The role of the European Union in the democratic consolidation and ...

The role of the European Union in the democratic consolidation and ethnic conflict management in the Republic of Macedonia

Nenad Markovic Zoran Ilievski Ivan Damjanovski Vladimir Bozinovski

1

Political Science Department Iustinianus Primus Faculty of Law Ss Cyril and Methodius University Skopje Blvd. Krste Misirkov bb 1000 Skopje www.pf.ukim.edu.mk

Authors of the study: Nenad Markovic Zoran Ilievski Ivan Damjanovski Vladimir Bozinovski

Prepared in the framework of the Regional Research Promotion Programme in the Western Balkans (RRPP), which is run by the University of Fribourg upon a mandate of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, SDC, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent opinions of the SDC and the University of Fribourg.

2

Table of contents 1. Introduction..................................................................................................... 4 1.1

The Ohrid Framework Agreement ........................................................... 5

1.2

The Law on territorial organization from 2004........................................ 6

1.3

The ―May Agreement‖ from 2007 ......................................................... 8

2. Quantitative and qualitative research ............................................................. 9 2.1

The public opinion survey analysis ........................................................ 10

2.2

Qualitative research: in-depth interviews............................................... 15 2.2.1 Findings (Ohrid Framework Agreement) ........................................ 16 2.2.2 Law on territorial organization ........................................................ 20 2.2.3 May Agreement ............................................................................... 22

3. Conclusion .................................................................................................... 23 BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................... 25

3

1.

Introduction In the past decade, Macedonia steadily developed as the European Union’s (EU)

favorite example of successful conflict management, especially after the EU’s crucial mediation role in the negotiations leading to the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) in 2001, as well as its implementation in the post-conflict period. Macedonia has been hailed as a rare example of peaceful interethnic coexistence, which until the outburst of violence in 2001, was an exception to the Balkan ―powder keg.‖1 Besides the conflict in 2001, two additional political events critically affected the stability of the Republic of Macedonia in the post-conflict period – the Law on territorial organization in 2004 and the so called May Agreement in 2007. These three political occurrences define the framework in which the stability of the interethnic relations in Macedonia was heavily tested during its transition to democracy, as was the ability of the international community, EU and USA as most relevant actors, to adequately react and contribute to conflict management and democratization of the local context. This is exactly the type of relevancy that drove this research to try to examine the role of the EU in the process of conflict resolution and democratic consolidation in the Republic of Macedonia. The hypothesis of the research is that EU had a significant role in all three critical processes (OFA, Law on territorial organization and May Agreement) but that this role was subservient to the role of the USA. In this regard, the USA was used as a counterfactual in the research in order to measure the role of the EU up against another relevant factor. The methodology used to collect the data which comprise the fundament of the research come from three sources: previous researches and in-desk analysis on the problems in focus, public opinion poll conducted in order to collect the general opinions of the population in the country on the three topics of interest as well as interviews with actors in the three political processes. Based on this data, an overall estimation of the role of the EU was conducted based on the analytical approach. This was methodologically supported by the comparative method whereas the role of the EU was compared in all three cases with the role of the US administration. Finally, the critical method was used to assess the advantages and the shortcomings of the role of the EU in the conflict resolution attempts in 2001 and post2001 Macedonia. 1

Ilievski, Zoran. and Taleski, Dane. ―Was the EU's Role in Conflict Management in Macedonia a Success?―. Ethnopolitics, Vol. 8, Iss. 3-4, 2010

4

1.1

The Ohrid Framework Agreement The conflict in Macedonia in 2001 was between an armed guerrilla group on one side,

National Liberation Army (NLA), and the Macedonian security forces, policy and army, on the other side. The NLA was mostly comprised of Albanians, and claimed to be fighting for the improvement of the rights of this minority population, while the Macedonian security forces were comprised mainly of ethnic Macedonians. Thus the conflict had a strong interethnic dimension. The reasons for the conflict can be found to some extent in internal factors (i.e. domestic inter-ethnic relations), but also to external factors (i.e. spillover from Kosovo).2 After tough and complex negotiations, with strong international mediation, the compromised reached, known as the Ohrid Framework Agreement, was consisted of the following main points: 1.

Basic Principles: rejection of the use of violence for political means, reaffirmation of

the sovereignty, integrity and unitary character of the Macedonian state, preservation and reflection of the multiethnic character of the country in its public life, and commitment to enhancing the local self-government; 2.

Cessation of hostilities and agreement for voluntary disarmament and disbandment of

the ―ethnic Albanian armed groups‖ under NATO supervision and with its assistance; 3.

Development of a decentralized government;

4.

Non-discrimination and equitable representation;

5.

Special parliamentary procedures: these procedures, i.e. the ―Badinter majority‖, are

to be used for adopting a number of constitutional amendments, the Law on Local SelfGovernment as well as laws that directly affect culture, the use of language, education, personal documentation, the use of symbols, laws on local finances, local elections, the city of Skopje and boundaries of municipalities; 6.

Education and the use of languages: state funding for university level education in

languages spoken by at least 20% of the population of Macedonia and the principle of ―positive discrimination‖ in the enrolment at state universities of candidates ―belonging to communities not in the majority in the population of Macedonia‖. Regarding the use of languages: any language spoken by at least 20% of the population is also an official language in Macedonia, and it may be used in: 1. municipalities where at least 20% of the population speaks that language, 2. communication with a main office of the central government and 3.

2

Balalovska, Kristina et al. ―Crisis in Macedonia―. Rome: Ethnobarometer, 2003, pp. 9-43

5

regional offices of the central government if they are located in ―a unit of local selfgovernment in which at least 20 percent of the population speaks an official language other than Macedonian‖; 7.

Expression of identity: next to the emblem of the Republic of Macedonia, local

authorities will be free to place on front of local public buildings emblems marking the identity of the community in the majority in the municipality; The provisions of the OFA have now been fully incorporated into the Macedonian legal and political system in order to regulate the protection of (group) rights of the ethnic communities in Macedonia

1.2

The Law on territorial organization from 2004 A case study that highlights the importance of the international community,

especially the EU and NATO in conflict management in post-Ohrid Macedonia was their involvement with the referendum on municipal boundaries in 2004. According to the decentralization provisions of the OFA, municipal boundaries in Macedonia were revised in the first half of 2004. This reduced the number of municipalities from 120 to 84, with the consequence, that now there were more municipalities with an ethnic Albanian majority. The overwhelming majority of ethnic Macedonians, as well as a large number of the most renowned ethnic Macedonian intellectuals and civil society actors, opposed the revised municipal boundaries, labeling it ―ethnic gerrymandering.‖ A movement called the ―Citizens’ Movement for Macedonia‖ gathered the most renowned intellectuals, businessman and civil society leaders in an effort to support a successful referendum. A successful referendum according to them was one in which more than half of the population would cast their votes, no matter which option the citizens would vote for. In contrast to that, the Government of Macedonia, supported by the international community, urged citizens not to go on voting, and in that way make the referendum invalid 3, since they estimated that the majority of the ethnic Macedonians would vote against the new territorial municipal boundaries, and thus jeopardize the implementation of the OFA.4 This

3

According to Macedonian legislation, the referendum is only valid if more than 50% of the totall population votes on it. 4 Whether such revision of the municipal boundaries in Macedonia was in line with the norms and the spirit of the OFA is another debate, which, having in mind the topic and th elimited space, can not be presented here.

6

lead the Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski to claim that the "decentralization has more support from the EU than from the Macedonian citizens".5 The ―World Macedonian Congress‖, a nationalist pan-Macedonian Diaspora organization based in Skopje, and the ethnic Macedonian opposition organized the collection of 150,000 signatures in order to test these municipal border revisions on a nation-wide referendum. By 23 August, 2004, 180,454 signatures had been collected; the referendum was scheduled for 7 November. The opposition campaigned with arguments that voting against the new municipality’s law was not voting against the OFA or decentralization nor against Euro-Atlantic integration, but only against the manner in which the new law was negotiated and adopted. However the EU and the US express concerns over the prolongation of the decentralization. The EU was "worried by a possible successful referendum", while the US send a messages that the referendum is "clear step backwards".6 The governing coalition (led by the SDSM and DUI) called upon the citizens to boycott the referendum, pursuing a campaign under the slogan: “Some questions don’t deserve an answer”. Although the international community strongly and openly backed the position of the Government, polls constantly showed that the referendum would be successful: the majority of voters would vote against the new Law on Territorial Organization.7 However on 4 November, 2004, just three days before the referendum, the USA surprisingly recognized Macedonia under its constitutional name. The referendum, held on 7 November 2004, failed because of the low turnout of 26.58%, no matter that 94,01% of that 26.58% voted against the revised municipal borders. Many connected the failure of the referendum with the recognition of the constitutional name of the country by the USA. The U.S.’s recognition was perceived by the voters as support for the position of the government on the municipalities law, and as American counsel of sorts not to push the country into further instability. However Javier Solana thought that the "referendum failed even before the decision of the US", because the citizens wanted to "choose course to Europe".8 In that respect it is clear that for the EU the decentralization was a important building stone in the implementation of the OFA. And the implementation of the OFA was the way forward to full EU integration. The EU again slightly changed its role in Macedonia from involvement in the

5

Cf. "Europeans believe more in Macedonia than we do" in Dnevnik, No 2584, October 10, 2004, p. 2 Cf. "Rumsfeld: Forward with us or back with the referendum" in Dnevnik, No 2584, October 10, 2004, p.1 7 UNDP. ―Early Warning Report FYR Macedonia―. Skopje: UNDP, 2004. http://www.undp.org.mk/ datacenter/publications/documents/ewr.pdf, pp. 14 and 47. 8 Cf. "From OFA Macedonia to European Macedonia" in Dnevnik, No 2606, November 10, 2004, p.1 6

7

conflict management, to guidance of the general reforms and the particular EU integration process.

1.3

The ―May Agreement‖ from 2007 Another case study of the international community’s involvement in conflict

management in Macedonia is their assistance in overcoming difficult inter-ethnic party conflicts. The DUI, the biggest party representing Albanians, left the Macedonian Parliament on 26 January 2007 as a demonstration of revolt that laws requiring the ―Badinter majority― were passed without DUI’s votes. This was possible with the votes of the ethnic Albanian DPA and votes from representatives of non-Albanian minority communities in Macedonia. DUI demanded negotiations on a range of inter-ethnic issues with the government, as a precondition for their return in Parliament. These include a list of laws that will be considered under ―Badinter majority― terms, and demands for a law granting the same rights to the former ethnic Albanian insurgents, as those granted to the state security forces that clashed with them in 2001. The EU and NATO set DUI’s return in Parliament as a condition for the country’s expected invitation for acession to NATO and the expected date for start of negotiations with the EU. The need for political dialogue was strongly stressed by the EU, a fact that latter resonated in the country reports that the European Commission prepares for Macedonia. The document, as it was presented in the media contained five points9:

1.

The parties agree to a list of 46 laws subject to vote according to the Badinter principle, which will be included in the new Book of Procedures of the Parliament;

2.

The parties agree to a replacement of a member of the Parliamentary Commission for Relations between Communities from VMRO-DPMNE with one from SDSM, and drafting a new law for the composition of this body;

9

Since this document is not public, the content of the document is presented as reported by Dnevnik on 31 May, 2007,

8

3.

The parties agree to address the issues of providing material and social support to the victims of the 2001 conflict and their families within current laws and procedures. The parties agree to the continuation of the working group on this issue;

4.

The parties agree to draft and submit for adoption to Parliament a law on the use of languages that is in full compliance with the Framework Agreement and with Amendment 5 of the Constitution. The parties agree to the continuation of the working group on this issue;

5.

Upon DUI’s return to the Parliament, the parties agree to the continuation of discussions on the issue of the method of Government formation.

The EU and the US played a key role as facilitators in the management of relations between the political parties. This is a slightly different role for the EU from previous engagement of brokering peace, pushing for implementation of the OFA, guiding the reform process and to some extent the EU integration process. However it does have the mitigation between political representatives of different ethnic communities in its core. The EU has now become a power broker, accompanied with the US, on disputes between the political parties in Macedonia.

2.

Quantitative and qualitative research To tackle the core issues of our research we will measure the perceptions of the public

with a nation-wide public opinion survey and we will compare it with the views of the key factors involved in the aforementioned processes through in-depth interviews. While fully aware of the strengths and weaknesses of each approach, namely the lack of information that the general public might have, as well as the subjectivity of the interviewees, we nevertheless expect to uncover a large part of the mosaic of historical fact and perception with the complementarily of the two approaches.

9

2.1

The public opinion survey analysis The nation-wide public opinion survey was undertaken during the summer of 2010, in

order of gaining the necessary data for testing the main hypothesis from the general public perspective, encompassing all aspects of the popular view, and primarily focusing on the involvement of the international community in the conflict management resolution of the interethnic crisis in Macedonia. This task has been accomplished using a representative stratified random sample of 1110 adult respondents on national level. In order to be representative, the sample was stratified with a consideration of the main social-demographic structures of Macedonian population (gender, age structure, education, occupation, and ethnicity). This stratification is compatible with the socio demographic data from the Macedonian Bureau of Statistics. The respondents were also differentiated regionally, as well as according to the urban-rural split. The size of the sample ensures a maximum marginal error of +/- 3.25%.

The questionnaire was developed to measure the general attitudes of the population towards the EU and the international community as a whole, and to emphasize their perceptions on the primary objective of the research-the involvement of the International Community in the conflict and post-conflict resolutions in Macedonia. The questions were closed ended in order of extracting the general attitudes and majority of them were constructed using the Likert scale, not in attempt to create the interval scale measures, but to avoid central tendency bias and then reducing the answers on nominal level by combining the affirmative and negative responses into two basic categories.

The first introductory question was imposed to perceive the general perceptions of the Macedonians towards the European Union. The question was Do you support the aspirations of the Republic of Macedonia in the European Union? The answers shows that Macedonians almost unanimously support the EU accession process, with 90.9% of respondents who gave affirmative answers in either of two ―Yes‖ categories yes, completely or yes, to some extent. Compared with previous data from surveys with similar question, the results only reestablished and confirmed the wide accepted perception that, during the last decade with

10

some oscillations on a smaller scale10, Macedonians from both Macedonian and Albanian ethnic background are extremely supportive for the EU integration process. Second question narrowed the scope of perceptions from general opinion about the EU, towards the respondents’ view on the European Union influence to the democratic building process and reforms in Macedonia. Again, more than two third of the survey participants gave positive evaluation on the role of the Union in the process of Macedonian democratic transformation. The positive evaluation is similar for all demographic groups, although well educated and especially ethnic Albanians are more favorable towards the EU role in democratization of Macedonia. The reason of such answers could be traced in the viewpoint of some ethnic Macedonians for ―democratization‖ defined as ―granting more rights to the ethnic minorities‖ in the country. The identity politics played an important role in Macedonia during the last two decades and has proved as an obstacle to the consolidation of democratic peace in the country, since the sufficient degree of national unity or unified political community is a key element for successful democratization.11 Hence, from the perspective of one part of the ethnic Macedonian population, broader spectrum of collective rights based on ethnicity could prevent the successful achievement of national cohesion and political unity. Further recognition of this argument could be traced in the next question, which was how do you evaluate the role of the EU in regards to the interethnic relations in the Republic of Macedonia? Although the majority of the surveyed population responded positively, one third of ethnic Macedonians and respondents over 50 years of age answered bad or somewhat bad, while this is the case with around 16% of the ethnic Albanians. The next question was closely connected to the previous two and it was based on the platform of defining the perceptions for the most positive influence from the various international actors in the democracy building process. The citizens were asked which state or organization had the most positive influence in democracy building in the Republic of Macedonia? 22.7% didn’t answered, while the most of the citizens with affirmative responses selected the EU, 23.6% and USA, 25.6%. The answers, as expected, clearly extracted and identified the most influential international actors in Macedonia, i.e. the EU and USA, with almost identical positive opinion among citizens on their role in Macedonia. However, in the cross-tabulation on this question with the ethnic demographic variable, could be noticed that 10

The surveys conducted for Macedonian Secretariate for European Affairs by the Institute for Democracy ―Societas Civilis‖ – Skopje (IDSCS) , on regular intervals during the period of 2003-2009, shows that the popular support on Macedonian EU acession process fluctuates from 87.5% to highest 91.9% 11 Engstrom, Jenny. ―Democratisation and the Prevention of Violent Conflict‖. Farnham: Ashgate, 2009, pp. 142

11

ethnic Albanians recognize, as more constructive, the role of the USA, while ethnic Macedonians are more positive towards the EU involvement. As presented in previous questions, one part of the ethnic Macedonians were reserved towards democratization which promotes multiculturalism and extended collective human rights based on ethnic origin, and therefore, the EU acting as ―soft power‖ with its conditionality approach is more acceptable international actor. The other important conclusion based on the responses is that, most of the Macedonians recognized the decisive role of the EU and the USA which they frequently correlates with the term ―international community‖, since according to their answers, the role of other international actors in Macedonia is rather marginal.

Is the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) a good or a bad solution for the state? is the next question on which around 55% of the respondents answered with good, or somewhat good and around 35% as bad, or somewhat bad. This agreement was initially refused by the majority of ethnic Macedonians, and perceived by them as enforced by the international community as solution to the crisis in 2001. However, during the last decade OFA has increasing acceptance, although considerable part of ethnic Macedonians are not convinced in its acquisitions. In this survey around 45% of the ethnic Macedonians consider the Framework Agreement as bad solution, which only support the previous argument. Nevertheless, comparison with similar survey conducted in 2008, noticed the positive trends in its acceptance, since only 24% of ethic Macedonian had positive feelings about OFA 12 in that survey, while the percentage in this survey has grown to 44%. In the consequent question, 30% of the citizens agree that OFA guarantees the equal rights for all ethnic communities, 30% thought that this is the case only in a few areas, while 25% disagree that OFA provides any equality for all ethnic groups in the country. The majority of the respondents which answered that OFA did not establish any equality are ethnic Macedonians and surveyors from other ethnic groups, besides Albanians. The other researches pinpoint that the majority of all ethnic groups in Macedonia agree that OFA was designed primarily for the needs of Albanians, while ethnic Albanians view was that OFA was endorsed for the benefit of all ethnic groups in the country13. The role of the EU in drafting Ohrid Framework Agreement was recognized as positive for half of the citizens, 16% didn’t have an opinion, and less than one third of the respondents rate the involvement of the EU as negative, which 12

Ohrid Framework Agreement Research 2008, conducted by IDSCS for the Secretariat for implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement (SIOFA) 13 Ibid

12

reflects the general view on the involvement of the EU in the interethnic relation, extracted in the previous questions.

The new law on territorial organization passed in 2004, was part of the provisions in the interethnic reconciliation process in Macedonia, supported by the USA and the EU. This Law was part of the indispensable package of laws necessary to ensure the decentralization process, regarded as a crucial component of the OFA14. Although aimed to calm the ethnic tensions, this law provokes serious debates and disagreements among ethnic and political actors in Macedonia, resulting with a referendum on its adoption 15. Widespread concerns had been expressed about the potential impact of the referendum on the Ohrid process, and on inter ethnic relations generally16. After the referendum the law was implemented, but the debate continues, since according to some politicians it was not fulfilled properly, and for others it has to be withdrawn completely. The popular view on this issue only confirmed the dispute, since the answers on the next question (do you think that there should be a change in the territorial organization passed in 2004 in Macedonia?) were proportionally distributed in all segments. Around 30% thinks that the law should not be changed, 15% stated that some changes are necessary, 26% are for complete revision of the law, and 22% of the respondents could not decide. The aim of the next two questions (What was the influence of the USA/the EU during the drafting of the Law on territorial organization?) was to stress the popular opinion on the involvement of international community in the enactment of Law on territorial organization. Around 40% of the respondents were undecided, 30% thinks that the influence from both actors was positive and around 25% gave negative answers to the role of USA and the EU in drafting the law, from which majority were ethnic Macedonians.17 Since the opinions were almost identical for both EU and USA, the obtained results only confirmed previous partial conclusions that, according to the general population: 

Respondents identifies the USA and the EU as main international actors in Macedonia

14

http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/fyrom/37790 On 3 September 2004 parliament adopted a decision to hold a referendum on 7 November. The referendum, would effectively require repeal of the newly passed Law on Territorial Organization, and a return to the status quo 16 http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/fyrom/37790 17 31% of all ethnic Macedonians gave this answer, while this was the case with only 6% of the ethnic Albanians 15

13



The USA and the EU involvement in Macedonia are based on strong mutual coordination, since the majority of the citizens could not detach and differentiate their opinion towards actions of either of them



The majority of ethnic Albanians, if is required to choose, lean towards the USA with their positive perceptions because of the more decisive role of the USA in the democratic transformation of Macedonia, which encompassed greater human rights for ethnically diverse communities



For the same reason, the negative role of the international community is viewed mainly by the ethnic Macedonians, and therefore their inclination is more towards the EU, which involvement is more as soft power with its conditionality approach

The next question was Do you support the provision of material and social welfare for the former NLA members and their families? One third of the respondents are completely supportive, 6.9% to some extent and half of the citizens (72% of ethnic Macedonian respondents) did not support any provisions for the former ethnic Albanian guerilla members. In the next question however, 61.5% of all respondents support an enactment of new law which should give provisions to victims of the 2001 insurgence in general, while 20% thinks that the provisions should be given using the existing legal framework. Around two thirds of the respondents agreed that the Macedonian government should be always constituted by the winner party in both main ethnic communities, and around 38% that the EU partially or completely influenced this process. From the ethnic Albanian point of view this will ensure the proportional representation of the will of the voters, and from ethnic Macedonian perspective the government will be more stable and without additional conditionality from the ethnic Albanian parties to participate in the government, usually based on new ethnic provisions.

The final question addressed the future expectation of the Macedonians from the EU influence in the country. The majority of the surveyors (more than 60%) presumed that EU role will have positive influence, while around 30% that it will be negative (32% of ethnic Macedonians and 10% of the ethnic Albanians). The last several questions only confirmed the general observations above, with additional remarks that the noticed sharp ethnical division over the involvement of the international community in the interethnic reconciliation and democratization process in general, could be obtained again in the respondents answers, 14

although the existence of the important declination tendency should be verified if compared with previous similar surveys conducted during the last decade18.

2.2

Qualitative research: in-depth interviews The quantitative part of the research within the project has been focusing on

interviews with the direct participants in the processes (OFA, Law on territorial organization and the May Agreement) as well as other not directly involved interviewees, nevertheless detrimental to understanding these three crucial political processes in post-2001 Republic of Macedonia. In this regard, overall 12 interviews were conducted with members of the Macedonian security forces, commanders of the National Liberation Army (NLA), politicians involved in all three processes as well as academicians, political analysts, political advisors of politicians involved in the processes in 2001 etc. The questionnaire was structured in three different parts, each part respectively entailing questions that reveal the content of the three major topics in focus:

-

The first part regards the Ohrid Framework Agreement. It entails 15 questions that reveal the nature, the actors as well as the dynamics of communication between the interviewees and EU officials during the conflict, the drafting and the implementation of the OFA.

-

The second part of the questionnaire regards the Law on territorial organization from 2004 and also regards the communication between the interviewees and EU officials regarding the specific political process concerning the Law on territorial organization. This part of the questionnaire entails 14 questions.

-

Similarly, the third part regards the May Agreement and the overall interviewees-EU officials communication within the framework of this political process with 14 questions as well.

Every designated part of the questionnaire was introduced to adequate interviewees (being that there are practically three smaller questionnaires within the main one). The questionnaire is of an open format (not coded or semi-coded). 18

The complete material and the detailed survey results are deposited at the Political Science Library at the Faculty of Law, University Ss. Cyril and Methodius-Skopje.

15

2.2.1 Findings (Ohrid Framework Agreement) The general impression of the role of the EU in the conflict management in Macedonia in 2001 as well as the peace negotiations and the drafting of the OFA in the perception of all interviewees is connected to two major points – the role of the EU compared to the role of the US administration as well as the obvious ―auxiliary‖, but constructive role that the EU had during the aforementioned political processes. Consequently, a major point in the quantitative research is also the predominance of the actors involved on the side of the US administration as well as the relatively compliant role of the EU officials in the peace process to its US counterparts. Many of the interviewed persons in the research point out, as a starting position, that the EU had a very constructive role in the peace process in 2001 in Macedonia. For instance of the interviewees states that ―the influence of the EU was vast, without them the Agreement would have been reached much harder and would have been implemented far harder.‖19 Another interviewee states that ―these actors (EU and USA) had a very positive role in the conflict resolution.‖20 However besides putting forward the positive role of the EU in the process, all interviewees univocally state that EU had only a facilitating role and did not make the decisive pressure on both conflicting sides in order to stop the violence and reach the OFA. Comparing the role of the EU as the ―smaller brother of the USA‖21 one of the interviewees states that the predominant role of the EU was to ―carry messages back and forth, while in reality the USA did all of the negotiating.‖22 The perceptions of the interviewees go as far as saying that the ―EU was not a crucial factor in that period, there had been another great power that imposed itself as a crucial player‖23 obviously referring to the USA and even evaluating the role of the EU in the process as ―twofaced.‖24 Although one of the interviewees claims that ―there has been no dissonance between in the policies of the EU and the US envoys (Francois Leotard and James Perdue), the US envoy dictated the politics, while the EU envoy was somewhat silent.‖ 25 One of the interviewees puts this very bluntly:

19

Interview conducted on 18.02.2011. Ibid. 21 Interview conducted on 10.03.2011. 22 Interview conducted on 18.02.2011. 23 Interview conducted on 18.04.2011. 24 Interview conducted on 23.03.2011. 25 Interview conducted on 8.03.2011. 20

16

―What is interesting concerning the EU is that in this period for the first time they had no trouble reaching a consensus in regards to Macedonia. A joint standpoint was put forward, that Macedonia has to be saved. In order to do this a lighter mission should have been sent, ―Concordia‖, the first military mission. However, the complete process developed under the influence of the USA and their crucial player – the envoy James Perdue (military intelligence person from Pentagon) that made vast pressure.‖26

The impact of the EU in the conflict resolution was made through its special envoy, Francois Leotard. The obvious differences in the politics of the EU and USA were noted in the qualitative research whereas EU made pressure on behalf of the side of the rebels (soft diplomacy) while US administration had a firm grip on their actions through their leaders: ―EU instrumentalized its influence through its envoy – Francois Leotard. They forced a peaceful method of resolving the conflict, in order to stop its spreading. EU made political pressure in order the demands of the Albanian side to be met, and NATO had its influence in this process as well. However, I must say that the USA had a dominant and strong influence on the Albanians because they had the impression that the USA supports them in the project of independent Kosovo. The Americans had crucial influence over Ali Ahmeti…‖27

What is even more interesting that one of the interviewees points out that the influence of the USA (compared to the EU) was bigger not just because of the control of the rebel leaders in the country, but also because of the control of the situation in the broader region meaning control over military formations in Kosovo. This interviewee states that ―the USA managed the crisis through controlling Hasim Thaci as well‖28 implying that the USA had access and influence over armed Albanian formations on both sides of the MacedoniaKosovo border. If one is to summarize the role of the EU compared to the role of the USA in the conflict management and the drafting if the OFA, one could use the allegory of one of the 26

Interview conducted on 8.03.2011. Interview conducted on 15.03.2011. 28 Interview conducted on 15.03.2011. 27

17

interviewed politicians directly involved in the process saying that ―the USA was the sun, and the EU was the moon in the conflict resolution.‖29 The EU itself however, interviewees point out, aided Macedonia not just politically but financially as well. Although politically, the USA administrations had the upper hand in the peace negotiations, the EU helped Macedonia stabilize ―politically and financially‖ meaning that they organized the donor’s conference that helped Macedonia push through the crisis in 2001. The other aiding factor was the Agreement on stabilization and association that the Republic of Macedonia signed with the EU, which also enhanced and easier way out of the crisis as well as financial consolidation of the country. Speaking on behalf of the actors, the frequency and the modality of that EU officials used made during the peace process, they were predominantly put through the special envoy of the EU – Leotard. Notwithstanding, another important figure was the EU’s foreign policy representative – Javier Solana, which most of the actors involved in the conflict point out as a leading figure in the peace process and have met on more than one occasion. Although once again most of the interviewees agree that the US representatives were the most proactive ones and the most present in the tete-a-tete and formal meetings, it was Leotard and Solana that were perceived as the voice of the EU on matters concerning the 2001 crisis in Macedonia. The meetings with the EU representatives are evaluated as frequent by most of the respondents with direct meetings as the predominant modus operandi of the EU officials. On behalf of the demands that the EU made on both sides it is interesting to state the opinion of one interviewee saying ―the EU opted for a peaceful solution, while Perdue made aggressive pressure‖30 whereas ―it seemed that the Albanians side does not trust the EU so much as it does the USA.‖31 On the list of the demands made by the EU during the peace process, peaceful conflict resolution prevailed, although some of the Macedonian respondents tend to think that the EU ―made substantive pressure Albanian demands to be met.‖32. This speaks of the relatively unbiased role of the EU, since involved actors from both sides tend to think that the EU was biased on behalf of the other side. Be it as it may, the demands of the EU during the peace process and the drafting of the OFA were in the line of calming the situation, refugee returning, reconstruction of infrastructure, confidence building measures, amnesty for the rebels which all later became part of the process of consolidating the country after the conflict in 2001. 29

Interview conducted on 23.03.2011. Interview conducted on 18.02.2010. 31 Interview conducted on 10.03.2010. 32 Interview conducted on 8.03.2011. 30

18

However, summarizing the interviews from the qualitative research, one occurrence stands out and is supported by almost all interviewees in the research – that the EU has been a stabilizing factor much more after the events in 2001 and the drafting of the OFA than in the very conflict resolution process. The role of the EU in the conflict resolution mostly came down to ―constant coordination with USA and NATO in order to solve the conflict as painlessly as possible‖33 while in fact the most efficient method of stabilization of the EU during the conflict was ―monitoring, through which the EU aided the stabilization of the country (…) and rationalization of tensions.‖34 Obviously, EU was the carrot in the ―stick and carrot‖ process, and the US administration, through Perdue, was the stick, which has been confirmed by respondents from both conflicting sides. The fragile political situation after the signing of the OFA, however, has been consolidated greatly through the efforts of the EU given that the EU acted as a ―supporting reminder in order to fulfill the OFA requirements and avoid the reactivation of the conflict‖. Many of the interviewees agree in pointing out that the EU ―contributed to the stabilization of the country through dialogue and spreading of democratic principles. It was all supported with projects in the sphere of education, media etc.‖ As one the respondents summarizes: ―The EU is the side that creates and insists upon implementation of the democratic standards as a very important factor in the stabilization of every consensual democratic society. This contributes towards greater trust among political elites, as well as among the general public. The concrete projects for support of certain spheres in the state compensate the lack of financial means and know-how concerning how to achieve what is foreseen in these projects.‖35 The biggest contribution of the EU in 2001 was in fact in the ―post-ante period in 2001, in creating a normal political ambient in the country.‖36

33

Interview conducted on 8.03.2011. Interview conducted on 10.03.2010. 35 Interview conducted on 14.03.2010. 36 Interview conducted on 11.04.2011. 34

19

Conclusions from the qualitative research on OFA

-

The US administration, through its special envoy James Perdue, had a more visible role in the conflict resolution process and the than the EU through its officials;

-

The more visible role in the conflict resolution of the USA was due to their control of the rebel Albanian leaders in Macedonia and in Kosovo, as well as the possibility to influence the military formations operations through the leaders;

-

The EU and the USA in the conflict resolution applied the ―carrot and stick‖ policy, whereas the carrot were the financial promises by the EU and the stick were the direct political pressures made by the US administrations;

-

The EU applied mediation and more passive policy in the conflict resolution, while the USA applied direct political pressure on both sides;

-

The role of the EU was much more important in the post-conflict period i.e. in the consolidation of the country than in the conflict resolution itself;

2.2.2 Law on territorial organization The involvement of the international community in the management of the disputes over the referendum on the Law on territorial organization in 2004 is another example of a successful coordinated multi-actor conflict resolution strategy. Although the EU throughout the process has been more vocal and has been able to frame the issue of decentralization as one of the key factors of its conditionality in the accession process 37, however, as in the case of the Ohrid Framework Agreement negotiations, the role of the EU is still perceived as of ―secondary‖ importance compared to that of the US. On one hand, the findings of the qualitative research do indicate that the EU has had a relatively important role in the bargaining process and pacification of political tensions. However, its role is always emphasized in a context of coordination and sharing of responsibilities with the other international actors. As one high ranking party official involved in the process states, ―the EU contributed a lot, and sometimes their role was 37

Thus, the EU delegation in Macedonia has stated on several occasions that the implementation of the process of decentralization is a key condition for further accession of Macedonia towards the EU. И децентрализацијата е услов за апликација во ЕУ. Утрински весник, 20.11.2003, http://star.utrinski.com.mk/?pBroj=1327&stID=10485&pR=3; Без децентрализација нема приближување до ЕУ. Утрински весник, 12.12.2003, http://star.utrinski.com.mk/default.aspx?pBroj=1346&stID=12261&pR=2

20

decisive, but as such it always acted in coordination with other international factors, most notably the United States‖38. In this sense, whilst EU’s efforts are acknowledged as ―constant demands for open dialogue and peaceful resolution of disputes‖39 and ―implementation of the process of decentralization‖40, there is a tendency among the political elites to evaluate the role of the EU less as a political actor, but rather through the lenses of expertise, whereby the EU is seen as ―provider of expert opinions‖41 On the other hand, there is a wide spread notion that the role of the European Union as a broker and enforcer of conditionality has been less decisive in comparison to that of the US. In this sense, several observers of the developments in 2004 indicate that the whole process has been lead and enforced by the US administration. Such sentiments have been effectively summed up by one former political adviser:‖the EU didn’t have influence in this case, the American ambassador was the key figure‖42 In terms of frequency and level of established contacts, the findings of the qualitative research reveal a high number of meetings between international officials and representatives from stake holder political elites throughout the whole length of the process of negotiating the Law on territorial organization and the referendum that came in its aftermath. On behalf of the EU and its member states the major actors in this constellation have been officials from the EU Delegation in Skopje and member states embassy personnel whereby meetings with political advisers have been much more frequent than those with designated ambassadors. Meetings with OSCE officials have been frequent as well, while communication with high US officials has been occasional. The predominant mode of communication has been direct meetings with constant inquires on whether the principal domestic political actors have the situation under control. Throughout the political debate and in the period of violent escalations, EU officials have been seen as mediators that tried to influence the ―creation of a political environment that will help and give support to the coalition partners in order to move the processes in a positive direction‖43. As one high ranking party official indicated, ―EU’s goal was to move things forward and to make sure that the process will not be halted‖. This notion has been evident also in the referendum campaign where the political elites from smaller parties active in the

38

Interview conducted on 11.04.2011. Interview conducted on 15.03.2011. 40 Interview conducted on 17.03.2011. 41 Interview conducted on 23.03.2011. 42 Interview conducted on 8.03.2011. 43 Interview conducted on 11.04.2011. 39

21

campaign have been advocated by EU officials that ―the referendum should fail and that the Law on territorial organization is good‖.44

Conclusions -

The role of the EU as an actor in conflict resolution is perceived as of ―secondary‖ importance compared to that of the US.

-

EU is perceived less as a political enforcer and more as a source of expertise.

-

Although the US actors had less frequent communication with the political elites in Macedonia, their influence and mediation has been much more persuasive and effective compared to the EU.

2.2.3 May Agreement Similarly to the previous two cases, the developments that lead to and followed the so called ―May agreement‖ present valid evidence of a coordinated approach of the international actors in Macedonia towards ethnic reconciliation. Even in the events that preceded the May agreement, the EU has played a crucial ―pressure‖ role through conditioning Macedonia’s EU accession with further development of political dialogue and implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement45. However, the May agreement case can be perceived as some sort of a turning point for EU involvement in ethnic conflict management in Macedonia as this process has been marked by the increasing persuasive role of the EU. In this sense, the findings of our research suggest that EU officials have been more vocal and persistent in comparison to the previous cases. As one prominent party leader stated, ―EU’s role has been substantially enhanced in this period with the final goal of stabilization of the political situation‖46 This is evident also from the direct meetings that have been convened by EU officials and political councilors and ambassadors from the member states which have been realized on a more frequent basis in comparison to other factors from the international community. Having this in mind, emphasis should be put on the role of EU’s Special Representative and Head of the Commission Delegation in Macedonia, Erwan Fouere, who

44

Interview conducted on 15.03.2011. Damjanovski, Ivan. ―Macedonia’s EU Accession – Negotiation or Stagnation?”. Faenza: Portal on Central Eastern and Balkan Europe, 2007 46 Interview conducted on 17.03.2011. 45

22

according to one party leader had influence on an equal footing with US ambassador Gillian Milovanovic. However, as argued by one high ranking Albanian politician, the role of the EU shouldn’t be exaggerated since the interventions from the US officials were still decisive. 47

Conclusions:

-

Compared to the previous two cases, the EU played a more significant role in ethnic conflict management.

-

The engagement of EU envoys and officials has been more frequent in comparison to the other international actors.

-

EU’s Special Representative and Head of the Commission Delegation has been a key figure in the mediation of the May Agreement.

3.

Conclusion The conflict in the Republic of Macedonia in 2001 between the Albanian guerilla

(NLA) and the Macedonian security forces, spurred by the inadequate accommodation of the relations between the two biggest ethnic groups in the country during its troublesome democratic transition, has been a cornerstone of the political and academic interest in the past decade. In this regards not just the conflict in 2001 and the Ohrid Framework Agreement, but also the Law on territorial organization from 2004 as well as the May Agreement from 2007 present a specific field whereas one of the most academically provocative aspects in the engagement of the EU in all three processes, put in a counterfactual relation to the role of the USA. The previous analysis in our view convincingly demonstrates that the USA was and still remains the driving factor in these three historical junctures of inter-ethnic conflict management and democratic consolidation of the young Macedonian republic. The EU has had the crucial supporting role, with its economic incentives and conditionality, which basically could be evaluated as supportive to the role of the USA. However, the effects that were achieved and made Macedonia the favorite case of a ―success story‖ in the Balkans was

47

Interview conducted on 11.04.2011.

23

precisely the fact that these international actors had strong coordination and conversion of their policy objectives. There was no divergence of US and EU (and especially member states within EU type) of discord as witnessed in Bosnia and Kosovo. Also there was no involvement of the ―Russian factor‖ in Macedonia compared to the cases of Bosnia and Kosovo. Therefore it is questionable whether there was a so called ―learning curve‖ in the international community which had learned on its mistakes in the previous two cases and that is why it acted in convergence and didn’t repeat the errors made in the management of the complex ethnopolitical processes in Macedonia. Or the Macedonian case simply cannot be compared with the other two, because of its demographic structure, history of conflict and different type of external intervention? Certainly this should be a topic of an entirely new research, complementary to this one, perhaps our own. The conclusions reaches in this paper were based on a three-lateral methodological approach – in-desk research, quantitative research on public perceptions on the issues in focus as well as interviews with the direct actors and witnesses of the political processes apropos the three aforementioned events. This approach provided for in-depth and convincing conclusions on the role of the EU in the most critical events in the history of the Republic of Macedonia.

24

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BALALOVSKA¸ Kristina et al. ―Crisis in Macedonia―. Rome: Ethnobarometer, 2003 --"Minority Politics in Southeast Europe: Crisis in Macedonia", The Ethnobarometer Working Paper Series, Rome: Ethnobarometer, 2002 DAMJANOVSKI, Ivan. ―Macedonia’s EU Accession – Negotiation or Stagnation?”. Faenza: Portal on Central Eastern and Balkan Europe, 2007 ―Declaration by the European Council on Former Yugoslavia, Lisbon, 26-27 June 1992, in Christopher Hill, European Foreign Policy: Key Documents (Routledge, London: 2000). ENGSTROM, Jenny. ―Democratisation and the Prevention of Violent Conflict‖. Farnham: Ashgate, 2009. ILIEVSKI, Zoran and TALESKI, Dane (2009) 'Was the EU's Role in Conflict Management in Macedonia a Success?',Ethnopolitics,8:3,355 — 367. LANTSCHNER, Emma. MARKO, Joseph, PETRICUSIC, Antonija (eds.). ―European Integration and its Effects on Minority Protection in South Eastern Europe―. Baden-Baden: Nomos Band 12, 2008. MESSAS, Kostas G. ―Failure in Former Yugoslavia: Hard Lessons for the European Union‖, in: Danopoulos, Constantine P. and Messas, Kostas G. (eds.). ―Crises in the Balkans: Views from the Participants‖. Boulder: Westview Press, 1997. Ohrid Framework Agreement Research 2008, conducted by the Institute for Democracy ―Societas Civilis - Skopje for the Secretariat for implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement (SIOFA). Spokesperson of the Secretary General, High Representative for CFSP, ―Javier SOLANA, EU High Representative for the CFSP, welcomes the agreement in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia between Prime Minister GRUEVSKI and the leader of the DUI party, Ali AHMETI‖, Brussels, 29 May 2007, S163/07. UN General Assembly Distr. GENERAL A/RES/27/225, 27 April 1993. VANKOVSKA-CVETKOVSKA, Biljana. ―UNPREDEP in Macedonia: Achievements and Limits of Preventive Diplomacy”. Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution 2.1, March 1999.

Newspaper articles:

"Europe blackmails: no money for the refugees untill you change the constitution" in Dnevnik, No 1633, August 23, 2001. "Europeans believe more in Macedonia than we do" in Dnevnik, No 2584, October 10, 2004. 25

"From OFA Macedonia to European Macedonia" in Dnevnik, No 2606, November 10, 2004. "Rumsfeld: Forward with us or back with the referendum" in Dnevnik, No 2584, October 10, 2004. "Solana will not leave untill he sees a new Government" in Dnevnik, No 1544, May 8, 2001. "Solving the problem through dialog" in Nova Makedonija, No 16915, February 24, 1994. "Surprising behavior of EU Presidency" in Nova Makedonija, No 16190, February 18 1994. Makfax online, “Ahmeti will decide about DUI's returning to Parliament”, 28.05.2007, http://www.makfax.com.mk/look/novina/article.tpl?IdLanguage=1&IdPublication=2&NrArti cle=69246&NrIssue=357&NrSection=10 Без децентрализација нема приближување до ЕУ. Утрински весник, 12.12.2003, http://star.utrinski.com.mk/default.aspx?pBroj=1346&stID=12261&pR=2. И децентрализацијата е услов за апликација во ЕУ. Утрински весник, 20.11.2003, http://star.utrinski.com.mk/?pBroj=1327&stID=10485&pR=3;

Web resources: ―The U.S. Embassy and the EU Mission in Skopje Greet Political Dialogue Agreement‖, May 29, 2007, ; European Union Police Mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUPOL PROXIMA), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=584&lang=EN Framework Agreement, 13 August 2001, at . http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/fyrom/37790 http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/fyrom/37790. UNDP. ―Early Warning Report FYR Macedonia―. Skopje: http://www.undp.org.mk/ datacenter/publications/documents/ewr.pdf

UNDP,

2004.

26