The website o~.it lines the different types of analytic support that might he useful to a customer at any given time. DI officers provide analysis that helps officials.
The
Coming
Revolution in
Intelligence Analysis
What To Do When Traditional Models Fail Carmen A. Medina Editors Note: This article is
designed
to
from decades ago would recog
stiniulale debate.
nize most of what
Written and circulated within
govern inent circles
presented ation
by
officer on
2001,
it is
wider audience. CIA
a
Steven Ward joins the
debate with
vIe
in
here for consider
a
coznzIeipoi~zt
a,-ti
case
of the Directorate of
Intelligence change
The great
challenge facing
Directorate of
may
be what is most needed.
ana
Intelligence (DI) insight to smart
providing policymakers. Meeting this chal lenge is hard, but intelligence officers have long believed that careful
attention to
craft of
to
to
50-plus
the trade-
to
the information avail
policymakers. During years, the CIA. a
On the CIAs
sion
its
we
model that
only successful execu produce quality intelli gence analysis. When we fal tered, we blamed the analysts (or the collectors), but not the
Office of
Policy Support in Directorate of Intelligence.
the
the provision of
as
timely,
objective analysis on the full
gence
intelli range
of national security threats and
foreign policy
issues
facing
the o~.it
analytic support that might he useful
to
a
customer at
time. DI officers
given analysis
any
provide
that helps officials through their policy agen by: addressing dayto-day
work
needed
das
tion to
events;
model.
developments providing related background informa tion; assessing the significance of developments and warning
apprising
consumers
of
and
near-term
consequences~ and
What if the
signaling potentially dangerous
not
situations in Lhe future.
the
in the
internet
accurate, and
of
serves
public
DI defines its mis
lines the different types of
work that added
believed, evolved
Carmen A. Medlna
most
United States. The website
intelligence analysis
would lead
able
case
needed.
website, the
real
is
value
in the Dls
what is
The Current Model
and managers in the
lysts
comforting, but change may be
page 29 of this issue. + +
Stability is often comforting, but in the
a typical analyst does today, from read ing traffic to preparing finished intelligence. Stability is often
failing, however, lies with the analysts hut with model they are asked to fol
low? Customer needs and
A
preferences are changing rap idly, as is the environment in which intelligence analysis operates. Yet the Dls approach to analysis has hardly changed over the years. A DI analyst
that it focuses first
key aspect
ments. In
of this model is
fact,
the
on develop analysts
work process is structured
around
developments. They spend the first quarter or more of their workday reading
23
Future
Analysis
the
through to
overnight
determine what
is
traffic
new
Analysts today have to dig deep to surpass the analytic abilities of theft customers.
They
Analysts today
have
value in
of informa
an era
report what is new to their col leagues and superiors and then
tion abundance. The
often
consumer,
munitv. The
be
an
death of
eventthe
world leader decline of
or
Or it may be
the
a
precipitous
Asian currency.
an
an
gence reporting of interestfrom
item of intelli on
a
other type of collec source, tion. This basic model has or
Assumption 3: The CIA and specifically the Dl have unique information about what is
happening.
recently,
specific
have greater
which
mining what
to do on any given day. As a result, the model has acquired an adcliuonal step understanding customer feed back to determine policymaker
interests. This ever,
new
step, how
merely supplements
the
pivot around which the ana lytic work turnsidentification of the
new
Critical,
development.
sometimes
unstated,
assumptions underpin
this
Assumption need
a
1:
Policymakers
service that tells them
what is going on in the world or in their particular area of
that the model needs as
Assumption need help in determining vliat an
24
event means
long
as
identify the
unclassified information
sources
85 percent of the
weekly periodicals; sional networks;
was
to
informal as
developed during
the 1960s and 1970s and opti mized
against
the characteristics
of that
period. It was an era information scarcitytruth
about the worlds societies
was
a
of
many closed
rare
ity. Communicating
commod across
hardgoverniiient leaders rarely talked to each other on the phone and sum mits among world leaders
key
had the fastest
ideology
were was
or
right
incom
to
access
ing intelligence could
seeing paiticu
count on
policymakers. Today, thanks to information technology, policy~ makers often readl the
ffic
at
the
same
a
a
raw
time as, if
before, analysts. In
always important
kno\v how far left
lions, such
information and
tnt
driver in international rela was
nica
email.
Policymakers today also read raw intelligence reports on a regular basis. Twenty to thirty years ago, analysts in the DI
was
events.
commu
profes
official,
I any criuca I cables before
borders and with other govern
unusual
their
and
evolve
tradecraft
well. The Dls
model
to
2: Policvmakers
as
they operate. If reality changes. then it isa good bet
tionsit
concern.
only
suit the environment in
ments
traclecraft model.
tive. When asked to
con
illustra
are
icals; US newspapers and Models work
they
in deter
ducted in late 2000
on, they respondents picked all four of the following sources: foreign newspapers and weekly period
llleat1.
interests of customers must
weight
cus
of the Senior Executive
relied
Dl managers
that the
survey of
to a
Intelligence Bulletin (SEIB) 4: Dl
analysts are particularly insightful about what these developments may
Assumption
When Models Fail
have realizer
ways
developments, intelli gence-related or not The tomers
decades.
More
more
main
recent
responses
work for
Dls
intelligence
an
has
of staying informed about
situation
signals; imag
ery, human-source, open-
guided the
policymaker,
policymaking corn new thing nmy
the
to
add
to
a
survey
SEtB customers
asked,
What other
daily intelligence
not
1998-1999 were
of
sources
rio you read?
Almost one-half of the respon dents vol ii nteered that they often read
raw
government would tack. These traits rio not describe todays
that
environment.
real percentage
raw
offered
tia as
a
Ific
traffic. Given was
not
specific choice, the was
almost
Analysis
Future
certainly higher
than the write-
of
political activity
ber of countries
in responses indicated.
in any
even
num
though
the audience for this type of
Analysts today deep
surpass the
to
abilities
dig analytic
have to
of their
customers.
government leaders
and often. US officials to
allow
to commu
nicate with each other
freely
leaders. This
opposition party
makes it much easier for makers
to
be their
analyststo
broad
as
A recent
was.
policy-
of
exam
political developments. trast,
was
covered in
directly
written
questions from ers.
Only
who
consumers
economic
specialists
or to
niche substantive
tify
where the Agency
not
are
iden
areas
still pro
can
vide unique support. Scientific and
military analyses are bor defy easy
derline issues that
solutions. A number of
our
con
particularly
senior customers,
civilian
agencies,
in response to senior custom
topics
matched what
was
as
their
experts
own
cal topics.
so
techni
on
there is
more
for the
intelligence ana lyst to provide value-added. The issue for military analysis, room
is which agency
the intentions of other govern ments and decipher what
most on
policymakers mindscovered political mat
however,
developments may mean. The DI has probably always under
ters, and many of those discussed the behavior and atti
ble. This is
foreign leaders, a subcategory of political analysis that remains of high interest to senior policymakers.
DI and the Defense Intelli
estimated the
extent to
policymakers serve as their own analysts. Arguably, policymak ers
have
never
needed the DI
the
tudes of
which
to
tell them that riots undermine
governments
or
that currency
The
toward non-tradi
move
already
crises shake investor confi
tional issues is
Today, however, they no longer even need much help deconflicting signals from other
underway, evidenced by the creation of specialized Centers
governments.
ons
dence.
with terrorism, weap proliferation, and narcotics
in
important issue international relations; it has
no
been
longer
the
replaced by
a
growing list
of non-traditional issues that tend
to
many of
defy ideological
tion. In the
political analysis want to
is still
king.
follow the ins and
We
outs
field, occupied gence Agency, to the
more
crowded
not
only by
the
but, increasingly
point, by the strong
intelligence centers at the uni fied military commands. The DI is still in the process of defin
ing
comparative advantage
its
in
military analysis.
gies
with
Analysis
a
emerging realities. in
some
other
conven
provide value-added, but, like political tional
that Fits the New
Analysis
Environment
flagship products political analysis bias. We need to do a better job aligning our publishing strate
areas can
the
still
challenge
than before. Economic faces
DI, however,
now a
our
still reflect
analysis,
defini
primarily responsi
too
ical orientation of governments is
should be
to deal
and crime. Nonetheless,
Analysts today have to reach beyond political analysis, an area in which it is particu larly hard to provide value topolicymakers. The ideolog
in
cannot serve
memos
about one-third of
presumably
into
In
much wider variety of
a
those memoswhose
own
gain insights
it
as
study
articles in the SEIB, for
issues
talk
even
once
is not
ple, revealed that 70 percent dealt mostly with analysis of
Modern communication tech
nologies and evolving diplomatic practices now
analysis
serve
is
So, how does the DI, one, do an era
or
any
intelligence analysis
in
of information abun
dance, wellconnected
policymakers,
and non:tradi~
tional issues? First,
we
need
assumptions:
new
greater
analysis
daunting competition
from
the open-source world and those analysts need either to
New
Assumption
the time,
good
policymakers
sense
in their
1: Most of
have
of what is going
areas
of
a
on
concern.
25
Future
Analysis
Analysts concentrate
must on
ideas,
inteffigence.
not
Assumption 2: Policymakers frequently understand
Neu
the direct consequences of events and their immediate
New
and
Assumption 3:
particularly
lacks unique inft)rmation about
developments, especially in the political and economic spheres Raw intelligence is ubiquitous and can get to policymakers before it reaches the analysts. New
Assumption 4: Policy
makers need the greatest
help understanding nontraditional intelligence issues. There is still a market for political analysis and certainly for related leader ship analysis, hut to be successful in traditional the Dl
must
insights
areas
generate unique
Analysts
analysts, particularly those involved in political work, the focus would shift from tracking develop ments in their particular accounts to addressing the spe cific, hard questions of
optimized against
these
assumptions would understand developments, but only
current as
the
necessary
foundation for
its real contribution to
policy
Analysts would specialize in complex analysis of the most difficult problems. makers.
They would focus cymakers
hardest
on
the
poli
questions.
Their
goals would include iden tifving new opportunities for
policymaking
and
warning first
of cliscontinuities that could
spell
stronger Links between analysts and
mean
cal terms? Flow would
26
in practi
the
than a will
even more
regional Customers are actually experts. at letting us know pretty good what issues keep them up at night; we have to stop dismiss need
ing these questions as either too hard or not intelligence-related. To free
analysts
work, dcemphasize products that largely describe what has just happened. This will need
will he hard customers
do this
because there
sho
ucts, which
to
to
want
are
such
are
prod
seen as
convenient, free goods. But if
relatively painless experi
our
last year with the
ence
elimination of the Economic
custon~ers.
Intelligence Weekly, a decadesold publication that reviewed economic developments, is any
ideas,
must concentrate on
intelligence.
not
Because the Dl has
oly
over
no monop the dissemination oF
intelligence reporting, synthesiz ing it for others is a poor investment of its time and tal
This
particularly applies to political and economic analy sis; policymakers do in fact often need help deciphering ent.
technical reports as
proliferation
on
such issues
and informa
(ion warfare. In many
substantive serve
fields, the
the
Dl
can
policymaker by
the hard questions and to develop more reliable trying
ways of
identifying
guide, policymaker demand for such products is shallow at best.
Analysts must think beyond finished intelligence. Analysts are
schooled in the
and
need
to
pro
ci u cc valida ted, finished mean intelligencefinished has it that been carefully ing considered, officially reviewed, coordinated with colleagues,
and sent cover
tackling What does this
to unconven
ideas, perhaps
cies to create
best
danger.
tional
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policymakers. An analyst, for example, would often start her day by reviewing feedback and tasking from customers, instead of first reading the morning traf fic. We need to use technology and a network of highcaliber representatives at policy agen
Analysts A Dl
must focus on the
customer. For many
well
relatively understood problems. into
well,
keen critical
need
thinkers open
The CIA
the DIoften
issues.
the Dl will
practice of intelligence analysis change?
significance.
understanding emerging To rio this kind of work
such
out
under official
The main
products
problem
often
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keep
officers who deal with
is that
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frequently
customersincluding
Future
those who carry the Pies/dents Dc/li Brie/to the most senior
The Old
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policyniakers.
of
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ques
tions, infornial trip reports, and memoranda of conversation.
intelligence analysts
Too many
and managers remain fixated
formal
products
makers
even
of the real scoop
most
events is
now
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exchanged and telephone in
calls. Our adherence
to
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ing little in the way of finished intelligence, and they are lot of time
a
individual tasks that
recognized
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adapters
other collaborative venues.1
Their focus must look to
Analysts Centers
the
long enough on a DI career ser vice panel, you will still hear some
say
managers
analysts
or
on
new
as
early
model.
customer
speaks
to
the future.
at
tran
something right.
the
of
like
old
analysis intelligence professional. We pnde our selves on carefully basing our judgments on fact, on our expertise, on our ability to warn, and on our neutrality. Sonic might argue that these are clearly the analytic qualities that
qualities
familiar
are
to
any
persist under any sce nario, regardless of whether must
our
Now for
needs
we
of
customers.
Something Completely
Heretical
the Crime and
the box
rewritten. The
look
have addressed the
that certain
in the Counterterror
ism Center
very
requirements. collaborative work, and less formal products
models. If you sit
as
meet
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The
doing
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and
rooms
doing produc
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the DI mainstream, the Centers
intelligence practices
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increasingly outdated concept of finished intelligence is what informal
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US
Century Analysis
21si
work. As
own
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policy-
as
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move
them in their
tour at
on
Analysis
Analysis
Perhaps not. To really hell) pol icymakers, we may
sm;lrt The need ished
five
10
escape the
intelligence
\cars
ago
by carol
currently leading he
rtnersltip.
Fri lures I a
sively sis an
In
on
new
mode
Dumaine.
would
produce
of
line,
10
Dl officer
a
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exte a
inrellige nec in
a
ann
submission
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unfinished
interact c,
mu
I,
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i
consumers
policymakers
continue to
to
officer
Ii di
need
raise the standards for intelli
analysis. we may need change more than just our
ly
mielligenceall
tieral ne.
As
gence
nierd isciplina ry fabric of spe corn ribut ions a ad a-a il able 2-i hours a
inc as ion a
day
than
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inhouse
ci al Li
a
who has written
1996. for example,
on
more
Dirccioraies Global
she noted thai the future
it
oi fin
consira tots
highlighted
was
assumptions
and
to
to
adopt
new
habits of
new
ways of
our
practices,
new
thinking,
and
communicating
analysis.
work habits.
The fundamental characteristics of
intelligence- an~~l~~sis, fully developed during
care
the last
To tell
thing
know,
half of the twentieth century,
to
may in fact need
go
to
he
a
policyniaker
he does we
not
have
take risks in to
print
to
some
already he prepared
our
thinking,
to
with new,
27
Future
Analysis
Neutrality cannot be justify analytic celibacy and
used to adventurous
analytic
lines
before anyone else. This is
disengagement
not
do nor
jump
to
best, an analyst will occasion ally lean forward, when in fact she
steps ahead of the on
policymaker
his difficult to generate
ideas when you have
close
new
stay the facts. New ideas are
to
to
often intuitive, based
on
one
stray bits of information that coalesce into new insight. or two
Analysts not only
are
to
ties for
no
handbooks
have
to
develop their
also have
agerswill
The
most
controversial
tral in favor of
tailoring
greater
to customer needs.
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already
that
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customer
our
years is
recent
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customer
on
nity, the less neutral
trend
come, in
analysis. Unfortunately, are smart
easily
this for themselves. The
lysts
do
ana
real value
increasingly will lie in Identifying discontinul ties that shatter precedents and trends.
Analysts are tifying what work in ever, more
what in the
teach
28
a
often is not
good at iden likely to
given situation; how
policymakers interested in can
usually figuring out are
work. While
courses
Intelligence Community analysts how
to
warn,
more we care,
should, the
select
that
we
an
policymaking the
sense
in
as we
have
impact
commu we
that
on cus
analyze
are
most
rele
policymakers. Analysts understandably are confused by this new direction. They were taught, they say, to produce intelligence analysis that focuses on events and developments, not customers. It is not their job vant to
to
worry about whether
it has
integrity must
that
he
in
our
willing
anal to
or not
or
the State
Department and that are not compatible with the goals of policymakers. But we should not pretend that integrity and neutrality are the same thing or that they are dependent on each other. Neutrality implies customer
and
mystical ability to parse the truth completely free from bias or prejudice. Integ rity, on the other hand, rests on professional standards and the willingness to provide the most complete answer to a cus tomers not
the
question,
even
he
answer
if it is
wants to
hear.
used
to
and
Neutrality cannot be justify analytic celibacy
disengagement tomer. If
impact.
from the
forced
to
cus
choose
between analytic detachment This is the
most
significant
siy
uncomfortable
are
some near
topics based
those aspects that
course,
distance from the
be we
tomer interests and we
our
irrelevance. We need, of
for the Pentagon
and
neutrality are compatible; hut truth they are not completely.
and then project ing them onto the future. This is recent events
who
our
focus
Being completely neutral and independent in the future, how ever, may only gain us
things
assert
that
foreign policy observers often compensated for lack of infor mation with ideologically based assertions. Intelligence analysts correctly tried not to do thatthey were reliably objective
yslswe
their
The
most arecan
noted
man
to trust it.
values bred
century
analysts will need to become less independent and neu
Analysts today spend consider able time identifying patterns in
policymakers
conten
detachment from policymak ing. The usual answer is to
in the 21~ century will
intuition, theyand
and
on
identify new opportuni poiicyniakers.
tion may be that 21
basis.
regular
a
there how
strive to he several
must
are
of the Cold War, when
conclusions,
consider all sources, coordinate with colleagues At your jews
significant ideologi Analytic detachment
in
and neutrality
he conservative:
to
lacking
cal conflict.
the customer.
always our current style. Almost everything an analyst learns teaches her
from
and
difficult consequence of work ing in an information-rich era
and
impact
on
policymaking,
the 21s1 century analyst choose the latter.
must