20, 109 citizenship in, 156. 157 citizenship of, 3,6-7,28--32,33-4, 128 Conference on Security and Cooperation, 128 education, 61 and global economy. 137 insularity, 127-8. 148

political consciousness, 136--7 poverty, 5,60--3 social citizenship, 55, 60--3, 141 supranational citizenship, 148, 157 underclass, 5 and United States, 137

European citizenship, 3, 6--7. 28--32, 33-4, 128 European Community (EC) citizenship. 17, 28-32 integration, 20 law, 29 multicultural society, 27-8 Single Market, 33 European Court of Justice, 29, 157 European identity, 157 European Parliament, 128, 157 European Union, 29 Eurotaoismus, 143 exchange relationships and citizenship, 148 and welfare, 91, 94, 95, 104 exclusion, 4-6, 17, 66, 142 black people, United States, 58 urban poor, United States, 54-5, 58 women, 76-7, 86 expert knowledge, 161 extended family, 99, 101 exterminist war, Gulf War (1991), 128-30

Falk, Richard, 7, 8, 127--40, 148-9 family see household fear, liberalism of, 84 feasibility, axis of, 140 federal states, 21 feminist views of gender and citizenship, 86, 157-8 feudal relations in marriage, 78-9 fidelity, sexual, 81, 84 food stamps, 56 France ghettos, 61 intellectuals, 164 public opinion about poverty, 60 racism, 62 Fraser, Nancy, 5, 90-107 free labour, 97-8, 99 free markets see markets freedom, 18-19 and citizenship, 2, 37 individual, 23, 30--1 of nations, 23 restrictions on, 42 French Revolution, 128, 141 and nationalism, 22, 23 full employment, 69 functional rationality, 71 functionalist view of rights, 31 fundamentalism, 19 future generations, rights of, 144 G7 (Group of Seven), 131, 138 Gaia, 8, 150-1 Gehlen, Arnold, 20 gender and citizenship, 93-4, 99 and civil citizenShip, 102-3 and contract~versus~charity dichotomy, 102 and international commerce, 134-5 and kinship, 100-1 and social citizenship, 92, 93--4 stereotypes, 87-8 see also men; women gender~neutral citizenship, 3, 5, 85-8 General Accounting Office (GAD), 52-3 geopolitics, 130--1, 133--4, 135 Germany Basic Law, 25 public opinion about poverty, 60 reunification, 20, 21

INDEX

ghettos Europe, 61, 63 United States,S, 15, 53-5, 61, 63 Giddens, Anthony, 155 gift relationship, 101 global capitalism, 138, 148-9, 151 global citizenship, 3, 8-9, 127-40, 141-52 global civil society, 138 global commons, 136 global democracy, 128 global ecological citizenship, 3, 8, 141-52 global economy, 134-5 global elites, 134-5, 148-9 global management, 8, 135-6, 149, 150 global reformism, 132-4, 149, 150 global stewardship, 144, 147 globalization, 7 of culture, 9,130-1.156-7 and postmodemization, 155 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 12, 136 Gordon, Linda, 5, 90--107 government, and reproduction of citizens, 47 Grand Coalition, 114-15 grassroots transnational activism, 138 Grawert, R., 25 Greece, Ancient, and women, 158 green movement, 143-4 Greenpeace, 138 Group of Seven (G7), 131, 138 growth, 10, 11, 12, 13 Guizot, Fram;ois, 11 Gulf War (1991), 128-30 Habermas, Jiirgen, 1,6-7,10,20-35 Handler, Jeel, 51 Hankiss, Elemer, 114-17, 125 Hann, C.M., 125 happiness, public, 42 Havel, Vaclav, 118, 120 Hayek, Friedrich von, 14 health, and employment, 68 health insurance, 56 health services public, 93 United States, 56, 59 Henderson, Vivian, 57 hereditary nationality, 23

173

Herrschaft, 6, 77, 78--81 Hesse, K., 34-5 heterogeneity of groups, 16-17 hierarchies, 97 of culture, 155, 161-5 history, 20 end of, 3, 12, 141 Hobbes, Thomas, 81 homogeneity of groups/nations. 16-17, 22,24 household/family and employment, 69, 71, 72 extended, 99, 101 as haven, 71, 118 headship of, 97, 98 and kinship, 100-1 and wages, 73, 99 women's role, 83, 85, 87,158 housing, United States, 55 human rights, transnational activism, 138 Hungarian thesis, 110-17 Hungary, 112, 113, 115,116,117,118, 120-4 husbands and wives, 78-81, 82-5, 97-8 immigration see migration imperialism cultural, 130-1, 159, 165 and global reform, 133-4 inclusion and exclusion, 4-6, 31, 77, 86, 142 of non~humans, 143, 144-6 individual in civic society, 95-6 and neo-republican citizenship, 45-6 individual freedom, 23, 30-1 individualism, possessive, 95-6 individualistic causes of poverty, 50, 51 individualistic citizenship, 2, 38-41,148 individualization, and employment, 70-1,73 industrial citizenship, 135 industrialization, 70 inequality, 47 United States, 49-55 infidelity, sexual, 81, 84 informal economy, Central Europe, 115-16, 118 informal labour market, 73 inherent worth, 146

174


institutions in corporate society, 43--4 Hungary, 122 public, 38 and social rights, 58 intelligentsia

Central and Eastern Europe, 6, ro8-20, 124 and culture, 163-4 interdependence, 105 interests and citizenship. 31, 3&-41 Hungary, 122-3 and stagflation. 11 international activism, 138-9 international commerce, 134-5, 148-9 internationalization, 6-9 Iraq, Gulf War (1991), 128-30 Ireland, public opinion about poverty, 60 Islam, 156 Italy, public opinion about poverty, 60

Japan and global economy, 137 job creation, 73 job splitting/sharing, 73 joblessness Europe, 62, 63 urban poor, United States, 54-5, 58 see also unemployment justice and gender~neutral citizenship, 87-8

see also law Kaot, Immaouel, 6, 17,22,24, 145, 147-13, 149, 162 Keynes. John Maynard, 12, 75 kinship and contract, 100-1 and entitlements, 99 Kluegel, lames, 49 Konnid, Gyorgy, 110 Korpi, Waiter, 52 labour forced, 13 free, 97-13 paid,99 labour force, exit from, 68 labour market

access to, 5, 15 participation in, 53-5, 66 and property rights, 99 land, property rights in, 99 language, and federation. 29

law and active citizenship, 25, 26-7 European Community, 29 and gender-neutral citizenship, 87-8 and individual autonomy, 32 and marriage, 78-81, 82, 83, 84-5 natural, 25, 79. 84, 145 rule of, 13-14, 16 League of Nations, 148 legislation, role of state, 36 legitimacy of EC policy, 33 of marriage relations, 79, 80 of offspring, 81 of political power, 95 leisure, 72 leisure class, 161, 162 Lepsius, M.R., 30 less-developed countries (LDCs), 16 levelling effect of democratization, 160 liberal rights, 30 liberal traditions of citizenship, 2. 3 liberalism of fear, 84 liberation, 37

Limits to Growth, 8 literature, death of, 154, 166 Locke, John, 25 Lowenthal, Leo, 153 loyalty to community, 37, 41, 48 Lllmpenproletariat, 5 Luxembourg, public opinion about poverty, 60 MacKinnon, Catherine, 106 Macpherson, C.B.. 95 Mannheim, Karl, 160-2, 163, 164 markets and citizenship, 93 and culture, 163 and democracy, 28 former communist countries, 16 and global capitalism, 149 and rights, 13, 14 and undercIass, 15 marriage, 6, 76-89, 97-8 Marshall, T.H., 2-4, 13-14, 30, 49, 66,

175

INDEX

Marshall, cont. 7S, 92-S, 97-9, lOS, 142, 146, 148, IS8-9, 160 Marx, Karl, 4, 150 masculinity of republican virtues, 42 see also gender; men mass culture, 154, 163-5 maternity leave, 74 maximization of benefits, 38-41 Mead, Lawrence, 13, 104 media and Gulf War (1991). 149n Medicaid, 56 Medicare, 56 membership of community. 41-2, 60 of groups and institutions, 31,160 of state, 24-5, 38: admission to citizenship, 37-8. 47 men and civil society, 100 domination by, 86, 94: see also marriage Herrsclraft, 6, 77, 78-81 husbands and wives, 78-81, 82-5, 97-13 masculinity of republican virtues, 42 see also gender middle class, 43, 44 black, United States, 57-8 Central Europe. 115-17 inner cities, 54 migration and migrants, 5, 33 from cities, 54, 61 to cities, 53 to Europe, 61-2, 142 to Netherlands, 69 militarism, 137 Gulf War (1991), 128-30 see also violence; war military virtue, 42, 45 Mill, John Stuart. 78 minimum wages, 73 minorities and self-determination, 16-18 underclass, 4-6 misuse of entitlements, 37-8 modernity, and postmodernity, 155 money, 28 moral economy, and self-interest, 99 moral rights, 146

morality, and marriage, 83 multicultural societies, 27-8, 33, 60 multiple citizenship, 38 nation, 22 nation-states, 17,20,21,147,157 and European union, 29 national autonomy, Central Europe,

109 national culture, 154, 163, 166 national identity and citizenship, 20-35 national traditions, 33 nationalism, 21-8 Central Europe, 124 and republicanism, 23, 27 nationality, 23 nations, 17 and cultural citizenship, 9 natural law, 25, 145 and marriage, 79, 84 naturalism in art, 161 nature participation in, 8, 146-7, 151 rights of, 143-6 needy people, 51 negative rights, 30, 31 neo-republican citizenship, 3, 44, 45-8 Netherlands conservatism, 71 ghettos, 61 labour force, 69 public opinion about poverty, 60 racism, 62 networks of communication, 32-3 of relationships, 43 new world order, 127, 130, 136 Nietzsche, Friedrich, 160 non-contractual reciprocity, 100-1 non-contributory welfare programmes, 91-2, 102 non-violence, 140 normative view of rights, 31 obligations of citizenship, 2, 5, 12, 13 of poor, 50 see also responsibility office, citizenship as, 2, 46, 47, 146 Okin, Susan Moller, 87

176

INDEX


old people, employment, 75-6 0lsoo, Mancur, 100tl opportunity equality of, 14, 58 and poverty, 49-50 order, and equality, 80-1 ownership and citizenship. 5, 37, 93, 94 and rights, 31 of self, 96 see also property

paid labour, 99, 100, 104 parental leave, 74 Paris, 61, 164 parliamentary democracy, Central Europe, 118, 120-1 Parsons, Taicott, 160 participation, 142, 146 Central Europe, 121 and communication, 25,32-3 in community, 2, 3, 5, 25, 60, 66-7, 72,91 in groups and institutions, 31 in labouT market, 53-5, 66, 68, 69, 73-5 in nature, 8, 146-7, 151 in self-rule, 24, 25, 26 of women, 6, 85, 99 partnership with nature, 147 passive benefits, 74 passive citizenship. 158--9 Paternan, Carole, 77 paternalism, bestowal of rights, 31, 32 paternity leave, 74 patriarchy, 97 patriotism, 27 pensions, 75 photography as de-distantation, 161 place, attachment to, 149, 150-1 planning, 44 pluralism in republic, 46-7 Poland, 112, 115, 117, 118, 120 political citizenship, 2, 92, 142 United States, 55 political economy, 12 poIiticailiberties, 23 political parties, Central Europe, 116, 121, 122-3 political rights, 3D, 57

politics and economics, 12, 71-3 European Community, 30 of impossibility, 132, 140 regional, 136-7 poll tax, United Kingdom, 13 polyarchy, 155 poor characteristics of, 52 deserving/undeserving, 51 see also poverty Popper, Karl, 12 popular culture, 154, 163-5 popular sovereignty, 24 positive discrimination, 54 possessive individualism, 95-{) post-industrialism, 44, 154 postmodernism, 9, 44 and citizenship, 153-68 and rationality, 40 postnational arrogance, 21 poverty, 49-65 and capitalism, 150 and class, 49 and dependence, 38 Europe, 5,60-3 United States, 5, 49--65 poverty line, United States, 56 power of powerless, 120 of underclass, 4 power elites, Central Europe, 112-14 powerlessness, 47, 120 Prague, demonstrations, 118 preferences, 3&-41 privacy rights, 106 private ethics, 40 private ownership, and rights, 31 private spheres, 100 privilege, 16 and poverty, 49 productivity, 68, 72 professional elites, Central Europe, 112-14 property rights: and civil rights, 98, 105; and labour market, 99; in land, 99; welfare as, 103-4; of wives, 79 succession to, and marriage, 81 see also ownership

177

responsibility communal, 99 for nature, 146-7, 151 responsible citizenship, 39-41, 47, 91 of welfare recipients, 104 see also obligations retirement, 68, 75 retraining, 74, 75 revolutions American, 128 Central Europe, 117-20 French, 41,128 rights, 13-14, 18 of citizenship, 2, 3, 5, 13, 26, 38-41 and market, 13 moral, 146 of nature, 143-6 negative, 30, 31 and ownership, 31 quality of life/of citizenship, 5 paternalistic bestowal of. 31, 32 of unborn, 144 see also civil rights; human rights; race liberal rights; political rights; social and citizenship, 93-4 rights; welfare rights and poverty, 49 and slavery, 97-8 Rio Conference on the Environment and social citizenship, 92 (1992),8, 135, 147 race-neutral citizenship, 3, 5, 59, 60 Romania, 124 racism, Europe, 62-3 Rome. Treaty of, 29 rationality, 40-1 Rotterdam, ghettos, 61 Rawls, John, 14,87 Rousseau, Jean~Jacques, 23-4, 81 Reagan, R.lReaganism, 62 rules, 45 realism in art, 161 ruling class reciprocity, non-contractual, 100-1, 105 Central Europe, 111, 112-14, 115 recurrent education, 74 and passive citizenship, 158-9 redundancy, and training, 74 Rupnik, 1., 109, 111-12, 120 reformism, global, 132-4, 149. 150 safety net, 60, 67 Regan. Tom, 145-6 second careers, 75 regional politics, 136-7 second-class citizens, 142 regulation of work, 68 women as, 76, 81, 85 religion see also underclass and individual freedom. 40 second economy/society, Central and marriage. 79-80 Europe, 115-16, 118 and work ethic, 69 self_determination religious divisions, 16-17 individual, 24, 26 Renan, Ernest, 23 of nations, 22, 23, 24: and replacement class, 6 minorities, 16-18 reproduction of citizens, 46, 47 self~interest, and moral economy, 99 republic, 36-7 self-ownership, 96 republican citizenship, 2, 27, 40, 42-3, self-regulating systems. 32 45 self~rule. participation in, 24, 25, 26 republicanism, and nationalism, 23, 27

provisions, 12, 16, 17,37-8 public assistance, vs social insurance, 91-2, 102-4 public community, 45 public education, 93 public ethics, 40 public expenditure, 11 cuts in, 68 public goods, 91 public happiness, 42 public institutions, 38 public opinion about Gulf War (1991), 128-30 about poverty: Europe, 60, 63; United States, 50-3, 59, 63 public services, 91, 93 Pufendorf, Samuel, 78, 81

178

INDEX


Serbia, 124 service industries. 70 sexual contract, 77 sexual fidelity, 81, 84 shared life-styles and traditions, 25,41 silent revolution, Hungary, 118 Singer, Peter, 145 Single Market, EC, 33 SkocpoI. Theda, 106 slavery, 47, 97-8 Sloterdijk, Peter, 143. 150 Smith, Eliot, 49 social citizenship, 2-3, 5, 92, 142 and capitalism, 148 Europe, 55, 60-3, 141 United States, 49-65, 90-107 and welfare state, 75 social class see class social cohesion. 5 social contract, 24, 77, 95

social equality. 47 social insurance, vs public assistance, 91-2, 102--4 social integration, 28 social isolation, urban poor, United States, 54-5, 58 social morality, and marriage, 83 social rationality. and economics, 71-3 social rights, 30, 31, 90-1 and democracy. 105 and poverty, 49-65 and welfare, 90 social science, and political practice, 67,71-3 social security, 5, 31, 37, 66 expenditure on, 68 social services, Europe, 62 social stratification, 15 social worth, 60, 63 socialism, Central Europe, 110-11, 115, 118, 150 sociaiization of citizens, 46 education as, 40, 41, 159 society, and citizen, 2 sociological definition of citizenship, 15 SOlidarity, 91,104-5 Solidarity (Solidamosc), 118 sovereignty Europe, 157

popular, 24, 32 Soviet empire, 118, 127 Sparer, Edward, 106-7 stagflation, 11 standard of living, 67 state and citizen, 2, 3, 24, 25, 36, 66, 128, 157-8 and culture, 163 intervention by, 150 membership of, 24-5 planning by, 44 state socialism, Central Europe, JJO-II, 115, 118, 150 status and citizenship, 13, 14, 15, 96, 153, 159 stereotypes of gender, 87-8 stewardship, global, 144, 147 stratification, social, 15, 49 structural causes of poverty, 50-3 subordination of women see women substantial rationality, 71 suburbanization, 61 supplemental security income (SSI) program, 56 supply-side economics, 11, 12 supranational citizenship, 20, 21, 28--30, 148, 157 surrogate citizens, lOB sustainability, 8, 135-6, 144, 149, 150 Switzerland, 21, 27 system integration, 28 Szelenyi, Ivan, IID-II, 112, 114-15, 116-17,125 tao, and environmentalism, 143 targetting, United States, 56 taste, 162-3, 165 taxation, It, 13, 18 of income, 75 and welfare programmes, 59 Taylar, Charles, 26, 27 technical clites, Central Europe, 112-14 technical rationality, 71 technological innovation and employment, 70 and global ecology, 149-50 territorial states, 21 territory of state, 25

Thatcher, M.rrhatcher regime, 62, 63, 71 thinking and doing, 67, 71-3 Third World, democracy, 28 Tocqueville, Alexis dc, 40, 77, 78, 81-5 totalitarianism, Central Europe, 109 trade unions, Central Europe, 122-3 traditions, national, 33 training, and employment, 70, 74, 75 transnational citizenship see global; international; supranational; world Treaty of Rome, 29 Turner, Bryan S., 8-9, 143, 144, 148, 163-8 unborn, rights of, 144 underclass, 4--6, 14-16,67 and citizenship, 55--60 United States, 53--60 undeserving poor, 51 unemployment, 66, 68 Europe, 61-2 immigrants, 61-2 nonnalization of, 72 and poverty. 52 urban poor, United States, 54-5 see also joblessness unemployment insurancelbenefits, 55-{j,74 United Kingdom citizenship, 156 Gulf War (1991),129--30 poverty, 60 racism, 62 Thatcherism, 62, 63, 71 United Nations, 132, 148, 149 Conference on the Environment (Rio 1992), 8, 135, 147 United States civil citizenship, 55, 90--107 cultural imperialism, 130--1, 165 and Europe, 137 geopolitical control, 135 and global economy, 135, 137 Gulf War (1991), 128--30 multiculturaI society, 27, 29, 60 social citizenship, 49-65 subordination of women, 81-5 underclass, 4-5 universal welfare, 93 The Unknown Society (TUS), 44

179

Urban, Jan, 119 USSR, 127 and Central Europe, 118 utilitarianism, and animal rights, 145-6 utopian globalism, 140 values, and underclass. 16 van Gunsteren, Herman, 1, 2, 36-48 van Steenbergen, Bart, 1-9, 141-52 Veblen, Thorstein, 162 velvet revolution, 118 violence Gulf War (1991), 128--30 non-violence, 140 see a/so militarism; war virtue in republic, 42, 45 vocational training, 74 Vogel, Ursula, 5-6, 76--89 voluntariness, 25 voluntary work, 72 wage costs, 68 wages equal pay, 73 and family, 73, 99 minimum, 73 Wall Street Journal, 135 Wallerstein, I., 148 war, 133-4 Cold War, 127 Gulf War (1991), 128--30 and world government, 149 see also militarism; violence welfare as charity, 101-5 and civil rights, 102-3 as contract, 101-5 as property rights, 103-4 and social rights, 90--1 universal, 93 and work, 66--75 welfare culture/ethos, 53 welfare programmes Europe, 63 effect of, 52-3 United States, 50-3, 54 welfare rights, 12, 13, 37 welfare state, 2-3, 5, 38, 62, 67-8 and social citizenship, 75, 90 United States, 94

180


white men, domination by, 93, 94, 97 Willis, Paul. 164 Wilson, William Juliu5, 4, 5, 15, 49-65 wives, and husbands, 78-81 women

Ancient Greece, 158 bodies, 81 citizenship, 85-8, 96, 158 and democracy, 77, 81-5 equal pay. 73 equality, 77, 78-81, 82, 83, 85 exclusion, 76-7, 86 and family, 99 and housework, 83, 85, 87, 158 and income tax, 75 and kinship, 100-1

labour market, 69-70 and marriage, 76-89, 97-8 participation in community, 6, 85. 99 and privacy, 106 property rights, 79 as second~class citizens, 76,81,85 transnational activism, 138 see also gender

work,S attitudes to, 52, 53 quality of, 72 and welfare, 66--75: United States, 13,50-3, 104 work ethic, 52, 69, 70

workfare, 13, 50 working class

culture, 164 inner cities, 54 world citizenship, 8,17,149, 150-1 World Council of Churches, 144 world government, 132, 148, 149, 150 world order. 133-4, 135 new, 127, 130, 136 Worldwatch Institute. 136 worth. inherent, 146 Yugoslavia, 124, 137, 156 Zugaro, EmiIio, 153 Zweers. W., 147